Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that there was legally sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (cf. People v Urquidez, 5 AD3d 800, 801 [2004]; People v Hirsch, 280 AD2d 612 [2001]; People v Murray, 168 AD2d 573, 573 [1990]). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Michale A.C., 73 AD3d 1042, 1043 [2010]; cf. CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the finder of fact to view the witnesses, hear the
Criminal trespass in the third degree (see Penal Law § 140.10 [a]) is a lesser-included offense of burglary in the second degree (see Penal Law § 140.25 [2]; Matter of Jay R., 255 AD2d 134 [1998]). Accordingly, the count of the petition charging criminal trespass in the third degree should have been dismissed (see CPL 300.40 [3] [b]; Matter of Jaleel H., 36 AD3d 808, 809-810 [2007]). Angiolillo, J.P, Florio, Leventhal and Cohen, JJ., concur.