United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 95-8215.
In re Linda Sue HOLLOWAY & Eldridge Hampton Holloway, Jr.,
Debtors.
Linda Sue Holloway, Eldridge Hampton Holloway, Jr., Plaintiffs-
Appellants,
v.
JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee,
Robert E. Brizendine, Trustee.
April 25, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (1:94-CV-1220-ODE), Orinda D. Evans, Judge.
(Bkcy. No. 91-82491-HR), Hugh Robinson, Jr., Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, and RONEY and CAMPBELL*, Senior
Circuit Judges.
LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge:
Debtors-appellants Eldridge and Linda Holloway appeal from a
judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia affirming a decision of the Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Georgia.
I.
In October of 1991, appellee John Hancock Mutual Insurance
Company obtained a judgment against Eldridge Holloway in the State
Court of Cobb County. The judgment became a lien on the Holloways'
residence, located in Georgia, in the amount of $26,792.97. The
Holloways filed a joint petition for bankruptcy in December of
1991.
*
Honorable Levin H. Campbell, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the First Circuit, sitting by designation.
In the bankruptcy proceeding, the Holloways sought to avoid
John Hancock's judgment lien on their real property. Unless a lien
is avoidable and the debtor has taken timely steps to avoid it, the
lien survives the discharge in bankruptcy.1 Title 11 U.S.C. §
522(f) allows debtors to avoid the fixing of certain liens if the
liens impair exemptions. An exemption is an interest of the debtor
carved out of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the debtor
and thereby shielded from creditors' claims. Section 522(f)
provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid
the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property
to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the
debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section, if such lien is—
(1) a judicial lien.
2
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1993). The referenced subsection (b)
exemptions include the federal bankruptcy exemptions enumerated in
11 U.S.C. § 522(d). Alternatively, however, § 522(b) allows states
to opt out of these federal exemptions listed in § 522(d). States
may write their own exemptions, in which case the only exemptions
available to the debtor become those legislated by the opt-out
state. Georgia has opted out of the § 522(d) exemptions and,
pursuant to the invitation extended to the states in § 522(b), its
1
A discharge in bankruptcy "voids any judgment ... to the
extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal
liability of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (emphasis
added). However discharges in bankruptcy do not affect liability
in rem. Thus, liens on property remain enforceable after
discharge unless avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code.
2
Section 522(f) was amended in 1994 by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, Pub.L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4112, 4132, 4133, 4137, 4145
(Oct. 22, 1994), but the pre-1994 language, as cited in the text
above, governs this dispute. See infra note 10.
legislature has enacted a list of exemptions available to Georgia
domiciled debtors. See O.C.G.A. §§ 44-13-100(a) and (b). Georgia
law allows a debtor to exempt from the bankruptcy estate his
aggregate interest, not exceeding $5000 in value, in real or
personal property used as a residence, and his aggregate interest,
not exceeding $400 plus the unused amount of the homestead
exemption, in other property.3
In order to exempt property under §§ 522(b) and (f), the
debtor must file, in the bankruptcy proceeding, a list of the
property that the debtor claims as exempt. 11 U.S.C. § 522( l ).
On January 22, 1992, the Holloways filed with the bankruptcy court
an exemption schedule which provided, in part:
Property Exemption Provision Value of Exemption
1984 Honda § 44-13-100(a)(1), (3), and (6) $3000.00
Checking Account § 44-13-100(a)(1) and (6) $1758.46
3
The Georgia exemptions provide in relevant part:
(a) In lieu of the exemption provided in Code Section
44-13-1, any debtor who is a natural person may exempt,
pursuant to this article, for purposes of bankruptcy,
the following property:
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed
$5,000.00 in value, in real property or personal
property that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor
uses as a residence ...;
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed
$400.00 in value plus any unused amount of the
exemption provided under paragraph (1) of this
subsection, in any property.
O.C.G.A. §§ 44-13-100(a)(1), (6).
Cash and savings § 44-13-100(a)(1) and (6) $1324.00
Residence § 44-13-100(a)(1) $ 0.00
Assets from Business § 44-13-100(a)(1) and (6)
$5217.54
—————
The Holloways thus listed their home as exempt under the Georgia
law but gave $0.00 as the value of the exemption. The exemption
for their residence was not assigned any value because, as both
parties concede, the Holloways personally retained no quantifiable
equity in their home, their ownership being subject to a first
security deed and note, a second security deed and note, and a tax
lien from the Internal Revenue Service. These security interests
exceeded, in total, the market value of the residence. The
Holloways, listing the value of their homestead exemption as $0.00,
proceeded to allocate their combined unused $10,000 homestead
exemption to their personal property—their automobile, their cash
and savings, their checking account, and their business
assets—pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(6).4
The Holloways filed a motion with the bankruptcy court to
avoid John Hancock's judgment lien on their residence pursuant to
4
Under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(3), the Holloways could each
exempt up to $1000 of their interest in a motor vehicle. The
Holloways exempted a total of $3000 of their Honda; thus, $2000
of the value of the Honda was exempted pursuant to 44-13-
100(a)(3) and $1000 of the value of the Honda must have been
exempted pursuant to § 44-13-100(a)(6). Therefore, the Holloways
claimed exemptions under §§ 44-13-100(a)(1) and (6) for personal
property of $9,300 ($1000.00 + $1758.46 + $1324.00 + $5217.54).
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1993). John Hancock filed a response
alleging that its lien in no way impaired "an exemption to which
the debtor[s] would have been entitled" because the Holloways had
no equity in their property and had listed no value in their
homestead exemption.
On January 4, 1993, the bankruptcy court issued the following
order granting the Holloways' motion for lien avoidance:
After consideration of the argument of counsel for Movants and
Respondents, this Court finds the judgment lien of Respondent
John Hancock Mutual Insurance Company ... avoidable. The
judgment lien of Respondent is therefore avoided upon the
exempted personal property of the Debtors. The real property
of the Debtors appears to have no equity over and above the
preexisting first and second security deeds and tax lien to
which the judgment of Respondent could attach; because the
judgment did not attach to any real property pre-petition,
there is no lien avoidance which must be had as to Debtors'
real property and Respondent's judgment.
Holloway v. John Hancock Mutual Ins. Co. (In re Holloway), No. A91-
82491-HR (Bankr.N.D.Ga. Dec. 31, 1992). Then on August 12, 1993,
the bankruptcy court issued another order, partially vacating its
earlier order:
[T]he Judgment lien against the exempted personal property of
the Debtors shall remain void. However, any reference in the
January 4, 1993 Order of this Court regarding the avoidance of
Respondent's Judgment against Debtors' real property or the
validity of the Judgment itself is hereby rescinded, vacated,
and set aside.
Holloway v. John Hancock Mutual Ins. Co. (In re Holloway), No. A91-
82491-HR (Bankr.N.D.Ga. Aug. 12, 1993). On March 14, 1994, the
bankruptcy court denied the Holloways' motion to alter or amend the
August 12, 1993 order. The Holloways appealed to the district
court.
The district court found that the bankruptcy court had denied
lien avoidance as a matter of federal law, but affirmed the
bankruptcy court's judgment on what the district court described as
independent state law grounds. The district court ruled that, by
listing their residence as an exemption but giving $0.00 as the
value of the exemption, the Holloways had acted in a contradictory
manner that was insufficient to plead the exemption under Georgia
law. Because § 522(f) only allows avoidance of liens that impair
"an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled," the
district court found that John Hancock's lien could not be avoided.
The Holloways now appeal from the judgment of the district court.
II.
This court reviews de novo the district court's determination
of law in a bankruptcy case. See Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162, 1164 (11th Cir.1994). In deciding
whether Georgia debtors may avoid a judicial lien pursuant to §
522(f), courts commonly determine, first, whether under Georgia
state law the debtors are entitled to the exemption they claim and,
second, whether the judicial lien would in fact impair the
exemption as a matter of federal bankruptcy law. Cravey v. L'Eggs
Prods., Inc. (In re Cravey), 100 B.R. 119, 121 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1989);
Register v. Reese (In re Register), 37 B.R. 708, 709
(Bankr.N.D.Ga.1983). Before reaching these questions, we first
address the Holloways' claim that the case should be remanded
because the bankruptcy court failed to state its findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52
The bankruptcy court's order denying avoidance of John
Hancock's judicial lien on the Holloways' residence contained no
express findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the district
court, and now on appeal, the Holloways argue that the case should
be remanded to the bankruptcy court because of its purported
disregard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52, which requires courts to state their
findings of fact specially and conclusions of law separately in
certain circumstances.5 The district court found that the
bankruptcy court's orders contained implicit factual findings
concerning the Holloways' interest in their real property, and John
Hancock's judgment lien on that real property, as well as "the
implicit legal conclusion that Debtors could not prevail under §
522(f)." Holloway v. John Hancock Mutual Ins. Co. (In re
Holloway), No. 1:94-cv-1220-ODE (N.D.Ga. Jan. 20, 1995). The
relevant characteristics of the secured interests in the
residential real estate are not in dispute. The district court
thus ruled that there was a sufficient basis for it to review the
legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court.
We agree. Even assuming for purposes of argument, although we
need not decide, that Rule 52 applies, there are sufficient
undisputed facts in the record for us to resolve the issues on
appeal, which, being legal in nature, are subject to our de novo
review. See Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In re Holtkamp), 669 F.2d
505, 510 (7th Cir.1982) ("[I]t is not error to fail to make formal
findings of fact or conclusions of law when the basis of the
bankruptcy judge's decision is clear and, thus, reviewable ... or
where there is no factual dispute.") (internal citations omitted).
5
Bankruptcy courts must follow Rule 52 when conducting
adversary proceedings. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7052.
Cf. Federal Land Bank v. Cornelison (In re Cornelison), 901 F.2d
1073, 1075 (11th Cir.1990) (remanding because the bankruptcy
court's factual findings were unclear). While our legal analysis
differs from that of the district court, it rests on a similar
factual frame which is adequate for our purposes.
B. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(1)
We turn first to the district court's ruling that the
Holloways' claim of a homestead exemption failed under state law
because of the lack of any value in their ownership interest in
their residence.
John Hancock urges this court to hold that the Holloways'
asserted homestead exemption of $0.00 was contradictory on its
face, rendering their purported claim of exemption insufficient to
plead the Georgia homestead exemption. It contends that zero
equity in a residence can give a debtor no right to the exemption
either legally or practically because exemptions apply only to a
debtor's financial equity in property. According to John Hancock,
the Holloways, lacking any residual monetary equity in their
residence, could make no valid claim to the homestead exemption to
support avoidance of John Hancock's judgment lien on the residence.
In response to John Hancock's argument, the Holloways argue
that the Georgia statute allows a debtor to exempt (up to $5000)
his "aggregate interest" in his residence, and this term is broad
enough to include the debtor's possessory and other non-monetary
rights in the residence apart from whatever financial equity, if
any, the homeowner may yet retain. See Maddox v. Southern Discount
Co. (In re Maddox), 713 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir.1983) ("The word
"interest' is a broad term encompassing many rights of a party,
tangible, intangible, legal and equitable, and the court will not
redefine the term to reach the result sought by the appellant.").
The right to claim an exemption for an unvalued possessory interest
can be critical since, once freed from the burden of debts by the
bankruptcy proceeding, the homeowner may be able to meet the
expenses of mortgages and other non-avoidable claims on the
property. In such event, the debtor's ability to have established
an exemption based on his possessory interest alone can be key to
his ability under § 522(f) to ward off judgment liens that would
otherwise prevent the "fresh start" that bankruptcy presumably
affords. (It was this argument that persuaded Congress in 1994 to
amend § 522(f) so as expressly to allow owners of fully-encumbered
property to avoid judicial liens. See supra note 2 and infra note
10.)
The district court ruled that, under Georgia law, a debtor may
not claim a valid exemption by listing a residence in which the
debtor has no equity as an exemption with a value of $0.00. This
is a close question. The Georgia Supreme Court has not passed on
it, and barring certification, we are left to determine on our own
how " "we believe a [Georgia] court would decide ...' " Wammock v.
Celotex Corp., 835 F.2d 818, 820 (11th Cir.1988) (citing Green v.
Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 952, 101 S.Ct. 356, 66 L.Ed.2d 216 (1980)). 6 The guidance
6
Although we have discretion to certify controlling
questions of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court, Ga. Const.
art. VI, § 6, para. 4; O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9; Ga.Sup.Ct.R. 37, we
do not do so, in part because, regardless of the outcome of our
state law inquiry, appellants cannot prevail under federal
found in the statutory language and in decisions of the lower
courts of Georgia and of the federal courts construing Georgia law
is limited.
The most relevant Georgia state court decision is that of the
Georgia Court of Appeals, dealing with the homestead exemption.
Wallis v. Clerk, Superior Court of DeKalb County, 166 Ga.App. 775,
305 S.E.2d 639 (1983). But Wallis, involving a different question,
did not arise in the lien avoidance context of § 522(f). In
Wallis, a debtor sued because he was denied any proceeds from his
homestead exemption when his house was sold as part of a bankruptcy
proceeding. The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled against the debtor,
holding that his equity in the house had been eliminated by a
secured mortgage that had a higher priority than did the debtor's
homestead exemption. In so ruling, the court stated that,
[a] bankrupt is entitled to claim a homestead exemption only
from his "aggregate interest" in real property. This means
that only the unencumbered portion of the property is to be
counted in computing the value of the property for the
purposes of determining the exemption. Appellant had no
aggregate interest in the property against which to assert his
claimed homestead exemption.
Id. 305 S.E.2d at 641 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). While this language can be read as stating a broad
principle contrary to the Holloways' position, it arose in a
situation so different as to render its relevance doubtful. Unlike
the debtor in Wallis, the Holloways are not seeking to place a
monetary value on their homestead exemption, but instead are only
asking that their admittedly valueless homestead exemption be
bankruptcy law, see infra Part II.C. The state law question is
not, therefore, "controlling."
legally recognized as an exemption so that it may be claimed under
§ 522(f) for purposes of avoiding John Hancock's judicial lien.
Federal bankruptcy cases in Georgia have not followed Wallis
when interpreting another Georgia exemption, the exemption for
household goods. 7 In Maddox, 713 F.2d at 1527-29, this court
adopted the opinion of the bankruptcy court allowing a debtor to
avoid a lien on household goods exempted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-
13-100(a)(4) even though the lien exceeded the value of the
household goods and the debtors had no equitable interest in the
goods. The court held that a debtor need not have equity in
household goods to claim an exemption under Georgia law for
purposes of § 522(f) lien avoidance. Id.; see also Moyer v. Fleet
Finance (In re Moyer), 39 B.R. 211, 212-13 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.), aff'd
746 F.2d 814 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053, 105
S.Ct. 2113, 85 L.Ed.2d 478 (1985). And in Bland v. Finance One (In
re Bland), 793 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc), this
court held that Wallis is irrelevant to claims under § 522(f),
because Wallis involved a first-in-priority purchase money secured
mortgage that could never be avoided under § 522(f). Still,
Maddox, Moyer, and Bland are not directly in point because the
liens that encumbered the property were the very liens the debtors
were trying to avoid pursuant to § 522(f), while in the present
case, the Holloways' property is fully encumbered by unavoidable
liens notwithstanding which they are seeking recognition of an
exemption in order to avoid an additional judicial lien.
7
Georgia law allows a debtor to exempt up to $3,500 of
"[t]he debtors' interest" in household goods. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-
100(a)(4).
In a case perhaps closest to the present, a bankruptcy court
in the Southern District of Georgia followed the reasoning of
Maddox, Moyer, and Bland, rather than Wallis, and found that a
debtor can avoid a judicial lien on a residence that is fully
encumbered by another unavoidable security interest. In Cravey v.
L'Eggs Prods., Inc. (In re Cravey), 100 B.R. 119
(Bankr.S.D.Ga.1989), the debtors' residence had a fair market value
of $85,000 but was subject to a deed to secure debt with
outstanding indebtedness of $83,891.65. As part of the bankruptcy
proceedings, the debtors conveyed legal title to their residence to
the secured creditor and, in addition, sought to claim a homestead
exemption under Georgia law so as to avoid the judgment liens of
other unsecured creditors pursuant to § 522(f). The judgment
lienholders contended that the debtors could not claim an exemption
under Georgia law because they no longer possessed an ownership
interest in their residence. The court found that although the
debtors had transferred the security deed and therefore legal title
to the secured creditor, the debtors still retained the right of
possession and the right to reclaim legal title by payment of the
debt. This equitable estate in the land was held to satisfy the
Georgia law requirement of an "aggregate interest" in property.
The court held that the "debtors do possess an interest in their
residence which is exemptible under the Georgia exemption statute."
Id. at 122.
In light of the above caselaw, we cannot say that, as the
district court believed, the Georgia courts would necessarily
refuse to recognize the Holloways' claim of exemption. Still, the
answer is not free from doubt, and in light of our disposition of
the federal bankruptcy issue, infra Part II.C, we think it
unnecessary to decide whether under Georgia law an equitable
interest without any monetary value forms a sufficient basis upon
which to claim a valid exemption. Instead, we shall assume,
without deciding, that the Holloways' claim of exemption in their
residence was valid under Georgia state law, and proceed next to
decide whether, as a matter of federal bankruptcy law, a lien can
be avoided under § 522(f) when, notwithstanding such a valid claim
of exemption, the debtor entirely lacks any financial equity in the
property claimed as exempt.
C. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)
Section 522(f) allows a debtor to avoid the fixing of a lien
"on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such
lien impairs an exemption." 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1993). John
Hancock argues that, according to the plain language of the
statute, a "lien impairs an exemption" only to the extent that the
lien sought to be avoided reduces the value of the debtor's claimed
exemption. Thus, it argues, a lien cannot be avoided over and
above the amount of the exemption. The Holloways argue that a lien
impairs an exemption to the extent that there is no remaining
equity, above and beyond the sum of the unavoidable claims on the
property and the claimed exemption, upon which the lien can fix.
The outcome of this dispute turns on the interpretation of the
8
"impairs an exemption" language of § 522(f), and courts have
8
We are dealing with the version of § 522(f) effective
before the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act. The 1994 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code clarified the meaning of the phrase "impairs
disagreed over what constitutes impairment of an exemption as well
as to what extent a lien may be avoided when an exemption is
impaired. See e.g., In re Thomsen, 181 B.R. 1013, 1014-15
(Bankr.M.D.Ga.1995). When a debtor's equity in the exempt property
is zero because the property is fully encumbered by senior secured
unavoidable debts, some courts have held that there is no exemption
having any quantifiable value to impair, hence no impairment of an
exemption. See e.g., Riddell v. N.C.R. Universal Credit Union (In
re Riddell), 96 B.R. 816, 818 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1989). These cases
follow the "plain language" of the statute and hold that § 522(f)
permits avoidance of a judicial lien only in the amount of the
debtor's exemption. They reason that § 522(f) expressly permits
lien avoidance only "to the extent" that the lien impairs an
exemption. The effect of this position is that the unavoided
portion of the lien survives bankruptcy and attaches to any equity
that accumulates post-petition.9 Another line of cases holds that
liens are fully avoidable even if there is no equity above and
beyond unavoidable liens and claimed exemptions upon which the
liens can attach. See e.g., In re Magosin, 75 B.R. 545, 549-50
(Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987). These cases reason that the entire judicial
lien above the amount of debtor's equity in the property must be
avoided to enable the debtor to obtain a "fresh start." This
position requires the court to recognize that a debtor's interest
in property is not limited to his equity but also includes
an exemption." See supra note 2 and infra note 10.
9
Under Georgia law, a judicial lien is enforceable against
property of a debtor for up to 21 years. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-
60—9-12-68.
equitable interests such as the right of possession, the right of
redemption and the right to create future equity. Under this broad
interpretation, impairment is said to be construed in a manner more
consistent with the fresh start purpose of the Bankruptcy Code
because the debtor is entitled to any post-petition appreciation or
build-up of equity in the property. See e.g., Cravey, 100 B.R. at
122. Given these two opposite constructions of § 522(f), courts
facing the issue before the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act were left to
decide between the plain language of § 522(f) and the "fresh start"
objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.
For present purposes, this court's position in the debate is
pre-ordained by a prior decision of this court, to which we must
now adhere under principles of stare decisis. In interpreting §
522(f), this court sided with the "plain language" position. In
Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162,
1166 (11th Cir.1994), we held that § 522(f) allowed a judgment lien
to be avoided to the extent of the Alabama homestead exemption, but
refused to allow the debtor to avoid the entire lien. The Wrenn
court, relying on City Nat'l Bank v. Chabot (In re Chabot), 992
F.2d 891 (9th Cir.1993), reasoned that the plain meaning of §
522(f) limits lien avoidance to the extent that such liens
interfere with the available exemptions as measured by the dollar
amount of the exemption claim. Thus, "§ 522(f) entitles [the
debtor] to avoid [the judgment] lien only to the extent of the ...
homestead exemption" irrespective of the debtor's equity interest
in the property. Wrenn, 40 F.3d at 1166-67. Applying Wrenn to the
case before us, the Holloways can avoid John Hancock's lien on
their residence only to the extent of their homestead exemption.
Because the Holloways' claimed exemption was worth $0.00, they are
not entitled to any lien avoidance.
The Holloways contend that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
effectively overrules Wrenn, and that a judgment lien can be
avoided to the extent that it impairs an exemption or exceeds the
amount of equity in the property. See Thomsen, 181 B.R. at 1016-
1017 (holding that the Bankruptcy Reform Act effectively overruled
Wrenn). Although the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code did,
in effect, overrule Wrenn prospectively,10 the Bankruptcy Reform Act
10
The interpretation of § 522(f) offered by debtors—that
judicial liens can be avoided even if property is fully
encumbered—has now been written into the federal law by virtue of
an explicit formula. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 amended §
522(f) by adding the following language defining the term
"impairment":
(2)(A) For the purposes of this subsection, a lien
shall be considered to impair an exemption to the
extent that the sum of—
(i) the lien;
(ii) all other liens on the property; and
(iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could
claim if there were no liens on the property;
exceeds the value that the debtor's interest in the
property would have in the absence of any liens.
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (as added by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4112, 4132, 4133,
4137, 4145 (Oct. 22, 1994)). In the section-by-section
analysis of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the amendments to §
522(f) were explained as follows:
Because the Bankruptcy Code does not currently
define the meaning of the words "impair an exemption"
in section 522(f), several court decisions have, in
recent years, reached results that were not intended by
Congress when it drafted the Code. This amendment
would provide a simply arithmetic test to determine
stated, with several exceptions not relevant here, that "the
amendments made by this Act shall not apply with respect to cases
commenced under title 11 of the United States Code before the date
of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 22, 1994], and shall not make
appealable any decisions rendered in such cases." Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4112, 4132, 4133,
4137, 4145 (Oct. 22, 1994); see also H.R.Rep. No. 835, 103rd
Cong., 2nd Sess. (Oct. 4, 1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3340. The Holloways' bankruptcy proceeding, brought under Title
11, commenced well before 1994, hence they cannot avail themselves
of the 1994 amendments. Unfortunately for them, Wrenn states the
controlling law during the relevant period.
III.
We hold that the Holloways' claimed homestead exemption,
whether a lien impairs an exemption....
The decisions that would be overruled involve
several scenarios. The first is where the debtor has
no equity in a property over and above a lien senior to
the judicial lien the debtor is attempting to avoid, as
in the case, for example, of a debtor with a home worth
$40,000 and a $40,000 mortgage. Most courts and
commentators had understood that in that situation the
debtor is entitled to exempt his or her residual
interests, such as a possessory interest in the
property, and avoid a judicial lien or other lien of a
type subject to avoidance, in any amount, that attaches
to that interest. Otherwise, the creditor would retain
the lien after bankruptcy and could threaten to deprive
the debtor of the exemption Congress meant to protect,
by executing on the lien. Unfortunately, a minority of
court decisions, such as In re Gonzalez, 149 B.R. 9
(Bankr.D.Mass.1993), have interpreted section 522(f) as
not permitting avoidance of liens in this situation.
The formula in the section would make clear that the
liens are avoidable.
H.R.Rep. No. 835, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (Oct. 4, 1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340.
assumed arguendo to be valid under Georgia law, was not impaired by
John Hancock's judicial lien, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)
(1993). We thus AFFIRM the decision of the district court that
John Hancock's lien on the Holloways' residence cannot be avoided.