F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 9 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
IHC HEALTH PLANS, INC., on its
own behalf and as successor in interest
to IHC Group, Inc., and IHC Care,
Inc.
Petitioners - Appellants,
v. Nos. 01-9013, 01-9014, 01-9015
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,
Respondent - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT
(Nos. 14599-99X, 14600-99X, 14601-99X)
Douglas M. Mancino (Robert C. Louthian, III, Robert E. Kohn, and David L.
Hirsch, with him on the briefs), McDermott, Will & Emery, Los Angeles,
California, appearing for the Appellant.
Teresa E. McLaughlin, Attorney, Tax Division, Department of Justice (Eileen J.
O’Connor, Assistant Attorney General, and Gary R. Allen, Attorney, Tax
Division, Department of Justice, with her on the brief), Washington, DC,
appearing for the Appellee.
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, HOLLOWAY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.
I. Background 1
IHC Health Plans, Inc. (“Health Plans”), on its own behalf and as successor
in interest to IHC Care, Inc. (“Care”) and IHC Group, Inc. (“Group”) (collectively
“petitioners”), 2 appeals the Tax Court’s decision denying petitioners’ request for
tax exemption under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). We have jurisdiction to review the
Tax Court’s decision under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). The sole issue presented in
this appeal is whether petitioners qualify for tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c)(3) as organizations operated exclusively for charitable purposes.
A. The IHC Integrated Delivery System
1. The formation of IHC
In 1970, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (“LDS Church”)
formed Health Services Corporation, later renamed Intermountain Health Care,
Inc. (“IHC”), as a Utah nonprofit corporation. IHC assumed ownership and
control of fifteen hospitals previously owned by the LDS Church. In 1975, the
LDS Church transferred control of IHC to an independent board of trustees,
comprised of persons representative of the community. The Internal Revenue
The Tax Court’s three opinions set out the facts in greater detail. See IHC
1
Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 593 (2001); IHC Group,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 606 (2001); IHC Care, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 617 (2001).
2
On December 21, 2000, Care and Group both became part of Health
Plans.
-2-
Service (“IRS”) has consistently recognized IHC as a charitable, tax-exempt
organization.
2. The formation of Health Services
As part of its plan to streamline and integrate its provision of health-care
services, IHC formed IHC Health Services, Inc. (“Health Services”) in 1982 as a
Utah nonprofit corporation. In 1983, IHC transferred its hospitals and
substantially all the assets necessary to its operation to Health Services. IHC then
ceased operating hospitals directly and assumed the role of a parent company,
with Health Services as IHC’s principal health-care services organization. IHC is
Health Services’ sole corporate member and the board of trustees of IHC and
Health Services are comprised of the same individuals.
At the end of 1999, Health Services operated twenty-two hospitals located
in Utah and Idaho, employing approximately 300 primary care physicians and 100
specialist physicians in its Physician Division; it separately employed
approximately 120 physicians in its Hospital Division. All Health Services
hospitals participated in the Medicare and Medicaid programs for inpatient and
outpatient hospital services. Between 1997 and 1999, Health Services provided
nearly $1.2 billion in health-care services, without reimbursement, to patients
covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and other governmental programs. During that
same period, Health Services furnished more than $91 million in free health-care
-3-
services to indigent patients.
The Commissioner has recognized Health Services as a tax-exempt
organization under section 501(c)(3).
3. Health Plans, Care, and Group
In order to further integrate its provision of health-care services, IHC
formed Health Plans, Care, and Group to operate as health maintenance
organizations (“HMOs”) within the IHC Integrated Delivery System. A detailed
description of each organization is set forth in Sections I(B)-(D), infra.
4. IHC’s role as parent company
IHC’s board of trustees maintained governance power and control over
Health Plans, Care, and Group. In particular, IHC had the authority, directly and
indirectly, to elect petitioners’ boards of trustees. IHC, Health Services, and
petitioners shared many of the same corporate officers. 3 IHC conducted
petitioners’ strategic planning, established their priorities, and attempted to
implement their business plans on an enterprise basis. Also, Health Services
provided petitioners with centralized management services, including human
resources, legal services, public relations, and treasury functions. 4
3
Health Plans, Care, and Group had identical officers and trustees.
4
Health Plans provided specialized management and administrative
services to Care and Group. Neither Care nor Group had any employees,
facilities, or equipment, and both relied on Health Services and Health Plans for
(continued...)
-4-
B. Health Plans
In 1983, IHC created Health Plans to operate as a state-licensed HMO and
preferred provider organization (“PPO”). IHC was the sole corporate member of
Health Plans and possessed the power to remove members from Health Plans’
board of trustees. Health Plans offered health plans to small-employer groups,
large-employer groups, and individuals, including Medicaid recipients. 5
In 1999, the population of Utah was approximately 2,130,000. Health
Plans enrolled 416,370 Utahans in its various plans, or approximately twenty
percent of Utah’s total population. In 1999, approximately 73,503 Utahans were
enrolled in a Medicaid managed-care program. Health Plans enrolled 35,902 of
these individuals, or approximately fifty percent of Utah’s total Medicaid
population.
In determining premiums, Health Plans applied an “adjusted community
rating” for individuals and small-employer groups, adjusting its rates for risk
factors such as age and gender. For large-employer groups, Health Plans used a
“past claims experience” method in determining premiums.
In June 1985, the IRS recognized Health Plans as tax exempt under section
4
(...continued)
their operational requirements.
5
Health Plans offered the following eight health plans: SelectMed,
SelectMed Plus, IHC Care, IHC Care Plus, IHC Direct Care, IHC Direct Care
Plus, Health Choice, and IHC Access.
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501(c)(3). The Commissioner subsequently revoked Health Plans’ tax exemption
in 1999.
C. Care
In 1985, IHC formed Care to operate as a “direct contract” HMO, offering
federally-qualified health plans in conjunction with Health Plans. 6 Health Plans
incorporated Care as a subsidiary because the HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300e-9, precluded Health Plans from operating a federally-qualified HMO
within the same corporate entity in which it operated a state-licensed HMO.
Health Plans was Care’s sole corporate member, and Care used the same network
of health-care providers as Health Plans.
Care only offered its IHC Care health plan to employers with more than 100
employees. Care used an adjusted community rating methodology to determine
IHC Care premiums, as required for all federally-qualified HMOs. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.104(a)(3), (b). Between 1996 and 1998, Care also offered IHC Senior Care,
a Medicare “risk” health plan it has since discontinued.
On April 28, 1986, Care applied for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3).
The Commissioner denied Care’s request in a final adverse determination letter on
6
The HMO Act of 1973 provided certain marketing advantages to
“qualified” HMOs. In particular, under 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9, certain employers
were required to offer their employees the option of enrolling in a federally-
qualified HMO.
-6-
June 16, 1999.
D. Group
In 1991, IHC formed Group to operate as a federally-qualified “group”
model HMO. IHC separately incorporated Group because, at the time of Group’s
formation, the Health Care Financing Administration 7 prohibited a single
corporation from operating two different types of federally-qualified HMOs.
Health Plans was Group’s sole corporate member.
Group offered its SelectMed health plan exclusively to employers with 100
or more employees. To determine the amount of the premium under the
SelectMed plan, Group relied upon an adjusted community rating methodology.
Enrollees in the SelectMed plan received a variety of health-care services at no
additional charge through Group’s “Core Wellness Program.” Between 1993 and
1998, Group also offered a Medicare “cost” health plan, IHC Senior Care, which
it has since discontinued.
In 1991, Group filed an application for tax exemption under section
501(c)(3). The Commissioner denied Group’s request in a final adverse
determination letter on June 16, 1999.
E. The Commissioner’s Decision
7
The Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”), an agency of the
Department of Health and Human Services, administered the HMO Act of 1973.
In 2001, HCFA’s name changed to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
-7-
In 1999, the Commissioner concluded that neither Health Plans, Care, nor
Group operated exclusively for exempt purposes under section 501(c)(3). The
Commissioner alternatively concluded that Health Plans and Care were not
entitled to tax-exempt status under section 501(m)(1), which precludes tax-exempt
status where a “substantial part of [an organization’s] activities consists of
providing commercial-type insurance.” 26 U.S.C. § 501(m)(1). Accordingly, the
Commissioner revoked Health Plans’ tax-exempt status, retroactive to January 1,
1987, and denied exemptions to Care and Group.
Health Plans, Care, and Group brought suit in the United States Tax Court,
seeking a declaratory judgment reversing the Commissioner’s adverse
determinations. On September 25, 2001, the Tax Court affirmed the
Commissioner’s conclusions in three separate opinions. IHC Health Plans, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 593 (2001); IHC Group, Inc. v. Commissioner,
82 T.C.M. (CCH) 606 (2001); IHC Care, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH)
617 (2001). 8 This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
We review Tax Court decisions “in the same manner and to the same extent
8
The Tax Court did not consider the Commissioner’s alternative conclusion
under 26 U.S.C. § 501(m)(1).
-8-
as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.” 26
U.S.C.§ 7482(a)(1). “Thus, we review factual questions for clear error, legal
questions de novo, and mixed questions of law and fact either for clear error or de
novo, depending on whether the question is primarily factual or legal.”
Consolidated Mfg. Inc. v. C.I.R., 249 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted). The appropriate legal standard for determining whether an organization
operates for a “charitable” purpose is a legal question, which we review de novo.
Whether an organization in fact operates exclusively for a charitable purpose,
however, is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. Florida Hosp.
Trust Fund v. C.I.R. , 71 F.3d 808, 810 (11th Cir. 1996); Living Faith, Inc. v.
C.I.R. , 950 F.2d 365, 371 (7th Cir. 1991). As the taxpayer claiming entitlement to
exemption, petitioners bear the burden of proof. Living Faith , 950 F.2d at 370
(citing cases).
B. Overview of Applicable Law
“Our analysis must start from the proposition that exemptions from income
tax are a matter of legislative grace.” Mutual Aid Ass’n of Church of the Brethren
v. United States , 759 F.2d 792, 794 (10th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). Thus, we
must narrowly construe exemptions from taxation. Bingler v. Johnson , 394 U.S.
741, 751-52 (1969) (recognizing the “principle that exemptions from taxation are
to be construed narrowly”). In this case, petitioners seek exemption under 26
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U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
Under section 501(c)(3), an organization must meet three requirements in
order to qualify for tax exemption: “(1) the corporation must be organized and
operated exclusively for exempt purposes; (2) no part of the corporation’s net
earnings may inure to the benefit of any shareholder or individual;[ 9
] and (3) the
corporation must not engage in political campaigns or, to a substantial extent, in
lobbying activities.” 10
Hutchinson Baseball Enters., Inc. v. C.I.R. , 696 F.2d 757,
760 (10th Cir. 1982). In this case, the sole question we must consider is whether
Health Plans, Care, and Group operated exclusively for exempt purposes within
the meaning of section 501(c)(3).
This element can be viewed as a corollary to the public-benefit
9
requirement under section 501(c)(3)’s definition of “charitable,” discussed infra.
Specifically, section 501(c)(3), in conjunction with section 501(a),
10
provides that the following organizations are exempt from taxation:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes,
or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but
only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office.
-10-
C. Whether Health Plans, Care, and Group Operated for a Charitable
Purpose.
This inquiry requires us to address two basic questions. First, we must
consider whether the purpose proffered by petitioners qualifies as a “charitable”
purpose under section 501(c)(3). “The term ‘charitable’ is used in section
501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is . . . not to be construed as
limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3).” 26 C.F.R.
§1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). An organization will not be considered charitable, however,
“unless it serves a public rather than a private interest .” 26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(3)-
1(d)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). 11
Second, we must determine whether petitioners in fact operated primarily
for this purpose. Geisinger Health Plan v. C.I.R., 985 F.2d 1210, 1219 (3d Cir.
1993) (Geisinger I). Under the “operational test” set forth in the IRS regulations,
“[a] n organization will be regarded as ‘operated exclusively’ for one or more
exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one
or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3). An organization
will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in
Although we are not bound by IRS regulations or revenue rulings, we do
11
accord them deference. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596
(1983) (“[T]his Court has long recognized the primary authority of the IRS and its
predecessors in construing the Internal Revenue Code.”).
-11-
furtherance of an exempt purpose.” 12 26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1).
In this case, the Tax Court concluded that “the promotion of health for the
benefit of the community is a charitable purpose,” Health Plans , 82 T.C.M. at
602, but found that neither Health Plans, Care, nor Group operated primarily to
benefit the community. Health Plans , 82 T.C.M. at 605; Care , 82 T.C.M. at 625;
Group , 82 T.C.M. at 615. For the reasons set forth below, we agree.
1. The promotion of health as a charitable purpose
In defining “charitable,” our analysis must focus on whether petitioners’
activities conferred a public benefit. 26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (“An
organization is not organized or operated exclusively for [an exempt purpose] . . .
unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.”). The public-benefit
requirement highlights the quid pro quo nature of tax exemptions: the public is
willing to relieve an organization from the burden of taxation in exchange for the
public benefit it provides. Geisinger I , 985 F.2d at 1215; cf. Flat Top Lake Ass’n
v. United States , 868 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1989) (“In many ways, exemption
from taxation may be seen as a democratic commonwealth’s method of
acknowledging the conferral of a universal benefit.”). As the Supreme Court has
12
The Supreme Court construed a similar provision under the Social
Security Act in Better Business Bureau v. United States, concluding that “a single
non-[exempt] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption
regardless of the number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes.” 326 U.S.
279, 283 (1945).
-12-
recognized, “[c]haritable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt
entity confers a public benefit – a benefit which the society or the community may
not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the
work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues.” Bob Jones Univ.
v. United States , 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (emphasis added).
a. Evolution of the “community benefit” standard
The IRS has long recognized that nonprofit hospitals may be exempt as
“charitable” entities under section 501(c)(3). See generally John D. Colombo,
Health Care Reform and Federal Tax Exemption: Rethinking the Issues , 29 W AKE
F OREST L. R EV . 215, 218 (1994). “Exemption for hospitals, in fact, is so
ingrained in the lore of taxation that today about half the states specifically
enumerate hospitals as exempt entities, alongside such traditional exemption
bulwarks as churches and educational institutions.” Id. at 215. Early on, the
touchstone for exemption was the provision of free or below-cost care. Id. at 217.
In 1956, the IRS published Rev. Rul. 56-185, which provided that a hospital
“must be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for
the services rendered and not exclusively for those who are able and expected to
pay.”
By the last part of the twentieth century, however, with the advent of
Medicare and Medicaid and the increased prevalence of private insurance,
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nonprofit hospitals moved away from this “relief of poverty” function. Colombo ,
supra , at 218. “The financing of their services evolved in parallel, from primary
dependence on the generosity of religious orders and charitable donors, to almost
exclusive reliance on payments for services rendered.” M. Gregg Bloche, Health
Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Charitable Exemption , 80
M INN . L. R EV . 299, 300 (1995).
In 1969, in response to the nonprofit hospital’s changing function, the IRS
modified its position regarding charity care. In Rev. Rul. 69-545, which modified
56-185, the IRS removed “the requirement[] relating to caring for patients without
charge or at rates below cost.” In its discussion, the IRS stated:
The promotion of health, like the relief of poverty and the
advancement of education and religion, is one of the purposes in the
general law of charity that is deemed beneficial to the community as
a whole even though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a
direct benefit from its activities does not include all members of the
community, such as indigent members of the community, provided
that the class is not so small that its relief is not of benefit to the
community.
Rev. Rul. 69-545. The hospital in question provided hospital care for all persons
in the community able to pay either directly or through third-party insurers. The
IRS also noted, however, that the hospital operated an emergency room open to
all persons regardless of ability to pay. 13
In addition, the hospital used surplus
13
In a subsequent ruling, the IRS characterized the hospital’s open
(continued...)
-14-
funds to improve patient care and finance medical training, education, and
research. Based on these factors, 14
the IRS concluded that the hospital was
“promoting the health of a class of persons . . . broad enough to benefit the
community.” Id.
(...continued)
13
emergency room as a “major factor” in its determination. Rev. Rul. 83-157.
14
The specific facts of the nonprofit hospital in Revenue Ruling 69-545 are
as follows:
Hospital A is a 250-bed community hospital. Its board of
trustees is composed of prominent citizens in the community.
Medical staff privileges in the hospital are available to all qualified
physicians in the area, consistent with the size and nature of its
facilities. The hospital has 150 doctors on its active staff and 200
doctors on its courtesy staff. It also owns a medical office building
on its premises with space for 60 doctors. Any member of its active
medical staff has the privilege of leasing available office space.
Rents are set at rates comparable to those of other commercial
buildings in the area.
The hospital operates a full time emergency room and no one
requiring emergency care is denied treatment. The hospital otherwise
ordinarily limits admissions to those who can pay the cost of their
hospitalization, either themselves, or through private health
insurance, or with the aid of public programs such as Medicare.
Patients who cannot meet the financial requirements for admission
are ordinarily referred to another hospital in the community that does
serve indigent patients.
The hospital usually ends each year with an excess of
operating receipts over operating disbursements from its hospital
operations. Excess funds are generally applied to expansion and
replacement of existing facilities and equipment, amortization of
indebtedness, improvement in patient care, and medical training,
education, and research.
-15-
Finally, in Revenue Ruling 83-157, the IRS amplified its prior ruling in 69-
545. The hospital in 83-157 was identical to the hospital in 69-545, 15
except that
it did not operate an emergency room open to all regardless of ability to pay. In
eschewing any rigid test under section 501(c)(3), the IRS made clear that although
“[g]enerally, operation of a full time emergency room providing emergency
medical services to all members of the public regardless of their ability to pay for
such services is strong evidence that a hospital is operating to benefit the
community . . . other significant factors . . . may be considered.” Rev. Rul. 83-
157. The IRS went on to conclude that the hospital did in fact operate for the
benefit of the community, noting that the hospital treated patients participating in
Medicare and Medicaid and applied any surplus funds to improve facilities,
equipment, and patient care, and advance its medical training, education, and
research.
Thus, under the IRS’s interpretation of section 501(c)(3), in the context of
health-care providers, we must determine whether the taxpayer operates primarily
for the benefit of the community . 16 And while the concept of “community benefit”
15
See note 14, supra, for the facts of Rev. Rul. 69-545.
16
In interpreting these three rulings, court decisions have highlighted
several factors relevant under the “community benefit” analysis. These factors
include:
(1) size of the class eligible to benefit;
(continued...)
-16-
is somewhat amorphous, we agree with the IRS, the Tax Court, and the Third
Circuit that it provides a workable standard for determining tax exemption under
section 501(c)(3).
b. Defining “community benefit”
In giving form to the community-benefit standard, we stress that “not every
activity that promotes health supports tax exemption under § 501(c)(3). For
example, selling prescription pharmaceuticals certainly promotes health, but
pharmacies cannot qualify for . . . exemption under § 501(c)(3) on that basis
alone.” Rev. Rul. 98-15. In other words, engaging in an activity that promotes
health, standing alone , offers an insufficient indicium of an organization’s
purpose. Numerous for-profit enterprises offer products or services that promote
health.
Similarly, the IRS rulings in 69-545 and 83-157 demonstrate that an
organization cannot satisfy the community-benefit requirement based solely on
16
(...continued)
(2) free or below-cost products or services;
(3) treatment of persons participating in governmental
programs such as Medicare or Medicaid;
(4) use of surplus funds for research or educational programs;
and
(5) composition of the board of trustees.
See, e.g., Geisinger I, 985 F.2d at 1218; see generally Sound Health Ass’n v.
C.I.R., 71 T.C. 158 (1978); Douglas M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the
Contemporary Nonprofit Hospital, 32 S T . L OUIS U. L.J. 1015, 1037-70 (1988).
-17-
the fact that it offers health-care services to all in the community 17
in exchange
for a fee. 18
Although providing health-care products or services to all in the
community is necessary under those rulings, it is insufficient, standing alone, to
qualify for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3). Rather, the organization must
provide some additional “plus.”
This plus is perhaps best characterized as “a benefit which the society or
the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements
and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues.”
Bob Jones Univ. , 461 U.S. at 591. Concerning the former, the IRS rulings
provide a number of examples: providing free or below-cost services, see Rev.
Rul. 56-185; maintaining an emergency room open to all, regardless of ability to
pay, see Rev. Rul. 69-545; and devoting surpluses to research, education, and
17
We recognize that certain health-care entities provide specialized
services, which are not required by “all” in the community, and we do not mean to
foreclose the possibility that such entities may qualify as “charitable” under
section 501(c)(3). As the IRS recognized in Rev. Rul. 83-157:
Certain specialized hospitals, such as eye hospitals and cancer
hospitals, offer medical care limited to special conditions unlikely to
necessitate emergency care and do not, as a practical matter, maintain
emergency rooms. These organizations may also qualify under
section 501(c)(3) if there are present similar, significant factors that
demonstrate that the hospitals operate exclusively to benefit the
community.
At least where the fee is above cost. We express no opinion on whether
18
an enterprise that sold health-promoting products or services entirely at or below
cost would qualify for tax exemption under 501(c)(3).
-18-
medical training, see Rev. Rul. 83-157. These services fall under the general
umbrella of “positive externalities” or “public goods.” Bloche, supra , at 312. 19
Concerning the latter, the primary way in which health-care providers advance
government-funded endeavors is the servicing of the Medicaid and Medicare
populations.
c. Quantifying “community benefit”
Difficulties will inevitably arise in quantifying the required community
benefit. The governing statutory language, however, provides some guidance.
Under section 501(c)(3), an organization is not entitled to tax exemption unless it
operates for a charitable purpose . Thus, the existence of some incidental
community benefit is insufficient. Rather, the magnitude of the community
benefit conferred must be sufficient to give rise to a strong inference that the
organization operates primarily for the purpose of benefitting the community .
Geisinger I , 985 F.2d at 1219.
19
Under the Treasury Department’s view, for-profit enterprises are unlikely
to provide such services since “‘market prices . . . do not reflect the benefit [these
services] confer on the community as a whole.’” Bloche, supra, at 312 (quoting
Tax-Exempt Status of Hospitals, and Establishment of Charity Care Standards:
Hearing before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 34-
37 (1991) (statement of Michael J. Graetz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury)). Thus, the provision of such “public goods”
– at least when conducted on a sufficiently large scale – arguably supports an
inference that the enterprise is responding to some inducement that is not market-
based. Cf. id.
-19-
Thus, our inquiry turns “not [on] the nature of the activity, but [on] the
purpose accomplished thereby.” 20
Bethel Conservative Mennonite Church v.
C.I.R. , 746 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). Of course, because
of the inherent difficulty in determining a corporate entity’s subjective purpose,
we necessarily rely on objective indicia in conducting our analysis. Geisinger I ,
985 F.2d at 1215 (citation omitted). In determining an organization’s purpose, we
primarily consider the manner in which the entity carries on its activities. Living
Faith , 950 F.2d at 372 (citing cases).
d. The resulting test
In summary, under section 501(c)(3), a health-care provider must make its
services available to all in the community plus provide additional community or
public benefits. The benefit must either further the function of government-
funded institutions or provide a service that would not likely be provided within
the community but for the subsidy. Further, the additional public benefit
conferred must be sufficient to give rise to a strong inference that the public
benefit is the primary purpose for which the organization operates. In conducting
this inquiry, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Geisinger I , 985 F.2d
20
As the Third Circuit has noted, “‘[w]hen the legality of an action depends
not upon its surface manifestation but upon the undisclosed motivation of the
actor, similar acts can lead to diametrically opposite legal consequences.’”
Geisinger I , 985 F.2d at 1215 (quotation omitted).
-20-
at 1219. With these principles in mind, we proceed to review the Tax Court’s
decision in the present case.
2. The Tax Court correctly defined “charitable” and applied the
appropriate legal test under 501(c)(3).
Petitioners first contend that the Tax Court erred in its conclusion
regarding the applicable law. Based upon our discussion supra , we disagree. The
Tax Court correctly recognized the “promotion of health for the benefit of the
community” as a charitable purpose. Health Plans , 82 T.C.M. at 602 (“[I]t is now
well settled that the promotion of health for the benefit of the community is a
charitable purpose.”). Further, the Tax Court considered the community-benefit
requirement based on the totality of the circumstances. 21
Id. at 604 (“The
community benefit test requires consideration of a variety of factors that indicate
whether an organization is involved in the charitable activity of promoting health
on a communitywide basis . . . . Considering all the facts and circumstances . . .
we conclude that petitioner did not provide a meaningful community benefit.”).
Thus, the Tax Court did not err in determining the applicable law.
3. The Tax Court correctly concluded that petitioners do not
21
Because the community-benefit requirement is considered under a
totality-of-the-circumstances test, we reject petitioners’ challenge to the Tax
Court’s reliance on any one of the numerous factors cited in support of its
conclusion.
-21-
operate primarily to promote health for the benefit of the
community.
Petitioners next argue that the Tax Court erred in concluding that
petitioners did not operate primarily for the benefit of the community. We
disagree.
a. Nature of the product or service and the character of the
transaction
In this case, we deal with organizations that do not provide health-care
services directly. Rather, petitioners furnish group insurance entitling enrollees
to services of participating hospitals and physicians. Petitioners determine
premiums using two methods: (1) an adjusted community rating for individuals
and small employers; and (2) past-claims experience for large employers. Thus,
as in Church of the Brethren , petitioners “sell[] insurance coverage . . .
extend[ing] benefits in return for a premium based generally on the risk
assumed.” 759 F.2d at 795. In other words, petitioners primarily perform a “risk-
bearing function.” Cf. Bloche, supra , at 399. In Church of the Brethren , as in the
instant case, the commercial nature of this activity inspired doubt as to the
entity’s charitable purpose. 759 F.2d at 795; cf. Federation Pharmacy Servs., Inc.
v. C.I.R. , 72 T.C. 687, 691-92 (1979), aff’d 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting
that selling pharmaceuticals is “an activity that is normally carried on by a
-22-
commercial profitmaking enterprise[]”). Where, as here, “[i]t is difficult to
distinguish the plaintiff corporation from a mutual insurance company,” Hassett v.
Assoc. Hosp. Serv. Corp. of Mass. , 125 F.2d 611, 614 (1st Cir. 1942), we must
carefully scrutinize the organization’s operation. 22
Cf. Church of the Brethren ,
759 F.2d at 795; Am. Ass’n of Christian Schools Voluntary Employees Beneficiary
Ass’n Welfare Plan Trust by Janney v. United States , 850 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th
Cir. 1988) (“Since the Trust has a substantial private purpose to provide insurance
in return for premiums, it is not an organization exclusively engaged in the
promotion of the social welfare.”). 23
b. Free or below-cost products or services
The fact that an activity is normally undertaken by commercial for-profit
entities does not necessarily preclude tax exemption, particularly where the entity
offers its services at or below-cost. Cf. Bloche, supra , at 311 n.31. But
We recognize that an activity that is not “inherently charitable” may
22
nonetheless further a charitable purpose. Rev. Rul. 69-572. Thus, we do not
accord dispositive weight to this (or any other) factor.
23
We are primarily concerned with this characteristic as it bears on our
determination of petitioners’ purpose. However, we also note that petitioners not
only resemble commercial insurance providers, petitioners in fact compete with
commercial insurance providers. Thus, “granting a tax exemption to [petitioners]
would necessarily disadvantage other for-profit [entities] with which [petitioners]
compete[].” Federation Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. C.I.R., 625 F.2d 804, 808 (8th
Cir. 1980) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n, Inc., 425 U.S.
1, 17-18 (1976)).
-23-
petitioners provide virtually no free or below-cost health-care services. 24
All
enrollees must pay a premium in order to receive benefits. 25
As the Eighth Circuit
has recognized, “[a]n organization which does not extend some of its benefits to
individuals financially unable to make the required payments [generally] reflects a
commercial activity rather than a charitable one.” Federation Pharmacy Servs.,
Inc. v. C.I.R. , 625 F.2d 804, 807 (8th Cir. 1980). Further, the fact that petitioners
in no way subsidize dues for those who cannot afford subscribership distinguishes
this case from the HMOs in Sound Health Ass’n v. C.I.R. , 71 T.C. 158 (1979), and
Geisinger I , 985 F.2d at 1219.
We acknowledge, as did the Tax Court, that petitioners’ “adjusted
community rating system[] likely allowed its enrollees to obtain medical care at a
lower cost than might otherwise have been available.” Care , 82 T.C.M. at 625;
Group , 82 T.C.M. at 615. Again, however, selling services at a discount tells us
little about the petitioners’ purpose . “Many profitmaking organizations sell at a
discount.” Federation Pharmacy , 72 T.C. at 692, aff’d 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.
1980). In considering price as it relates to an organization’s purpose, there is a
Health Plans did apparently conduct some free health screenings in 1999.
24
Health Plans, 82 T.C.M. at 605.
25
Petitioners note that Care and Group offered “risk” and “cost” Medicare
health plans, and contend that Care and Group went forward with these plans
“with the full knowledge that those plans might lose money.” Care and Group
discontinued these plans, however, based on concerns of “financial feasibility.”
-24-
qualitative difference between selling at a discount and selling below cost. 26
In sum, petitioners sole activity is arranging for health-care services in
exchange for a fee. To elevate the attendant health benefit over the character of
the transaction would pervert Congress’ intent in providing for charitable tax
exemptions under section 501(c)(3). Contrary to petitioners’ insinuation, the Tax
Court did not accord dispositive weight to the absence of free care. Neither do
we. Rather, it is yet another factor that belies petitioners’ professions of a
charitable purpose. 27
c. Research and educational programs
Nothing in the record indicates that petitioners conducted research or
offered free educational programs to the public. 28
This bolsters our conclusion
that petitioners did not operate for the purpose of promoting health for the benefit
of the community.
26
Further, as the Tax Court noted, “the benefit associated with these cost
savings is more appropriately characterized as a benefit to petitioner[s]’ enrollees
as opposed to the community at large.” Care, 82 T.C.M. at 625; Group, 82
T.C.M. at 615.
As the Eighth Circuit has noted, “a ‘charitable’ hospital may impose
27
charges or fees for services rendered, and indeed its charity record may be
comparatively low depending upon all the facts . . . but a serious question is
raised where its charitable operation is virtually inconsequential.” Federation
Pharmacy, 625 F.2d at 807 (8th Cir. 1980) (quoting Sonora Cmty. Hosp. v. C.I.R.,
46 T.C. 519, 526 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As the Tax Court noted, petitioners’ Core Wellness Program was offered
28
exclusively to enrollees.
-25-
d. The class eligible to benefit
(1) Health Plans
As the Tax Court noted, “[Health Plans] offered its [coverage] to a broad
cross-section of the community including individuals, the employees of both large
and small employers, and individuals eligible for Medicaid benefits.” Health
Plans , 82 T.C.M. at 604. In fact, in 1999, Health Plans’ enrollees represented
twenty percent of Utah’s total population and fifty percent of Utah residents
eligible for Medicaid benefits. 29
Nevertheless, even though almost all Utahans were potentially eligible to
enroll for Health Plans coverage, the self-imposed requirement of membership
tells us something about Health Plans’ operation. As the Third Circuit noted in
Geisinger I :
The community benefitted is, in fact, limited to those who belong to
[the HMO] since the requirement of subscribership remains a
condition precedent to any service. Absent any additional indicia of
a charitable purpose, this self-imposed precondition suggests that
[the HMO] is primarily benefitting itself (and, perhaps, secondarily
benefitting the community) by promoting subscribership throughout
the areas it serves.
985 F.2d at 1219. Further, w hile the absence of a large class of potential
We acknowledge that Health Plans’ service to Utah’s Medicaid
29
community provides some community benefit. The relevant inquiry, however, is
not “whether [petitioner] benefitted the community at all . . . [but] whether it
primarily benefitted the community, as an entity must in order to qualify for tax-
exempt status.” Geisinger I, 985 F.2d at 1219.
-26-
beneficiaries may preclude tax-exempt status, its presence standing alone provides
little insight into the organization’s purpose. Offering products and services to a
broad segment of the population is as consistent with self promotion and profit
maximization as it is with any “charitable” purpose.
(2) Care and Group
Neither Care nor Group offered their health plans to the general public.
Rather, both Care and Group limited their enrollment to employees of large
employers (employers with 100 or more employees). Thus, as the Tax Court
found, “[Care and Group] operate[d] in a manner that substantially limit[ed] [the]
universe of potential enrollees.” Care , 82 T.C.M. at 625; Group , 82 T.C.M. at
615. Based on this finding, the Tax Court correctly concluded that neither Care
nor Group promoted health for the benefit of the community.
e. Community board of trustees
Finally, we consider petitioners’ board composition. Prior to 1996, Health
Plans’ bylaws provided that “[a] plurality of Board members shall represent the
buyer-employer community and an approximately equal number of physicians and
hospitals representatives shall be appointed.” As the IRS noted, Health Plans’
pre-1996 bylaws skewed control towards subscribers, rather than the community
at large. In 1996, however, Health Plans amended its bylaws to require that a
majority of board members be disinterested and broadly representative of the
-27-
community.
It makes little difference whether we consider petitioners’ board prior to
1996 or following the amendments. Even if we were to conclude petitioners’
board broadly represents the community, the dearth of any actual community
benefit in this case rebuts any inference we might otherwise draw.
4. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we agree with the Tax Court’s conclusion that
petitioners, standing alone, do not qualify for tax exemption under section
501(c)(3).
D. Whether Petitioners Qualify for Tax-Exempt Status as an “Integral
Part” of Health Services.
Petitioners contend that even if they do not qualify for tax exemption
standing alone, they qualify based on the fact that their activities are an “integral
part” of Health Services, essential to Health Services in accomplishing its tax-
exempt purpose. We disagree.
In general, “separately incorporated entities must qualify for tax exemption
on their own merits.” Geisinger Health Plan v. C.I.R. , 30 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir.
1994) ( Geisinger II ) (citing Church of the Brethren , 759 F.2d at 795 n.3). Several
circuits, however, have recognized a so-called “exception” to this general rule,
commonly called the integral-part doctrine. See, e.g., id. (“[The] ‘integral part
-28-
doctrine’ . . . may best be described as an exception to the general rule that
entitlement to exemption is derived solely from an entity’s own characteristics.”);
Tex. Learning Tech. Group v. C.I.R. , 958 F.2d 122, 126 (5th Cir. 1992); Squire v.
Students Book Corp. , 191 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1951). Under the integral-
part doctrine, where an organization’s sole activity is an “integral part” of an
exempt affiliate’s activities, the organization may derive its exemption from that
of its affiliate. Geisinger II , 30 F.3d at 498; see also Geisinger I , 985 F.2d at
1220 (“The integral part doctrine provides a means by which organizations may
qualify for exemption vicariously through related organizations, as long as they
are engaged in activities which would be exempt if the related organizations
engaged in them, and as long as those activities are furthering the exempt
purposes of the related organizations.”).
To the extent the integral-part doctrine rests on a derivative theory of
exemption, it runs contrary to two fundamental tenets of tax law: (1) the
“doctrine of corporate entity,” under which a corporation is a separate and distinct
taxable entity; 30 and (2) the canon of statutory interpretation requiring strict
construction of exemptions from taxation. 31 Bingler , 394 U.S. at 751-52. IHC
See, e.g., Moline Prop. v. C.I.R., 319 U.S. 436, 438 (1943); Church of the
30
Brethren, 759 F.2d at 795 n.3.
As the Third Circuit noted in Geisinger II, the “integral-part doctrine” is
31
not codified. 30 F.3d at 499. Although it finds support in 26 C.F.R. § 1.502-1(b),
(continued...)
-29-
separately incorporated Health Services, Health Plans, Care, and Group. “It
cannot now escape the tax consequences of that choice, no matter how bona fide
its motives or longstanding its arrangements.” Nat’l Carbide Corp. v. C.I.R. , 336
U.S. 422, 439 (1949). Further, we reject petitioners’ contention that the integral-
part doctrine constitutes a “less rigorous” road to tax exemption. The rigor of the
charitable-purpose requirement remains constant, regardless of the theory upon
which the taxpayer bases its entitlement to tax exemption under section 501(c)(3).
Nevertheless, to the extent the integral-part doctrine recognizes that we
should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining an organization’s
purpose, the doctrine is in accord with our section 501(c)(3) jurisprudence. One
of the myriad factors we may consider in determining an organization’s purpose is
whether an essential nexus exists between an organization seeking tax exemption
and a tax-exempt affiliate. The example cited in the Treasury Regulations aptly
illustrates the point: “a subsidiary organization which is operated for the sole
purpose of furnishing electric power used by its parent organization, a tax-exempt
educational organization, in carrying on its educational activities.” 32
26 C.F.R.
(...continued)
31
it must ultimately be justified under section 501(c)(3) and its charitable-purpose
requirement.
We need not decide whether such an organization operates for an exempt
32
purpose per se. We merely note that these facts would suggest that the subsidiary
operates for an exempt purpose.
-30-
§ 1.502-1(b). In other words, as we interpret the integral-part doctrine, it simply
recognizes that “[t]he performance of a particular activity that is not inherently
charitable may nonetheless further a charitable purpose.” Rev. Rul. 69-572. “The
overall result in any given case is dependent on why and how that activity is
actually being conducted.” Id. (emphasis added).
Using the example cited in Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b), if we were to
consider the nature of the subsidiary’s activity in isolation – furnishing electricity
– we would have no indication that the subsidiary serves an exempt purpose. On
the other hand, when we look at the totality of the circumstances, it becomes clear
that the subsidiary’s activity furthers the exempt purpose of education: the
product provided is essential; the subsidiary furnishes its product solely to the
tax-exempt affiliate; 33
and the tax-exempt parent exercises control over the
33
The IRS contrasted the following hypothetical:
[T]he subsidiary organization is not exempt from tax if it is operated
for the primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business which
would be an unrelated trade or business (that is, unrelated to exempt
activities) if regularly carried on by the parent organization. For
example, if a subsidiary organization is operated primarily for the
purpose of furnishing electric power to consumers other than its
parent organization (and the parent’s tax-exempt subsidiary
organizations), it is not exempt since such business would be an
unrelated trade or business if regularly carried on by the parent
organization.
26 C.F.R. § 1.502-1(b).
-31-
subsidiary. These facts, considered in conjunction with the exempt purpose for
which the tax-exempt parent operates, support a strong inference that the
subsidiary operates for the same exempt purpose as does the parent.
In this case, we need not decide whether petitioners provide a service
necessary to Health Services in conducting its exempt activities. The required
nexus between the activities of petitioners and Health Services is lacking. As the
Tax Court noted, “petitioner[s]’ enrollees received approximately 20 percent of
their physician services from physicians employed by or contracting with Health
Services, while petitioner contracted for the remaining 80 percent of such
physician services directly with independent physicians.” Health Plans , 82
T.C.M. at 606. Thus, unlike the subsidiary furnishing electricity in Treasury
Regulation § 1.502-1(b), petitioners do not function solely to further Health
Services’ performance of its exempt activities. Rather, a substantial portion
(eighty percent) 34
of petitioners’ enrollees received physician services from
The following table, taken from petitioners’ brief, presents a percentage
34
breakdown of petitioners’ total billings for physician services:
Year Employed Not employed/ Not employed/
Panel Non-panel
1997 23.4 % 64.3 % 12.3 %
1998 22.1 % 65.8 % 12.1 %
1999 20.5 % 69.2 % 10.3 %
(continued...)
-32-
“physicians with no direct link to [Health Services].” 35
Health Plans , 82 T.C.M.
at 606. Thus, our consideration of petitioners’ “connectedness” to Health
Services in no way detracts from our earlier conclusion that petitioners do not
qualify for a charitable tax exemption under section 501(c)(3).
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the Tax Court’s decision denying
petitioners tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
34
(...continued)
“Employed” includes those physicians employed by Health Services’ Physician
Division. “Not employed/Panel” includes independent contractors who had
medical staff privileges at a Health Services hospital. “Not employed/Non-panel”
includes all other physicians.
35
We recognize that when we consider petitioners standing alone, drawing
a distinction between a “staff-model HMO” (as in Sound Health) and a “contract
HMO” (as in Geisinger and here) may not make sense. Colombo, supra, at 245.
“[T]he ‘community benefits’ attributable to a particular [HMO] are the same
whether treatment is performed by employee physicians or independent
contractors pursuant to a service agreement.” Id. at 245-46. Under the integral-
part doctrine, however, the distinction is highly relevant, since we seek to
determine whether an essential nexus exists between petitioners’ operations and
those of Health Services, the tax-exempt affiliate.
-33-
IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2003-04-09
Citations: 325 F.3d 1188
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