The respondent was admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in the State of New York at a
The petition charges that the respondent has been guilty of misconduct as an attorney at law in soliciting retainers in personal injury actions; the employment of persons, not members of the bar, to solicit such retainers for a compensation, and the promising and giving of valuable consideration for inducing retainers in personal injury cases. The petition sets out six specific instances of solicitation. In addition, it is charged that respondent converted to his own use part of the money received in settlement of an infant’s claim, through his failure to comply with the order of compromise, retaining more than the amount fixed as his fee.
Respondent's answer put these charges in issue and the matter was referred to a referee to take testimony in regard to said charges and report the same with his opinion thereon to this court. The referee having duly reported, the petitioners move for such action in the matter as this court may deem just and proper.
After respondent’s admission to the bar in December, 1908, he joined his brother, Moses M. Schleider, in the practice of law, and remained with him until some time in 1917. The firm name was Schleider & Schleider. From 1917 to the present time respondent has been engaged on his own account in the practice of law with offices at 51 Chambers street, in the borough of Manhattan. Respondent’s testimony in the investigation before Mr. Justice Wasservogel proves that while he was a member of the firm of Schleider & Schleider that firm engaged in the solicitation of retainers in personal injury cases. The suggestion is that respondent’s brother was the dominant member of that firm. By order of this court dated the 10th day of January, 1930, Moses M. Schleider was suspended for one year from the practice of law as the result of charges of solicitation growing out of the ambulance chasing investigation.
The referee has found that the charges so far as they involve solicitation of the case of Amelia Ambrose have not been sustained. Mrs. Ambrose testified that she was injured in September, 1925; that the day after the accident respondent came to see her, and told her that he had obtained news of the accident from a doctor. She testified that respondent was a stranger to her before that time. She retained respondent on a fifty per cent basis. It appears that Mrs. Ambrose subsequently took the matter away from respondent because she did not hear from him for a long time. Speaking of the Ambrose case, the referee, in his report, statés: “ There seems to be a hostile animus in her case against the respondent and I do not accept her statements as true.”
Respondent claims that the Allen case came to him through some client who volunteered to recommend him. As to the other cases, he has no recollection as to how they came to him.
These cases in which solicitation was established developed since respondent commenced to practice on his own account.
On the charge of conversion, the record shows that in the Allen case (one of those in which solicitation was proved), the order of compromise recites that the boy’s case was settled for $500, of which the attorney (respondent) was to receive $166.67. The guardian should have received $333.33. The parent’s case was settled for $250. Respondent’s retainer provided for a forty per cent fee. The parent, therefore, should have received $150, which, with the $333.33 for the infant, made a total of $483.33 to be turned over to the parent and guardian. Allen testified that he received $455 only, which is $28.33 less than the amount provided for.
Respondent testified before Mr. Justice Wasservogel that there was a bond premium of about fifteen dollars, and “ Then there was some certifications and otherwise that might have been two or three dollars, and otherwise I can’t recall.” Before the referee his testimony is to the effect that the premium on the bond was ten dollars; certificate of the bond two dollars; brain specialist ten dollars or fifteen dollars, and expenses for witnesses and examination of hospital records. Respondent contends that the allowance named in the compromise order is for services only, and did not cover disbursements, and, therefore, he was justified in deducting these disbursements. He could offer no proof by way of office records as to these disbursements. The present contention as to his right to retain the sum in question for disbursements is not quite consistent with testimony given by him before Mr. Justice Wasservogel to the effect that the expenses of the litigation came out of his share.
Referring to this charge of conversion, the referee said: “ Nothing is said in the order about, disbursements. Payment of $10 for the bond was made subsequent to the order. The father of the
In view of the fact that the allowance to respondent in the compromise order in the infant’s action was for services, and no mention was made of disbursements, we agree with the referee in the conclusion reached by him.
The charges of solicitation herein relate to respondent’s conduct some years ago. There is no proof of solicitation within the past two and a half years. Speaking of respondent’s present practice, the referee said: “ By slow degrees the respondent has built up a counsel practice under which be receives retainers from other lawyers who refer such cases to him and depend upon his skill and professional abilities for such success in these cases.” Lawyers of standing in the profession have appeared and testified to their retaining respondent as counsel. We think the interests of justice will be served if respondent is suspended for a period of one year, with leave to apply for reinstatement at the expiration of that term upon proof of his compliance with the conditions incorporated in the order.
Merrell, Finch, McAvoy and Proskauer, JJ., concur.
Respondent suspended for one year.