It was clearly the intention of this testator to provide, at all events and under all circumstances, for the comfortable support of his wife so long as she should remain his widow. He gives her by the first clause of his will “ the rents, interest and entire income ” of all his estate, real and personal, after payment of his just debts and funeral ex-, penses, to have, use and enjoy the same as long as she shall remain his widow. And he adds: “ It is my desire that if during the life of my wife she and my son ” (referring to his son Aaron, who has since deceased) “ shall have their home together, and if the entire income of my estate shall prove insufficient to the comfortable support and maintenance of my said wife (or of both, if my wife and son continue to reside together), then I authorize and direct my said executors, from time to time, to pay and advance to my said wife, out of the principal of my estate, such sum or sums of money as may be requisite or proper to provide for her or them such comfortable support and maintenance. The above provision for my wife shall be in lieu and in bar of dower and all other claims of hers upon my estate.”
It is a familiar rule of law, that, as between life tenant and remainderman under a will, the burden of taxes and repairs must ordinarily be borne by the
In providing for his son and for the children of his son in the event of. their father’s death, he does not, as the respondent’s counsel claim, devise and bequeath the remainder after a mere life estate; he devises and bequeaths only such part of his possessions as may be left at the widow’s death, after every penny needed
John W. Blanck, a nephew of the testator, formerly filed his account as such in 1885. That account shows that from the death of her husband until June, 1878, Mrs. Blanck received from the estate $6,448, or at the rate of nearly $1,300 per year. From June, 1878, to June, 1885, she received $3,332.50, or at the rate of about $475 per year. She should not be stinted to this amount nor be compelled to regulate her mode of life according to the standard which the administratrix seeks to apply.
I strongly intimated, in my memorandum of July 2d, that I might have refused to grant this respondent letters, if I had felt at liberty to do so under the law. There seemed to me reason to apprehend that the petitioner would not receive at her hands the consideration to which she is entitled under the will. The evidence now before me shows that my apprehensions were not without substantial foundation. The course which the administratrix has pursued has
A decree may be entered directing the payment to the petitioner of $325. Such portion of that sum should be paid out of income as the amount of income now on hand will justify; the remainder should be paid out of the principal. The decree must fix these sums definitely, and if counsel disagree in the premises their differences will be adjusted by the court. Counsel for the petitioner has suggested that she will be content for the future if she shall be permitted to continue in the occupancy of the premises now devoted to her use and shall receive the sum of $50 per month. It is not necessary, and perhaps not proper, to give any direction at present in this regard. But it is hoped that some agreement may be arrived at which will be satisfactory to all parties in interest and prevent useless and expensive litigation.