IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-41254
HEIRS OF H P GUERRA, DECEASED,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Et. Al.,
Defendants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
March 28, 2000
Before POLITZ, JOHN R. GIBSON,* and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
This is a saga from the border, worthy of the creativity of
Cormac McCarthy. Its roots are earlier, but for our purposes, its
genesis is the 1949 condemnation of mineral rights taken as part of
the construction of the Falcon dam and reservoir along the U.S.-
Mexican border. The government condemned approximately 3,000 acres
of Horace Guerra’s land and the accompanying mineral rights and
compensated him pursuant to a final judgment. Guerra and later his
heirs repeatedly requested revestment of the mineral rights. The
government refused and by the mid-1980s had begun leasing the
rights to third parties. In 1995, with a large fortune now at
*
Circuit Judge of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
stake, the heirs brought this suit under the Quiet Title Act and
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), alleging an invalid taking and a violation of
equal protection. The district court granted summary judgment to
the Guerras. Today we REVERSE and grant summary judgment to the
United States, holding that the heirs’ claims cannot be brought
under the Quiet Title Act and do not justify relief from the
condemnation judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
I
The condemnation was part of the Falcon dam and reservoir
project built between Laredo and Roma, Texas. Congress authorized
the condemnation in 1936 for the construction of dams and
reservoirs on the U.S.-Mexican border with the lofty ambition of
evening the episodic flow of the Rio Grande River. The Falcon
project’s dam and reservoir would cover an area of land cutting
across Starr and Zapata Counties. Horace Guerra’s land was located
in Starr County and included the site of the planned dam.
In January 1949, the government filed declarations of taking
to condemn Guerra’s and the other Starr County owners’ property.
As only the surface and perhaps some constraints upon the
exploitation of minerals seemed necessary to the project, Guerra
and several other Starr County landowners wrote to the government
asking to have their mineral interests excluded from the
condemnation. The government responded that it would further
consider the issue of revestment. What consideration the
government gave we do not know. We do know that Guerra was not
offered revestment.
2
In December 1949, the government condemned the land of the
Zapata County landowners. It developed a plan for Zapata County
whereby those landowners whose land met specific hydrogeologic
conditions could retain title to their mineral interests or have
them revested subject to a perpetual non-drilling easement. Zapata
County landowners received written notice of the policy.
In December 1951, a jury awarded Guerra over $79,300 for the
taking of his surface and mineral interests, substantially more
than the government had offered. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
award in 1953 after the government appealed. The Guerras contend
that Horace Guerra was unaware of the Zapata County policy until
after the judgment had become final. He continued to petition for
the return of the mineral interests, however, and in 1955, the
government agreed to return the mineral interest regarding 677
acres of the land acquired from Guerra. After Guerra died, his
heirs (the “Guerras”) continued to request revestment of mineral
rights throughout the 1950's and in 1960, 1980 and 1981. In 1981,
the government told them again that it would not allow mineral
exploration in the vicinity of the Falcon Dam and would not revest
those rights.
Meanwhile, the government undertook various activities
regarding the Guerras’ condemned land. In 1954, it leased a 472-
acre tract of the land to the State of Texas to use as a park,
retaining the mineral interests. Sometime after 1959, the
government began granting oil and gas leases on the land. It
issued two leases in the early 1980's. In 1983, the government
3
entered lease negotiations with Huffco Petroleum Company for
portions of the Guerra land that had not been previously leased.
The government granted this lease in 1986 based on Huffco’s
evidence that it could safely explore the area with new technology.
Huffco recorded the lease in 1991. The Guerras noticed drilling
activities in 1992.
In 1995, Guerra’s heirs filed suit under the Quiet Title Act
(the “QTA”), Rule 60(b), and an independent action theory. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, a magistrate judge recommended
revestment of title in the mineral interests to the heirs and an
award of restitution totaling $71.6 million. The district court
adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge. The government
appealed under a variety of theories: that the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear any claim; that it had no jurisdiction under
the QTA; that the statute of limitations had run under the QTA;
that res judicata bars the suit; that the heirs failed to satisfy
the requirements of 60(b); and that the remedies of revestment and
restitution are unavailable under either the QTA or 60(b).
II
The Guerras’ claim to the mineral interests rests on two
distinct legal assertions: that the initial taking of Horace
Guerra’s land was invalid, and that the government’s refusal to
revest the mineral rights since then amounts to a violation of
equal protection. Their challenge to the validity of the taking
faces significant hurdles given the final condemnation judgment and
the passage of almost 50 years.
4
First, we cannot accept in full the government’s argument that
title cannot be disputed after the initial declaration of taking.
We are persuaded rather that a declaration of taking creates only
defeasible title, which the landowner is entitled to challenge.2
Once a judgment has been entered in a condemnation proceeding,
however, it enjoys the finality of a civil judgment.
The Quiet Title Act permits suit in cases in which the title
to property is “disputed.”3 The district court allowed the heirs
to pursue their claims under the QTA. We find no authority for
the proposition that the QTA offers an escape from the constraints
of res judicata. The two courts that have allowed QTA suits as a
challenge to the validity of prior condemnation proceedings did so
where the plaintiffs had received no notice of the proceeding and
thus could not have participated in it.4 In those cases, res
judicata would not have precluded the claim; the plaintiffs needed
only an avenue to get into court. Here, Horace Guerra participated
fully in the condemnation proceedings. Even assuming that a QTA
suit might be a proper vehicle for a challenge to a condemnation
judgment under some circumstances,5 it does not act to circumvent
res judicata.
2
See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 241 (1945).
3
28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1999).
4
See Fulcher v. United States, 632 F.2d 278, 285 (4th Cir.
1980) (en banc); United States v. Herring, 750 F.2d 669, 673 (8th
Cir. 1984).
5
The First Circuit has held that Quiet Title Act suit cannot
proceed after a condemnation judgment. See Cadorette v. United
States, 988 F.2d 215, 225-26 (1st Cir. 1993) (Breyer, C.J.).
5
Alternatively, the Guerras seek to employ Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to directly attack the
condemnation judgment.6 The provision of Rule 60 potentially
available to the Guerras is 60(b)(6), which allows a court to
vacate a judgment when it is appropriate to accomplish justice.7
A court may grant relief under 60(b)(6) only under extraordinary
circumstances.8
The Guerras argue that evidence discovered after the final
judgment -- the Zapata County revestment policy and the
government’s leases to third parties -- reveal that the original
taking was invalid. A condemnation is valid if, at the time of the
taking, the government’s exercise of eminent domain served a valid
statutory purpose.9 Courts have limited power to review an
6
See FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b) (1999).
7
The first three provisions of Rule 60(b) are time-barred
after one year. Rule 60(b)(4) allows relief only if the initial
court had no jurisdiction over the proceedings or if the
proceedings violated due process. The Guerras do not allege any
jurisdictional defect or procedural failure regarding the
condemnation suit itself. Relief under Rule 60(b)(5) is also
unavailable here: that rule allows only relief from a judgment that
has prospective effect. See In re Moody, 849 F.2d 902, 906 (5th
Cir. 1988).
8
See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1949);
American Totalisator Co., Inc. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 3 F.3d 810,
815 (5th Cir. 1993). The independent action theory, under which
the Guerras also seek relief, presents a similarly high hurdle: it
requires a case of gross injustice sufficient to demand a departure
from res judicata. See United States v. Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. 1862,
1866-67 (1998).
9
Catlin, 324 U.S. at 241.
6
agency’s determination of public purpose.10 A court may invalidate
a taking only if the officials acted in bad faith or so
capriciously and arbitrarily that the action was without an
adequate determining principle.11 In examining whether the taking
was arbitrary and capricious, we look at the agency’s authorization
to condemn the land. The enabling legislation for the Falcon
project authorized the agency to take any “real or personal
property which may be necessary.”12 The statute did not define
“necessary.”
We fail to see how the government’s policy for Zapata County
landowners made the taking of the Starr County mineral interests
arbitrary and capricious. When it undertook the first stage of
condemnations, the government’s initial policy was to condemn the
mineral rights in order to secure the safety of the dam and
reservoir. That a year later, the government felt secure in
initiating a new policy for the next stage of condemnations does
not render the taking of Guerra’s interest without an adequate
determining principle. The policies developed over time and at
separate stages of condemnations for the project.
Nor can we infer from the government’s leasing of the rights
that it had originally condemned the land in bad faith. Equally,
the government’s abandonment of the non-use policy in the early
10
See United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 1286,
1289 (5th Cir. 1970).
11
See United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 (1947).
12
See 22 U.S.C. 277c(b) (1936).
7
1980's does not invalidate the taking. The government may change
its use of the property without affecting the validity of the
original condemnation.13 The events subsequent to the taking of the
Guerras’ land, including the government’s changed policy regarding
revestment and its altered uses of the land, do little to suggest
the invalidity of the original condemnation. We find no
extraordinary circumstance that would justify re-opening the
judgment.
The Guerras also contend that the refusal to revest the
mineral rights denies them equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment. It is uncertain whether the government even classified
Starr County landowners differently from Zapata County landowners
by undertaking the condemnations at separate times and using
different policies. Even assuming that the government’s actions
did classify the two groups differently, the classification
involves no suspect class and thus need only bear a rational
relation to a legitimate governmental purpose.14 The government
condemned land in the two counties at different times, and it was
not irrational to refuse to make the Zapata County policy
retroactively available to the Starr County landowners.
The Guerras fared more poorly than did their Zapata County
neighbors in the Falcon Dam saga, and the government’s steadfast
refusal to revest their mineral rights, coupled with its current
13
See Higginson v. United States, 384 F.2d 504, 507 (6th Cir.
1967).
14
Richard v. Hinson, 70 F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1995).
8
profits in leasing those rights, makes the government’s policies
seem inequitable. But much government action that is less than
ideal falls short of a constitutional injury. The Guerras were
paid for the minerals in an amount fairly determined in litigation.
The government became the record owner. The later development of
the mineral interests and their greatly enhanced value reflect the
good fortune of the owner of the minerals. That the minerals were
acquired in condemnation does not make that circumstance unfair or
illegal. Ultimately, the Guerras’ allegations of an invalid taking
or an equal protection violation cannot overcome the deference
courts owe governmental bodies to accomplish legislative ends. The
acts of which the Guerras complain are thus not ours to remedy.
REVERSED.
9
Heirs Of H P Guerra v. United States
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 2000-03-28
Citations: 207 F.3d 763
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