ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Sean G. Thomasson
Roderick D. McGillivray
Columbus, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Attorney General of Indiana
Arthur Thaddeus Perry
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
__________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
__________________________________________________________________
JASON HUBBELL, )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), )
)
v. ) Indiana Supreme Court
) Cause No. 03S00-9912-CR-714
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )
__________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE BARTHOLOMEW CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Stephen Heimann, Judge
Cause No. 03C01-9908-CF-1191
__________________________________________________________________
ON DIRECT APPEAL
__________________________________________________________________
September 5, 2001
BOEHM, Justice.
Jason Hubbell was convicted of murder and criminal confinement and
sentenced to seventy-five years imprisonment. In this direct appeal, he
raises ten issues, which we restate as eight. Hubbell contends: (1) the
trial court erred by not dismissing the grand jury’s indictment; (2)
evidence of the location of the victim’s body and cellular phone calls
violated the alibi statute; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting physical and testimonial evidence; (4) the admissions of his post-
polygraph statements violated his right to cross-examine witnesses; (5) the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting a witness’ pretrial and
trial identification of Hubbell; (6) the State committed several Brady
violations; (7) he was denied his right to counsel by frequent moves
throughout the Department of Corrections; and (8) he was entitled to a new
trial based on cumulative error. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Factual and Procedural Background
Sharon Myers left for work at the Arvin plant early on the morning of
May 13, 1997. She never arrived. Another employee of Arvin, Sherry Young,
saw a man and a woman leaving the Arvin plant as she arrived at work that
same morning. The woman looked similar to Myers. The man had one hand on
the woman’s neck or back, and the two entered a white van and drove away.
The police came to the plant later that morning to look for Myers.
Young had “mentally” made note of the license plate number and gave the
police the number and a description of the van. The police traced the
license plate number to a white van owned by Hubbell. Hubbell worked at
the Arvin plant with Myers and had called in sick on May 13. Young then
identified a picture of the van as the one she had seen that morning, and
later that day identified Hubbell when police presented him to her.
In November 1997, skeletal remains were found in a marsh area in
Johnson County and identified as Myers’ through dental records. An autopsy
showed a fracture in the hyoid bone[1] which, together with the size of a
ligature found around Myers’ neck, indicated that the cause of death was
manual strangulation. Acrylic fibers found near the body were consistent
with fibers found in Hubbell’s van. Grass fragments found in the search of
the van were consistent with grass samples from the marsh. The FBI
obtained fingerprints from the van and also shot several rolls of film of
fingerprints that might or might not be different from the fingerprints
taken. No prints from Myers were identified, and the authorities lost the
rolls of film.
On August 31, 1998, Hubbell was indicted by a grand jury on the
charges of murder and criminal confinement. On September 28, Hubbell filed
a notice of alibi, which he amended on October 15. The State did not
respond. At trial, the State introduced parts of Hubbell’s statements made
following a polygraph examination. The State also introduced testimony
from a jail inmate that Hubbell admitted the killing to him. Hubbell was
convicted of both charges after a four-week jury trial in October and
November of 1999. The trial court sentenced him to sixty-five years for
murder and ten years for confinement, to be served consecutively.
I. Grand Jury Indictment
Hubbell first argues that, because there were police officers present
during the grand jury proceedings, he was prejudiced and the indictments
should be dismissed. Before trial, Hubbell moved to dismiss the grand jury
indictment. The trial court denied Hubbell’s motion after a hearing on the
matter.
Indiana Code section 35-34-2-4 prescribes the conduct of grand jury
proceedings and allows for a limited number of people, including witnesses,
clerks, and the prosecuting attorney’s staff, to be present during the
proceedings. In Indiana, there is no per se rule presuming prejudice when
unauthorized persons appear before the grand jury, or even when those
persons participate in the interrogation of witnesses. Fair v. State, 266
Ind. 380, 390, 364 N.E.2d 1007, 1012 (1977). To obtain dismissal of an
indictment, the defendant must show that his substantial rights were
prejudiced. In this case, Hubbell contends that there were two police
officers present during the grand jury proceedings. The first, Detective
Ken Hardwick, was present during the testimony of Hubbell’s wife, Robyn
Hubbell. Hubbell claims that Hardwick made gestures indicating that Robyn
was being untruthful and consulted with the prosecuting attorney during
Robyn’s testimony. Hubbell also claims that another detective, Mark
Gorbett, acted similarly when Hubbell’s alibi witness, Heather Hilliard,
testified. Finally, he contends that two other witnesses before the grand
jury were harassed.
At the hearing on the motion to quash the indictment, the State
submitted an affidavit from Gorbett claiming that although officers were
present, none of them took any actions indicating untruthfulness by the
witnesses. Robyn testified that although her demeanor was affected by the
police officers, the content of her testimony remained the same. The trial
court then ruled:
At this time as it relates to the Motion to Quash or Motion to Dismiss
the Grand Jury Indictment, I’m going to find that the defendant has
not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his substantial
rights have been prejudiced and I’m going to deny the Motion to Quash.
It is for the trial court to evaluate the truthfulness of the witnesses.
We cannot conclude on this record that the finding of absence of prejudice
was error.
II. Alibi Statute
The indictment in this case stated that Hubbell was in Bartholomew
County on May 13, 1997. Hubbell contends that the trial court erred by
admitting evidence of Myers’ body, which was found in Johnson county, and
cellular phone calls that were made from outside Bartholomew County. The
basis of this contention is his notice of alibi defense claiming he was in
Bartholomew County on those dates. The State did not respond to the
notice. Under the alibi statute, Indiana Code section 35-36-4-3, if the
State does not respond to a notice of alibi defense, the court is to
exclude “evidence offered by the prosecuting attorney to show that the
defendant was at a place other than the place stated in . . . the
indictment.” This Court has refused to adopt a rule excluding all evidence
of events occurring outside the time and spatial limits raised by a notice
of alibi defense. Woods v. State, 250 Ind. 132, 143, 235 N.E.2d 479, 485
(1968). Testimony describing events outside these limits is admissible if
it circumstantially proves commission of a particular crime within the
limits. Id. Evidence of Myers’ body was not used to prove that Hubbell
committed a crime in Johnson County, for example, body dumping. See Ind.
Code §§ 23-14-54-1 to 2, 23-14-54-5 (1998). Rather, it was offered as
circumstantial evidence supporting the claim that he committed crimes in
Bartholomew County.[2]
Similarly, the cellular phone calls were not offered to establish that
Hubbell was outside of Bartholomew County. At trial, David Ebney, a former
operations manager for Blue Ridge Cellular, testified that the signal of
the Indianapolis cellular phone tower overlapped into Bartholomew County.
The trial court also admitted Hubbell’s cellular phone bill, which showed
that he made two phone calls on May 13, 1997 through a cellular tower
located north of Bartholomew County. However, there was no testimony that
calls from the cellular tower outside of Bartholomew County must have been
made outside of Bartholomew County. The jury was left with unconnected and
incomplete testimony on that point. In short, the evidence of the location
of the body and calls was not used to prove that the “defendant was at a
place other than the place stated in the indictment.” Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in admitting this evidence.
III. Evidentiary Issues
Hubbell contends that there were two evidentiary errors in his case
that require reversal because the resulting prejudice outweighed any
probative value. Relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ind.
Evidence Rule 403. The trial court’s rulings on the admission of evidence
under Rule 403 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
A. Hubbell’s Gun and Ammunition
Hubbell contends that the admission of a handgun found in his home and
bullets found in his van violated Indiana Evidence Rule 403. The State
argues that because the gun matched bullets found in the van, the jury
could have concluded that the gun was used to coerce Myers into the van.
Hubbell filed a pretrial motion in limine to exclude this evidence arguing
that there was no evidence that a gun was used to commit this crime. The
State argued that Myers left her work “against her will,” presuming that a
gun was used to coerce her. The trial court denied the motion.
We agree with Hubbell that the introduction of the gun and bullets was
an abuse of discretion. The State presented no evidence that Young was
coerced with a gun to leave her place of employment and no evidence that
the gun was in any way connected with her murder. Its suggestion that
Hubbell may have used the gun to coerce Myers is no more than speculation
given the absence of any other evidence suggesting the use of a weapon.
There also was a danger of unfair prejudice from admission of the gun. “As
a general proposition, we agree that the introduction of weapons not used
in the commission of the crime and not otherwise relevant to the case may
have a prejudicial effect.” Lycan v. State, 671 N.E.2d 447, 454 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996).
The highly attenuated relevance of the gun was insufficient to
overcome its potential prejudice. However, any error in the admission of
the gun and bullets was harmless. “Errors in the admission or exclusion of
evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the
substantial rights of a party.” Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1141
(Ind. 1995); Ind. Trial Rule 61. In this case, the State presented
evidence that a man matching Hubbell’s description and driving Hubbell’s
van left the Arvin parking lot with a woman who looked like Myers. Fibers
and grass near Myers’ body matched fibers and grass from Hubbell’s van.
Finally, Hubbell confessed to a jail inmate that he murdered Myers. Given
this evidence, we cannot say that evidence of the gun and bullets affected
Hubbell’s substantial rights.
B. Fingerprint Film
Hubbell also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting testimony that two rolls of film containing photographs of
fingerprints found in Hubbell’s van were destroyed. The FBI conducted a
search of Hubbell’s van on May 19, 1997. They found numerous fingerprints,
but none from Myers. The FBI also took pictures of other fingerprints from
the van. These rolls of film were lost before they could be developed.
Hubbell filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony of the lost rolls of
film because of the danger that the jury would assume the missing film
contained fingerprints of the victim. The trial court denied this motion
and, at trial, an FBI agent testified that, although the film had been
destroyed, more fingerprints were found in the van.
We think admitting the testimony was error. Unless there was some
basis to suggest the missing fingerprints were Myers’, this testimony again
raises only speculation. There was no evidence suggesting that the lost
photographs were of fingerprints from a source different from the
fingerprints that were not lost. The lost photos do not suggest that
anyone else, much less Myers, was in the van. Although the probative value
of this testimony is minimal, its prejudicial effect was also low and any
error was harmless for the same reason as the gun and bullets.
IV. Hubbell’s Post-Polygraph Statements
Hubbell also contests the admission of his statements from a post-
polygraph interview. On May 19, 1997, Hubbell submitted to a polygraph
examination. Sergeant Jeff Williams questioned Hubbell after the
interview. The exact questions are not in the record because Williams’
notes have been destroyed. However, in his report, Williams stated:
During the post-test interview I explained the results of the
polygraph examination to [Hubbell] to see if he could furnish any
reason for the deceptive responses. When I stated to him that I
believed that he was responsible for [Myers’] disappearance he stated
that it might be possible but he can’t say that he did it. He stated
that he has prayed to God every night since then that it isn’t so.
When I asked him to explain further he states he knows that he does
things during his episodes that he can’t remember so he always has
doubts now about things he could have done.
Hubbell filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence of this exchange.
The motion was denied and Williams testified to the statements Hubbell
made, with no reference to the polygraph examination. Hubbell argues that
the trial court erred in admitting this testimony because he was unable to
cross-examine Williams fully because evidence of the polygraph was
inadmissible. He urges this Court to “render inadmissible any [post-
polygraph] statements which are not admissions, but are speculative
responses to an officer’s question of why the polygraph indicated deceptive
responses.”
As an initial matter, Hubbell cites to no authority for this
proposition. Although the right to cross-examine witnesses is guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution and is “one of the fundamental
rights of our criminal justice system,” Pigg v. State, 603 N.E.2d 154, 155
(Ind. 1992), it “is subject to reasonable limitations placed at the
discretion of the trial judge.” McQuay v. State, 566 N.E.2d 542, 543 (Ind.
1991); accord Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Requiring
Hubbell to choose between incomplete questioning (foregoing his Sixth
Amendment rights) and revealing unfavorable polygraph results would present
an impermissible choice. But Hubbell gives no reason why a complete cross-
examination of Williams required reference to the polygraph. The trial
court stated:
With regard to Motion in Limine #6 concerning the defendant’s post
polygraph statements to Detective Williams; these statements are not
tied so directly to the polygraph results that they force the
defendant to “invoke the doctrine of completeness” and divulge the
fact that a polygraph examination was performed. In the police
report, Officer Williams says: “When I stated to him that I believed
that he was responsible for Sharon’s disappearance he stated that it
might be possible but he can’t say that he did it.” This portion of
the conversation is illustrative of the post polygraph questioning.
The discussion does not require the divulgence of the polygraph exam.
Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court was correct that
exploring the polygraph examination was not critical to Hubbell’s
statements or his ability to cross-examine Williams.
V. Eyewitness Identification
Hubbell next contends that the trial court erred in admitting Young’s
pre-trial and in-court identifications. He contends that the pre-trial
identification was unduly suggestive and therefore tainted the in-court
identification. He further contends that the suggestive lineup led Young
to add further details to her description of Hubbell. On the morning of
Myers’ disappearance, Young saw a man and a woman get into a white van in
her employer’s parking lot and drive away. Young was able to give the
police the license plate number of the van, and described the man as having
“blonde hair, probably five nine, six foot.” Less than six hours later,
police presented Hubbell to Young in a showup or single person lineup. At
the showup, Young thought Hubbell was the man she had seen driving the van,
although she was not positive. This testimony was corroborated by Steve
Prosser, another witness at the showup. Two police officers testified that
Young was not positive that Hubbell was the man driving the van.
At trial, Young testified that she watched the couple walk across the
parking lot for several minutes and took notice of them because they were
leaving work at an unusual hour. She also testified that she was
approximately thirty feet from the van and had a three-quarters view of the
driver’s face for three seconds. The parking lot was well-lit and the
driver of the van turned and made eye contact with Young before driving
away. She made a mental note of the license plate number of the van. Her
description of the suspect remained largely the same after the showup,
although she did provide more detail on his haircut.
In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), overruled on other
grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the United States
Supreme Court noted that a show-up procedure may be so unnecessarily
suggestive and so conducive to irreparable mistake as to constitute a
violation of due process. Such a claimed violation is to be examined in
light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding it. Id. A per se
rule of exclusion of pre-trial identification evidence involving suggestive
or unnecessary procedures was rejected in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 109-14 (1977). Instead, due process permits the admission of such
evidence if, under the totality of circumstances, the identification is
reliable. Accord Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-201 (1972). Hubbell’s
claim thus involves a two-step analysis. Slaton v. State, 510 N.E.2d 1343,
1348 (Ind. 1987). The first question is whether the initial identification
procedure was unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive. Id. As noted in
Stovall, “The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the
purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely
condemned.” 388 U.S. at 302. This Court has also recognized the inherent
suggestiveness of such one-on-one confrontations. Head v. State, 443
N.E.2d 44, 55 (Ind. 1982); Poindexter v. State, 268 Ind. 167, 173, 374
N.E.2d 509, 512 (1978). The second inquiry is whether, under the totality
of the circumstances, the identification was reliable even though the
procedure was suggestive. Slaton, 510 N.E.2d at 1349. We have permitted
such procedures when they occur shortly after the commission of the crime
“because of the value of permitting a witness to view a suspect while the
image of the perpetrator is fresh in the witness’s mind.” Head, 443 N.E.2d
at 55. “Likewise, one-on-one confrontations have been found proper where
circumstances rendered an alternative approach such as a lineup
impossible.” Id. at 55-56.
In this case, we agree with Hubbell that the “single person lineup”
was unduly suggestive. We also find no exigent circumstances requiring
this showup, which occurred six hours after Young had seen the white van
leaving the parking lot. Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 502 (Ind.
1990) (showup two hours after robbery was unduly suggestive). Thus, the
pre-trial identification was erroneously admitted.
Where it is established that evidence of an out-of-court
identification has been erroneously admitted based on a finding that the
confrontation procedure was impermissibly suggestive and not otherwise
justified based on the totality of the circumstances, the error may
nonetheless be harmless. A conviction will not be reversed if the State
can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967), cited in Wethington, 560 N.E.2d at 502. Whether or not Young could
identify Hubbell conclusively, she did identify his van by license plate
number and also reported a driver of his general description. This,
together with the fiber and grass matches and Hubbell’s confession, renders
any error in Young’s identification harmless.[3]
VI. Brady Violations
Hubbell claims that his due process rights were violated by the
State’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence and the trial court’s
failure to perform an in camera review of all the evidence to look for
additional exculpatory evidence.[4]
A. Conservation Report
First, Hubbell contends that the State failed to produce a complete
case report by a conservation officer. The State produced a two-page case
report in response to Hubbell’s motion to produce. However, Hubbell later
learned of the existence of a fifteen-page report that contained an
interview with a witness claiming to see suspicious persons in the area
where the body was found. Hubbell had copies of this report at least ten
months prior to trial.
Although not explicitly stated, it appears that Hubbell is contending
that the State’s actions violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88
(1963), and its progeny. There is no doubt that the State is required to
disclose evidence that is favorable to the accused and material to the
accused’s guilt or punishment. See Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644, 648-
49 (Ind. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1170 (2000). Evidence favorable to
the accused includes impeaching evidence. Id. at 649. In this case,
however, the full conservation report was discovered at least ten months
prior to the actual trial. Hubbell had adequate opportunity to investigate
the witness and alter trial strategy accordingly. Brady applies to the
discovery of favorable evidence “after trial.” See Lowrimore v. State, 728
N.E.2d 860, 866-67 (Ind. 2000); Williams, 714 N.E.2d at 648-49; accord Dye
v. State, 717 N.E.2d 5, 12 (Ind. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 957 (2000)
B. Marcus Yano
Hubbell also contends that he was denied the opportunity to discover
a report detailing the exculpatory testimony of Marcus Yano. At trial, a
witness testified that Eddie Harrison, Hubbell’s candidate as the
perpetrator of these crimes, had told her he killed Myers. Harrison denied
making the statement. Hubbell requested the entire police file on Myers’
murder prior to his deposition of Detective Dennis Knulf. Knulf appeared
at his deposition with a summary report, which the State refused to turn
over to Hubbell. After trial, Yano came to defense counsel’s office and
signed an affidavit claiming that Harrison was in the Arvin parking lot the
morning Myers disappeared and that Knulf knew of this. Hubbell now claims
that the summary report contained information leading to Yano and that he
was denied the opportunity to discover this fact.
Hubbell learned of Yano’s allegations on November 5, 1999, after the
guilty verdict, but before the sentencing hearing on December 3. He did
not raise this issue until January 19, 2000, when he filed an affidavit
unaccompanied by any motion. Although Indiana law has not been entirely
clear on this point, the procedural steps for raising a Brady issue are
controlled by Criminal Rule 16 and Trial Rules 59 and 61. A Brady
violation is almost always based on evidence that comes to light after
trial. If so, it is raised by a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence, or a motion to correct error. Pursuant to Criminal
Rule 16(A), the defendant must file a motion to correct error in order to
address “newly discovered material evidence, including alleged jury
misconduct, capable of production within thirty (30) days of final judgment
which, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered and
produced at trial.” See also Ind. Trial Rule 59(A). A motion to correct
error addressing newly discovered evidence “is a mandatory prerequisite for
an appeal, and a failure to file such a motion will result in a waiver of
the issue” unless the provisions of Trial Rule 60(B)(2) for late discovered
evidence apply.[5] 4A Kenneth M. Stroud, Indiana Practice § 4.1, at 44 (2d
ed. 1990). Because Hubbell knew of Yano’s affidavit within thirty days
after the judgment and failed to file a motion to correct error, Hubbell
has waived this issue.
Requiring a defendant to file a motion to correct error gives the
trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue and may avoid an
unnecessary appeal. Hubbell’s attempt to raise the issue on appeal without
trial court review, and without a hearing in the trial court, puts the
appellate court in the unenviable position of attempting to weigh
credibility on an undeveloped paper record. This is a task for the trial
court. The trial judge has the benefit of a detailed understanding of the
other evidence in the case and can best assess any potential prejudice as
well as weigh the credibility of claims of new evidence. For all these
reasons, the issue is not preserved on this record.
VII. Improper Transfers in Department of Corrections
Hubbell claims that he was denied both his right to be present at
important stages of the criminal proceedings and his right to counsel as a
result of his frequent transfers by the Department of Corrections.[6] On
December 9, 1998, Hubbell was transferred, over his objection, to the
Department of Corrections because its medical facilities were better than
those in the Bartholomew County Jail. On August 11, 1999, Hubbell was
transferred back to the jail pursuant to his request. In the interim,
Hubbell had spent time at the Plainfield, Pendleton, and Michigan City
correctional facilities. He claims these frequent moves made it impossible
for him to attend several court proceedings and impossible for his attorney
to contact him and discuss important decisions.
Although Hubbell has the right to be present at significant stages of
the criminal proceedings, he has not established that any hearings he
missed, including the one on July 14, 1999, were of critical importance to
implicate the Confrontation Clause. Even if the Confrontation Clause is
not violated, the right to be present may be guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees the defendant the
right to be present in his own person “whenever his presence has a
relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to
defend against the charge. . . . [T]he presence of a defendant is a
condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would
be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” United States v.
Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105-06, 107-08 (1934)). In sum, “a defendant is guaranteed the right
to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to
its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the
procedure.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987).
The defendant has the burden of showing how his presence could
contribute to a more reliable determination of the fact at issue. If a
defendant can contribute or gain nothing from attending the proceeding,
then his due process right is not violated. Id.; see also Hovey v.
Calderon, 1996 WL 400979, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 1996). Hubbell has
not shown, or attempted to show, how any of these proceedings were critical
to the outcome of the trial or how his presence would have contributed to
the fairness of the procedure. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745. Accordingly, his
due process claim fails. Ridley v. State, 690 N.E.2d 177, 180-81 (Ind.
1997).
As for the right to counsel, there is no showing that the transfers
were made for the purpose of preventing Hubbell from conferring with
counsel, or from preparing his defense. Nor is there any showing, other
than Hubbell’s general allegations, that the transfers had this effect.
There is therefore no reversible error on this issue. See Nagy v. State,
505 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ind. 1987); Hurley v. State, 446 N.E.2d 1326, 1331
(Ind. 1983).
VIII. Cumulative Error
As a final point, Hubbell suggests that even if each of the foregoing
individual errors was harmless, their cumulative effect requires reversal.
The State responds that a number of trial irregularities that do not amount
to error standing alone do not collectively amount to reversible error.
See Reaves v. State, 586 N.E.2d 847, 858 (Ind. 1992); Stonebraker v. State,
505 N.E.2d 55, 61 (Ind. 1987). Assuming, for the sake of argument, that
under some circumstances the cumulative effect of trial errors may warrant
reversal even if each might be deemed harmless in isolation, in this case
it is clear in light of the evidence of guilt that no prejudice resulted
from any of the erroneous rulings, individually or cumulatively. Thompson
v. State, 728 N.E.2d 155, 163 (Ind. 2000).
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] The hyoid bone is “a bone or complex of bones situated at the base of
the tongue and supporting the tongue and its muscles.” Merriam Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 569 (10th ed. 1993).
[2] The same is true of evidence of grass fragments found on the underside
of Hubbell’s van.
[3] For the same reasons, any error in admitting Young’s in-court
identification of Hubbell was also harmless.
[4] In his reply brief, Hubbell claims he was “denied his Due Process
Rights based upon a pattern of conduct on the part of the State and its
agents that deprived Defendant of his ability to effectively discover
relevant and/or exculpatory evidence the State had in either its actual or
constructive possession.” Brady violations are a species of due process
violations and as such are addressed above. To the extent Hubbell is
making a separate claim, he argues that the trial court erred by not
reviewing all the evidence in camera to determine whether Hubbell had
access to all exculpatory, material evidence. We find no authority
requiring trial courts to perform such an extensive task and are not
inclined to order them to do so.
[5] Trial Rule 60(B)(2) allows a party to file a motion for relief from
judgment within one year after the judgment for “newly discovered evidence,
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
motion to correct errors under Rule 59.”
[6] Hubbell also contends that Indiana Code sections 35-33-11-1 and 2 were
violated, thus violating his due process rights. He has not alleged any
specific harm from a violation of these statutes, nor has he presented this
Court with any authority as to why a violation of these statutes should be
cause to vacate these convictions. See Parr v. State, 504 N.E.2d 1014,
1018 (Ind. 1987).