William Hall was appointed sheriff of Franklin county, and, together with his sureties, William Trigg and Christopher Greenup, executed bond, conditioned as the law directs, for a faithful discharge of his duties as sheriff.
Whilst Hall was acting as sheriff, there were placed in his hands for collection, by the commandant of the twenty-second regiment of the Kentucky militia, fines to the amount of two hundred and seventy five dollars, for which Hall gave a receipt to the commandant.
Neither of the defendants answered, and on a final hearing, the court decreed the paymaster to pay the
Assuming the facts to be as they are charged by the complainants in their bill, it cannot be denied, but that in equity and good conscience, Trigg ought to be repaid the amount of the money, which, under the judgment against him aiid Greenup, he was compelled to pay. It is true, the judgment was rendered hv a court of competent jurisdiction; but it is alleged to have been rendered upon a demand which had been previously paid, and paid too in a way, which, from the nature of the transaction, Trigg cannot be presumed to have had any knowledge, and as he alleges he was totally ignorant of when the judgment was rendered against him, and the money again paid by him.
Unless, therefore, there be something in the peculiar circumstances of this case, which distinguishes it irom the ordinary case of a complainant seeking the aid of a court of equity, to obtain remuneration for money paid under the judgment of a court, which is afterwards discovered by him to have been previously paid by another, Trigg, upon the hypothesis of the facts alleged in the bill being true, is indisputably entitled to relief.
The circumstances are not, however, perceived, which, in the opinion of the court, forbid relief in this case. We know that the money paid by Trigg, is alleged in the bill to have been paid over to the regiment; but that circumstance assuredly cannot absolve the regiment from liability. After paying over the money which he received from Trigg, to the creditors of the regiment, the paymaster, no doubt, would not, in his personal right, be liable to the demand of Trigg, unless before the money was paid over by him, he knew of Trigg’s equity; hutas the money was applied by the paymaster to the satisfaction of debts owing by there»
We admit that the law has furnished no remedy in favor of anv person against a regiment, in its character of regiment; hut the law does, in language not to be misunderstood, recognize the regiment as a debtor, and lias given to the creditors of the regiment, the right of suit against the paymaster, through whose hands all the funds of the regiment are directed to pass.
Thus, in the thirty-second section of the militia law, (2 Dig. L. K. 399,) it is provided that “the regimental paymaster, before he acts as such, shall enter into bond witb sufficient security, in the county court, to the commonwealth of Kentucky, in the sum of one thousand dollars, conditioned, &c ; which bond shall not be void on the first recovery.” And in the thirty-fourth section, it is provided, that “the paymaster shall, in settling claims, pay respects to seniority, and that a younger claim shall not lie settled until those of an elder date are paid off;” and the forty-fifth section gives to those whose demands are not paid by the paymaster, remedy by motion, &c. The nineteenth section of an amendatory act, (2 Dig. L. K. 927) provides, that “it shall be the duty of the paymaster or paymasters of the regiment or regiments from which a new regiment may have been or shall hereafter be formed, to liquidate, in presence of the paymaster of saiil new regiment, the accounts of the same, taking into account all debts due or to become due, in favor of, as well as those against said regiment or regiments, at the time of formation, having regard to colours, drums and files, in the possesion of either, and if it shall appear that there is a balance in favor of the new regiment, it shall lie paid over to the paymaster of the new regiment, in proportion to the number taken from the old regiment; but if it shall appear that the old regiment has a debt against it, then, and in that case, the new regimental paymaster shall assume a proportionable part of said debt, and pay the same under the rules and regulations now prescribed by law respecting seniority of claims.”
It is true, that in another section of the law, it is made the duty of the commandant of a regiment, to draw orders on the paymaster in favor of such as may hav«
Tims considered, Trigg must be a creditor of the regiment, prior to those whose debts are still subsisting and unpaid, and must, of course, be entitled to a preference over them in a court of equity.
Hence, we conclude, that assuming the facts alleged in the bill to be true, Trigg is entitled to he compensated for the money advanced by him, out of the funds of the regiment, and that it was proper for him to apply to a court of equity for that purpose.
We are also of opinion, that it was proper, under the act of this'eountry subjecting dioses in action to the payment of debts, for the complaiuauts to make those persons who are alleged to have money of the regiment in their haiTds, parties; but as the process appears not to have been served upon two of them, it was premature to hear the cause and pronounce a decree in favor of the complainants.
The decree must, therefore, be reversed with costs, and in the opinion of a majority of the court, (Judge Mills dissenting,) the- cause must be remanded to the