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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 20-BG-600
IN RE ANITHA W. JOHNSON, RESPONDENT.
A Suspended Member of the Bar
of the District of Columbia
(Bar Registration No. 495672)
On Report and Recommendation
of the Board on Professional Responsibility
(Disciplinary Docket Nos. 2010-D551 et al.)
(Board Docket No. 18-BD-058)
(Argued March 16, 2022 Decided July 27, 2023)
John O. Iweanoge, II, for respondent.
Myles V. Lynk, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, with whom Hamilton
P. Fox, III, Disciplinary Counsel, was on the brief, for the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, SHANKER, * Associate Judge, and
THOMPSON, Senior Judge.
SHANKER, Associate Judge: In this bar disciplinary matter, the District of
Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) concluded in a Report
*
On June 2, 2023, Associate Judge Shanker was substituted for Associate
Judge Beckwith. See Administrative Order 3-23.
2
and Recommendation, following review of a Report and Recommendation by an Ad
Hoc Hearing Committee (“Committee”), that Respondent Anitha W. Johnson
violated over 20 District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct in connection
with five separate client matters over the course of seven years and recommended
that she be disbarred for “flagrant dishonesty and indifference to her clients.” Ms.
Johnson filed exceptions to the Board Report and Recommendation in this court.
After Ms. Johnson filed her exceptions, and after considering Ms. Johnson’s
response to an order to show cause, this court suspended Ms. Johnson from the
practice of law in the District of Columbia pending final disposition of this
proceeding. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(g).
Ms. Johnson argues that the consideration of expert testimony at her
Committee hearing deprived her of the right to a fair hearing, challenges the Board’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and contests the Board’s recommended
sanction of disbarment. We conclude that Ms. Johnson was not deprived of her right
to a fair hearing; that the facts found by the Committee and upheld by the Board are
supported by substantial evidence of record; that Ms. Johnson committed the
charged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct; and that the recommended
sanction is warranted based on Ms. Johnson’s flagrant dishonesty. We therefore
order that Ms. Johnson is disbarred from the practice of law in this jurisdiction.
3
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
A. Factual Background
Ms. Johnson was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar in 2006 and has no
prior record of professional discipline. This case arose out of her conduct in five
separate client matters and her financial record-keeping and commingling. The
Committee heard evidence on the alleged rule violations and made the following
factual findings under a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. 1
1. Count 1: Police Misconduct Case Filed on Behalf of the
Rudders, Ms. Goss, and Their Children
In June 2008, Roger and Rosena Rudder, their five-year-old daughter, Mr.
Rudder’s sister Noverlene Giselle Goss, and Ms. Goss’s 15-year-old daughter (“the
Rudders”) attended an annual parade celebrating the culture of Trinidad. Following
1
The Board concurred with the factual findings as supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Ms. Johnson takes exception to many of the findings. We
address those exceptions in the Discussion; because we conclude that the findings
are supported by substantial evidence of record, see infra, we accept them for
purposes of this recitation.
4
an altercation with the District of Columbia police, all three adults and Ms. Goss’s
daughter were arrested. The adults accepted diversions in their criminal cases.
The Rudders claimed that they were subjected to excessive force by the police,
including the striking and mishandling of the minor children, and in October 2008
they met with Ms. Johnson about filing a civil action against the police. Ms. Johnson
falsely told the Rudders that she had successfully handled several police misconduct
matters; in fact, she had not previously litigated an excessive force case. Thinking
that Ms. Johnson “[knew] what she [was] doing,” the Rudders signed a contingency
fee agreement with Ms. Johnson.
The Rudder family had two potential causes of action: District of Columbia
common-law claims against the individual police officers and federal civil rights
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The common-law claims were generally easier to
establish, but they had a one-year statute of limitations, although that was tolled for
minors until they reached the age of 18. D.C. Code §§ 12-301, 13-302. The Section
1983 claims had a three-year statute of limitations but imposed heightened pleading
standards and provided a qualified immunity defense for individual defendants and
a defense for the governmental entity that the officers acted contrary to policy or
custom. Ms. Johnson was not aware of these principles.
5
The Rudder family provided Ms. Johnson with the names of witnesses and
leads to obtain possible video of the incident. Ms. Johnson, however, “kind of blew
it off a little,” telling the Rudders that that was “something for later.” She failed to
take steps to secure eyewitness testimony or video footage. Later, Ms. Johnson told
the Rudders and Ms. Goss to contact the witnesses themselves. An expert in police
misconduct cases opined that Ms. Johnson’s failure to investigate the case was a
“fatal, fatal mistake.”
In November 2009—more than a year after being retained and 17 months after
the incident—Ms. Johnson filed a complaint in federal court on behalf of the
Rudders against the District of Columbia and two named police officers. Ms.
Johnson testified at the Committee hearing that in drafting the complaint she
“combined a complaint where [she] saw various causes of actions, and [she] just put
them in there.” She later told Disciplinary Counsel that the “main count” was the
Section 1983 claim and that “[a]ll other [common-law] claims was [sic] just added
to the complaint.” The common-law claims for the adults were barred because they
were filed outside the statute of limitations. The minors’ common-law claims,
however, were tolled, so they were still viable. Ms. Johnson did not have the statute
of limitations “on [her] mind” when she filed the complaint.
6
The defendants moved to dismiss the adults’ common-law claims on statute-
of-limitations grounds and the Section 1983 and some of the constitutional claims
for failure to plead sufficient facts. The defendants explicitly acknowledged that the
minors’ common-law claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. Ms.
Johnson, however, expressly conceded the lack of viability of the entire common-
law case and filed a proposed order providing for the dismissal of all of the common-
law claims. The D.C. Circuit later called this move “inexplicabl[e].” Rudder v.
Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2012). And even after the defendants pointed
out the error in their reply brief, Ms. Johnson did not correct her erroneous
concession. Accordingly, the district court dismissed with prejudice all of the
common-law claims, including the minors’ claims, and it subsequently dismissed
the entire case on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to plead adequate facts to
withstand a motion to dismiss the federal civil rights and constitutional claims.
Later, during an unsuccessful mediation, the defendants’ lawyers told the Rudders
that they had “no leverage” because they had “given up [their] rights.”
Ms. Johnson did not inform her clients when the government filed its motion
to dismiss or when the court granted the motion. She did not advise them about the
statute-of-limitations issues, nor did she consult with them before conceding to
7
dismissal of all of the common-law claims. Without informing them of what had
happened, she moved for reconsideration and for leave to file an amended complaint.
The evidence shows that Rosena Rudder emailed Ms. Johnson asking if the
defendant’s motion to dismiss had been denied—over a month after the district court
had granted the motion. Ms. Johnson replied, claiming that the defendants were “not
interested in settlement while the issue of dismissal is pending”; Ms. Johnson did
not say in this email that dismissal had in fact been granted a month earlier.
After Ms. Johnson filed the motion to reconsider, the Rudders discovered on
their own that their case had been dismissed and confronted Ms. Johnson. Only then
did she tell them about the dismissal and that she was taking steps to reverse it. Ms.
Johnson, however, understated the seriousness of the dismissal. As she testified, “I
assured them everything is still on track; don’t worry . . . .” Ms. Johnson falsely
represented that the “case was not dismissed due to [her] error”; rather, she told the
Rudders, the court “just dismissed the case on its own initiate [sic] which was clearly
an error and was inappropriate.”
The district court denied the motion for reconsideration. Ms. Johnson then
filed an appeal, again without consulting with or informing her clients. While the
appeal was pending, Mr. Rudder sent a letter to Ms. Johnson to terminate the
8
attorney-client relationship. He also sent a letter to the D.C. Circuit seeking a
continuance to obtain new counsel, asserting that Ms. Johnson had performed
incompetently. In November 2010, Mr. Rudder filed a complaint with Disciplinary
Counsel.
Ms. Johnson responded by warning the Rudders that if they continued to claim
the case was dismissed due to her error, they “will not be successful on appeal.” The
Rudders kept Ms. Johnson as their attorney, and she filed an appellate brief on their
behalf, again without sharing a draft or consulting with them.
During the appeal, the Rudders fired Ms. Johnson and proceeded with another
attorney. In January 2012, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court in part and
reinstated the minors’ common-law claims and the constitutional claims against the
individual officers. The adults’ common-law claims remained dismissed as time-
barred. Ultimately, the parties settled the case.
To Disciplinary Counsel and before the Committee, Ms. Johnson made false
or misleading statements and tried to minimize her responsibility for the dismissal
or blame her clients. For example, she claimed in correspondence with Disciplinary
Counsel that she had filed a “similar case for excessive force,” based, she later
9
acknowledged, on her involvement in a police misconduct case as a paralegal. She
falsely told Disciplinary Counsel that she had not missed any deadlines,
notwithstanding the statute-of-limitations issues. She claimed that she had
“previously informed the Rudders of the issue of the dismissal,” but the evidence
established that she did so only after the district court denied her motion to
reconsider, seven months after the defendants had moved to dismiss. And she
characterized the disciplinary complaint as a misunderstanding, asserting that “Mr.
Rudder is not an attorney and does not realize . . .” or “does not understand” what
happened.
2. Count 2: Representation of Donnell Lewis in a Divorce
Matter
In July 2007, Donnell Lewis signed a retainer agreement with Ms. Johnson
for representation in a divorce matter that was pending in D.C. Superior Court. Ms.
Johnson entered her appearance and the court scheduled a status hearing without
consulting Ms. Johnson about her availability. Ms. Johnson had a conflict on the
date set by the court but did not move for a continuance or find substitute counsel,
although she did arrange to participate by telephone.
10
Approximately one month before the hearing, Ms. Johnson informed Mr.
Lewis that she intended to withdraw as his attorney because he had not paid her.
Because the matter was pending before a court, however, she was required to move
for the court’s consent to withdraw. She did not do so.
On the day of the status hearing, Ms. Johnson did not appear in person; and,
although she had obtained approval to appear by telephone, the court clerk was
unable to reach her because she was in another courtroom at the time. The court was
unhappy that Ms. Johnson was not present because the case had “been continued
numerous times” and expressed its “frustrat[ion] that [Ms. Johnson] has just chosen
not to be here today.” The court asked Mr. Lewis why his counsel was not present.
In response, Mr. Lewis disclosed confidential information about his relationship
with Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson thereafter filed a motion to withdraw in which she revealed in
greater detail confidential information about Mr. Lewis’s situation. Ms. Johnson did
not file the motion to withdraw in camera or ex parte because she was not aware
that she could do so. Mr. Lewis had not given Ms. Johnson permission to disclose
the basis of her motion to withdraw.
11
3. Count 3: Representation of Glenn Strawder in a Medical
Malpractice Matter
In 2004, Glenn Strawder suffered a retinal tear in his left eye and lost all vision
in that eye. Mr. Strawder believed the tear was the result of medical malpractice and
sought legal representation. In April 2007, he found Ms. Johnson, who agreed to
take his case on a contingent fee basis (with Mr. Strawder paying costs and
expenses), even though she had no experience handling a complex medical
malpractice case.
Ms. Johnson testified that she planned to file suit to preserve the cause of
action before the statute of limitations expired and then hand the case off to a more
experienced lawyer. She did not do so. Ms. Johnson drafted a complaint using a
model form she had obtained at a seminar. The complaint sought damages for pain
and suffering, medical expenses, and lost earnings.
Ms. Johnson had difficulty finding a qualified expert witness who would
testify that the defendants had violated the applicable standard of care. Two experts
opined that they could not support a claim of breach of the standard of care.
Nonetheless, Ms. Johnson arranged for Mr. Strawder to take out loans against the
value of his cases from a litigation financing company. Ms. Johnson told Mr.
12
Strawder that she believed in the strength of his case and encouraged him to apply
for the litigation loans, which she submitted on his behalf. She did so
notwithstanding the views of the experts she had contacted and her failure to try to
value the case. Ms. Johnson told the litigation finance company that the case was
valued at $5 million, but she testified at the hearing that she “didn’t know whether
[Mr. Strawder’s] case had value” and she had “no idea” how that number was arrived
at. She also told the finance company that Mr. Strawder understood the terms of the
loan when, in fact, he did not. After exhausting his own funds, Mr. Strawder
borrowed more than $17,000.
Ms. Johnson did not explain to Mr. Strawder “the implications of borrowing
the funds, including the high interest rate” he would be charged if he received any
recovery. Moreover, despite requests from Mr. Strawder, Ms. Johnson never
provided him with accounts of how she used the loan funds or with records or
receipts accounting for the funds Mr. Strawder paid her.
Ms. Johnson was ultimately able to secure a medical expert, but he was not a
retinal specialist. Ms. Johnson failed to obtain and provide the expert with Mr.
Strawder’s complete medical records before he was deposed, a fact that came out at
the deposition. During an unsuccessful mediation, Ms. Johnson persuaded Mr.
13
Strawder to dismiss the individual doctor from the case without getting anything in
return, because she believed it made the case easier to settle. According to a medical
malpractice expert, this was a “serious” mistake. Ms. Johnson told the Committee
that Mr. Strawder made the decision to dismiss the doctor, but the Committee found
this assertion intentionally false.
Ms. Johnson withdrew from the case in February 2009. The court later denied
Mr. Strawder’s new counsel’s request to re-open discovery, and Mr. Strawder
accepted what he believed was a nuisance-value settlement.
4. Count 4: Representation of Katina Wilson in Separate Child
Custody and Personal Injury Matters
a. In July 2012, Katina Wilson retained Ms. Johnson to represent her on
an hourly fee basis in seeking sole custody of her daughter. Ms. Wilson paid $1,000
as an advance fee, which Ms. Johnson deposited into her Interest on Lawyer Trust
Accounts (IOLTA) account. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Johnson entered her appearance
on Ms. Wilson’s behalf in D.C. Superior Court. Trial was scheduled for July 2013.
Ms. Johnson represented Ms. Wilson through discovery and pre-trial matters.
Ms. Wilson requested that Ms. Johnson’s office provide her regular invoices. Ms.
14
Johnson sent invoices for the first few months, but then stopped, and she did not
maintain detailed time records. Ms. Wilson continued to make monthly payments
(sometimes twice a month), often in thousand-dollar amounts, despite not knowing
what services she was paying for. She paid Ms. Johnson $16,000 in total.
Ms. Johnson failed to prepare Ms. Wilson’s case for trial. She failed to
prepare any fact witnesses whom Ms. Wilson had identified (including a witness
about domestic abuse, which was an issue in the case), despite telling Ms. Wilson
that she would. She also provided Ms. Wilson incomplete information about what
was happening with her case. In addition, Ms. Johnson mishandled discovery issues,
which led to various disputes and ultimately to the imposition of sanctions on Ms.
Wilson at trial.
Ms. Johnson frequently failed to comply with discovery rules and scheduling
orders. Opposing counsel unsuccessfully tried to get complete discovery responses
from Ms. Johnson. She did not provide this information even though Ms. Wilson
had provided her with the requested information. Eventually, Ms. Johnson provided
some discovery responses after being compelled by court order, but some of the
responses were evasive and nonresponsive.
15
About one week before the trial, Ms. Johnson told Ms. Wilson that she was
going to withdraw as her attorney because she had received an opportunity to teach
a course overseas that conflicted with the scheduled trial. Ms. Johnson described
the course to opposing counsel as a “great career opportunity” for her. Ms. Johnson
told Ms. Wilson that she had arranged for another attorney to stand in for her at trial.
She misled Ms. Wilson about the potential ramifications of changing counsel and
she falsely told Ms. Wilson that the stand-in attorney was “of counsel” in her law
firm. Ms. Johnson also told Ms. Wilson that “[i]t will not take a rocket scientist to
represent someone in a custody case.”
Ms. Wilson was initially amenable to having the other attorney handle her
case. She believed that the new counsel was prepared and would bill at the same
hourly rate as Ms. Johnson. Ms. Johnson did not explain that the successor counsel
was expecting fees up to $20,000, in addition to the $16,000 Ms. Wilson had already
paid. After she found out about the new counsel’s fees, Ms. Wilson decided that she
could not afford to pay and that her only option was to proceed to trial pro se.
Ms. Johnson did not explain to Ms. Wilson that there were unresolved
discovery disputes and pending sanction motions to be addressed at trial, let alone
how to handle these issues. Ms. Wilson did not learn of the most recent sanction
16
motion until Ms. Johnson uploaded it to a shared file system, and she was unaware
that she could be held personally liable for the discovery disputes that had arisen
during Ms. Johnson’s handling of the case.
Ms. Johnson left the country without having filed or been granted a motion to
withdraw, without having informed the presiding judge, and without having
arranged for successor counsel. She also did not turn over the case file to Ms. Wilson
or prepare her for the trial, including how to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
While Ms. Johnson had subpoenaed witnesses to testify for Ms. Wilson, she had not
prepared them for trial. The same day Ms. Johnson left the country, Ms. Wilson
emailed all the parties to tell them she would proceed pro se.
Two days before trial and three days after she had left the country, Ms.
Johnson filed a motion to withdraw. The same day, opposing counsel filed a fourth
motion to compel discovery and for sanctions based on Ms. Johnson’s failure to
submit complete responses. Ms. Johnson did not file an opposition, nor did she
explain to Ms. Wilson why opposing counsel had filed the motion or how she should
respond.
17
Ms. Wilson appeared alone for the trial. Pursuant to a court order, Ms.
Johnson appeared by telephone to address why Ms. Wilson was appearing without
counsel. The court then granted Ms. Johnson’s withdrawal motion. Ms. Wilson
represented herself, including presenting witnesses and addressing the outstanding
discovery and sanctions motions. Ms. Wilson relied on her recollection of scenes
from the television program “Law and Order” to raise objections. She also “Googled
what to ask” to assist her in examining witnesses.
Ms. Wilson learned from opposing counsel that she was entitled to submit
documentary exhibits and have access to a trial notebook. Thus, after the first two
days of trial, Ms. Wilson went to Ms. Johnson’s office to obtain exhibits and a trial
notebook from Ms. Johnson’s paralegal. The court permitted her to late-file the
exhibits but did not permit her to submit anything “new.”
Despite Ms. Johnson’s conduct and eleventh-hour withdrawal, Ms. Wilson
was able to prevail and obtain full custody of her daughter. Even though she
prevailed, the court sanctioned Ms. Wilson $1,089 in attorney’s fees and costs for
discovery failures for which Ms. Johnson was responsible. Ms. Johnson did not
reimburse Ms. Wilson for those sanctions or for any of the $16,000 Ms. Wilson had
paid in fees. After Ms. Johnson stopped handling the case, Ms. Wilson requested a
18
final bill from her. Ms. Johnson never provided one. In response to Disciplinary
Counsel’s investigation, however, Ms. Johnson created two different versions of
billing invoices, each of which she termed a “comprehensive bill” and “itemized
accounting of all of the time that [she] spent in her representing Ms. Wilson.”
b. In August 2012, several months after she retained Ms. Johnson in the
child custody matter, Ms. Wilson was struck by a cab while walking in a crosswalk.
Ms. Johnson agreed to handle the matter for Ms. Wilson on a contingency fee basis.
Although Ms. Johnson drafted a fee agreement for a 33 percent contingency fee, Ms.
Wilson never signed the agreement, and Ms. Johnson did not provide anything else
in writing about the basis or rate of the fee.
Ms. Johnson’s office sent Ms. Wilson to the Maryland Injury Center to receive
treatment for her injuries. Ms. Johnson also sent a letter to the cab driver’s insurance
company demanding $30,000, and the insurer responded with an offer to settle. Ms.
Johnson never shared this offer with Ms. Wilson. Ms. Johnson settled with the
insurer for $4,500 without discussing the offer with Ms. Wilson and without her
approval. Later, without being informed about the total amount offered in settlement
or given the chance to approve the offer, Ms. Wilson was told that she would receive
$1,500 as her portion of the settlement. Ms. Wilson asked that her share of the
19
settlement funds be applied to Ms. Johnson’s bill for her legal fees in the child
custody matter. Ms. Johnson, however, never accounted to Ms. Wilson how the
settlement funds were used or applied to the bill for the child custody case.
Ms. Johnson deposited the $4,500 settlement check into her trust account. She
later obtained a $2,960 reduction of the Maryland Injury Center’s fee for medical
services to $1,500 by falsely representing that her firm would reduce its 33 percent
fee. In fact, Ms. Johnson took $1,500, which was her full one-third of the settlement
amount. Six months after placing the settlement funds into her trust account, Ms.
Johnson sent a $1,500 check to the Maryland Injury Center.
5. Financial Record-Keeping and Commingling
Due to the accounting irregularities in the Wilson matters, Disciplinary
Counsel, with the assistance of a forensic investigator, sought to analyze Ms.
Johnson’s accounting more generally. Ms. Johnson failed over the course of almost
a year to provide requested accounting and supporting documents. Eventually, with
respect to the Wilson matters, Ms. Johnson submitted to Disciplinary Counsel two
different invoices bearing the same number and date. The Hearing Committee did
not conclude that either invoice was intentionally false, but it determined that Ms.
20
Johnson’s record-keeping in the Wilson matters was unreliable and that neither
invoice had been submitted to Ms. Wilson.
This prompted Disciplinary Counsel to focus its attention on one of Ms.
Johnson’s IOLTA accounts. As with the Wilson invoices, Ms. Johnson provided
Disciplinary Counsel with two different versions of client account ledgers covering
the same time period. The forensic investigator tried to compare the second,
purportedly “updated” ledger against relevant bank records but found that it was
impossible for him to match up the transactions. The investigator nonetheless
concluded that Ms. Johnson’s IOLTA account was short at least $3,000 from what
should have been in the account according to the ledger.
In digging deeper, the forensic investigator determined that accounts for
certain randomly selected clients were short when compared with bank records,
including the account of Fuad and Marenikeji Aregbe, which was $350 short, and
the account of Dionne Hart, which was $786 short. And, although checks for a
settlement in Ms. Hart’s matter were deposited in the IOLTA account, Ms. Johnson
wrote a check from a different account to pay a health care center on behalf of Ms.
Hart.
21
Ultimately, the Committee found that Ms. Johnson negligently (but not
recklessly or intentionally) misappropriated Ms. Hart’s entrusted funds, commingled
funds by leaving earned fees in her IOLTA account, failed to keep reliable and
complete records of client funds, failed to respond to Disciplinary Counsel’s
inquiries and subpoenas in a truthful and expeditious manner, and provided
conflicting and contradictory versions of requested documents.
B. The Disciplinary Process
In June 2018, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel instituted disciplinary
proceedings against Ms. Johnson, alleging in a five-count Specification of Charges
that she had committed multiple rule violations in connection with the client matters
and record-keeping addressed above and also an additional non-client matter. The
Committee held a four-day hearing in March 2019, at which Disciplinary Counsel
presented the testimony of 11 witnesses, including three experts. Ms. Johnson
testified but did not present any other witnesses.
In October 2019, the Committee issued its Report and Recommendation,
finding clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Johnson violated Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.1(a) and (b), 1.2(a), 1.3(a), 1.3(b)(1) and (2), 1.3(c), 1.4(a)
22
and (b), 1.4(c), 1.5(a)-(c), 1.6(a)(1), 1.15(a), 1.15(c), 1.16(d), 3.4(c), 8.4(c), and
8.4(d). The Committee found that several of the Rule violations occurred more than
once, as they were repeated among multiple counts, and also that Ms. Johnson
intentionally testified falsely at the hearing. The Committee recommended the
sanction of disbarment after considering (1) the seriousness of Ms. Johnson’s
conduct; (2) prejudice to the clients; (3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty;
(4) violation of other disciplinary rules; (5) Ms. Johnson’s disciplinary history;
(6) whether Ms. Johnson had acknowledged her wrongful conduct; and
(7) mitigating circumstances. See In re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032, 1053 (D.C. 2013).
Ms. Johnson filed exceptions to the Committee’s Report and
Recommendation. In an October 2020 Report and Recommendation, the Board
found that four alleged Rule violations (Rule 1.5(b), Rule 3.4(c), and two violations
of Rule 8.4(d)) had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence but otherwise
upheld the Committee’s Report and Recommendation, resulting in a determination
that Ms. Johnson had committed over 20 rule violations and testified falsely in
several respects at the hearing. 2 The Board adopted the Committee’s
2
The Board concluded that Ms. Johnson violated the following Rules:
• Rule 1.1(a) and (b) (competence) (three counts);
23
recommendation of disbarment. In so doing, it cited the seven-year span of Ms.
Johnson’s misconduct, Ms. Johnson’s false testimony at the Committee hearing, and
her lack of remorse, and it explained that Ms. Johnson’s “repeated, persistent, and
pervasive dishonesty constituted flagrant dishonesty such that . . . [she] should be
barred from the continued practice of law.”
• Rule 1.2(a) (consulting with client and abiding by client’s decisions)
(one count);
• Rule 1.3(a) (diligence and zeal) (two counts);
• Rule 1.3(b)(1) and (2) (seek client’s lawful objectives and not prejudice
or damage client) (three counts);
• Rule 1.3(c) (reasonable promptness) (three counts);
• Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (communication) (three counts);
• Rule 1.4(c) (informing client of settlement offer) (one count);
• Rule 1.5(a) and (c) (reasonableness of fee and communication of
contingent fee arrangement) (one count);
• Rule 1.6(a)(1) (client confidentiality) (one count);
• Rule 1.15(a) (safekeeping of records) (one count);
• Rule 1.15(a) (negligent misappropriation, commingling, and record-
keeping) (one count);
• Rule 1.15(c) (accounting of client funds) (one count);
• Rule 1.16(d) (terminating representation) (one count);
• Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) (three
counts);
• Rule 8.4(d) (serious interference with administration of justice) (one
count).
24
Ms. Johnson filed a brief in this court, taking exception to most of the Board’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law and its recommended sanction. The Office
of Disciplinary Counsel did not file exceptions, but it filed a brief supporting the
Board’s Report and Recommendation.
II. Discussion
We “accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are
unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and [we] adopt the recommended
disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent
dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar
R. XI, § 9(h)(1). “Substantial evidence means enough evidence for a reasonable
mind to find sufficient to support the conclusion reached.” In re Evans, 902 A.2d
56, 70 (D.C. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the
Board’s legal determinations de novo. In re Samad, 51 A.3d 486, 495 (D.C. 2012)
(per curiam).
Before this court, Ms. Johnson argues that (1) the consideration of expert
testimony by the Committee deprived her of her right to a fair hearing; (2) the
Committee’s and Board’s factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence;
25
(3) the Board’s legal conclusions regarding her Rule violations are erroneous; and
(4) disbarment is unwarranted. We take each claim in turn.
A. Consideration of Expert Testimony
At a pre-hearing conference seven months before the hearing, Disciplinary
Counsel disclosed to Ms. Johnson that it might call expert witnesses. In accordance
with the Committee’s pre-trial order, Disciplinary Counsel disclosed its expert
witnesses’ identities, subject areas, and contact information before the hearing. The
three identified witnesses had expertise in the standards of care for police
misconduct cases, personal injury law, and domestic relations cases.
One week before the hearing, Ms. Johnson moved to exclude the experts’
testimony on the ground that Disciplinary Counsel failed to provide sufficient
information on the witnesses’ areas of expertise, the subject matter of the testimony,
or the substance of the experts’ opinions. The Committee denied the motion,
qualified the witnesses as experts, and heard their testimony on direct and cross-
examination.
26
The Board rejected Ms. Johnson’s claim that the Committee erred in
considering the testimony. The Board stated that pre-hearing discovery of expert
reports or expert opinion testimony is not required by the Board Rules and that Ms.
Johnson was able to cross-examine the witnesses concerning their qualifications and
expertise.
In this court, Ms. Johnson renews her claim about insufficient disclosures and
also argues that the experts improperly testified about an ultimate issue, namely, the
existence of rule violations. We discern no error. Whether evidence—including
expert testimony—is relevant and admissible under Board Rule 11.3 is “within the
ambit of the Hearing Committee’s discretion,” In re Speights, 173 A.3d 96, 102
(D.C. 2017) (per curiam), and is not governed by “the rules of evidence applicable
in other proceedings,” id. Expert testimony regarding standards of care is not
uncommon in disciplinary hearings. See, e.g., id. at 100-02; In re Outlaw, 917 A.2d
684, 686 (D.C. 2007) (per curiam); In re Fair, 780 A.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C. 2001).
The record reflects that the experts here provided opinion testimony about the
applicable standards of care, not conclusions about Ms. Johnson’s violations of
Rules of Professional Conduct.
27
In addition, as Ms. Johnson concedes, the Board Rules impose no
requirements regarding expert disclosures, and, in any event, Disciplinary Counsel
disclosed its expert witnesses’ identities, subject areas, and contact information
before the hearing. Ms. Johnson suffered no prejudice, as she was permitted to
question the experts regarding their qualifications and expertise on cross-
examination.
B. The Committee’s and Board’s Factual Findings
Ms. Johnson lodges 82 exceptions to the Committee’s and Board’s factual
findings. The Committee heard testimony by all of the adult clients involved in the
matters at issue and three expert witnesses and considered over 100 exhibits. We
have carefully reviewed the record and Ms. Johnson’s exceptions, and we conclude
that the findings are supported by substantial—if not overwhelming—evidence of
record, including testimony that the Committee found credible or, in the case of Ms.
Johnson, not credible. We are required to “place great weight on credibility
determinations made by the Board and the Hearing Committee because of the
Hearing Committee’s unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their
demeanor.” In re Klayman, 282 A.3d 584, 593 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see In re Godette, 919 A.2d 1157, 1164 (D.C. 2007) (“An
28
appellate body’s duty to defer to the findings of the trier of fact is obviously at its
zenith where that trier of fact had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe
the demeanor of the witness.”).
Ms. Johnson’s exceptions are largely conclusory or circular, 3 or they focus on
the weight given to evidence 4 or on inconsequential alleged discrepancies. 5 But “the
weight, value and effect of the evidence” “fall primarily within the sphere
customarily left to the factfinder,” In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1208 (D.C. 1993),
3
For example, Ms. Johnson states, without explaining why the evidence was
insufficient, that she “excepts to the finding of fact . . . that she did not discuss with
her clients the motions to reconsider after the dismissal of the complaint”; that “the
Hearing Committee’s finding that Mr. Lewis found it stressful to appear at the status
hearing is contradicted by the fact that Mr. Lewis represented himself in the case and
appeared in Court without counsel for two years”; and that successor counsel for Ms.
Wilson “was provided with adequate information and documents relating to the
case” and “two hours spending going over the facts of the case and documents was
sufficient for her to prepare for the case.”
4
For example, Ms. Johnson claims that the Hearing Committee did not read
certain evidence “in context”; that the finding that the Rudders hired her due to her
purported experience in police brutality cases is “unfounded” because she herself
did not testify at the hearing that she made such a representation to the Rudders; and
that “the Hearing Committee appears to be naive to the fact that [a] discovery dispute
as to the adequacy of a response is distinct from failing to respond to discovery.”
5
For example, Ms. Johnson asserts that the adults in the Rudder matter did
not accept “judgment[s]” that included diversion, as found by the Hearing
Committee, but rather “entered into” a diversion program to resolve their criminal
charges; and that the Hearing Committee’s finding that Ms. Johnson’s intern
attempted to contact witnesses in the Rudder matter “later” did not establish that the
attempt did not occur in 2008 (the year of the incident).
29
and “[t]his court must accept a finding that is supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole, even though there may also be substantial evidence in the
record to support a contrary finding,” Godette, 919 A.2d at 1163 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, we will not disturb the Hearing Committee’s and
Board’s factual findings.
C. The Board’s Conclusions of Law
Many of Ms. Johnson’s challenges to the findings of specific rule violations
rest on her version of the facts. As we have explained, however, we must accept the
factual findings of the Committee and the Board if those findings are “supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Godette, 919 A.2d at 1163. That is
true even if “there might also be substantial evidence to support a contrary finding.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Having reviewed the record, we conclude
that substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Ms. Johnson violated
the rules at issue.
Because the reports and recommendations below are
voluminous and meticulously detailed, we will not cite to
every factual example, exhibit, excerpt of the transcript,
and so forth. Rather, we conclude that substantial
evidence of each charged violation is supported by a
30
handful of notable examples upon which we will focus our
review.
In re (Johnnie) Johnson, 275 A.3d 268, 276 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam).
1. Rule 1.1(a) and (b) (competence) (Rudders, Lewis, and
Strawder)
Rule 1.1(a) requires lawyers to provide competent representation, defined as
“the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation.” Rule 1.1(b) requires lawyers to serve their clients with “skill
and care commensurate with that generally afforded to clients by other lawyers in
similar matters.” Competent representation requires the “legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” In re
Drew, 693 A.2d 1127, 1130, 1132 (D.C. 1997) (per curiam). Rule 1.1(b) is “better
tailored [than Rule 1.1(a)] to address the situation in which a lawyer capable to
handle a representation walks away from it for reasons unrelated to his competence
in that area of practice.” In re Lewis, 689 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C. 1997) (per curiam).
“[T]the same failings that constitute . . . 1.1(a) violations [can] constitute 1.1(b)
violations.” Evans, 902 A.2d at 72.
31
We find ample evidence of record to support the conclusion that Ms. Johnson
violated Rules 1.1(a) and (b) in the Rudder, Lewis, and Strawder matters. Among
other things, Ms. Johnson failed to adequately investigate the Rudder case, was
unaware of basic principles in police misconduct cases, and allowed the statute of
limitations to run on the adult Rudders’ common-law claims and then explicitly—
and “inexplicably,” Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 793 (D.C. Cir. 2012)—
conceded that the children’s claims should be dismissed too. What’s more, she failed
to correct her error after being made aware of it. See In re Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210
A.3d 775, 787 (D.C. 2019) (per curiam) (attorney “failed to correct her errors after
being made aware of them”). In the Lewis matter, Ms. Johnson arranged to
participate in the hearing by telephone but then could not be reached, and she failed
to file her motion to withdraw, which revealed client confidences, in camera or ex
parte because she did not know she could. And with respect to Mr. Strawder, Ms.
Johnson did not know how to value a medical malpractice claim and had no idea
where the $5 million valuation for Mr. Strawder’s case came from, allowed the
expert witness to be deposed without sufficient preparation, and dismissed the
individual doctor from the case without obtaining anything in return. In all three
matters, Ms. Johnson demonstrated a “‘fail[ure] to engage in the thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary’ for the case[ ] that clearly prejudiced her client.”
Id. (quoting Evans, 902 A.2d at 69-70).
32
We therefore accept the Board’s conclusion that Ms. Johnson violated Rules
1.1(a) and 1.1(b) multiple times.
2. Rule 1.2(a) (consulting with client and abiding by client’s
decisions) (Wilson)
Rule 1.2(a) obligates a lawyer to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation . . . and [to] consult with the client as to the means
by which they are to be pursued.” The Board credited Ms. Wilson’s testimony that
Ms. Johnson did not present her with the insurer’s offer to settle her personal injury
claim. We have no basis to disturb that factual finding, and it supports a conclusion
that Ms. Johnson violated Rule 1.2(a). See In re Elgin, 918 A.2d 362, 375 (D.C.
2007); In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904, 919 (D.C. 2002).
3. Rule 1.3(a) (diligence and zeal) (Rudders and Strawder)
Rule 1.3(a) states that an attorney “shall represent a client zealously and
diligently within the bounds of the law.” The same facts supporting the Rule 1.1(a)
and (b) violations support Rule 1.3(a) violations in the Rudder and Strawder
representations. See In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 16 & n.14 (D.C. 2005) (same evidence
33
can support multiple charges of rule violations). Ms. Johnson’s “conduct not only
fell short of her obligation to provide zealous and diligent representation—it also
demonstrated a pattern of neglect, which we have defined as ‘indifference and a
consistent failure to carry out the obligations that the lawyer has assumed to the
client.’” Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d at 778 (quoting In re Wright, , 1255 (D.C.
1997) (per curiam)).
4. Rule 1.3(b)(1) and (2) (seek client’s lawful objectives and not
prejudice or damage client) (Rudders, Strawder, and
Wilson)
Rule 1.3(b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not intentionally: (1) [f]ail to seek
the lawful objectives of a client through reasonably available means permitted by
law and the disciplinary rules; or (2) [p]rejudice or damage a client during the course
of the professional relationship.” “Rule 1.3(b) does not ‘require proof of intent in
the usual sense of the word.’” In re Dickens, 174 A.3d 283, 300 (D.C. 2017)
(quoting In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d 1106, 1116 (D.C. 2007)). “Rather, neglect ripens
into an intentional violation when the lawyer is aware of her neglect of the client
matter; or put differently, when a lawyer’s inaction coexists with an awareness of
her obligations to her client.” Id. (cleaned up). Intent can also be found where “the
neglect is so pervasive that the lawyer must be aware of it.” Lewis, 689 A.2d at 564.
34
Again, the evidence relating to the Rudder, Strawder, and Wilson matters—
including Ms. Johnson’s failure to correct her erroneous concession about dismissal
of the Rudder children’s claims, her dismissal of the individual doctor in Mr.
Strawder’s case, and her abandonment of Ms. Wilson on the eve of trial—establishes
pervasive neglect that prejudiced clients. See Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d at 788
(attorney’s “failure to correct those deficiencies in the amended complaint ripened
into an intentional violation because she was undoubtedly aware of the problems by
that point”) (cleaned up); In re Vohra, 68 A.3d 766, 781 (D.C. 2013) (finding
violations of Rules 1.3(b)(1) and (2) where attorney was made aware of the need to
cure deficiencies in client’s visa applications and failed to do so, seriously
prejudicing client’s pursuit of permanent resident status); Ukwu, 926 A.2d at 1116
(“Knowing abandonment of a client is the classic case of a Rule 1.3(b)(1) violation.”)
(cleaned up).
5. Rule 1.3(c) (reasonable promptness) (Rudders, Strawder,
and Wilson)
Rule 1.3(c) provides that an attorney “shall act with reasonable promptness in
representing a client.” Ms. Johnson clearly failed to act with reasonable promptness
in investigating, filing a complaint, and correcting her error in the Rudder case. In
35
the Strawder matter, she failed to order medical records to prepare the expert before
his deposition. Regarding Ms. Wilson, she repeatedly failed to comply with
discovery requests and orders and to prepare witnesses for trial, and, of course, she
withdrew at the eleventh hour without acting earlier to ensure that Ms. Wilson was
not left to proceed on her own. We have little difficulty finding multiple Rule 1.3(c)
violations.
6. Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (communication) (Rudders, Strawder,
and Wilson)
Rule 1.4(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.” Similarly, Rule 1.4(b) states than an attorney “shall explain a matter
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.” The Rule places the burden on the attorney to “initiate
and maintain the consultative and decision-making process if the client does not do
so and [to] ensure that the ongoing process is thorough and complete.” D.C. R. Prof.
Conduct 1.4, cmt. [2].
“While [a]n attorney need not communicate with a client as often as the client
would like, the attorney’s communication with the client must be reasonable under
36
the circumstances.” Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d at 789 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Accordingly, the ‘guiding principle’ for evaluating conduct under Rule
1.4 is whether the lawyer fulfilled ‘reasonable client expectations for information’
consistent with the lawyer’s ‘duty to act in the client’s best interests’ and the client’s
overall objectives.” Id. (quoting D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4, Cmt. [3]). “To meet
that expectation, a lawyer not only must respond to client inquiries but also must
initiate communications to provide information when needed.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[A] lawyer may not withhold information to serve the
lawyer’s own interest or convenience.” In re Mitrano, 952 A.2d 901, 927 (D.C.
2008) (quoting D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4, Cmt. [5]).
The record is replete with examples of Ms. Johnson failing to keep her clients
informed, and, in some cases, withholding information to serve her own interests,
such as her interest in avoiding discovery of her statute-of-limitations error. See,
e.g., Klayman, 282 A.3d at 596 (upholding finding of Rule 1.4(b) violation where
attorney “did not consult with [client] before taking important steps in the
litigation”); Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d at 789 (violations of Rules 1.4(a) and (b)
where attorney “repeatedly failed to inform [client] of the developments in her case
in a timely manner” and client “testified that she had to inquire several times over a
period of two or three weeks before [attorney] told her that the trial court had
37
dismissed her original complaint”); In re Starnes, 829 A.2d 488, 506 (D.C. 2003)
(per curiam) (finding Rule 1.4(a) violation where lawyer “routinely failed to keep
his clients informed of developments in their respective cases”). We recognize that
Ms. Johnson disputes these factual findings and testified to the contrary regarding a
number of these occurrences. But we cannot agree that the Committee’s findings
were not supported by substantial record evidence. The Committee chose to credit
the testimony of the clients over that of Ms. Johnson, as it was entitled to do in its
role as factfinder. See Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d at 790; Klayman, 282 A.3d at
593; In re Bradley, 70 A.3d 1189, 1193 (D.C. 2013) (per curiam); Godette, 919 A.2d
at 1164. We generally will not second guess such a credibility determination,
Klayman, 282 A.3d at 593, and we particularly decline to do so where, as in at least
one instance here, there is documentary evidence—the emails between Rosena
Rudder and Ms. Johnson indicating that the Rudders did not know that dismissal had
been granted over a month earlier—corroborating the credited witness’s account.
See Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d at 790.
7. Rule 1.4(c) (informing client of settlement offer) (Wilson)
Rule 1.4(c) provides that “[a] lawyer who receives an offer of settlement in a
civil case . . . shall inform the client promptly of the substance of the
communication.” Ms. Johnson’s failure to inform Ms. Wilson of the insurer’s
38
settlement offer violates this rule as well. See Elgin, 918 A.2d at 375; In re Thyden,
877 A.2d 129, 143-44 (D.C. 2005).
8. Rule 1.5(a) and (c) (reasonableness of fee and communication
of contingent fee arrangement) (Wilson)
Rule 1.5(a) provides that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable.” We agree
with the Board that, while Ms. Johnson’s hourly fee in the Wilson custody case
might not have been unreasonable, the fees Ms. Wilson ultimately paid were
unreasonable in light of the substantial evidence that Ms. Johnson did not prepare
witnesses, left Ms. Wilson to proceed pro se, and did not refund the amount of the
discovery sanction imposed on Ms. Wilson based on Ms. Johnson’s failures.
Rule 1.5(c) states in part that “[a] contingent fee agreement shall be in writing
and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined . . . .” Before the
Board, Ms. Johnson conceded a violation of Rule 1.5(c) for not putting in writing
the Wilson personal injury case contingency fee agreement.
39
9. Rule 1.6(a)(1) (client confidentiality) (Lewis)
Rule 1.6(a)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a client’s
confidence or secret. Rule 1.6(b) defines a “confidence” as “information protected
by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law” and a “secret” as “other
information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate, or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing, or would be likely
to be detrimental, to the client.” The evidence shows that Ms. Johnson publicly filed
a motion to withdraw in which she revealed circumstances about Mr. Lewis that led
her to inform him that she could no longer represent him. We agree with the Board
that the information Ms. Johnson revealed was “secret” and that Mr. Lewis’s
statements to the court—after he had been forced to appear alone and explain why
his attorney was absent—neither constituted revelation of the same information nor
served to impliedly authorize Ms. Johnson’s disclosures under Rule 1.6(e)(4).
10. Rule 1.15(a) (safekeeping of records) (Strawder)
As relevant here, Rule 1.15(a) provides that a lawyer shall keep complete
records of client funds. The evidence shows that, despite requests from Mr.
Strawder, Ms. Johnson never provided him with accounts of how she used the loan
40
funds or with records or receipts accounting for the funds Mr. Strawder paid her.
We agree that this constitutes a violation of Rule 1.15(a).
11. Rules 1.15(a) (negligent misappropriation, commingling, and
record-keeping) and 1.15(c) (accounting of client funds)
(Wilson)
Rule 1.15(a) provides, as relevant here, that “[a] lawyer shall hold property of
clients or third persons that is in the lawyer’s possession in connection with a
representation separate from the lawyer’s own property.” Rule 1.15(c) adds that “a
lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property
that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or
third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”
Before the Board, Ms. Johnson conceded violations of these rules with respect
to Ms. Wilson, based on her commingling of personal and client funds and her failure
to make a prompt payment to the Maryland Injury Center. We also agree with the
Board that substantial evidence establishes that Ms. Johnson committed negligent
misappropriation and commingling with respect to Ms. Hart. See Ekekwe-Kauffman,
210 A.3d at 792 (“Misappropriation is defined as any unauthorized use of client’s
funds entrusted to a lawyer, including not only stealing but also unauthorized
41
temporary use for the lawyer’s own purpose, whether or not she derives any personal
gain or benefit therefrom.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. (“To guard
against the loss of clients’ money, Rule 1.15(a) also requires a lawyer to hold client
funds in a separate trust account and to avoid commingling her clients’ funds with
her own property.”).
12. Rule 1.16(d) (terminating representation) (Wilson)
Rule 1.16(d) states that, in connection with the termination of representation,
“a lawyer shall take timely steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a
client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client
is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been
earned or incurred.” We have little difficulty concluding that Ms. Johnson violated
this rule when she decided, a week before trial, to travel abroad to teach, failed to
give reasonable notice to Ms. Wilson, failed to ensure that Ms. Wilson had new
counsel she could afford, and failed to provide Ms. Wilson with the trial notebook
and adequate instruction prior to trial.
42
13. Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation)
(Rudders, Strawder, and Wilson)
Rule 8.4(c) prohibits an attorney from engaging in “conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” “Rule 8.4(c) is not to be accorded
a hyper-technical or unduly restrictive construction,” Ukwu, 926 A.2d at 1113, and
it “encompasses conduct evincing a lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle[;] a lack of fairness and straightforwardness[;] failure to provide
information where there is duty to do so[; or] reckless disregard of the truth,” id.
We agree with the Board that at least the following acts by Ms. Johnson
constitute dishonesty under the standards described above: (1) her claim to the
Rudders that she had handled previous police misconduct cases; (2) her assertion to
the Rudders that their case was “still on track”; (3) her claim that the dismissal of
the Rudders’ complaint was “not due to [her] error”; (4) her representation to the
litigation financing company in the Strawder matter that she had explained the terms
of the financing arrangement to Mr. Strawder and that he understood those terms;
and (5) her statement to the Maryland Injury Center that she would take a five
percent reduction in her fees in order to convince the center to reduce its bill for
services rendered to Ms. Wilson.
43
We also concur that Ms. Johnson was dishonest before Disciplinary Counsel
and the Committee. For example, in response to an inquiry from the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel regarding the Rudder case, Ms. Johnson described filing a
“similar case for excessive force,” when in fact she had never “filed” such a case as
an attorney; even if Ms. Johnson had worked on a similar case as a paralegal, the
clear implication of her claim was that she had experience as an attorney in police
misconduct cases. See Ukwu, 926 A.2d at 1113 (“lack of fairness and
straightforwardness” constitutes dishonesty) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Johnson also told Disciplinary Counsel that she immediately advised the
Rudders of the dismissal of their complaint, when the evidence shows (and she later
admitted) that she did not do so until after the district court denied her motion for
reconsideration.
14. Rule 8.4(d) (serious interference with administration of
justice) (Wilson)
Rule 8.4(d) prohibits an attorney from engaging in “conduct that seriously
interferes with the administration of justice.” “To establish a violation of Rule
8.4(d), [Disciplinary] Counsel must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
(1) the attorney either took improper action or failed to take action when he or she
should have acted; (2) the conduct involved bears directly on a case in the judicial
44
process with respect to an identifiable case or tribunal; and (3) the conduct taints the
judicial process in more than a de minimis way, meaning that it must at least
potentially impact upon the process to a serious and adverse degree.” (Johnnie)
Johnson, 275 A.3d at 279 (internal quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up). We agree
with the Board that Ms. Johnson violated this rule in the Wilson child custody case
by withdrawing just before trial, forcing the court to choose between delaying a child
custody matter and allowing a party to handle a trial without counsel.
D. Sanction
The Board agreed with the Hearing Committee’s recommendation that Ms.
Johnson be disbarred. The Board’s recommended sanction comes to us with a
“strong presumption in favor of its imposition,” In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d 366, 371
(D.C. 2003), and “[i]f the Board’s recommended sanction falls within a wide range
of acceptable outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed,” In re McClure, 144 A.3d
570, 572 (D.C. 2016) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ultimate
responsibility of imposing sanctions, however, “rests with this court in the first
instance.” Godette, 919 A.2d at 1164 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
imposing the sanction, we must ensure that we do not “foster a tendency toward
inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct” and that the sanction is not
45
“otherwise . . . unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(1). “Where this court takes a
significantly different view of the seriousness of an attorney’s conduct, the court
thus has not hesitated to reach its own conclusion as to the appropriate sanction.” In
re Baber, 106 A.3d 1072, 1076 (D.C. 2015) (per curiam).
In imposing professional discipline, we aim “not only to maintain the integrity
of the profession and to protect the public and the courts, but also to deter other
attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.” In re Martin, 67 A.3d 1032, 1053
(D.C. 2013). “[T]he purpose of imposing a sanction is not to punish the
attorney . . . .” In re Avery, 189 A.3d 715, 720 (D.C. 2018) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction,
we evaluate “(1) the seriousness of the conduct, (2) prejudice to the client,
(3) whether the conduct involved dishonesty, (4) violation of other disciplinary
rules, (5) the attorney’s disciplinary history, (6) whether the attorney has
acknowledged his or her wrongful conduct, and (7) mitigating circumstances” as
non-exhaustive factors. Martin, 67 A.3d at 1053.
Disbarment is “our harshest sanction.” In re Tun, 286 A.3d 538, 547 (D.C.
2022). It is, however, an appropriate sanction for “flagrant dishonesty.” In re White,
11 A.3d 1226, 1233 (D.C. 2011) (per curiam) (“Where this court has concluded that
46
the attorney’s conduct falls into a category of dishonesty of a flagrant kind it has
held disbarment to be the appropriate sanction.”); see also In re Mazingo-Mayronne,
276 A.3d 19, 21 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam) (“a continuing and pervasive indifference
to the obligations of honesty in the judicial system can warrant disbarment”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Flagrant dishonesty is either dishonesty accompanied by aggravating factors
or continued and pervasive dishonesty. See In re O’Neill, 276 A.3d 492, 503 (D.C.
2022) (“demonstrated and persistent indifference to the truth” over six years justified
disbarment); Mazingo-Mayronne, 276 A.3d at 22 (“disbarment can be warranted for
a prolonged pattern of repeated dishonesty, even in the absence of the aggravating
circumstances” such as criminal conduct or the improper taking of funds for personal
gain); In re Howes, 52 A.3d 1, 15 (D.C. 2012) (“[W]here such dishonesty is
aggravated and prolonged, disbarment is the appropriate sanction.”).
We conclude that disbarment is warranted here based on Ms. Johnson’s
repeated and pervasive dishonesty over seven years, both in the representation of
clients and before Disciplinary Counsel and the Committee. See Baber, 106 A.3d at
1077 (“The repeated and protracted nature of Mr. Baber’s dishonesty weighs
significantly in favor of disbarment.”). In the Rudder matter, Ms. Johnson
47
misrepresented to the Rudders her experience handling police brutality cases, to their
detriment; falsely represented that everything was “still on track” with their case;
and falsely denied fault for the dismissal of claims in the case, seemingly to avoid
revelation of her statute-of-limitations errors. During the investigation or before the
Committee, she again claimed that she had filed a police brutality case and asserted,
contrary to the clear record, that she had not missed any deadlines in the case and
had kept her clients informed. In the Strawder matter, Ms. Johnson dishonestly made
up a valuation of the lawsuit for the litigation financer when she did not even know
how to value a medical malpractice claim and misrepresented to the lender that she
had explained the terms of the financing arrangement to Mr. Strawder and that he
understood those terms. And in the Wilson personal injury matter, Ms. Johnson
falsely stated to Ms. Wilson’s health care provider that she would take a five percent
reduction in her fees in order to convince the health care provider to reduce its bill
for services rendered to Ms. Wilson, when in fact Ms. Johnson did not reduce her
fees to Ms. Wilson.
Moreover, Ms. Johnson’s repeated dishonesty was accompanied by an
appalling level of indifference to her clients, consistent incompetence that prejudiced
her clients, a revelation of client confidences, financial mismanagement, and a lack
of remorse and acknowledgement of responsibility. See (Johnnie) Johnson, 275
48
A.3d at 282 (disbarment warranted, even in the absence of prior disciplinary record,
where behavior involved dishonesty, case handling prejudiced client’s claim,
attorney committed numerous rule violations, and attorney showed no remorse); In
re Moawad, 268 A.3d 820, 821-22 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam) (“we look to the totality
of the misconduct in determining whether the dishonesty was flagrant and have
considered whether the intentional dishonesty was an attempt to hide other
misconduct and blame others for his misconduct”); id. (“[w]e have also considered
whether during the disciplinary proceedings respondent acknowledged his
misconduct, showed remorse, or showed any willingness to pay restitution or return
his client’s unearned fees”); Baber, 106 A.3d at 1077-78 (disbarment warranted,
even in the absence of prior disciplinary record, where dishonesty came at the
expense of clients’ interests, was compounded by conduct that betrayed client
confidences, and prejudiced clients and attorney showed no remorse).
To be sure, taken in isolation, some of Ms. Johnson’s false statements can be
characterized as puffery, deflection, or an extension of her lack of competence.
Considered together, though, we agree with the Committee and the Board that Ms.
Johnson has exhibited a consistent lack of forthrightness, a willingness to shade the
truth for her own benefit, and a disregard for the obligation for honesty and candor
that comes with the privilege of membership in our jurisdiction’s Bar. See Baber,
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106 A.3d at 1077 (“honesty is basic to the practice of law, and . . . lawyers have a
greater duty than ordinary citizens to be scrupulously honest at all times”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); In re Williams, 513 A.2d 793, 796 (D.C. 1986) (per
curiam) (“We grant the license to practice law as a privilege, not as a right, and we
do so only on the strict condition that the attorney aspire to the highest standards of
ethical conduct.”).
Finally, while recognizing that “[p]erfect consistency is not achievable in this
area,” In re Silva, 29 A.3d 924, 927 (D.C. 2011), because the “imposition of
sanctions in bar discipline . . . is not an exact science but may depend on the facts
and circumstances of each particular proceeding,” In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458, 463
(D.C. 1994) (per curiam), we are satisfied that disbarment here is consistent with the
sanction imposed in comparable cases. See, e.g., (Johnnie) Johnson, 275 A.3d at
282; In re Bynum, 197 A.3d 1072, 1074 (D.C. 2018) (per curiam) (disbarment
warranted where attorney’s “dishonest conduct spanned five years, from the outset
of his representation of his clients, through the disciplinary hearing in this case, and
[the] dishonesty [was] exacerbated by his lack of remorse and effort to shift the
blame to others”); Baber, 106 A.3d at 1077-78; id. at 1078-79 (citing cases).
50
Accordingly, “[c]onsidering the circumstances of this case as a whole,”
Baber, 106 A.3d at 1078, we conclude that disbarment falls within the range of
acceptable outcomes, is consistent with dispositions for comparable conduct, and is
not otherwise unwarranted.
III. Conclusion
Because the Committee’s and Board’s factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence, we are required to adopt them. Reviewing the Board’s legal
conclusions de novo, we conclude that they are consistent with our precedent.
Because disbarment for flagrant dishonesty is consistent with our prior decisions,
and because it is warranted in Ms. Johnson’s case in light of the number and
seriousness of her rule violations, we adopt the Board’s recommendation.
Accordingly, it is ordered that Ms. Johnson is disbarred from the practice of law in
the District of Columbia. For purposes of reinstatement, the effective date of Ms.
Johnson’s disbarment will not begin to run until she files an affidavit that complies
with D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 14(g).
So ordered.