In Re Hear

Court: Indiana Supreme Court
Date filed: 2001-09-28
Citations: 755 N.E.2d 579, 755 N.E.2d 579, 755 N.E.2d 579
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2 Citing Cases

FOR THE RESPONDENT           FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT

                                       DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION

Kevin  McGoff                             Donald  R.   Lundberg,   Executive
Secretary
Suite 400                         Seth Pruden, Staff Attorney
8900 Keystone Crossing            115 West Washington Street
Indianapolis, IN 46240                  Suite 1165
                                  Indianapolis, IN 46204





      IN THE

      SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA



IN THE MATTER OF               )
                                    )  Case No. 29S00-9911-DI-662
CHARLES F. HEAR                )


      DISCIPLINARY ACTION


                             September 28, 2001


Per Curiam

      Attorney Charles F. Hear partnered with a non-lawyer  to  run  a  debt
collection business out of the non-lawyer’s home.  Respondent  Hear  allowed
the non-lawyer unrestricted and unsupervised access  to  Hear’s  letterhead,
signature stamp, and business and trust accounts in exchange for  a  portion
of the  fees  from  the  debt  collection  business.   Today  we  approve  a
Statement of Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline  between
the respondent and the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission,  which
calls for the respondent’s suspension from the  practice  of  law  for  this
misconduct.  See Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 11.
      Having been admitted to the bar of this state in 1993, the  respondent
is subject to our disciplinary jurisdiction.
       The parties agree to the following facts.  The respondent engaged the
services  of  a  non-lawyer  to  solicit  debt  collection  clients  and  to
administer and manage the debt collection cases  the  non-lawyer  solicited.
The  respondent  authorized  the  non-lawyer  to  use  letterhead  captioned
“Charles F. Hear, attorney at law” and which listed  the  home  address  and
telephone number of  the  non-lawyer  in  Anderson.   The  respondent  never
maintained a law office at the non-lawyer’s home,  but  that  fact  was  not
known to collection clients or others dealing with the non-lawyer.
      The respondent also authorized the non-lawyer to use a rubber stamp of
the respondent’s signature for use on letters and to make deposits into  the
respondent’s trust account.  The respondent turned over physical control  of
his trust and business accounts by having all  checks,  deposit  slips,  and
monthly bank statements of his accounts mailed to the non-lawyer.
      The non-lawyer, on behalf of the respondent, solicited collection work
from a company in the business of purchasing accounts receivable from  other
companies and thereafter attempting  to  collect  those  receivables.   That
company agreed to send a few collection files to the respondent and  to  pay
the respondent 40 percent of all amounts collected, with  the  remainder  of
the funds to be remitted to the company.  The respondent and the  non-lawyer
thereafter agreed that the non-lawyer would be paid a percentage of  the  40
percent their business would retain under this arrangement.
      The company sent to the respondent a matter involving  a  credit  card
debt  of  approximately  $1,700.   The  non-lawyer  used  the   respondent’s
letterhead in corresponding with the debtors.  The  debtors  tendered  their
first payment of $200 to the non-lawyer in the form of a check made  payable
to “Charles Hear, attorney at law” as instructed by  the  non-lawyer.   Upon
receipt of the check, the non-lawyer  deposited  it  into  the  respondent’s
business  account.   The  debtors  continued  to  make   payments   to   the
respondent, and the non-lawyer deposited each payment into the  respondent’s
business account.  By the end of 1996, the debtors had made  at  least  $800
in payments.
      None of the $800 was remitted to the company.  Instead, the non-lawyer
stole the funds by writing checks to himself  or  on  his  behalf  from  the
respondent’s business account.  All of the  checks  bore  the  rubber  stamp
signature of the respondent.
      In 1997, the debtors paid $700 to the respondent, no portion of  which
was remitted to the company.  The non-lawyer deposited the  money  into  the
respondent’s trust account, which  also  contained  about  $5,500  in  funds
belonging to one of the respondent’s clients.  The non-lawyer stole a  total
of $3,524 from the trust account by writing checks  to  himself  or  on  his
behalf  and  signing  them  with  the  rubber  stamp  of  the   respondent’s
signature.   The  non-lawyer’s  misdeeds   went   undetected   because   the
respondent’s account records were sent to and maintained by the  non-lawyer,
and the respondent never reviewed them.
      The respondent and the non-lawyer  terminated  their  relationship  in
1997.  In 1998, the debtors discovered their payments had not been  credited
and attempted to contact  the  respondent  at  the  address  listed  on  the
letterhead they received.  They were unsuccessful,  as  the  non-lawyer  had
vacated the premises and the telephone had been disconnected.
      We find that by failing to safeguard the creditor company’s  funds  in
his trust account, the respondent violated Ind.  Professional  Conduct  Rule
1.15(a), which requires a  lawyer  to  hold  in  a  separate  account  funds
belonging to clients or third persons that are in a lawyer’s  possession  in
connection with  a  representation.   By  failing  to  notify  the  creditor
company and promptly remit its funds, the respondent  violated  Prof.Cond.R.
1.15(b), which requires that lawyers promptly notify a client of receipt  of
funds belonging to the client  and  promptly  deliver  those  funds  to  the
client.  By allowing funds paid by the debtors  to  be  deposited  into  his
business  account,  the  respondent  violated  Prof.Cond.R.  1.15(c),  which
provides that when in  the  course  of  a  representation  a  lawyer  is  in
possession of property in which both the lawyer  and  another  person  claim
interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there  is
an accounting and severance of their interests.
      We further find that the respondent, by failing to supervise the  non-
lawyer, violated Prof.Cond.R. 5.3(a), which requires that  a  partner  in  a
law firm make reasonable efforts to ensure  that  the  firm  has  in  effect
measures giving reasonable  assurance  that  the  conduct  of  a  non-lawyer
employed or retained by or associated with the firm is compatible  with  the
professional obligations of the lawyer.  The respondent, by failing to  make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the  non-lawyer’s  conduct  complied  with
the  respondent’s  professional  obligations,  also  violated   Prof.Cond.R.
5.3(b), which provides that a lawyer  having  direct  supervisory  authority
over the non-lawyer  shall  make  reasonable  efforts  to  ensure  that  the
person’s conduct is compatible with  the  professional  obligations  of  the
lawyer.  By sharing  fees  from  the  collection  business,  the  respondent
violated Prof.Cond.R. 5.4(a), which prohibits  lawyers  or  law  firms  from
sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer except under circumstances not  present
here.
      The respondent, by engaging the non-lawyer to solicit collection  work
on his behalf, violated Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(a), which prohibits a  lawyer  from
seeking or recommending by in-person contact (including  by  telephone)  the
employment, as a private practitioner, of the lawyer or  the  lawyer’s  firm
to a non-lawyer who has not sought his  advice  regarding  employment  of  a
lawyer or assisting another person in doing so.  By paying the non-lawyer  a
commission  for  the  business  he  recruited,   the   respondent   violated
Prof.Cond.R.7.3(f), which prohibits a lawyer  from  compensating  or  giving
anything  of  value  to  a  person  to  recommend  or  secure  the  lawyer’s
employment by a client except under  circumstances  not  present  here.  [1]

      Given our finding of misconduct,  we  must  determine  an  appropriate
discipline.  The parties agree that a 100-day suspension from  the  practice
of law is warranted.  Where an attorney allowed non-lawyers to list  him  as
counsel of record in bankruptcy cases in which the non-lawyers rendered  all
of the advice and prepared all filings,  we  imposed  a  90-day  suspension.
Matter of Gillaspy, 640 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. 1994).  Thus,  we  find  that  the
100-day suspension to which  the  parties  have  agreed  is  an  appropriate
sanction for the respondent’s misconduct.
      Accordingly, the respondent, Charles F. Hear, is hereby suspended from
the practice of law for  100  days,  beginning  October  30,  2001,  at  the
conclusion of which he shall be automatically reinstated.
      The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide notice of this order in
accordance with Admis.Disc.R. 23(3)(d) and  to  provide  the  Clerk  of  the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the  Clerk  of  each
of the United States District Courts in this state, and the  Clerk  of  each
of the United States Bankruptcy Courts in this state  with  the  last  known
address of the respondent as reflected in the records of the Clerk.
      Costs of this proceeding are assessed against the respondent.




-----------------------
[1] The Commission has withdrawn charges that the respondent violated
Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) by providing false information to the
Commission during its investigation of this case.  In preparing his
response, the respondent relied on information provided by the non-lawyer,
who falsified the information as part of his efforts to conceal his
misdeeds.  While the parties agree the respondent acted recklessly in
continuing to rely on the non-lawyer for information after the allegations
of misconduct were submitted to the respondent, the parties agree the
respondent did not possess the intent to deceive the Commission when he
made the erroneous statements to the Commission.

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