In Re the Marriage of Isler

                            No. 13565
         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                               1977


IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
ROBERT ISLER,
                        Petitioner and Respondent,
     and
CHRISTINE M. ISLER,
                         Defendant and Appellant.


Appeal from:   District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
               Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
    For Appellant:
         William J. Miele argued, Miles City, Montana
    For Respondent :
         Kenneth R. Wilson argued, Miles City, Montana


                                      Submitted:   April 18, 1977

                                       Decided:    JUN 2 1 1 7
                                                            9z
Filed:   JUN 2 2 ]gin
M r . J u s t i c e Daniel J . Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.


         T h i s i s a n appeal by , t h e mother from a judgment of t h e

d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Rosebud County, awarding custody of t h e p a r t i e s '

two minor c h i l d r e n t o t h e i r f a t h e r .

         C h r i s t i n e and Robert I s l e r were married i n September 1970,

and divorced i n A p r i l 1976.                  Although t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found

both p a r e n t s f i t and proper persons, i t awarded custody of David,

then f o u r y e a r s o l d , and Douglas, t h e n one y e a r o l d , t o t h e

father.         The mother contends t h e award of custody t o t h e f a t h e r

was a n abuse of d i s c r e t i o n on t h e p a r t o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

because :

         1 ) Evidence a t t r i a l on t h e f a c t o r s l i s t e d i n s e c t i o n 48-332,

R.C.M.        1947, of t h e Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, favored

t h e mother.

         2)     The award was erroneously based on t h e r e l a t i v e e a r n i n g

c a p a c i t y of t h e p a r t i e s .

         3)     The d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e presumption

i n f a v o r of awarding c h i l d r e n of t e n d e r y e a r s t o t h e i r mother was

overcome by t h e evidence.

         I n determining t h e i s s u e of custody t h e paramount c o n s i d e r a -

t i o n i s t h e w e l f a r e of t h e c h i l d r e n and must of n e c e s s i t y be

l e f t l a r g e l y i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .   The d e c i -

s i o n o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i l l n o t be o v e r r u l e d on a p p e a l a b s e n t

a showing of a c l e a r abuse of d i s c r e t i o n .                Tweeten v. Tweeten,

              Mont   .        9            P.2d               , 34    St.Rep.      337,339.

         S e c t i o n 48-332, R.C.M.          1947, s t a t e s :

         "Best i n t e r e s t of c h i l d . The c o u r t s h a l l determine
         custody i n accordance w i t h t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e
         c h i l d . The c o u r t s h a l l c o n s i d e r a l l r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s
         including :
              "(1) t h e wishes of t h e c h i l d ' s parent o r parents
        a s t o h i s custody;

              "(2)      t h e wishes of t h e c h i l d a s t o h i s custodian;

                'I ( 3 ) t h e i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e
        c h i l d with h i s parent o r p a r e n t s , h i s s i b l i n g s , and
        any o t h e r person who may s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e c h i l d ' s
        best interest;

            "(4) t h e c h i l d ' s adjustment t o h i s home, school,
        and community; and

               "(5) t h e mental and physical h e a l t h of a l l i n d i v i -
        d u a l s involved    ."
       The f i r s t two f a c t o r s of s e c t i o n 48-332 a r e not h e l p f u l

i n t h i s case. Both p a r e n t s seek custody and t h e c h i l d r e n were

too young a t t h e time'of t r i a l t o express a preference,                            The

f i f t h f a c t o r a l s o provides l i t t l e guidance.           The record i n d i c a t e s

t h a t . b o t h p a r t i e s coped w e l l with t h e s t r a i n of t h i s d i s p u t e and

none of t h e persons involved, including t h e c h i l d r e n , were shown

t o have a physical o r mental problem t h a t would have an e f f e c t

on t h e custody i s s u e .

       The t h i r d f a c t o r involves t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of t h e c h i l d r e n

with t h e i r p a r e n t s and o t h e r s "who may s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t 1 '

their best interests.               The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found both t h e mother

and f a t h e r expressed t h e i r love f o r t h e c h i l d r e n and:

             "That both of t h e minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s
       a r e h e a l t h y , normal c h i l d r e n t h a t love each o t h e r
       and both of t h e i r p a r e n t s , and have b e n e f i t e d from
       a healthy home environment . I 1

       The record supports these findings.                         However, t h e mother

t e s t i f i e d she intended t o move t o t h e San Francisco a r e a i n C a l i -

f o r n i a and l i v e temporarily with her p a r e n t s while searching f o r

a permanent home f o r h e r s e l f and t h e c h i l d r e n .            During t h i s time

she planned t o work as an accounting c l e r k f o r a stockbroker

i n San Francisco and commute t h e 40 miles from h e r p a r e n t s ' home.
She argues i f she were given custody h e r plan would enable t h e

c h i l d r e n t o form a c l o s e and rewarding r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e i r

maternal grandparents which they would otherwise l o s e .

        The f o u r t h f a c t o r r e l a t e s t o t h e c h i l d r e n ' s adjustment

t o home, school, and community.                  The mother contends she can

provide a more s t a b l e environment f o r t h e c h i l d r e n .             She n o t e s

t h e f a t h e r , an engineer f o r Bechtel Power Corporation, i s sub-

j e c t t o many geographical d i s r u p t i o n s i n h i s c a r e e r .       Although

t h e family had l i v e d i n C o l s t r i p , Montana, f o r over t h r e e years

a t t h e time of t r i a l , i t was t h e f a t h e r ' s t h i r d duty assignment

i n the s i x and one-half years he had worked f o r Bechtel, and h i s

s t a y i n C o l s t r i p was not projected t o l a s t beyond 1981.                The

mother argues i f she were given custody t h e c h i l d r e n would not

be s u b j e c t t o these constant and p r e d i c t a b l e r e l o c a t i o n s , b u t

i n s t e a d would have t h e b e n e f i t of a s t a b l e and secure l i f e

with h e r near t h e i r maternal grandparents.

        However, t h e record shows a s t a b l e home i n C o l s t r i p .             The

family l i v e d i n a modern three-bedroom home.                     The f a t h e r spent

a l o t of time with t h e c h i l d r e n and they had a c l o s e r e l a t i o n -

ship.     He shared i n t h e housekeeping d u t i e s and helped d i s c i p l i n e

the children.          H i s place of work was only a few minutes d r i v e

from t h e home and he was a v a i l a b l e i f an emergency arose.                     But

t h e mother, a t l e a s t temporarily, would be 40 miles away from

the c h i l d r e n , working i n San Francisco.              Considering t h e f a c t o r s

a p p l i c a b l e i n s e c t i o n 48-332, we f i n d no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n

granting custody t o t h e f a t h e r .

        The mother next argues t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t erroneously based

i t s custody decision on t h e superior earning power of t h e f a t h e r .
The f a t h e r earned approximately $1,800 per month and t h e mother

would earn s u b s t a n t i a l l y l e s s i n h e r p o s i t i o n a s an accounting

clerk.      Nothing i n t h e record expressly s t a t e s t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t considered t h i s f a c t o r i n determining t h e custody i s s u e ,

but t h e mother argues t h e c o u r t must have done so because t h a t

was " t h e only d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e p a r t i e s 1 ' favorable t o t h e

f a t h e r t h a t was s e t f o r t h i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of

fact.      That i s n o t enough.           Absent any o t h e r i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e

record we w i l l n o t presume t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s custody award

t o t h e f a t h e r was based on h i s s u p e r i o r earning power.

        The mother's f i n a l argument i s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h e evidence rebutted t h e presumption i n favor

of awarding custody of c h i l d r e n of tender years t o t h e i r mother

when a l l t h i n g s a r e equal.          I n Tweeten v. Tweeten,                    Mont   .     9



        P. 2d           , 34    St.Rep. 337, 341, we s t a t e d t h i s presumption

continues under t h e Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, b u t held

t h a t i t i s not conclusive and each custody case must be decided

on i t s own f a c t s " r a t h e r than by t h e use of ' c o n t r o l l i n g o r con-

c l u s i v e ' presumption.       * * *"
        I n The Matter of t h e Adoption of Redcrow,                               Mont   .-
                                                                                           3



        P.2d          , 34     St.Rep. 306, 308, t h e Court s t a t e d t h a t a

f i n d i n g t h a t both competing couples a r e f i t and s u i t a b l e adoptive

p a r e n t s i s "not equivalent t o a f i n d i n g t h a t each would e q u a l l y

promote t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e child."             This i s a l s o t r u e i n

custody cases.           Accordingly, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n

concluding t h a t       "* * *      t h i s presumption, l i k e any o t h e r d i s p u t a b l e

presumption, may be overcome by c o n t r a r y evidence."
             The mother r e l i e s on Casale v. Casale, (Ky.1977'                    No. 76-

      273)   ,        S.W.2d            , where        the Supreme Court of Kentucky

      reversed an a&rd of custody of t h e p a r t i e s ' i n f a n t c h i l d t o

      the father, stating:

                     "***       W a r e n o t prepared t o d e f i n e p r e c i s e l y
                                 e
             t h e quantum of proof necessary t o overcome t h e p r e f -
             erence t h a t t h e mother should be t h e custodian of
             c h i l d r e n of tender years. This i s a value judgment
             t h a t has t o be decided on a case-by-case b a s i s . Here
             t h e evidence i s so c l o s e , we a r e of t h e opinion t h a t
             t h e n a t u r a l preference f o r t h e mother should prevail."

      I t thus appears t h a t t h e preference f o r t h e mother comes i n t o
                                           F   .

      I

      play i n Kentucky a t t h e c l o s e of t h e evidence.              That i s n o t t h e

      case i n Montana.         Here, t h e p a r t i e s proceed from the presumption

      and once i t i s overcome by a preponderance of t h e evidence t h e r e

      i s no preference f o r t h e mother.              I n meeting t h i s burden, t h e

      f a t h e r need not prove t h e mother t o be u n f i t .

             I n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h e presumption

      i n favor of t h e mother had been overcome by t h e evidence and

      t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d r e n would be b e s t served by g r a n t i n g

      custody t o t h e f a t h e r .

             W a f f i r m t h e judgment
              e                                    .



      W ...---.---
       e Concur:




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