A careful examination of this case discloses very little of merit in the appeal, and no reason why this court should reverse the judg
“ It is not necessary to decide whether the conveyances made byPage 592the defendant were made before or after the fact of the revocation of the power became known to him. He made use of his power to convey to himself, without consideration, the property of his ¡Drincipal, and now claims it as his own, denying his duty to account to her for its value. The exercise of the power was a fraud upon the rights of the plaintiff. The conveyances by which the defendant claims title to the premises belonging to the plaintiff are fraudulent, null and void, and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment setting them aside with the costs of this action.”
The defendant having signally failed to establish the contention introduced in his amended answer, that the conveyances to the plaintiff, though absolute in form, were really intended as mortgages to secure the plaintiff against loss in becoming surety for the defendant, there is no other conclusion to which the trial court could arrive, without doing violence to a rule as old as the principles of equity itself. In the case of Davoue v. Fanning (2 Johns. Ch. *252), Chancellor Kent fully developed the principle that a trustee could not purchase property of his cestui que trust for his own benefit, citing authorities reaching back to the early days of the eighteenth century. In the carefully considered case of Hawley v. Cramer (4 Cow. 717), cited with approval by Chancellor Walworth in the case of Van Epps v. Van Epps (9 Paige, 237), we are told that “ By the Koman law, guardians were' prohibited from purchasing the property of their wards, agents and attorneys, the property entrusted, to their care or management; and generally, all persons, having a trust or charge, were disabled from purchasing the property which was the object of such trust. And the disability was extended to their children, and other persons under their control.” The same authority tells us that “in the case of the petition of Frances James, in bankruptcy (8 Ves. 352), Lord Eldon set aside a purchase made by a solicitor, who had been employed by the assignees in the business of the estate, although the sale was perfectly fair, and the purchase sanctioned by most of the persons interested in the estate ; the amount bid being, at the time of sale, considered the full value of the premises. He observes, ‘ this doctrine, as to purchases by trustees, assignees, and persons having a confidential character, stands much more upon general principle than upon the circnmstances of any individual case. It rests upon this, that the purchase
“ In all such cases,” say the court in the case of Hawley v. Cramer (supra), “ the rule appears now to be fully settled that the purchase, however fair and honest it may have been, must be set aside on the application of any of the parties in interest; provided, such application be made within a reasonable time after the sale, which is to be judged of by the court, under all the circumstances of the case. And the fact that the purchase was made by the trustee through the intervention of a third person, or that the trustee purchased as agent for another, makes no difference in the legal effect of the transaction, or in the application of the general rule. A person who is incapacitated from purchasing on his oivn account cannot, in any case, or under any circumstances, buy as the agent of a third person.”
“ The rule of equity which prohibits purchases by parties placed in a situation of trust or confidence with reference to the subject of purchase,” say the court in the case of Van Epps v. Van Epps (9 Paige, 241), “is not, as the defendant supposes, confined to trustees or others who hold the legal title to the property to be sold ; nor is it confined to a particular class of persons, such as guardians, trustees or solicitors. But it is a rule which applies universally to all who come within its principle ; which principle is that no party can be permitted to purchase an interest in projierty and hold it for his own benefit, where he has a duty to perform in relation to such property which is inconsistent "with the character of a purchaser on his own account and for his individual use.”
In the case at bar the pretended sale was made to the son of the defendant, who was familiar with all the facts in the case, and who was charged with knowing the relations existing between the defendant and the plaintiff in this action; and purchasing with notice of the fact that the sale was made for the purpose of divesting his sister of the title to property which rightfully belonged to her, he could get no better title than the defendant, acting as attorney in fact, could have given to himself. The subsequent transfer from
In the recent case of Williams v. Paine (169 U. S. 55), where the question arose as to the validity of a transfer of real estate under a joint power of attorney executed by husband and wife, the court say: “ And, lastly, that the contract of sale was within the scope of
It is true, of course, that the plaintiff came into possession of this property through a gift or advancement from the defendant, and if he were in need or distress she would owe him great obligations; but it is conceded that the defendant, an old man, has retained for his own use and benefit something like $50,000, and the entire proceeding seems to have been undertaken for no other purpose than to deprive this plaintiff of her share of the property advanced by the father, for the benefit of the son, who has been intimately identified with the various transactions, and appears to have the defendant largely under his control. We are entirely clear, then, not only that the trial court has acted within the rules of equity and law, but that substantial justice will be done by affirming the judgment.
All concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.