[Cite as In re Parrett v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-764.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
CLARK COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: :
RICHARD L. PARRETT :
: C.A. CASE NO. 2015-CA-96
Plaintiff-Appellant :
: T.C. NO. 20150118A
v. :
: (Civil appeal from Common
EDWARD D. WRIGHT, EXECUTOR : Pleas Court, Probate Division)
:
Defendant-Appellee :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the ___3rd ___ day of _____March_____, 2017.
...........
DAVID D. HERIER, Atty. Reg. No. 0068990, 451 Upper Valley Pike, Springfield, Ohio
45504
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
WILLIAM D. WEST, Atty. Reg. No. 0018465, 20 S. Limestone Street, Suite 120,
Springfield, Ohio 45502
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
.............
DONOVAN, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Richard L. Parrett appeals a decision of the Clark County
Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, dismissing his complaint to set aside an
antenuptial agreement he entered into with his now deceased wife, Ellen Schwartz
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Parrett, and finding that said agreement was valid and enforceable. Richard filed a
timely notice of appeal with this Court on October 22, 2015.
{¶ 2} The record establishes that on June 20, 2005, Richard and Ellen entered into
an antenuptial agreement (hereinafter “the agreement”). Neither party was represented
by an attorney when they entered into the agreement. The agreement itself was drafted
by Ellen’s son and the executor of her estate, defendant-appellee, Edward W. Wright.
On the same day, the agreement was hand carried to a clerk in the Clark County Probate
Court who notarized it in a handwritten notation at the bottom of the document. The
parties lived together as husband and wife until January 2, 2015, when Ellen passed away
due to complications from Alzheimer’s disease.
{¶ 3} On April 9, 2015, Richard filed a complaint to set aside the antenuptial
agreement, arguing that he signed it under duress at the insistence of Ellen and her son,
Edward. Richard also asserted that at the time he signed the agreement, he was
unaware of the value and extent of Ellen’s income and property, both real and personal.
Thereafter, Edward filed an answer to Richard’s complaint on April 27, 2015.
{¶ 4} On September 15, 2015, the matter proceeded to a trial to the bench. On
September 25, 2015, the trial court issued a decision dismissing Richard’s complaint and
finding the antenuptial agreement to be enforceable. Specifically, the trial court found
that Richard failed to meet his burden to prove that he was not sufficiently appraised of
the extent of Ellen’s assets at the time that the parties entered into the agreement. The
trial court further found that Richard entered into the agreement voluntarily and not under
duress or as a result of fraudulent inducement.
{¶ 5} It is from this judgment that Richard now appeals.
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{¶ 6} Richard’s sole assignment of error is as follows:
{¶ 7} “DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT, RICHARD L. PARRETT, HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING A FULL
DISCLOSURE OR KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE, EXTENT, AND VALUE OF THE
OTHER SPOUSE’S PROPERTY WHEN HIS DECEASED WIFE’S EXECUTOR
ATTEMPTS TO USE AN ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT TO COMPLETELY DISINHERIT
HIM FROM HIS WIFE’S ESTATE?”
{¶ 8} In his sole assignment, Richard contends that the trial court erred when it
held that the antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. Specifically, Richard
argues that the trial court erred when it found that he “failed to meet the burden of proving
*** that he was not sufficiently appraised of the assets of Ellen at the time that the
Antenuptial Agreement was signed on June 20, 2005.” Richard asserts that the burden
was on Ellen’s estate to establish that he entered into the antenuptial agreement with the
benefit of full knowledge or disclosure of the assets of the proponent.
{¶ 9} An antenuptial agreement is a contract entered into between prospective
spouses in contemplation and consideration of their future marriage, whereby the
property rights and economic interests of either or both of the prospective spouses are
determined and set forth. Rowland v. Rowland, 74 Ohio App.3d 415, 419, 599 N.E.2d
315 (4th Dist. 1991). These agreements may include provisions concerning the
disposition or devolution of property and payments for sustenance upon the death of one
or other of the spouses, or provisions for the distribution of property and the sustenance
or maintenance of one or other of the spouses, upon a separation or divorce, or any
combination of the concerns between the parties. See Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d
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99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (1984).
{¶ 10} Although antenuptial agreements are not per se invalid, they must meet
certain minimum standards of good faith and fair dealing. Zimmie v. Zimmie, 11 Ohio
St.3d 94, 98, 464 N.E.2d 142 (1984). The parties to an antenuptial agreement are in a
fiduciary relationship to one another and, thus, are under a mandatory duty to act in good
faith with a high degree of fairness and disclosure of all circumstances which materially
bear on the antenuptial agreement. Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d at 108, 464 N.E.2d at 508; see,
also, Cohen v. Estate of Cohen, 23 Ohio St.3d 90, 491 N.E.2d 698 (1986).
{¶ 11} The test in Ohio for the validity of an antenuptial agreement is set forth
in Gross, paragraph two of the syllabus: “Such agreements are valid and enforceable (1)
if they have been entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; (2)
if there was full disclosure, or full knowledge and understanding of the nature, value and
extent of the prospective spouse's property; and (3) if the terms do not promote or
encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.” The Ohio Supreme Court has also held
that the validity of an antenuptial agreement is a question of fact for the trial court, and
the trial court's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Bisker v.
Bisker, 69 Ohio St.3d 608, 609–610, 635 N.E.2d 308 (1994).
{¶ 12} “Abuse of discretion” has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable,
arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482
N.E.2d 1248 (1985). It is to be expected that most instances of abuse of discretion will
result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are
unconscionable or arbitrary.
{¶ 13} A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that
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would support that decision. It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding
the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive,
perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would support a contrary
result. AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment
Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
{¶ 14} When an antenuptial agreement provides disproportionately less than the
party challenging it would have received under an equitable distribution, the burden is on
the one claiming the validity of the contract to show that the other party entered into it with
the benefit of full knowledge or disclosure of the assets of the proponent. Fletcher v.
Fletcher, 68 Ohio St.3d 464, 467, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (1994). This burden shifting is in
derogation of traditional contract principles because ordinarily a party asserting the
invalidity of a contract bears the burden of proving a defense to it. Id.; see Ohio Loan &
Discount Co. v. Tyarks, 173 Ohio St. 564, 184 N.E.2d 374 (1962), paragraph two of the
syllabus.
{¶ 15} In Messer v. Messer, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1570, 2002-Ohio-4196, we affirmed
a trial court’s decision invalidating the parties' antenuptial agreement. The trial court's
decision was partly based on the husband’s lack of disclosure of assets in the antenuptial
agreement prepared by his attorney and signed by his wife two months before the parties’
marriage. Therein, we stated the following:
Furthermore, the record also supports the trial court's finding that
assets were not disclosed. In this regard, Gross indicates that disclosure is
“satisfied either by the exhibiting of the attachment to the antenuptial
agreement of a listing of the assets of the parties to the agreement, or
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alternatively a showing that there had been a full disclosure by other
means.” Id. at 105. The agreement in the present case did not refer to any
assets, other than a house George owned at the time, nor was any list
attached to the agreement. Diane testified that she was not aware of
George's other assets, including retirement funds, bank accounts, or
vehicles. Similarly, George testified that at the time of the agreement, he
owned a house trailer, a whole life policy of insurance through GM, a GM
pension, and a vehicle. Admittedly, none of these items was disclosed in
the agreement. Thus, the evidence of record supports the trial court's
finding that assets were not disclosed.
Id. at ¶ 32.
{¶ 16} Initially, we note that in its decision finding the antenuptial agreement to be
valid and enforceable, the trial court improperly placed the burden on Richard of proving
that he was not sufficiently appraised of Ellen’s assets at the time that the parties entered
into the agreement. As previously stated, when an antenuptial agreement provides
disproportionately less than the party challenging it would have received under an
equitable distribution, the burden is on the one claiming the validity of the contract to show
that the other party entered into it with the benefit of full knowledge or disclosure of the
assets of the proponent. Fletcher, 68 Ohio St.3d at 467. Accordingly, the burden was on
Edward, as the representative of Ellen’s estate, to adduce evidence which established
that Richard entered into the antenuptial agreement with the benefit of full knowledge or
disclosure of Ellen’s assets. Only in this way would Edward be able to affirmatively
establish that the antenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable against Richard.
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{¶ 17} Furthermore, even if the trial court had properly placed the evidentiary
burden on Edward, the record affirmatively suggests that Richard was not sufficiently
appraised of Ellen’s assets at the time that the parties entered into the antenuptial
agreement. The parties’ antenuptial agreement states in pertinent part:
*** [N]ow, therefore, in consideration of said Richard L. Parrett and Ellen J.
Schwartz consummating the said contract of marriage, said Richard L.
Parrett and Ellen J. Schwartz hereby agree to waive and release and
forever quit claim and renounce all dower, curtesy, and other interest in and
to the said real estate and personal property that said Richard L. Parrett
and Ellen J. Schwartz may now have or hereafter acquire by means
whatever.
***
And in consideration of the consummation of said marriage, Richard L.
Parrett and Ellen J. Schwartz hereby release, cancel and waive all claims
to all property of said Richard L. Parrett and Ellen J. Schwartz to which they
might be entitled as wife or widow, husband or widower.
{¶ 18} Similar to the invalidated agreement in Messer, there was no attachment to
the antenuptial agreement of a listing of Ellen’s assets. The antenuptial agreement only
generally refers to any “real estate and personal property” owned presently or in the future
by either party. The antenuptial agreement in the instant case did not specifically refer
to any of Ellen’s assets, nor was any list attached to the agreement. Richard testified
that at the time the parties entered into the antenuptial agreement that he was aware that
Ellen owned the house in which she lived at 259 South Arlington Avenue in Springfield,
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Ohio, the furniture in the house, and a motor vehicle. Richard also testified that he was
aware that Ellen was receiving Social Security payments on a monthly basis. Other than
the house, furniture, and vehicle, which were not specifically listed in the antenuptial
agreement or attached documentation, Richard testified that he was unaware of any
additional assets or property, real or personal, owned by Ellen at the time the agreement
was executed or thereafter.
{¶ 19} Significantly, evidence was adduced that Ellen had undisclosed bank
accounts at Key Bank, West Bank, and Huntington Bank. One of those bank accounts
contained over $17,000.00 at the time of Ellen’s passing. Richard testified that he was
unaware that any of these bank accounts existed until they were revealed during
discovery in the instant case. As a result of the discovery process, Richard testified that
he also learned that Ellen owned an interest in two real estate properties along with one
of her sons, Mark Wright. Finally, evidence was adduced that Ellen was receiving
payments from the sale of Thomas Tape, a business that she co-owned with her previous
deceased husband. Admittedly, none of these assets were disclosed to Richard in the
antenuptial agreement or at any point thereafter. Thus, the evidence of record supports
the conclusion that assets were not disclosed. Messer at ¶ 32.
{¶ 20} Upon review, we conclude that the trial court improperly placed the burden
on Richard of proving that he was not sufficiently appraised of Ellen’s assets at the time
that the parties entered into the agreement.
{¶ 21} Richard’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 22} Richard’s sole assignment of error having been sustained, the judgment of
the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further
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proceedings consistent with the opinion.
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HALL, P.J., and FROELICH, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
David D. Herier
William D. West
Hon. Richard P. Carey
In re Parrett v. Wright
Combined Opinion