In Re: Chase Hunter v.

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1981

In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,

Appellant.

No. 15-1985

In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,

Appellant.

No. 15-2128

In Re: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,

Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:15-cv-00414-HEH; 3:15-cv-00336-HEH; 3:15-cv-00206-
HEH)

Submitted: January 26, 2016 Decided: April 7, 2016

Before DUNCAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chase Carmen Hunter, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Chase Carmen Hunter

challenges the district court’s dismissal of Hunter’s complaints

as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2012).

On appeal, Hunter argues that (1) the district judge should have

recused himself, (2) the district court’s orders did not comply

with Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) or 58, and (3) she is entitled to

the relief sought.

Because Hunter failed to seek recusal in the district

court, she has failed to preserve this issue for appellate

review. Accord Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d

572, 592 (4th Cir. 2015). We discern no exceptional or

extraordinary circumstances in this case justifying review of

this issue on its merits. Id.; see Corti v. Storage Tech.

Corp., 304 F.3d 336, 343 (4th Cir. 2002) (Niemeyer, J.,

concurring) (“[I]t remains the law of this circuit that when a

party to a civil action fails to raise a point at trial, that

party waives review of the issue unless there are exceptional or

extraordinary circumstances justifying review.”).

We next review for abuse of discretion the district court’s

decision to dismiss Hunter’s petitions under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

Michau v. Charleston Cty., 434 F.3d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 2006)

(identifying standard of review). Hunter contends that the

district court’s order should be overturned because, by failing

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to make specific findings of fact, it did not comply with Fed.

R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) or 58. Hunter misconstrues these rules.

Rule 52(a)(1) requires that a district court, “[i]n an action

tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,

. . . find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law

separately,” and enter judgment in accordance with Rule 58.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). Rule 58 provides general rules

regarding the entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. The

district court violated neither of these rules. Because the

action did not go to trial, Rule 52(a)(1) is inapplicable. Rule

58 does not require the district court to make findings of fact.

In her final argument, Hunter reiterates the allegations

contained in her petitions for declaratory judgment, and claims

that she was entitled to relief. First, the district court

properly found that the relief she sought in her first petition

had already been denied by the district court, and was

subsequently denied by this court. In re: Hunter, No.

3:14-cv-00648 (E.D. Va. PACER Nos. 2, 4), aff’d, 621 F. App’x

253 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2062). Second, we find no error in

the district court’s dismissal of Hunter’s conclusory challenge

to the constitutionality of a Virginia statute. Finally, we

agree with the district court’s determination that it lacked

jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in her third petition.

See Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718-19 (4th

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Cir. 2006) (holding that “state-court loser” seeking redress in

federal district court asserts claim that “is, by definition,

‘inextricably intertwined’ with” state court decision and

therefore outside federal court’s jurisdiction).

Hunter has filed numerous frivolous appeals and petitions

for mandamus in the last two years. Hunter is warned that

similar filings in the future may result in issuance of an order

to show cause why a prefiling injunction or other sanctions

should not be entered against her by this court.

We dismiss Hunter’s appeals as frivolous. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED