Filed 6/27/13 Herrera v. 99¢ Only Stores CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SHANNON HERRERA, D059877
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2008-00095210-
CU-PO-CTL)
99¢ ONLY STORES,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Luis R. Vargas, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Diego Sup. Ct.) Reversed.
Gregory S. Cilli for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Morris Polich & Purdy, Jens B. Koepke, Scott M. Koppel and Danilo D.
Endoso for Defendant and Respondent.
In this slip and fall case, the defendant, 99¢ Only Stores (the Store), moved for
summary judgment. The trial court granted the Store's motion and entered judgment
in favor of the Store. Shannon Herrera appealed. As we shall explain, we conclude
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 1, 2006, Herrera and her husband entered the Store to shop.
Approximately 10 minutes after entering the Store, Herrera walked into an aisle and
slipped and landed on her back.
While lying on the floor, Herrera noticed a six-foot-wide puddle of clear sticky
liquid. To her left, she could also see a clear liquid dripping down the shelves to the
floor. Herrera's husband noticed a case of lemon-lime soda on a high shelf that looked
"crunched" with its bottom soaked and a liquid dripping from that shelf.
About twenty minutes after the fall, paramedics arrived and took Herrera to the
hospital. She suffered a fractured tailbone, a herniated disk and a pinched sciatic nerve
in her right leg.
Herrera's operative complaint alleged three causes of action for general
negligence, products liability, and premises liability. The Store generally denied
Herrera's allegations. Later, it moved for summary judgment.
In response to the general negligence and premises liability causes of action, the
Store alleged it did not have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition.
For the products liability cause of action, it alleged Herrera could not establish a
defective soda can caused her accident. The court granted the motion and entered
judgment in the Store's favor. Herrera timely appealed.
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On appeal, Herrera does not claim the trial court erred in finding against her on
her products liability and premises liability causes of action. She, however, contends
the trial court erred in finding that the reasonable and permissible inferences from the
evidence demonstrated no triable issue of fact on her general negligence cause of
action. We requested further briefing on whether the Store had met its initial burden to
show that either one or more elements of the general negligence cause of action could
not be established. Both parties provided a response.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
A summary judgment motion on appeal "raises only questions of law regarding
the construction and effect of the supporting and opposing papers"; therefore, we
review the record de novo. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank
(1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064.) In doing so, we apply the same three-step
analysis the trial court performs. (Clark v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (2000) 83
Cal.App.4th 1048, 1054.) We first identify the issues framed by the pleadings because
it is those issues the papers must address. (Ibid.) Second, we determine if the moving
party's evidence demonstrates the opponent cannot establish its claim and justifies a
judgment in the moving party's favor. (Ibid.) Lastly, we determine whether the
opposing party's evidence demonstrates a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.) When
analyzing the parties' evidence, we strictly construe the moving party's evidence and
liberally construe the opposing party's evidence. (Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 100.)
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The moving party bears an initial burden of production to show the
nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) To meet this burden, the moving party's evidence must
show that "one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded,
cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) (All further statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.) This burden includes addressing
all liability theories contained in a plaintiff's pleadings. (Lopez v. Superior Court
(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 705, 717.)
If the moving party does not meet its initial burden of production, the
nonmoving party does not have to produce any evidence, and the court must deny the
summary judgment motion. (See § 437c, subd. (p)(1); Consumer Cause, Inc. v.
SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 469.) "A summary judgment may not be
granted when the moving party has failed to 'refute [a] tenable pleaded theor[y].'
[Citation.]" (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 161–162 [quoting
Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 942].)
Our Supreme Court set the standard for slip and fall cases: store owners must
have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1206 (Ortega).) However, when the store owner or its
employees create the hazardous condition, notice is imputed to the store owner.
(Hatfield v. Levy Brothers (1941) 18 Cal.2d 798, 806.)
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II. Analysis
In her general negligence cause of action, Herrera alleged four liability theories.
Two liability theories concerned notice to the Store of the hazardous condition.
Specifically, Herrera alleged the Store failed to warn her of the hazardous condition
and that it failed to clean up the liquid on the floor.
Herrera's other two general negligence theories concerned actions taken by the
Store or its employees. She alleged the Store improperly stocked the soda on the shelf
which caused soda to leak onto the floor. She also alleged the Store failed to inspect
the cans when it stocked the cans on the shelf. Herrera, in other words, alleged the
Store or its employees created the hazardous condition.
We agree the Store met its initial burden with respect to Herrera's failure to
warn and failure to clean up the liquid theories of liability. These general negligence
theories are no different than a premises liability cause of action where a store owner
must have actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition before a breach of
duty can be found. (See Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) The hourly inspection
report, the declaration of the Store's assistant managers, and Herrera's deposition
satisfied the Store's production burden on these theories and shifted the burden to
Herrera to show a triable issue of material fact. Herrera failed to provide any evidence
to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact on these two theories.
This same evidence, however, is not sufficient to shift the burden to Herrera on
her remaining two general negligence theories. When a store owner or its employees
create the hazardous condition, notice is imputed to the store owner. (Hatfield v. Levy
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Brothers, supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 806.) In order for the Store to shift the burden to
Herrera, it had to produce evidence, such as declarations, affidavits, or other records,
to show Herrera could not establish one or more elements of her remaining negligence
theories. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853–855.) The
Store's evidence only addressed actual or constructive notice, not its precautionary
actions taken while stocking soda on the morning of the accident. Because the Store
failed to provide any evidence which showed Herrera could not establish her
remaining negligence theories, the burden did not shift to Herrera to produce any
evidence. (See § 437c, subd. (p)(1); Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare, supra,
91 Cal.App.4th at p. 469.) Therefore, any evidence she did submit is immaterial to the
ultimate decision.
In its supplemental brief, the Store argued it had shifted the burden to Herrera
because it had provided evidence to negate the actual or constructive notice
requirement in premises liability claims, and Herrera could not use her complaint "to
fill th[at] evidentiary void." Relying on Moore v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 472 (Moore) and Lively v. Wild Oats Markets (C.D.Cal., Nov. 3, 2006,
No. CV 04-117-RGK) [2006 WL 5085248] (Lively), it further argued that alleging
"how a store owner operated its store was negligent does not obviate the need to show
some actual or constructive notice."
The Store's reliance on Moore and Lively is misplaced. Moore concerned
actions by customers, which caused a hazardous condition. (Moore, supra,
111 Cal.App.4th at p. 478 [customers allowed to take food into store].) Moore is
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distinguishable. Here, Herrera alleged the Store created the hazardous condition not
its customers.
Lively concerned actions by employees, which caused a hazardous condition.
(Lively, supra, 2006 WL 5085248 at p. *1 [employees placed floral arrangement,
which leaked water, on floor where customers would walk by it].) The store in Lively,
though, took precautionary measures to counter the higher risk that its employees'
actions might cause a hazardous condition. (Id. at p. *2 [store placed slip-resistant mat
in front of display].) Here, assuming the Store created the hazardous condition as
alleged by Herrera, it failed to present evidence that it increased precautions in
response to the risk it created. (Moore, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 479 ["If the store
owner's practices create a higher risk that dangerous conditions will exist, ordinary
care will require a corresponding increase in precautions."]; see also Ortega, supra,
26 Cal.4th at p. 1205 ["the care required is commensurate with the risks involved"].)
The Store admitted its employees stocked soda on the morning of Herrera's
accident. A reasonable inference from this evidence, coupled with the fact of the
liquid on the floor, is that an employee mishandled the case while stocking it, thus
causing damage to soda in the case which then leaked liquid on the floor. The Store's
actual or constructive notice argument in its summary judgment motion did not obviate
its burden to show Herrera did not and could not discover evidence to prove her
negligence theory. For example, the Store could have provided evidence showing
increased inspections after it stocked its shelves or how it trained its employees to
minimize damage to inventory when it stocked its shelves.
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The Store's evidence, strictly construed, did not address two of Herrera's
negligence theories. Because the Store failed to meet its initial burden of proof, the
court erred when it granted the Store's summary judgment motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Herrera is to recover her costs on appeal.
MCINTYRE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O'ROURKE, J.
AARON, J.
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