In re Aiden J.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 221
Docket: Som-17-255
Submitted
On Briefs: November 29, 2017
Decided: December 7, 2017

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

IN RE AIDEN J. et al.

PER CURIAM

[¶1] The mother of Logan J., Aiden J., Marissa J., Belladonna J., and

Jessie B. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Skowhegan, Nale, J.)

terminating her parental rights to her five children pursuant to 22 M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2016).1 She challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence to support both the court’s finding of parental

unfitness and its determination that termination is in the children’s best

interests. The mother also argues that the Department of Health and Human

Services failed to comply with 22 M.R.S § 4041 (2016) because it did not

provide the mother with Home Community Treatment (HCT) services. We

affirm the judgment.

1 The children’s father consented to the termination of his parental rights and is not a party to

this appeal.
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[¶2] Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found by

clear and convincing evidence that the mother (1) is unable to protect the

children from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within

a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs; and (2) is

unable to take responsibility for the children within a time that is reasonably

calculated to meet the children’s needs. See 22 M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). The court also found that termination of the

mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. See 22 M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). We review factual findings supporting the unfitness

determination for clear error and apply the same standard to the factual

findings supporting the best interest determination, although we review the

court’s ultimate conclusion that termination is in the children’s best interests

for an abuse of discretion. See In re M.B., 2013 ME 46, ¶ 37, 65 A.3d 1260.

[¶3] The court based its determinations on the following findings of

fact:

There is . . . no question that [the mother] has made some
progress participating in the services that were designed to help
her address her mental-health issues. . . . However, the progress
that [the mother] has made in reunifying with her children over
the past seventeen-to-twenty-two months is insufficient to meet
these five children’s needs, as explained by [the psychologist] in
his Court Ordered Diagnostic Evaluation and expanded upon in
his testimony. The Court accepts [the psychologist’s] conclusions
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and assigns a great weight and credibility to his report and
testimony. Based on [the psychologist’s] evaluation and
testimony, the Court finds that [the mother] is not yet close to
alleviating jeopardy.

The critical issue, for [the mother], is her ability to protect
the children and take responsibility for them. The original
jeopardy with regard to all five children centered around [the
mother’s] inability to provide the children adequate supervision
and care. With regard to this, the issue of [the mother’s] relative
parental fitness, the Court is most persuaded by [the
psychologist]. His written evaluation, in conjunction with his
testimony, demonstrated to the Court the troublingly high
probability that the progress she has made, such as it is, would
collapse if these children were returned to her custody.

At the outset, [the psychologist] was asked to assess
whether [the mother] is “capable of providing for the needs of
these five children, including two [Logan and Aiden] which have
been specifically identified with special needs.” He answered
simply: “By herself, no.” Having heard from all the children’s
foster parents, and the counselors for Logan and Aiden, the Court
is familiar with these five children’s particular needs. The Court
agrees with [the psychologist] and finds that, by herself, [the
mother] is simply not capable of providing for [the children].

. . . .

Based on the complete picture of the evidence before it, but
particularly [the psychologist’s] report and testimony, the Court
finds that it is essentially a full-time task for [the mother] to tend
to her own high needs. The Court recognizes that, in answering
“[b]y herself, no,” [the psychologist] raised the possibility that,
with the assistance of a capable adult, it is conceivable that [the
mother] could find some way to meet these five children’s needs
someday. However, looking at all the evidence, and in particular
[the mother’s husband’s] own live testimony, the Court is unable
to find that [the mother’s] husband is a person who is capable of
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helping her sufficiently shorten the substantial amount of time it
would take her to alleviate the persistent jeopardy that was first
found to exist in September of 2015.

[The mother] finds herself in tragic circumstances. In her
testimony, she asked for acknowledgment that where she finds
herself today is not entirely the result of choices that she has
made. The Court does acknowledge that. She has been abused in
her life. That is not her fault.

However, as evidenced by her own testimony, [the mother]
still does not have an adequate understanding as to what effect
her own mental-health challenges have already had—and are
highly likely to continue having—on her children. What she must
do to protect and take responsibility for these five children, she
cannot do in a timely manner[,] if she can do it at all.

After twenty-two months out of their mother’s care for
Logan, Aiden, Marissa, and Belladonna, and seventeen months out
of her mother’s care for Jessie, and with no clear path forward for
the mother to alleviate jeopardy any time soon, the law demands
permanency for these children so that they can be happy, healthy,
safe, and productive. [The psychologist], in his written report,
informed this Court that, after studying the mother, he “does not
have any idea of how long treatment would have to take place for
her to be able to parent these children.”

[¶4] Given these findings and the court’s other specific findings of fact,

all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did

not err in its finding of parental unfitness, nor did it err or abuse its discretion

in determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights, with a

permanency plan of adoption, is in the children’s best interests. See
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In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430; In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123,

¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297.

[¶5] The mother contends that the court’s findings are nonetheless

unsupported by the record because the Department failed to comply with

22 M.R.S. § 4041, specifically by failing to provide her with HCT.2 To the

contrary, the record shows that the Department developed a reunification

plan that clearly outlined the safety goals and services in which the mother

needed to engage, offered the mother numerous reunification services,3 and

made a good faith effort to cooperate with and seek the participation of the

mother throughout these proceedings. See generally 22 M.R.S. § 4041.

Despite the Department’s reunification efforts, the mother was still

unsuccessful in reunifying with the children.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

2 The mother requested HCT but was never offered this service. The testimony from the
Department in this case indicates that this service was not recommended for the mother and her
children because the mother lacked consistency in her participation in visitation with her children
and she was still struggling with her mental health stability. Regardless, “[e]ven if the Department
had not made reasonable efforts to reunify, which is not the case here, that failure alone does not
preclude a termination of parental rights.” In re Danika B., 2017 ME 209, ¶ 4, --- A.3d ---.

3 These services included, among others, transportation services, mental health counseling,

medication management, domestic violence counseling, supervised visitation with the children,
family team meetings, and the aid of a number of caseworkers.
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Richard W. McCarthy, Jr., Esq., Pittsfield, for appellant mother

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services

Skowhegan District Court docket numbers PC-2015-38 and PC-2015-72
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY