F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
April 11, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAWN HOLT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 05-5031
v.
GRAND LAKE MENTAL HEALTH
CENTER, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 03-CV-654-JOE-FHM)
Jonathan Everett Shook (Randall D. Huggins with him on the brief), Shook,
Huggins & Johnson, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jo Anne Deaton (Lindsay J. McDowell with her on the brief), Rhodes,
Hieronymus, Jones, Tucker & Gable, P.L.L.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-
Appellee.
Before MURPHY, EBEL and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dawn Opala Holt sued her former employer, Grand Lake Mental Health
Center, Inc. (“GLMHC”), claiming GLMHC unlawfully terminated her because
she has a disability. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma granted summary judgment to GLMHC, concluding Holt failed to
demonstrate she was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Holt appeals. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291 and affirm the decision of the district court.
II. BACKGROUND
Holt is diagnosed with a mild form of cerebral palsy that adversely affects
her speech and her ability to perform certain activities which require fine motor
coordination. Holt requires assistance when chopping, peeling, and slicing food.
She sometimes has difficulty eating and must chew her food thoroughly or it will
become lodged in her throat. She cannot cut her own fingernails or toenails. Holt
can dress herself, but sometimes must ask for help when buttoning her clothes.
Despite these challenges, Holt successfully held three different positions at
GLMHC. In September of 1993, she applied for a position as a counselor or case
manager, and the following month, GLMHC hired her to work as a children’s case
manager. In 1995, she was promoted to Intake Coordinator for Rogers County
Clinic. In 1998, Holt was appointed the acting County Administrator of the
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Rogers County Clinic. Later that year, she was permanently appointed to the
Rogers County Administrator position. With each new position, Holt was given
more responsibility and a higher salary. Throughout this time and extending into
2000, Holt’s supervisors consistently gave her positive performance evaluations,
with summary scores that ranged between “exceptional” and “clearly
outstanding.”
In the beginning of 2001, however, perceptions of Holt’s performance
began to turn negative. At that time, Holt’s supervisor, Charles Danley, observed
a “marked change” in Holt’s behavior. He stated Holt’s behavior was erratic, she
was late to meetings, and her staff indicated she was “hiding in her office” and
not providing leadership. At the time, Holt told Danley she was experiencing an
ongoing domestic violence situation. In April of 2001, Danley placed Holt on
two weeks’ paid administrative leave.
After returning to work, Holt received her annual performance evaluation,
dated June 20, 2001. In spite of her recent problems, Holt received high marks
for her performance over the preceding year. As in past years, her summary
scores fell between “exceptional” and “clearly outstanding.” Unlike past years,
however, the evaluation noted Holt needed to recognize and address her personal
issues.
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In July of 2001, at the request of the Commissioner of the Department of
Mental Health, Danley and Holt attended a meeting at the Rogers County Health
Department. Members of the public, judges, the Assistant District Attorney for
Rogers County, and others attended the meeting. During the meeting, some
individuals criticized Holt. Danley observed Holt during the meeting, and
characterized her reaction to the criticism as “deplorable.” He described her
response as being “very defensive” and “in denial.” Moreover, he stated he saw
Holt covering her ears, rocking back and forth, and apparently sucking her thumb
in response to the criticism. Immediately after the meeting, Danley told Holt he
was “enraged”and “very upset” by her conduct. He advised her there would be
consequences as a result. Danley also told others at GLMHC he was concerned
about Holt’s conduct.
That summer, GLMHC was asked to begin providing mental health services
in Tulsa after a local hospital closed. On August 1, 2001, Danley reassigned Holt
to the position of acting Intake Coordinator in Tulsa. He selected Holt partly
because he was not satisfied with her performance as Administrator at Rogers
County Clinic, and partly because Holt lived closest to the Tulsa location. Holt
had difficulty adjusting to the new position in Tulsa. She told GLMHC’s Clinical
Director, Dr. Janet Hackworth, that she felt overwhelmed by the paperwork and
specifically noted she was having difficulty with the volume of writing that was
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required of her. Hackwork observed that Holt was occasionally tearful, agitated,
and unfocused.
On August 8, Hackworth sent Holt home because she felt Holt had acted
inappropriately in front of the Tulsa staff. On the same day, Holt requested she
be allowed to return to her old position as Rogers County Administrator. In a text
message to Danley and GLMHC’s human resources manager, Holt stated she had
problems keeping up with the writing demands of the Tulsa job due to her
cerebral palsy.
After the August 8 incident, Danley’s concerns about Holt’s ability to be an
administrative leader increased, and he decided to remove Holt from her position
as County Administrator at the Rogers County Clinic. At Holt’s termination
hearing, GLMHC’s executive team told Holt they had observed a rapid
deterioration in her ability to function on the job. The team told Holt they
believed the domestic abuse she was experiencing negatively affected her ability
to perform at work. Danley and the executive team noted GLMHC’s “at will”
employment policy, and stated they did not want to fire Holt for cause because
they wanted to make it as easy as possible for her to transition to another job.
The executive team offered Holt another position within GLMHC, where she
would have less responsibility and receive less pay. The team also left open the
possibility that Holt might be able to return to her County Administrator position
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after a period of time. Holt declined the offer and her employment with GLMHC
was terminated effective August 17, 2001.
Holt sued GLMHC. She claimed it violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, by terminating her
because of her cerebral palsy. GLMHC moved for summary judgment on grounds
that Holt was not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. The district court
granted GLMHC’s motion. Holt appeals, alleging the district court erred when it
determined she failed to present sufficient evidence to support her claim that
cerebral palsy substantially limited her ability to perform one or more major life
activities. She argues a reasonable jury could have found she was substantially
limited in the major life activities of “performing manual tasks” or “caring for
herself.”
III. ANALYSIS
This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Salehpoor v. Shahinpoor, 358 F.3d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment
is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court
must examine the record to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact
is in dispute, and must construe the facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Curtis v. Okla. City
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Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1214 (10th Cir. 1998). “If there is no
genuine issue of material fact in dispute, we determine whether the district court
correctly applied the substantive law.” Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental
Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999).
To establish a valid claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must first prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that she has a disability. Poindexter v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999). To satisfy the
ADA’s definition of disability, a plaintiff must (1) have a recognized impairment,
(2) identify one or more appropriate major life activities, and (3) show the
impairment substantially limits one or more of those activities. 1 Doebele v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003). Holt’s
arguments on appeal focus solely on the third step of the test, the question of
substantial limitation.
The Supreme Court has noted the term “substantial” must “be interpreted
strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.” Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). The Court defines a
1
Whether the plaintiff has an impairment within the meaning of the ADA
and whether the conduct affected is a major life activity for purposes of the ADA
are questions of law for court to decide. Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342
F.3d 1117, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003). Ascertaining whether the impairment
substantially limits the major life activity is a question of fact for the jury,
although a court is not precluded from deciding the issue on a motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 1129, 1130 n.5.
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“substantial” impairment as one “that prevents or severely restricts [an] individual
from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives”
and that is “permanent or long term.” Id. at 198. Plaintiffs must prove the
limitations caused by their impairments are substantial “in terms of their own
experience.” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999).
Accordingly, courts must assess the effects of an impairment on a case-by-case
basis. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198. Holt asserts the undisputed evidence creates a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether her cerebral palsy substantially
impairs her ability to perform the major life activities of performing manual tasks
and caring for herself.
A. Performing Manual Tasks
To meet the ADA’s definition of “disabled,” a plaintiff must satisfy a
“demanding standard.” Id. at 197. “[I]mpairments that interfere in only a minor
way with the performance of manual tasks” do not qualify as disabilities under the
ADA. Id. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Holt, this court
must decide whether the evidence presented could allow a jury to conclude the
limitations faced by Holt “amount to such severe restrictions in the activities that
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives that they establish a manual
task disability.” Id. at 202.
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Courts have granted summary judgment to defendants when the evidence
shows a plaintiff is restricted from doing a few specific tasks, but can otherwise
perform a variety of manual activities. For instance, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held a plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial limitation when,
although she could not type or write for long periods of time, she could perform
“a wide range of manual tasks, including grocery shopping, driving, making beds,
doing laundry, and dressing herself.” Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc.,
261 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir. 2001). Similarly, in Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC,
evidence demonstrated the plaintiff had a severe restriction in his ability to
perform certain tasks such as typing and cutting foam-board. 234 F.3d 1219,
1223 (11th Cir. 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined
the plaintiff’s impairment fell “short of substantially limiting the major life
activity of performing manual tasks” because the plaintiff admitted he could
perform daily activities such as dressing himself, driving, and working with a
computer. Id. The court concluded “a plaintiff must demonstrate that he is
substantially limited in a range of manual tasks rather than a narrow category
thereof.” Id.
Summary judgment in favor of the defendant may not be appropriate,
however, when evidence indicates a plaintiff’s impairment restricts him from
performing a wide range of manual tasks. In Emory v. AstraZeneca
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Pharmaceuticals LP, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit court noted the
plaintiff, Alvin Emory, was unable to perform a wide array of manual tasks. 401
F.3d 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2005). The act of getting dressed, for example, presented
“huge hurdles” for Emory. Id. Emory could not lift heavy objects, open or close
his right thumb, tie his shoes, tie a necktie, roll his sleeves, close buttons, put on
a belt, cut his own nails, manipulate the top of a toothpaste tube, cut his own
meat, open a jar, hold a pen in his right hand, pull heavy dishes and pans from the
oven, or “perform certain basic household chores and repairs.” Id. at 176.
Confronted with this broad range of limitations, the court determined summary
judgment was inappropriate because “[a] rational factfinder could reasonably
conclude . . . Emory is substantially limited in his ability to perform manual
tasks.” Id. at 182.
The instant case is more similar to Chanda and Thornton than to Emory.
The record shows Holt’s limitations are narrow and specific; it does not indicate
she is severely restricted in her ability to perform a broad range of manual tasks.
For example, Holt is unable to perform the specific task of cutting her own nails,
but she has presented no evidence that would allow a factfinder to conclude she is
severely restricted in her ability to perform other manual tasks relating to personal
hygiene. While Holt needs help when chopping, cutting, and slicing food, the
evidence is insufficient to allow a factfinder to conclude she is severely restricted
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in her ability to cook. It is undisputed that Holt occasionally must ask others for
assistance when buttoning her clothing; Holt has introduced no evidence,
however, that would permit a factfinder to conclude she is severely restricted in
dressing herself. In short, based on the evidence presented, 2 a rational jury could
not find Holt is substantially limited in her ability to perform manual tasks.
B. Caring for One’s Self
Holt also claims the limitations caused by her cerebral palsy substantially
impair her ability to perform the major life activity of caring for herself. Caring
for one’s self “encompasses normal activities of daily living; including feeding
oneself, driving, grooming, and cleaning home.” Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action
Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (quotation
omitted). As discussed above, the relevant evidence shows Holt has difficultly
with, or is prevented from performing, a limited number of manual tasks. It also
indicates Holt sometimes has difficulty chewing and swallowing her food. These
specific limitations, however, do not permit a rational factfinder to conclude Holt
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Holt also claims she substantially limited in her ability to perform manual
tasks because she has difficulty chewing and swallowing. Chewing and
swallowing, however, are not manual tasks. Instead, they are components of the
major life activity of “caring for one’s self.” See Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action
Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that
“feeding oneself” is a component of the major life activity of caring for one’s
self). Accordingly, we consider Holt’s argument relating to her chewing and
swallowing limitations in Part III.B, infra.
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is prevented from caring for herself or is severely restricted in her ability to care
for herself. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to GLMHC.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the order of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma is affirmed.
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