In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System & Source

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

IN RE: THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION ) Arizona Supreme Court
OF ALL RIGHTS TO USE WATER IN ) No. WC-02-0003-IR
THE GILA RIVER SYSTEM AND SOURCE. )
) Maricopa County
) Superior Court
) Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3, W-4
) (Consolidated)
)
) [Contested Case No. W1-206]
)
) O P I N I O N
__________________________________)

Interlocutory Appeal from the Superior Court of Maricopa County
The Honorable Eddward P. Ballinger, Jr., Judge

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

SPARKS, TEHAN & RYLEY, P.C. Scottsdale
By Joe P. Sparks
John H. Ryley
Susan B. Montgomery
Robyn L. Kline
Attorneys for San Carlos Apache Tribe

RYLEY CARLOCK & APPLEWHITE, P.A. Phoenix
By John C. Lemaster
Michael J. Brophy
Cynthia M. Chandley
Sean T. Hood
William A. Richards
Attorneys for Phelps Dodge Corporation

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Washington, D.C.
By Kelly A. Johnson
Patrick Barry
John L. Smeltzer
Attorneys for the United States
FENNEMORE CRAIG, P.C. Phoenix
By Lauren J. Caster
Michael J. Pearce
Thomas R. Wilmoth
Attorneys for ASARCO L.L.C.

SALMON, LEWIS & WELDON, P.L.C. Phoenix
By M. Byron Lewis
John B. Weldon, Jr.
Mark A. McGinnis
Jason P. Alberts
Attorneys for Salt River Valley Water Users’ Association and
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District

MOYES STOREY, LTD. Phoenix
By Lee A. Storey
Steve Wene
Bradley K. Keogh
Attorneys for City of Safford

SALMON, LEWIS & WELDON, P.L.C. Phoenix
By Riney B. Salmon, II
Ronnie P. Hawks
Attorneys for San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District

BROWN & BROWN LAW OFFICES Pinetop
By David A. Brown
Attorneys for Franklin Irrigation District

LAW OFFICE OF L. ANTHONY FINES Tucson
By L. Anthony Fines
Attorneys for Gila Valley Irrigation District

Rodney B. Lewis Chandler
John T. Hestand
Timothy L. Pierson
Ruth E. Koester
Attorneys for Gila River Indian Community

H U R W I T Z, Justice

¶1 This is an interlocutory appeal by the San Carlos

Apache Tribe (“Apache Tribe” or “Tribe”) from an order issued in

the Gila River general stream adjudication. See Ariz. Rev.

2
Stat. (“A.R.S.”) §§ 45-251 to -264 (2003) (authorizing general

stream adjudications). The central issue is whether claims

advanced by the Tribe (and the United States on the Tribe’s

behalf) are precluded by a consent decree entered in 1935 by the

United States District Court for the District of Arizona. We

conclude that the decree precludes the Tribe’s claims to

additional water from the Gila River mainstem, but not to water

from tributaries of the Gila.

¶2 The San Carlos Apache Reservation was established in

1872. The Gila River Indian Community (“GRIC”) Reservation was

established in 1859. Each reservation borders the Gila River.1

¶3 In the late 1800s, the federal government began

considering a storage dam on the Gila River to provide water to

the Tribe, GRIC, and non-Indian landowners in the Florence-Casa

Grande area. In 1924, Congress first appropriated funds for the

San Carlos Irrigation Project (“San Carlos Project”), a

reclamation project involving construction of the Coolidge Dam

1
“The Gila River originates in Western New Mexico and flows
in a general westerly direction across Arizona to its confluence
with the Colorado River.” United States v. Gila Valley
Irrigation Dist., 454 F.2d 219, 220 (9th Cir. 1972). “The land
through which the stream flows is semi-arid or desert land
requiring irrigation for successful agricultural or
horticultural results.” Gila Valley Irrigation Dist. v. United
States, 118 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1941).

3
on the Gila River and the creation of the San Carlos Reservoir.

To facilitate the development of the San Carlos Project, the

United States entered into agreements in 1924 with landowners

along the Gila River (the “Landowners’ Agreements”). Under

these agreements, the landowners conveyed water rights

appurtenant to their lands to the United States in exchange for

San Carlos Project waters.

¶4 In 1925, the United States filed a complaint (the

“Complaint”) in the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona on behalf of itself, the Tribe, GRIC, and

landowners within both the San Carlos Project and the Florence-

Casa Grande Project (an earlier reclamation project on the Gila

River). The Complaint named as defendants numerous individuals,

irrigation districts, canal companies, and corporations. The

Complaint alleged that GRIC, the Apache Tribe, and the

reclamation projects were entitled to certain quantities of

water from the Gila River and its tributaries and that the

defendants’ claims were “in conflict with or adverse to” the

rights of the tribes and the projects. Compl. ¶ 7. The

Complaint sought a determination of the rights of the parties

“to the use of the waters flowing in said Gila River and its

said tributaries.” Id. ¶ 8.

¶5 Two years later, the United States filed an amended

complaint (the “Amended Complaint”). The Amended Complaint

4
denominated all parties other than the tribes and the United

States as defendants, but explained that landowners “who have by

contracts devoted their water rights to the said Florence-Casa

Grande Project, and the San Carlos Project . . . are interested

on the side of the United States in this action.” Am. Compl. ¶

15. In contrast to the initial Complaint, which sought an

adjudication of rights to the “waters from said Gila River and

its tributaries,” Compl. ¶ 8, the Amended Complaint sought only

to adjudicate the parties’ rights to the “waters of the Gila

River.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15.

¶6 Litigation continued over the next eight years. In

1935, the United States entered into stipulations dismissing

without prejudice all defendants who maintained claims only to

waters of the Gila River tributaries. The remaining parties

stipulated to the entry of the Globe Equity Decree (the

“Decree”). The Decree states that the parties “have concluded

and settled all issues in this cause” and that the Decree

“embodie[s] . . . and confirm[s]” the settlement of the parties.

The Decree then “defin[es] and adjudicat[es] the[] claims and

rights” of the parties by listing the dates of priority and

amounts of water to which each is entitled. The Decree also

specifies the places at which the parties may divert water.

¶7 The Decree is administered by a Water Commissioner

appointed by the district court. The district court has

5
retained jurisdiction to enforce and interpret the Decree.

Litigation interpreting the Decree began soon after its entry

and has continued ever since.2

¶8 Arizona law provides for the determination of multiple

water use claims through general stream adjudications. See

A.R.S. §§ 45-251 to -264. The Gila River general stream

adjudication began in 1981 when we ordered a series of petitions

consolidated into a single proceeding. See In the Matter of the

Rights to the Use of the Gila River (“Gila I”), 171 Ariz. 230,

232-33, 830 P.2d 442, 444-45 (1992).3 In 1995, the Legislature

declared that “an early focus by the general stream adjudication

courts” should be “the trial of Indian and non-Indian federal

2
The first Ninth Circuit decision involving the Decree was
Gila Valley Irrigation District v. United States, 118 F.2d 507
(9th Cir. 1941), and the most recent was United States v. Gila
Valley Irrigation District, 117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997).
3
The history of the Gila River general stream adjudication
is documented in previous decisions of this and other courts.
See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545,
557-59 (1983) (subsection entitled “The Arizona Cases”); Gen.
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 201 Ariz. 307, 309-10 ¶¶ 1-2, 35 P.3d 68, 70-71 (2001);
Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
Sys. & Source, 198 Ariz. 330, 333-34 ¶¶ 1-2, 9 P.3d 1069, 1072-
73 (2000); Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
Gila River Sys. & Source, 195 Ariz. 411, 413-14 ¶¶ 1-5, 989 P.2d
739, 741-42 (1999); Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 175 Ariz. 382, 384-85, 857 P.2d
1236, 1238-39 (1993); Gila I, 171 Ariz. at 232-33, 830 P.2d at
444-45; United States v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 270-71,
697 P.2d 658, 663-64 (1985) (subsection entitled “The
Controversy”).

6
water claims.” 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 9, § 25(C). The

superior court accordingly directed interested parties to file

summary judgment motions as to whether claims raised by or on

behalf of the Tribe in the general stream adjudication were

precluded by the Decree.

¶9 In 2001, GRIC, ASARCO LLC, Phelps Dodge Corporation,

the City of Safford (“Safford”), the Gila Valley Irrigation

District (“GVID”), the Franklin Irrigation District (“FID”), and

the San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District (“SCIDD”) filed

summary judgment motions. These motions argued that the Decree

precludes the Tribe, and the Government on its behalf, from

asserting additional claims to water from the Gila River and its

tributaries. Some motions also contended that under the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983),

non-parties to the Decree could assert the claimed preclusive

effect of the Decree. The Tribe also filed a summary judgment

motion, arguing that the Decree does not preclude its claims to

additional water from the Gila River or the San Carlos River, a

tributary of the Gila. The Tribe also argued that the

Landowners’ Agreements preclude GRIC from asserting claims to

the San Carlos River.

¶10 On May 17, 2002, the superior court granted partial

summary judgment to ASARCO, Phelps Dodge, Safford, SCIDD, GVID,

and FID. The court held that the Decree was limited to the Gila

7
River mainstem and did not cover its tributaries. The superior

court also held that non-parties to the Decree could assert its

preclusive effect.4

¶11 Given the lengthy nature of general stream

adjudications, we have provided for interlocutory review of

certain superior court orders. Special Procedural Order

Providing for Interlocutory Appeals and Certifications

(September 26, 1989); see Gila I, 171 Ariz. at 233 n.2, 830 P.2d

at 445 n.2 (discussing the Special Procedural Order). We

granted interlocutory review of six issues raised by the Apache

Tribe and one issue raised by Phelps Dodge. Each of these

issues turns on the preclusive effect of the Decree.5

4
On March 7, 2002, the superior court had entered an order
holding that “neither GRIC nor the United States on behalf of
GRIC shall be entitled to claim water rights relating to the
mainstem of the Gila River . . . except to the extent that such
rights were granted to them by the Globe Equity Decree.” The
superior court’s May 17, 2002 order, which is the subject of
this appeal, refers to and incorporates by reference this
previous order.
5
The six issues raised by the Tribe are as follows:

(1) “Where the San Carlos Apache Reservation was established
pursuant to the Apache Treaty of 1852 as a Permanent Tribal
Homeland of nearly 2 million acres, with nearly 1,500,000 acres
on the Gila River, did the Superior Court err when it denied the
Apache Tribe a trial on the merits of its claims by granting a
motion for partial summary judgment holding that the doctrine of
res judicata preclude[s] the Tribe from claiming water for its
Tribal homeland in excess of the United States[’] right to water
for 1,000 acres under the Globe Equity Decree?” (2) “Did the
Superior Court err in ruling that [the] statement of facts in
its Amended Order in W1-203 involving GRIC also applies to the

8
¶12 This Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory

appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona

Constitution and the Special Procedural Order.6 We review grants

_______________________________
Apache Tribe in W1-206?” (3) “Did the Trial Court err when it
denied the Apache Tribe’s request for an evidentiary hearing on
the adequacy of the representation of the United States as its
Trustee under § 42(1)(e) of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments[,] and ruled that res judicata applies to the Apache
Tribe under [the] Decree?” (4) “Did the Superior Court err
where it failed to conclude that the United States lacked any
authority from Congress to represent the Apache Tribe in Globe
Equity or to dispose of Tribal property which would preclude the
application of res judicata; or alternatively, where it failed
to conclude that the issue of lack of authority is a disputed
genuine issue[] of material fact?” (5) “Did the Superior Court
err in failing to determine that the Landowners’ Agreement of
1924 or the Decree, specifically preclude GRIC, and the United
States on behalf of GRIC, from claiming any water rights to the
San Carlos River in the Gila River stream adjudication?” (6)
“Did the Superior Court err when it ruled that the ‘mutuality
exception’ under Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983),
does not apply to bar any claims that the parties to the Decree
may have to any of the tributaries of the Gila River in the Gila
River stream adjudication?”

Phelps Dodge raised the following issue:

“Did the Superior Court err when it found that the claims of the
parties in the Globe Equity 59 proceedings to waters of the Gila
River’s tributaries had been ‘split’ from those same parties’
claims to the main stem waters of the Gila River, and therefore
that such tributary claims had not been part of the GE 59 Decree
and were not affected by the same preclusive, res judicata
effects that the GE 59 Decree had on the parties’ claims to the
river’s main stem?”
6
Our Special Procedural Order “is the exclusive remedy for
the presentation of interlocutory issues to this court in this
adjudication” and was issued pursuant to Article 6, Section 5 of
the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. § 45-259 and § 12-2101 (2003),
and Rule 19(a)(3) and (f) of the Arizona Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure. Gila I, 171 Ariz. at 233 n.2, 830 P.2d at
445 n.2.

9
of summary judgment de novo. See Duncan v. Scottsdale Med.

Imaging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 308 ¶ 2, 70 P.3d 435, 437 (2003).7

II.

¶13 Federal law dictates the preclusive effect of a

federal judgment. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin

Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001) (noting that state courts cannot

give federal judgments “merely whatever effect they would give

their own judgments, but must accord them the effect that [the

United States Supreme] Court prescribes”); Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 488 n.9 (1994) (“State courts are bound to apply

federal rules in determining the preclusive effect of federal-

court decisions on issues of federal law.”); First Pac. Bancorp

v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000) (“When

considering the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment,

we apply the federal law of claim preclusion.”); Restatement

(Second) of Judgments (“Second Restatement”) § 87 (1982)

(“Federal law determines the effects under the rules of res

judicata of a judgment of a federal court.”). Thus, our task is

to give the Decree the same preclusive effect as the federal

courts would give it.

_______________________________
7
After granting review, we entered an order permitting
“[a]ny party that properly filed a notice of appearance in this
matter” to submit a brief. Pursuant to that order, the United
States, the Apache Tribe, GRIC, Phelps Dodge, ASARCO, SCIDD,
Safford, GVID, FID, and Salt River Project (“SRP”) filed briefs.

10
¶14 We deal today with the issue of claim preclusion,

formerly referred to as res judicata.

Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata provides that
when a final judgment has been entered on the merits
of a case, ‘it is a finality as to the claim or demand
in controversy, concluding parties and those in
privity with them . . . as to every matter which was
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand . . . .’

Nevada, 463 U.S. at 129-30 (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac,

94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)) (internal alteration omitted); see also

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (“Under res

judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by

parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.”).

The defense of claim preclusion has three elements: (1) an

identity of claims in the suit in which a judgment was entered

and the current litigation, (2) a final judgment on the merits

in the previous litigation, and (3) identity or privity between

parties in the two suits. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of

Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1971).8

8
Only claim preclusion is at issue in this case.
“‘[C]onsent judgments ordinarily support claim preclusion but
not issue preclusion.’” Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392,
414 (2000) (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4443 (1981)).
This is because issue preclusion (formerly referred to as
collateral estoppel) “attaches only when an issue of fact or law
is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment.
In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, or
default, none of the issues is actually litigated.” Id.
(internal alterations and citations omitted).

11
¶15 The parties agree that the Decree is a final judgment

and satisfies the second element of claim preclusion. The

parties differ sharply, however, as to whether the other two

elements of claim preclusion – an identity of claims and privity

– are present in this case. We address these issues in turn

below.

III.

¶16 The parties advance very different positions as to

what claims were asserted in the Globe Equity litigation and

adjudicated by the Decree. The Tribe argues that the United

States (as trustee) asserted only a theory of prior

appropriation. The Tribe contends that the Decree therefore

does not address the Tribe’s “aboriginal” water rights or

Winters reserved water rights.9 The Tribe also argues that the

Decree did not involve claims to the tributaries of the Gila

River, particularly the San Carlos River. The United States

agrees with the Tribe with respect to claims to tributaries of

the Gila River, but does not expressly contest that the Decree

covered all claims to water from the Gila River mainstem. GRIC

takes no position as to whether the various parties’ motions for
_______________________________
9
As the Supreme Court has noted, its decision in Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), established that when the
federal government creates an Indian reservation, it “impliedly
reserve[s] a right to the amount of . . . water necessary to
effectuate the purposes” of the reservation. Nevada, 463 U.S.
at 116 n.1.

12
summary judgment should have been granted, but argues that the

Globe Equity litigation sought to quantify water rights for only

the Gila River mainstem.

¶17 In contrast, Phelps Dodge, SCIDD, Safford, GVID and

FID argue that the Decree resolved all of the Tribe’s claims to

water both in the Gila River mainstem and its tributaries. SRP

argues that the Decree precludes the Tribe from asserting

additional claims to the Gila River mainstem, but takes no

position with respect to the tributaries. ASARCO contends that

the Apache Tribe and the United States are precluded only from

asserting claims for additional water from the Gila River and

the San Carlos River, but that they may assert claims to waters

from other Gila River tributaries; ASARCO also argues that the

Decree awarded waters of the San Carlos River to ASARCO through

its predecessor, Kennecott Copper Corporation (“Kennecott”).

¶18 The Supreme Court of the United States has never

precisely defined the test for determining if there is an

identity of claims in two actions for purposes of claim

preclusion. Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure in 1938, federal case law focused on the “causes of

action” asserted in the two suits. See, e.g., United States v.

Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933) (“A ‘cause of

action’ may mean one thing for one purpose and something

13
different for another.”); see also O.L. McCaskill, Actions and

Causes of Action, 34 Yale L.J. 614, 614 (1925) (“The cause of

action has not been understood. Eminent writers . . . have

failed to agree as to its character and scope.”). In those

days, “the courts were prone to associate claim with a single

theory of recovery, so that, with respect to one transaction, a

plaintiff might have as many claims as there were theories of

the substantive law upon which he could seek relief against the

defendant.” Second Restatement § 24 cmt. a.

¶19 Under this approach, the federal courts developed a

number of tests for determining whether two causes of action

were the same for purposes of claim preclusion. One test

focused on the “primary right” of the plaintiff that allegedly

had been infringed. See, e.g., Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips,

274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927) (“A cause of action does not consist of

facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts

show.”). Another test focused on whether the same evidence

considered in the first suit would sustain the second. See

Restatement of Judgments (“First Restatement”) § 61 (1942)

(“[T]he plaintiff is precluded from subsequently maintaining a

second action based upon the same transaction, if the evidence

needed to sustain the second action would have sustained the

first action.”); see also John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation,

Proper Test to Determine Identity of Claims for Purposes of

14
Claim Preclusion by Res Judicata Under Federal Law, 82 A.L.R.

Fed. 829 (1987) (collecting case law establishing different

tests).

¶20 After the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure in 1938, the “tests for determining the identity of a

claim or cause of action . . . developed concomitantly with the

evolution of modern civil procedure.” Wagner, supra, at 836;

see also Nevada, 463 U.S. at 130 (noting that “[d]efinitions of

what constitutes the ‘same cause of action’ have not remained

static over time,” and citing the changes between the First and

Second Restatements of Judgments). “With the adoption of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the unified form of action

. . . much of the controversy over ‘cause of action’ abated.”

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).

Thereafter, the test for determining the identity of claims

focused on the “transaction” or “natural grouping or common

nucleus of operative facts” making up the plaintiff’s claims.

Second Restatement § 24 cmt. b; see also Williamson v. Columbia

Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 1950) (noting that

the “modern systems of pleading, especially the federal system,

as exemplified by the free permissive joinder of claims, liberal

amendment provisions, and compulsory counterclaims” altered the

definition of “claim” for purposes of claim preclusion).

¶21 “Seven of the thirteen federal circuit courts, as well

15
as the Claims Court have thus far expressly adopted the [Second]

Restatement’s transactional approach” to defining a claim for

purposes of claim preclusion. Wagner, supra, at 837. While the

Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted the Second

Restatement’s transactional approach, it has applied a

transactional analysis in several different contexts in which

the definition of “claim” was legally significant. See, e.g.,

United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725 (holding that for purposes

of pendent jurisdiction the “state and federal claims must

derive from a common nucleus of operative fact”); Reeves v.

Beardall, 316 U.S. 283, 286 (1942) (holding that because the

plaintiff’s “two claims arose out of wholly separate and

distinct transactions,” the district court’s decision on one

claim was a final judgment for purposes of Rule 54(b)).

¶22 We assume, without deciding, that the federal courts

would utilize the Second Restatement’s transactional test for

determining the identity of claims in this case. Under the

Second Restatement, the determination of what “factual grouping

constitutes a ‘transaction’” is “not capable of mathematically

precise definition; it invokes a pragmatic standard to be

applied with attention to the facts of the case.” Second

Restatement § 24(2), cmt. b. Defining the transaction that

makes up a claim involves a consideration of “whether the facts

are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they

16
form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a

unit conforms to the parties’ expectations . . . .” Id. §

24(2).

¶23 Under the Second Restatement test, the claims to the

Gila River mainstem asserted by the United States in the Globe

Equity litigation would not seem to be part of the same

“transaction” as its claims to the tributaries. Because claims

to water depend in part on the location of the party asserting

the claim, the facts needed to establish a claim to the Gila

River mainstem are necessarily spatially distinct from those

needed to establish a claim to a tributary. The “origins” of

these claims may also be dissimilar. Moreover, the dismissal

without prejudice from the Globe Equity litigation of all

defendants with claims to the tributaries indicates that the

parties determined that the most “convenient trial unit” for

claims to the Gila River mainstem was one that excluded the

tributaries. That dismissal also indicates that the parties

expected that claims to waters of the tributaries would be

resolved later.

¶24 We need not, however, decide today whether the Second

Restatement test, or the earlier “cause of action” test of the

17
First Restatement, governs the preclusive effect of the Decree.10

Whatever the appropriate test for establishing identity of

claims in two actions, it is clear that parties to a consent

decree can agree to limit the decree’s preclusive effects. “The

basically contractual nature of consent judgments has led to

general agreement that preclusive effects should be measured by

the intent of the parties.” 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4443

(1981).11 Thus, while a judgment will ordinarily preclude later

10
Because the Decree was entered in 1935, it is not clear
under federal law what test would have applied then. See
Nevada, 463 U.S. at 131 n.12 (noting that more than one test for
identity of claims was used in 1944 when the Orr Ditch decree
was entered).
11
Many federal cases recognize this principle. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905,
911 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A settlement can limit the scope of the
preclusive effect of a dismissal with prejudice by its terms.”);
Satsky v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1468 (10th Cir.
1993) (quoting same language from Wright & Miller, supra, §
4443); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs-Employers Constr. Indus.
Pension, Welfare & Training Trust Funds v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426,
1432-33 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that parties wishing to
“preclude the application of res judicata to a future action
. . . can reserve that right” by agreement, and referring to
Wright & Miller, supra, § 4443); Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d
736, 740-41 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Wright & Miller, supra, §
4443 for the proposition that “[w]hen a consent judgment entered
upon settlement by the parties of an earlier suit is invoked by
a defendant as preclusive of a later action, the preclusive
effect of the earlier judgment is determined by the intent of
the parties”); May v. Parker-Abbott Transfer & Storage, Inc.,
899 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1990) (“This court recognizes
that consent decrees are of a contractual nature and, as such,
their terms may alter the preclusive effects of a judgment.”)
(citing Wright & Miller, supra, § 4443).

18
litigation of “all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against

the defendant with respect to all or any part of the

transaction,” Second Restatement § 24(1), that rule does not

apply when the parties “have agreed in terms or in effect that

the plaintiff” may reserve a portion of its claim, id. §

26(1)(a). This is because the “main purpose” of precluding

further litigation on a claim “is to protect the defendant from

being harassed by repetitive actions based on the same claim.

The rule is . . . not applicable where the defendant consents,

in express words or otherwise” to allow the plaintiff to pursue

his claim in multiple suits. Id. § 26 cmt. a.12

¶25 The parties’ agreement to limit the preclusive effect

of a judgment by permitting the plaintiff to try only a portion

of its claim may be either express or implied. Id. § 26(1)(a).

The Second Restatement elucidates this point:

After a collision in which A suffers personal injuries
and property damage, A commences in the same
jurisdiction one action for his personal injuries and
another for the property damage against B. B does not

12
In determining the preclusive effect of the Decree, we are
mindful that “since consent decrees . . . have many of the
attributes of ordinary contracts, they should be construed
basically as contracts.” United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking
Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 (1975) (footnote omitted). The Decree’s
“scope . . . must be discerned within its four corners, and not
by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the
parties to it.” United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673,
682 (1971). Thus, the Decree “must be construed as it is
written, and not as it might have been written had the plaintiff
established his factual claims and legal theories in
litigation.” Id.

19
make known in either action his objection (usually
called “other action pending”) to A’s maintaining two
actions on parts of the same claim. After judgment
for A for the personal injuries, B requests dismissal
of the action for property damage on the ground of
merger. Dismissal should be refused as B consented in
effect to the splitting of the claim.

Id. § 26 cmt. a, illus. 1. Applying this principle, the Ninth

Circuit has held that a county’s failure to object in state

court proceedings to a plaintiff’s attempt to reserve its Fifth

Amendment takings claim for federal court impliedly permitted

the plaintiff to bring the later federal action. Dodd v. Hood

River County, 59 F.3d 852, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1995).

¶26 In addition to permitting parties to limit the

preclusive effects of their judgments, federal law recognizes

the power of a court in a first action to reserve the

plaintiff’s right to maintain a second action on part of a

claim. Id. at 862 (“A court may be able to reserve part of a

plaintiff’s claim for subsequent litigation by expressly

omitting any decision with regard to it in the first

judgment.”); Second Restatement § 26(1)(b). Thus, when a court

determines that its judgment is without prejudice “to a second

action on the omitted part of the claim,” that determination

prevents the first judgment from obtaining preclusive effect in

the second action. Second Restatement § 26 cmt. b; see also

Wright & Miller, supra, § 4413 (“A judgment that expressly

leaves open the opportunity to bring a second action on

20
specified parts of the claim or cause of action that was

advanced in the first action should be effective to forestall

preclusion.”).

¶27 Given this well-recognized right of the parties and

the courts to limit the preclusive effect of their judgments, we

must determine what claims were actually adjudicated by the

Globe Equity litigation and what preclusive effect the Decree

was intended to have.

¶28 The first issue we address is whether the Decree

adjudicated claims to the tributaries of the Gila River. The

starting point in that analysis is the language of the Complaint

and the Amended Complaint. The initial Complaint stated that

the

sole source of water necessary and proper for the
economical and successful irrigation and cultivation
of such lands under the said San Carlos Irrigation
Project is the said Gila River together with its
tributaries thereto lying to the East of the said Gila
Indian Reservation, to-wit: The San Pedro River, the
San Carlos River, San Francisco River, Blue River and
Eagle Creek[.]

Compl. ¶ 5 (emphasis added). The prayer for relief in the

initial Complaint asked

[t]hat the court by its decree determine the relative
rights of the parties hereto, in area and extent, and
in duration according to their relative rights
respectively in priority of appropriation, in to and
of the waters of the said Gila River and its
tributaries in Arizona and New Mexico, including

21
natural flow and flood waters, to the end that it may
be known how much of said waters may be diverted from
said river by the parties hereto and for what
purposes, where, by what means of diversion and with
what priorities.

Id. ¶ 8 (emphasis added). The Complaint specifically referred

to the “Gila River and its tributaries” numerous times,

including the report of the waters previously appropriated by

the Apache Tribe, id. ¶ 3(c), the identification of the

defendants and their claims, id. ¶ 7, and the prayer for relief,

id. ¶ 8.

¶29 In contrast, the Amended Complaint specifically

excludes the Gila River tributaries. In defining the

defendants’ claims, the Amended Complaint states:

Each of the defendants . . . claims some right to
divert water from the Gila River as it flows between a
line 10 miles east of the parallel to the dividing
line between Arizona and New Mexico, and the
confluence of the Salt River with the Gila River, and
after the following tributaries of the Gila River, the
San Francisco River, the San Carlos River, the San
Pedro River, and the Santa Crus [sic] River,
respectively, have joined the main stream, and all but
a few of said diversions being in the District of
Arizona; or the said defendants claim some right to
store the water of said river, or of some tributary
thereof, either within or above the stretch of the
same as just described.

Am. Compl. ¶ 15 (emphasis added). Thus, the portion of the Gila

River placed in dispute by the Amended Complaint was the Gila

River after the tributaries join the mainstem.

¶30 The prayer for relief in the Amended Complaint

22
requested

[t]hat the Court, by its decree, determine the rights
of the parties hereto to the waters of said river and
its tributaries and the rights of said parties to
divert water from said river within the area aforesaid
and for storage above, to the end that it may be known
how much of said waters may be diverted from said
river by the parties hereto and for what purposes,
where, by what means of diversion and with what
priorities.

Id. Prayer (emphasis added). Although the prayer at first seems

to suggest that the parties’ rights to water in the Gila River

tributaries are in fact at issue, it then makes clear that the

Government is only seeking to adjudicate rights in the “area

aforesaid” and from “said river” – language consistent with the

notion that the Amended Complaint was directed only to the

parties’ rights to waters in the Gila River mainstem. This

conclusion is buttressed by paragraph fifteen of the Amended

Complaint which makes clear that the “area aforesaid” is the

“Gila River . . . after the following tributaries . . . have

joined the main stream.” Id. ¶ 15.

¶31 The procedural history of the Decree reinforces this

conclusion. After filing the Amended Complaint, the United

States obtained the dismissal of all defendants with claims

solely to the tributaries of the Gila River. The Decree

explicitly states that certain defendants, all of whom

maintained claims to the tributaries, were dismissed “because

their claims and rights, if any, were and are outside the scope

23
of said suit as same was and is outlined and defined in the

amended complaint herein.” Both the defendants and their

“claim[s] or rights to the use of water which said defendants

. . . now or hereafter may have” were dismissed “without

prejudice.” This was because “five stipulations between the

plaintiff and the defendants” established “that the dismissal of

said defendants should be accomplished upon motion of the

plaintiff and Order of this Court.”

¶32 The effect of this dismissal without prejudice was to

exclude from the Globe Equity litigation any claims by the

dismissed defendants to the tributaries of the Gila River. See

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990) (A

“dismissal without prejudice is a dismissal that does not

operate as an adjudication upon the merits and thus does not

have a res judicata effect.”) (internal citation and alterations

omitted). Indeed, the Decree expressly so states, providing

that defendants with claims to the tributaries would “be left as

though they never had been named or made parties defendant.”

The court “confirmed” that the dismissals were “made a part of

this decree to protect [the defendants’] rights in that

respect.” Given that the Decree made plain that it was not

resolving the claims of the dismissed defendants to water of the

tributaries, it naturally follows that the Decree also did not

adjudicate the Tribe’s claims to the tributaries, as the

24
dismissed defendants would have been necessary parties to any

such adjudication.

¶33 Our conclusion that claims to water from the

tributaries were not adjudicated by the Decree is further

supported by the Decree’s schedule of rights and priorities.

The Decree states that “the Gila River is the stream from which

the water called for under each of said rights is and may be

diverted.” The portion of the Decree establishing the rights of

the various parties to use the waters of the Gila River refers

only to the “waters of the Gila River.” In enumerating the

rights of GRIC, the Apache Tribe, the San Carlos Project, and

the Gila Crossing District to divert water, the Decree

specifically refers to their rights to “divert . . . the waters

of the Gila River.” Similarly, in establishing the parties’

storage rights, the Decree refers to “[t]he right . . . to store

the waters of the Gila River in the San Carlos Reservoir.”

Finally, Article XIII states:

[A]ll of the parties to whom rights to water are
decreed in this cause . . . are hereby forever
enjoined and restrained from asserting or claiming--as
against any of the parties herein . . . --any right,
title or interest in or to the waters of the Gila
River, or any thereof, except the rights specified,
determined and allowed by this decree, and each and
all thereof are hereby perpetually restrained and
enjoined from diverting, taking or interfering in any
way with the waters of the Gila River or any part
thereof . . . .

25
(Emphasis added.)13

¶34 Notwithstanding this compelling evidence that the

Decree was intended to adjudicate only rights in the Gila River

mainstem, various parties arguing to the contrary point to

language in the Decree regarding the proper method for measuring

the amount of water to be diverted by the so called “upper

valley defendants”:

[P]rovided further that the drafts on the stream by
the upper valley[] defendants shall be limited to a
seasonal year diversion which will result in an actual
consumptive use from the stream of not to exceed
120,000 acre feet of water; said consumptive use made
in any seasonal year shall be determined by adding the
recorded flows at a gauging station located in the
Gila River at Red Rock Box Canyon above the heading of
the Sunset Canal in New Mexico and a gauging station
located in the San Francisco River immediately above
its confluence with the Gila River and deducting from
said sum the recorded flows at a gauging station
located on the Southern Pacific Railway bridge
crossing the Gila River near Calva, Arizona[.]

(Emphasis added.) Rather than establishing any right to the

waters of the San Francisco River, however, this provision

merely establishes a method of measuring flows in the Gila River

based on readings at certain gauging stations. Some of the

stations used to measure those flows are located on the

13
Several parties argue that we should read the phrase “or
any thereof” in Article XIII to mean “or any tributary thereof.”
We decline that invitation. In context, the phrase is most
naturally read as referring to a portion of the waters of the
Gila River mainstem.

26
tributaries that feed into the Gila River, but the Decree does

not establish any party’s right to divert from those flows as

opposed to the mainstem itself.

¶35 ASARCO also argues that the Decree awarded Kennecott,

its predecessor, “the water from the San Carlos River.” ASARCO

relies on a provision in the Decree describing Kennecott’s right

to divert water when upstream defendants have been given water

from the “available storage in the San Carlos Reservoir.” When

that happens, Kennecott is entitled to an apportionment “of the

natural flow of the Gila River” as “gauged by and deemed to

correspond with the natural flow of the Gila River and San

Carlos River at the points where said streams enter the San

Carlos Reservoir.” ASARCO claims that this language gives it

rights to San Carlos River water.

¶36 We do not so read the Decree. Because the Decree

establishes the parties’ rights to water both from the flow of

the Gila River and from waters stored in the San Carlos

Reservoir, the Decree required some method for gauging how much

of each source was being used. The reference to the San Carlos

River upon which ASARCO relies simply enables the Water

Commissioner to measure the flow of water in the Gila River to

27
which Kennecott is entitled.14 The provision does not award

Kennecott any water from the San Carlos River, nor does any

other portion of the Decree.

¶37 SCIDD argues that “the practical impacts” of the

Decree indicate that it must have adjudicated rights to waters

of the tributaries of the Gila River in addition to the

mainstem. SCIDD asserts that because “the Gila River is largely

a product of the inflows from the Gila River’s tributaries[,]

[i]f those tributaries can be dammed or diverted with impunity,

the protections offered by the Globe Equity Decree are

illusory.” It does not follow, however, that simply because the

rights of parties on the tributaries were not adjudicated in the

Globe Equity litigation, such rights are limitless or that

parties with claims to the waters of the tributaries may divert

the flow of those tributaries with “impunity.” The rights of

those with claims to the Gila River tributaries will be

determined in this Gila River general stream adjudication. To

the extent that those rights conflict with rights vested under

the Decree, that issue can be addressed by the superior court in

future proceedings.

14
Kennecott’s property was not located on the San Carlos
River, but rather on the Gila River, well downstream from the
confluence of the San Carlos and Gila Rivers.

28
4.

¶38 In sum, we conclude that the Decree adjudicated only

claims to the Gila River mainstem and not to its tributaries.

The Decree therefore has no preclusive effect as to the

tributaries.

¶39 The next issue is what claims to the mainstem were

adjudicated by the Decree. The Tribe argues that the Decree

adjudicated only its appropriative rights and not aboriginal or

Winters rights. Other parties claim that the Decree adjudicated

all claims of the Tribe to the mainstem.

¶40 The starting point is once again the language of the

Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint first alleges

generally that the members of the Apache Tribe were “occupants

and possessors of large areas of land with water rights

appertaining thereto.” Am. Compl. ¶ 3. The Amended Complaint

declares that the United States has the power to assert claims

to water on behalf of the Apache Tribe and GRIC because

on its acquisition from Mexico (by the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo and the Gadsden Purchase) of the
territory within which are the lands occupied by . . .
the Apache Indians . . . [the United States] became
and ever since has remained the guardian of the Indian
inhabitants, including the said Pimas and Apaches, and
became the owner of the soil of said territory . . . .
The United States, upon such acquisition, furthermore
became the full sovereign of said territory, having
both national and municipal or State sovereignty; and
it had plenary power over said lands and waters.

29
Id. ¶ 7. The Amended Complaint goes on to allege that

[t]he Apache Indians, at a long time antedating the
acquisition by the United States of the lands ceded as
aforesaid by Mexico, occupied and possessed and owned,
under the Indian title of occupancy and possession
. . . a large area which included that now reserved to
them by the establishment of their reservation known
as the San Carlos Indian Reservation.

Id. ¶ 9.

¶41 After establishing a chain of title to the lands of

the Apache Tribe, the Amended Complaint asserts that the Tribe’s

right to water is based on theories of “occupancy and

possession”:

These Indians are entitled by their rights of
occupancy and possession and on account of the
reservations thus made, to sufficient water for the
irrigation of the lands deemed necessary for them to
irrigate from the Gila River, excluding the San Carlos
River, three thousand (3,000) acres of land, which
lands are of a good agricultural character and are
susceptible of irrigation from said streams and
require irrigation to make them capable of producing
crops . . . . The said water rights have a priority,
antedating all priorities of white persons and as of
the date when the Apache Indians first came to occupy
said territory, which was before the United States or
Mexico acquired sovereignty thereof, as well as a
priority as of the date of said first reservation,
which was December 14, 1872.

Id. ¶ 9(b).

¶42 The Amended Complaint then sets forth a separate

claim, based on prior appropriation, with a priority date of

between 1873 and 1901:

30
The Indians of said San Carlos Reservation irrigated
with the waters of the Gila River, exclusive of the
waters of the San Carlos River, through a number of
ditches on their reservation aforesaid, from the year
1873 to the year 1900, and since, beginning with 100
acres and increasing to 2,500 acres of land in the
year 1900, and on account thereof the United States is
entitled, as a mere appropriator, to 32 second-feet of
water, continuous flow, with a limitation of 12,800
acre-feet of water per annum, with priorities as of
. . . prior to the year 1901.

Id. ¶ 10.

¶43 Finally, the Amended Complaint summarizes the water

rights the United States is claiming for the Tribe. It states

that the federal government has

reserved and appropriated, acquired, and owns, and is
entitled to use for said Indian reservations . . . .
37½ second-feet of water with a limitation of 15,000
acre-feet per annum, and 32 second-feet with a yearly
limitation of 12,000 acre-feet . . . with priorities,
respectively, as of the year 1846, when the United
States obtained sovereignty over that territory, as
well as of December 14, 1872.

Id. ¶ 14, 14(b) (emphasis added).

¶44 Contrary to the Tribe’s argument, the Amended

Complaint establishes that the United States was asserting

rights in addition to those based on prior appropriation. The

Amended Complaint describes the Tribe’s rights to water both

“reserved and appropriated,” id. ¶ 14, and claims that such

rights derive from both “occupancy and possession,” id. ¶ 9(b).

Indeed, because the Amended Complaint asserts a claim to water

from 1846, almost thirty years prior to 1873, the first year in

31
which the Tribe is alleged to have begun irrigation, the United

States necessarily must have asserted claims under theories in

addition to prior appropriation. Id. ¶ 14. This is confirmed

by the fact that the Amended Complaint claims that the Tribe is

entitled to water with two different priority dates, 1846 and

1872. Id.

¶45 The Decree also indicates that the Globe Equity

litigation adjudicated the totality of the Tribe’s water rights

in the Gila River mainstem. The Decree’s introduction states

that

the plaintiff and the parties defendant . . . have
concluded and settled all issues in this cause . . .
and mutually have agreed . . . that such settlement
should be embodied in and confirmed and made effective
by way of the within decree of the Court in this
cause, defining and adjudicating their claims and
rights as against each other in identical form and
substance as hereinafter set forth[.]

(Emphasis added.) Article XIII then states:

(Emphasis added.) It is difficult to imagine more explicit

language indicating that the Decree was intended to resolve all

32
of the parties’ claims to the Gila River mainstem.

¶46 Based on the language of the Complaint, the Amended

Complaint, and the Decree, we conclude that all of the Tribe’s

water rights, under all theories, to the Gila River mainstem

were placed at issue and resolved in the Globe Equity

litigation. The Decree precludes all further claims to the

mainstem of the Gila River by the parties to the Decree.

IV.

¶47 The United States was a party to the Globe Equity

litigation, but the Tribe was not. We must therefore next

determine whether the United States and the Tribe were in

privity in the Globe Equity litigation such that the Tribe is

bound by the Decree.15

¶48 We start from the premise that the United States’

representation, as trustee, of a tribe in litigation that

results in a judgment or decree ordinarily binds that tribe to

the decree. The Supreme Court so held in 1912, in a case

involving the authority of the federal government to represent

the Cherokee Nation in litigation instituted for the return of

title to certain Indian lands. Heckman v. United States, 224

U.S. 413, 444 (1912). The Court noted that the “efficacy” of

15
In June of 1935, before the entry of the Decree, the Pima
Indian Tribal Council (now GRIC) petitioned for leave to
intervene as a party in the Globe Equity litigation; the
district court denied the request. The Apache Tribe did not
seek to intervene before the entry of the Decree.

33
the litigation “does not depend upon the Indians’ acquiescence”

in the litigation. Id. at 444-45. Rather, because the United

States instituted suit on behalf of the Indians, “[i]t was not

necessary to make the[] grantors parties, for the government was

in court on their behalf.” Id. at 445. The resulting decree

obtained by the Government in the litigation “bind[s] not only

the United States, but the Indians whom it represents in the

litigation.” Id. at 445-46.

¶49 Similarly, in Arizona v. California, the Supreme Court

noted that the “United States’ action as [the Tribes’]

representative w[ould] bind the Tribes to any judgment” entered

in the litigation. 460 U.S. 605, 615 (1983) (citing Heckman,

224 U.S. at 444-45). The Court noted that, absent certain

specific language included in the decree in that case, “[t]here

is no question that if these claims [currently asserted by the

Tribe] were presented in a different proceeding, a court would

be without power to reopen the matter due to the operation of

res judicata.” Id. at 617.

¶50 The Tribe nonetheless argues that the United States

lacked authority to represent it in the Globe Equity litigation.

First, the Tribe asserts that “the United States lacked any

authority from Congress to represent the Apache Tribe in [the]

Globe Equity [litigation] . . . which would preclude the

34
application of res judicata.”

¶51 This argument fails. In 1893, Congress enacted

legislation specifically providing that “[i]n all States and

Territories where there are reservations or allotted Indians the

United States District Attorney shall represent them in all

suits at law and in equity.” Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 1,

27 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 175 (2001)).

Here, the Amended Complaint expressly alleges that the Globe

Equity litigation was “instituted at the suggestion of the

Secretary of the Interior and by the direction and authority of

the Attorney General.” Am. Compl. ¶ 3. This allegation makes

plain that the United States was proceeding pursuant to

authority expressly granted by Congress. See Heckman, 224 U.S.

at 445-46 (“[I]f the United States . . . is entitled to bring a

suit of this character, it must follow that the decree will bind

not only the United States, but the Indians whom it represents

in the litigation.”).

¶52 Second, the Tribe argues that the Decree is “without

validity as to the Tribe” because there was no “clear

congressional authorization to extinguish Apache Tribal water

rights, as required by the federal common law and the

Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177.”16 In support of this

16
In relevant portion, the Nonintercourse Act provides that
“[n]o purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or

35
argument the Tribe relies primarily on County of Oneida v.

Oneida Indian Nation, which held that “the Nonintercourse Act[]

simply ‘put into statutory form what was or came to be the

accepted rule—that the extinguishment of Indian title required

the consent of the United States.’” 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985)

(quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,

678 (1974)).

¶53 The Oneida doctrine has no application here. The

Decree served to determine the scope of the Tribe’s water

rights, not to extinguish them. The Ninth Circuit expressly

recognized this distinction between the definition of tribal

rights and the extinguishment thereof in United States v.

Ahtanum Irrigation District (“Ahtanum I”), 236 F.2d 321 (9th

Cir. 1956), and United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District

(“Ahtanum II”), 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964). Ahtanum I held

that the Secretary of the Interior “had the power” to enter into

an “arrangement for the apportionment of the Ahtanum waters”

under his “general powers of supervision and management” over

Indians. 236 F.2d at 338. In Ahtanum II, the court clarified

that

it must be plain from our original opinion that if we
ha[d] been called upon to uphold the power of the
_______________________________
of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe
of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless
the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant
to the Constitution.” 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2001).

36
Secretary of the Interior to make a conveyance of the
waters of Ahtanum Creek to these white landowners we
would have been confronted with a very serious
question indeed—a much more difficult question than
that which we decided.

330 F.2d at 903 (emphasis added).

¶54 More recently, in United States v. Truckee-Carson

Irrigation District, a case involving the Pyramid Lake Paiute

Tribe’s attack on the 1944 Orr Ditch Decree, the Ninth Circuit

affirmed the notion that “[t]he authority to represent the Tribe

in litigation must be distinguished from the authority to

extinguish tribal property interests.” 649 F.2d 1286, 1300 (9th

Cir. 1981), amended by 666 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1982), aff’d in

part and rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Nevada v.

United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). The court found that

section 10 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 did not “confer[] on

the Secretary [of the Interior] authority to extinguish the

Pyramid Lake Tribe’s water rights.” Id. at 1298. Nonetheless,

the court held that “an action to quantify reserved water rights

was within the authority conferred by section 10 of the

Reclamation Act of 1902.” Id. at 1300.

¶55 The 1924 Act “[f]or the continuance of construction

work on the San Carlos Federal irrigation project in Arizona”

contains language nearly identical to that of section 10 of the

37
Reclamation Act of 1902.17 Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 288, § 5, 43

Stat. 475, 476. Thus, while the Government may not have had

authority to “extinguish” the Tribe’s right to water in the

Globe Equity litigation, it possessed the power to “represent

[the Tribe’s] interests in [the] litigation” in order to

“quantify [the Tribe’s] reserved water rights.” Truckee-Carson,

649 F.2d at 1300.18

¶56 The Tribe next asserts that the United States’

representation of the Tribe in the Globe Equity litigation was

so inadequate as to prevent the presence of privity between the

17
Section 10 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 provides: “[T]he
Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized to perform any
and all acts and to make such rules and regulations as may be
necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying the provisions
of this act into full force and effect.” Reclamation Act of
1902, ch. 1093, § 10, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (codified in scattered
sections of 43 U.S.C.). The 1924 Act provides: “The Secretary
of the Interior is hereby authorized to perform any and all acts
and to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary and
proper for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this Act
into full force and effect[.]” Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 288, §
5, 43 Stat. 475, 476.
18
The Tribe argues in the alternative that the superior court
erred “where it failed to conclude that the issue of lack of
authority is a disputed genuine issue[] of material fact.” The
Tribe, however, identifies no such issue of fact. Because the
United States had statutory authority to represent the Tribe, we
affirm the superior court’s determination that there are no
genuine issues of material fact precluding a grant of summary
judgment against the Tribe on this issue.

38
Tribe and the Government.19 The Tribe relies on § 42(1)(e) of

the Second Restatement, which provides, in relevant part, as

follows:

(1) A person is not bound by a judgment for or against
a party who purports to represent him if:
. . . .
(e) The representative failed to prosecute or
defend the action with due diligence and reasonable
prudence, and the opposing party was on notice of
facts making that failure apparent.

The Tribe contends that, in the Globe Equity litigation, the

Government ignored the Tribe’s substantial rights to Gila River

water under the Winters doctrine, prosecuted the case while

under an actual conflict of interest, and staffed the case with

attorneys biased against the Tribe. Moreover, the Tribe alleges

that “[t]he United States’ representation of the Tribe was so

grossly deficient as to provide notice to the opposing parties

of this fact, and to create no legitimate claim of justifiable

reliance by them.”

¶57 We begin by assuming, without deciding, that the

United States’ representation of the Tribe in the Globe Equity

litigation produced less than desirable results for the Tribe.

However, our job in this case is not to re-evaluate the

litigation skills and strategies of the Government’s attorneys

seventy years after their efforts resulted in the entry of the

19
While the United States does not agree that it provided the
Tribe with inadequate representation, it supports the Tribe’s
request for an evidentiary hearing on the claim.

39
Decree. Rather, we must apply federal law, giving the Decree

the same preclusive effects as would the federal courts. Cf.

Locklin v. Switzer Bros., Inc., 335 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir.

1964) (“[A] ‘foreign’ federal court will not set aside a

judgment, in an independent equitable action, unless the

judgment would be set aside on those same grounds by the ‘home’

federal court.”) (citing Bros. Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320

F.2d 594, 607 (5th Cir. 1963)). Thus, we must determine what

preclusive effect the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona would provide the Decree.

¶58 Our role is analogous to that of a federal court

applying state court preclusion principles to a previous state

court judgment. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738

(1994); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.

373, 380 (1985) (“‘It has long been established that § 1738 does

not allow federal courts to employ their own rules of res

judicata in determining the effect of state judgments. Rather,

it goes beyond the common law and commands a federal court to

accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is

taken.’”) (quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,

481-82 (1982)). As the Second Restatement points out, “[i]t has

long been established that the judgments of the federal courts

are to be accorded full faith and credit when a question of

their recognition arises in a state court or in another federal

40
court.” Second Restatement § 87 cmt. a.

¶59 The Supreme Court has never expressly held that the

Government’s representation of a tribe can be so inadequate as

to remove privity. The Court, however, has twice rejected

similar arguments in cases analogous to this one. In Arizona v.

California, the Court held that the Government’s concurrent

representation of five tribes in litigation involving the

Colorado River did not “authorize relitigation of their reserved

rights.” 460 U.S. at 626. The Court held that

[a] breach of the United States’ duty to represent the
Tribes’ interests is not demonstrated merely by
showing that the government erred in its calculation
of irrigable acreage, whether by an oversight or, as
viewed in retrospect, by an unnecessarily cautious
litigation strategy . . . . [A] claim of inadequate
representation cannot be supported on this record.

Id. at 628 n.21.

¶60 The Court reached a similar result in Nevada, holding

that the Paiute Tribe was bound by the Government’s

representation in the Orr Ditch litigation:

This Court left little room for an argument to the
contrary in Heckman v. United States, where it plainly
said that “it could not, consistently with any
principle, be tolerated that, after the United States
on behalf of its wards had invoked the jurisdiction of
its courts . . . these wards should themselves be
permitted to relitigate the question.” We reaffirm
that principle now.

41
463 U.S. at 135 (internal citations omitted, alteration in

original).

¶61 The Tribe argues that this case is factually

distinguishable from the Supreme Court precedents and that the

Court would apply § 42(1)(e) of the Second Restatement and find

an absence of privity with respect to the Globe Equity Decree.

We need not today resolve that issue, however, because we

conclude that the doctrine of comity compels us to refrain from

addressing the Tribe’s arguments.

¶62 Ordinarily, relief from a judgment “must be obtained

by means of a motion for that purpose in the court that rendered

the judgment unless relief may be obtained more fully,

conveniently, or appropriately by some other procedure.” Second

Restatement § 78. In the federal courts, such a motion is

governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).20 Consent

20
Rule 60(b) provides:

Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or a party’s legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the

42
decrees are subject to the requirements of Rule 60(b). Rufo v.

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992).

¶63 Under Rule 60(b), a court may also “entertain an

independent action to relieve a party from a judgment . . . .”

As a general matter, that action “may or may not be begun in the

court which rendered the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)

advisory committee’s note (1946 Amendment, Subdivision (b)); see

also Locklin, 335 F.2d at 334 (stating that an “independent

equitable action may be maintained in any court exercising

equitable jurisdiction”).

¶64 However, even if Rule 60(b) facially grants us the

power to consider the Tribe’s privity arguments in an

_______________________________
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1),
(2), and (3) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant
relief to a defendant not actually personally notified
as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of
coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of
review and bills in the nature of a bill of review,
are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.

43
“independent” attack on the Decree, the doctrine of comity

counsels to the contrary. “The principle [of comity] is that a

court should not assume to disturb another court’s disposition

of a controversy unless there are good reasons for doing so.”

Second Restatement § 78 cmt. a.

¶65 Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1964),

illustrates the application of the comity doctrine. In that

case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s refusal to

entertain an action challenging an injunction issued by the

United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on

the grounds “that changed circumstances had rendered inequitable

the prospective application of the decree.” Id. at 170. The

court held that

for a nonissuing court to entertain an action for such
relief would be seriously to interfere with, and
substantially to usurp, the inherent power of the
issuing court . . . to supervise its continuing decree
by determining from time to time whether and how the
decree should be supplemented, modified or
discontinued in order properly to adapt it to new or
changing circumstances.

Id. at 172. The Ninth Circuit found that it “need not go so far

as to hold that these considerations and this interpretation of

Rule 60(b) deprive all courts other than the issuing court of

jurisdiction in such a case as this.” Id. Nonetheless,

“considerations of comity and [the] orderly administration of

justice demand that the nonrendering court should decline

44
jurisdiction of such an action and remand the parties for their

relief to the rendering court, so long as it is apparent that a

remedy is available there.” Id.

¶66 Similarly, in Treadaway v. Academy of Motion Picture

Arts & Sciences, the Ninth Circuit, following Lapin, held that a

district court could “refuse entirely to entertain [an] action

if relief in a more appropriate forum—the rendering court—were

available.” 783 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1986) (footnote

omitted). In that case, the plaintiff brought an independent

action under Rule 60(b) in a district court challenging a

bankruptcy court’s sale of certain films, photographs, and

scripts. Id. at 1419-20. In affirming the district court’s

refusal to consider the action, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that

Lapin “was germane to independent attacks on all types of final

judgments.” Id. at 1422. The court emphasized that “[w]hen a

court entertains an independent action for relief from the final

order of another court, it interferes with and usurps the power

of the rendering court just as much as it would if it were

reviewing that court’s equitable decree.” Id.

¶67 Because “discretion requires a [federal] district

court to decline to hear a claim seeking relief from a judgment

entered by a coordinate court, at least when it is apparent that

the parties can seek redress in the issuing court,” Feller v.

Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 728 (4th Cir. 1986), this Court should

45
ordinarily decline to entertain an independent action

challenging the validity of a federal decree. Such comity to

the federal courts is particularly appropriate here.

¶68 The issuing federal court – the United States District

Court for the District of Arizona – expressly retained

jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of the

Decree in 1935. That court continues to actively “review the

actions of the Water Commissioner and to enforce the Decree.”

United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist. (“GVID III”), 961

F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1992). The Tribe is a party to the

federal litigation, having been granted permission to intervene

in 1990.

¶69 In its motion to intervene, the Tribe made clear that

none of the allegations in its complaint in intervention sought

“to vacate the Decree, or re-litigate issues.” Thus, in federal

court, the Tribe has declared that it “does not seek to litigate

rights to additional Gila River water in this matter, and [that]

no allegations have been made in the proposed Complaint in

Intervention regarding Winters water rights.”

¶70 The limited nature of the Tribe’s intervention in the

federal litigation does not, of course, establish its

acquiescence in the Decree’s validity. It is clear, however,

that the Tribe has consciously declined to adjudicate its

“inadequate representation” claim in the forum responsible for

46
issuing, interpreting, and enforcing the Decree. Notions of

comity would be seriously undermined if we were to permit the

Tribe to assert the very arguments in this Court that it has

explicitly pretermitted in the federal court.

¶71 The Tribe presumably moved to intervene in the federal

litigation only for limited purposes because the district court

had already intimated its view of a tribe’s ability to challenge

both the validity of the Decree and the adequacy of the United

States’ representation in the Globe Equity litigation. In 1983,

GRIC “successfully moved to intervene as a plaintiff” in the

federal litigation interpreting the Decree. GVID III, 961 F.2d

at 1434. In granting GRIC’s motion, however, the district court

prohibited GRIC from intervening “for the purpose of vacating

the Decree or relitigating the issues resolved by the Decree.”

The court noted that GRIC’s motion to intervene was filed forty-

seven years after the entry of the Decree:

To the extent GRIC seeks to vacate the Decree or to
relitigate the issues the Decree resolves, it is hard
to imagine a more untimely motion. The prejudice to
the parties that is posed by GRIC’s avowed intent at
this late date to dismantle the Decree is manifest.
Water is lifeblood to the land affected by the Decree
and the Decree apportions much of the available water.
To permit an attack now on the Decree would cast the
apportionment of Gila River water into a legal limbo,
perhaps of many years duration, that would be
detrimental to the interests of all the parties to the
Decree.

In addition, the district court expressly refused to consider

47
GRIC’s argument that the United States’ representation of GRIC

in the Globe Equity litigation had been inadequate, stating that

it was “too late in the day for GRIC now to complain of its

representation back in 1935.” GRIC’s intervention was thus made

“subject to the condition that any complaint that GRIC files in

the action must seek only to enforce the Decree and not to

vacate the Decree or to relitigate issues already determined by

the Decree.”

¶72 The Tribe argues that the district court’s 1983 ruling

with respect to GRIC’s intervention establishes that the Tribe

cannot obtain relief in the court that issued the Decree, and

therefore the Tribe should be allowed to pursue such relief

here. But we take precisely the opposite message from the 1983

ruling. Our task, after all, is to accord the Decree the same

preclusive effect as would the issuing federal court. The 1983

ruling tells us that the issuing court would not entertain an

attack on the Decree, despite its facial power under Rule 60(b)

to do so, because of untimeliness. Comity requires that we

respect that determination; a contrary determination would

reward a party who had waited too long to attack a judgment in

federal court by providing a state forum.

¶73 Had the Tribe believed that the district court erred

in refusing to allow GRIC to intervene to attack the Decree, it

could have sought to attack the Decree in its 1990 motion to

48
intervene and then sought federal appellate review from any

denial thereof. Had it done so, the federal courts could have

conclusively addressed the issue. If we were today to consider

the Tribe’s privity arguments, we would be in effect rewarding

its strategic choice to withhold making those arguments in the

court that issued the Decree in order to seek a more favorable

forum here. The doctrine of comity requires a different

result.21 We therefore decline to consider the Tribe’s attack on

the Decree on the basis of absence of privity.22

¶74 Phelps Dodge, SRP, and Safford, none of whom were

parties to the 1935 Decree (the “Nonparties”), argue that they

should nonetheless be able to assert the preclusive effect of

the Decree against the Tribe and the United States. Ordinarily

21
We express no opinion as to what other remedies, if any,
might be available to the Tribe for the Government’s allegedly
inadequate representation. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S.
at 628 n.20 (noting that “in an appropriate case the Tribes’
remedy for inadequate representation by the government may lie
in the Court of Claims”).
22
Arizona law requires that “when rights to the use of water
or dates of appropriation have previously been determined in a
prior decree of a court, the court shall accept the
determination of such rights and dates of appropriation as found
in the prior decree . . . .” A.R.S. § 45-257(B)(1) (emphasis
added). Given our conclusion as a matter of federal law that
the doctrine of comity prevents us from considering the Tribe’s
argument that the Decree should not be enforceable against it
because of the absence of privity, we need not consider today
whether § 45-257(B)(1) also requires the same result as a matter
of state law.

49
the application of claim preclusion requires “mutuality” – both

the party asserting the preclusive effect of a prior judgment

and the party against whom preclusion is asserted must have been

parties in the prior litigation. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 143. In

certain circumstances, however, “exceptions to the res judicata

mutuality requirement have been found necessary . . . .” Id.

The Supreme Court established such an exception in Nevada,

holding that the Orr Ditch litigation was “a comprehensive

adjudication of water rights intended to settle once and for all

the question of how much of the Truckee River each of the

litigants was entitled to.” Id. Because of the scope of the

litigation, “[n]onparties [including] subsequent appropriators

. . . have relied just as much on the Orr Ditch decree in

participating in the development of western Nevada as have the

parties to that case.” Id. at 144. Under those circumstances,

the Court recognized a limited exception to the requirement of

mutuality for claim preclusion, enabling those later

appropriators to assert the preclusive effect of the decree

against parties to the decree.

¶75 In this case, the Nonparties argue that the Globe

Equity litigation was sufficiently comprehensive to qualify for

the Nevada mutuality exception; they also claim that they have

relied on the Decree in the same manner as did the later

appropriators in Nevada and should be able to use the Decree’s

50
preclusive effect against parties to the Decree.23 In

opposition, the Tribe and the United States argue that because

the United States “expressly limited the Globe Equity

proceedings to a defined segment of the Gila River exclusive of

tributaries,” the Globe Equity litigation was not sufficiently

“comprehensive” to qualify for the mutuality exception outlined

in Nevada.24 In addition, the United States argues that because

the Decree grants “compromise” rights in addition to

establishing priorities under the doctrine of prior

appropriation, subsequent appropriators would not be justified

in relying on the Decree when appropriating water, and are

therefore not entitled to assert the preclusive effect of the

Decree.

¶76 We have concluded above that the Decree was intended

to resolve all claims to the Gila River mainstem. The United

States included as defendants in the Globe Equity litigation all

those with claims to the mainstem of the Gila River, and the

Decree includes all water rights theories that the parties could

have asserted. Thus, as to the mainstem of the Gila River, the

23
As parties to the Decree, or successors in interest to
parties to the Decree, ASARCO, GVID, FID, and SCIDD are entitled
to assert the preclusive effect of the Decree and need not rely
on the Nevada mutuality exception to claim preclusion.
24
GRIC joins the Tribe and the United States in this
argument, but focuses its brief on refuting the ability of
Phelps Dodge in particular to assert the preclusive effects of
the Decree.

51
Decree is comprehensive. In addition, given the long history of

the Decree, it is clear that those not party to the Decree have

in fact relied upon it in the same manner as the later

appropriators in Nevada. With respect to the Gila River

mainstem, the Nevada exception to mutuality applies and those

who were not party to the Decree are entitled to assert its

preclusive effects against parties to the Decree and their

successors.

¶77 None of the Nonparties, however, seek to assert the

preclusive effect of the Decree as to the Gila River mainstem.

Rather, the Nonparties claim that under the Nevada mutuality

exception they are entitled to assert the preclusive effect of

the Decree as to waters of the Gila River tributaries. Because

we have determined that the Decree itself precludes only

additional claims to the mainstem, any assertion of preclusive

effect by the Nonparties with respect to waters of the

tributaries fails.

VI.

¶78 The Gila River general stream adjudication consists of

a series of cases organized by watershed and by petitioner. The

case we today consider, denominated W1-206, involves claims by

the Apache Tribe and the United States on the Tribe’s behalf.

Case W1-203 involves claims by GRIC and the United States on

GRIC’s behalf.

52
¶79 Before issuing its order in this case, the superior

court considered similar summary judgment motions in W1-203. On

March 7, 2002, the superior court issued an order in W1-203,

granting summary judgment to those parties who had filed motions

arguing that the Decree precluded GRIC or the United States on

GRIC’s behalf from asserting additional claims for water in the

Gila River. The court concluded that “neither GRIC nor the

United States on behalf of GRIC shall be entitled to claim water

rights relating to the mainstem of the Gila River . . . except

to the extent such rights were granted to them by the Globe

Equity Decree.”

¶80 When it issued its May 17, 2002 order in case W1-206,

the superior court stated that it “ha[d] considered all filed

memoranda and arguments of counsel and ha[d] otherwise become

fully advised as to the issues presented.” The court then

[g]rant[ed] the motions for summary judgment filed by
GRIC, SCAT, Safford, GVID and FID jointly, SCIDD,
Phelps Dodge, and ASARCO to the extent that these
motions seek a determination that preclusive effect of
the Globe Equity Decree is applicable to the parties
consistent with the findings and conclusions set forth
in this court’s Amended Order . . . that was entered
in contested case No. W1-203.

¶81 The Apache Tribe argues that the superior court

“committed clear error by adopting the findings and conclusions

in the Amended Order in W1-203 for GRIC as the sole basis for

granting summary judgment against the Tribe in W1-206.”

53
According to the Tribe, a determination of the preclusiveness of

the Decree required “separate examination of the unique factual

history involving these two very different Indian Tribes . . .

and . . . separate consideration of the different legal

arguments made by the Tribe and GRIC on summary judgment

. . . .”

¶82 We have today determined the preclusive effects of the

Decree as a matter of law based on our interpretation of the

Decree and the filings in the Globe Equity litigation leading to

the Decree. This legal determination of the Decree’s preclusive

effects makes any factual differences between cases W1-203 and

W1-206 irrelevant. Because our opinion does not rely upon any

factual determinations, but rather only on the record in the

Globe Equity litigation, the Tribe’s arguments about the form of

the order below do not affect our conclusions.25

VII.

¶83 In summary, for the reasons stated above, we hold that

the Globe Equity Decree precludes the Apache Tribe and the

United States on the Tribe’s behalf from asserting claims to

25
One of the issues on which we granted review was whether
the superior court erred in failing to determine that the Decree
or the Landowners’ Agreements of 1924 specifically preclude GRIC
and the United States on behalf of GRIC from claiming any rights
to the San Carlos River in the Gila River general stream
adjudication. See supra note 5. Because this issue would be
more appropriately addressed in any review of the summary
judgment order in W1-203 by GRIC, we vacate our order granting
review of this issue as improvidently granted.

54
water from the mainstem of the Gila River beyond those rights

granted in the Decree, but that it does not preclude claims to

the tributaries of the Gila River. (Tribe’s issue 1.) This

holding also addresses the single issue raised by Phelps Dodge

in its cross-appeal. We hold that the superior court’s

reference in case W1-206 to its order in W1-203 was not

reversible error. (Tribe’s issue 2.) We decline on grounds of

comity to address the Tribe’s argument that the Decree is not

entitled to preclusive effect because of an absence of privity.

(Tribe’s issue 3.) We hold that the Government was vested with

the authority to represent the Tribe in the Globe Equity

litigation and to litigate the extent of the Tribe’s water

rights. (Tribe’s issue 4.) We vacate our order granting

interlocutory review of the effect of the Landowners’ Agreements

on any claims by GRIC to the San Carlos River. (Tribe’s issue

5.) We hold that the Nevada exception allows non-parties to the

Decree to assert its preclusive effect, but only as to waters in

the Gila River mainstem. (Tribe’s issue 6.)

¶84 The May 17, 2002 order of the superior court is

therefore affirmed to the extent that it holds that the Decree

has preclusive effect with respect to claims by the Tribe and

the United States to waters in the Gila River mainstem. The

order is also affirmed to the extent that it concludes that the

Decree has no preclusive effect with respect to the tributaries

55
of the Gila River. This case is remanded to the superior court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

____
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

CONCURRING:

____
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

_________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

____
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

____
∗
A. John Pelander, Judge

∗
Pursuant to Article 6, Section 3 of the Arizona
Constitution, the Honorable A. John Pelander, Chief Judge of the
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, was designated to sit in
this matter.