OPINION OF THE COURT
In early 1990, respondent was found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect of a charge of burglary in the second degree. Following a hearing held pursuant to CPL 330.20 (6), County Court determined that respondent was "currently suffering from a mental illness but is not dangerous as a result of that disorder”. In accordance with the provisions of CPL 330.20 (7), the court on August 17, 1990 granted an order committing respondent to the custody of petitioner. Respondent was forthwith involuntarily committed to a State psychiatric center pursuant to that order, but her status was converted to one of voluntary patient on February 12, 1991. She was discharged to a private community residence in early June and formally discharged from the State psychiatric center on July 10, 1991. Meanwhile, however, by letter application to County Court dated June 21, 1991, petitioner requested an order of conditions to govern respondent’s compliance with a specific postrelease treatment program and to provide for, inter alia, the monitoring of her behavior during the period of her transition from an institutional setting to an open community residential environment. Respondent, through Mental Hygiene Legal Service, opposed the application on the ground, inter alia, that County Court lacked jurisdiction to impose an order of conditions once petitioner had completed her period of confinement under the court’s prior civil commitment order. County Court overruled respondent’s objections, agreeing with the contention made on petitioner’s behalf that it had the power to grant the order of conditions as the equivalent of a release from confinement upon conditions pursuant to CPL 330.20 (12). This appeal by respondent ensued.
As a preliminary matter, we note that CPL 330.20 (21) (added by L 1983, ch 976) sets forth detailed rules governing appeals (by permission) from various determinations in proceedings following the adjudication of a person as not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect under CPL 330.20. However, CPL 330.20 (2Í) does not provide for any right of
Turning to the merits, we are of the view that County Court’s authority as a criminal court to grant an order of conditions under CPL 330.20 (12) had already expired when petitioner made the application herein and, therefore, the order of conditions must be reversed and this proceeding dismissed. Clearly, County Court was not empowered to impose the order herein as an order of conditions upon release under CPL 330.20 (12), the justification urged upon and adopted by County Court. By its own terms, CPL 330.20 (12) only applies "when a defendant is in [petitioner’s] custody pursuant to a retention order or recommitment order” (emphasis supplied), i.e., when in petitioner’s custody as a result of a subsequent judicial determination, made after the initial hearing and findings under CPL 330.20 (6), that a defendant has a dangerous mental disorder pursuant to CPL 330.20 (8) (retention order) or CPL 330.20 (14) (recommitment order). Moreover, any purported authority under CPL 330.20 (12) to impose new conditions on respondent’s release from confinement would directly conflict with CPL 330.20 (7), concededly the governing statute here, which provides that, after the initial order of commitment, "further retention, conditional release or discharge of such defendant shall be in accordance with the provisions of the mental hygiene law” (emphasis supplied) (see, People v Flockhart, supra, at 844).
We likewise conclude that County Court’s authority to grant the order of conditions imposed herein cannot be sustained under the alternative rationale urged by petitioner on
In light of the foregoing disposition, it is unnecessary for us to address respondent’s contention that any order of conditions issued with an order of commitment under CPL 330.20 (7) must expire when the defendant is released from confinement (cf., People v Stone, 73 NY2d 296; People v Flockhart, supra, at 845).
Mikoll, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Mahoney and Harvey, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed.