2022 IL App (5th) 220209-U
NOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 08/17/22. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0209 cons.
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
In re S.L., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Marion County.
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 18-JA-105
)
Samantha M., ) Honorable
) Ericka A. Sanders,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
NO. 5-22-0210
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
In re I.L., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Marion County.
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 18-JA-106
)
Samantha M., ) Honorable
) Ericka A. Sanders,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
1
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Wharton and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The judgments of the circuit court of Marion County that found the respondent unfit
and that terminated the respondent’s parental rights are affirmed because the circuit
court’s finding that the respondent was unfit, based on failure to make reasonable
progress, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In this consolidated appeal, the respondent, Samantha M., appeals the judgments of the
circuit court of Marion County that found her unfit as a parent, and found it in the best interests of
the respondent’s biological minor children S.L. and I.L. to terminate the respondent’s parental
rights. The respondent raises one issue on appeal, which is whether the State met its burden to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is unfit. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 This case began with the filing of, inter alia, petitions for adjudication of wardship
regarding the two minor children at issue in this case: S.L., who was born in September of 2009
(circuit court case No. 18-JA-105, petition filed on November 28, 2018), and her brother, I.L., who
was born in October of 2014 (circuit court case No. 18-JA-106, petition filed on November 29,
2018). The petitions alleged that the children’s father (V.L., who is not a party to this appeal)
engaged in a sexual act with S.L., and that V.L.’s paramour, who also lived in the household, had
pending cases with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and therefore
legally could not be left in charge of the children. The petitions alleged that the respondent, who
is the children’s mother, resided in Pittsburgh, Kansas.
¶5 On December 12, 2018, counsel was appointed to represent the respondent. On January 3,
2019, service plans that were dated December 12, 2018, were filed for each child. The plans noted
2
that integrated assessments for the children were scheduled for January 18, 2019, and that the
respondent, who had stated that she wished to have the children live with her in Kansas, was to
participate in the assessments. Also on January 3, 2019, a parent child visitation and contact plan
was filed for the respondent and the two children. The plan was dated December 12, 2018, and
allowed the respondent to visit the children one time per month for four hours.
¶6 On January 9, 2019, a report was filed by Caritas Family Solutions (Caritas) that indicated
that the respondent had not yet visited with the children, but planned to after a hearing on that date.
The report stated that the respondent lived in Kansas with her three other children, currently was
involved with family preservation services as a result of four reports against her in December 2018
for physical abuse and neglect, which subsequently were determined to be unfounded, and was
receiving intact services in Kansas. On January 25, 2019, ahead of a scheduled January 30, 2019,
pretrial hearing, Caritas filed a second report, which indicated that the respondent engaged in a
supervised visit with the children on January 9, 2019, as planned, that “[t]he visit went very well”
with “no concerns noted,” and that the respondent planned to participate in another supervised visit
after the January 30, 2019, hearing. The report noted that the respondent had not yet completed
her integrated assessment because the respondent was not in Illinois on the date it was scheduled
to take place, but that the respondent would be doing so in the near future. On February 11, 2019,
a DCFS integrated assessment with clinical screener was filed. It did not include detailed
information about the respondent, because she still had not participated in an integrated
assessment. However, the assessment noted that the respondent had visited with the children only
one time—on January 9, 2019—since the case began, and had “not been consistent in her contact
with” caseworkers. Thus, the assessment stated that with regard to the respondent, “the prognosis
for reunification in a timeframe meaningful to [the children] (5-12 months) is guarded.”
3
¶7 On March 27, 2019, ahead of a scheduled April 3, 2019, pretrial hearing, Caritas filed a
new report, which indicated that the respondent still had visited with the children only on January
9, 2019, but that she did call or video chat with the children via V.L. during his visits with the
children. The report also indicated that the respondent was going to receive a packet by mail to
complete part of her integrated assessment, with the remainder to be completed by phone, and that
the respondent had advised her children that she was pregnant again. On April 3, 2019, a DCFS
family service plan dated February 3, 2019, was filed, which reflected “[u]nsatisfactory [p]rogress”
on the respondent’s part with regard to completing her integrated assessment.
¶8 On April 23, 2019, amended petitions for adjudication of wardship were filed on behalf of
each of the children, due to new concerns related to V.L.’s paramour. No allegations against the
respondent were presented in the amended petitions. Also on April 23, 2019, Caritas filed a report
dated April 15, 2019, which indicated that it was prepared for use at an April 24, 2019, hearing,
and indicated that the respondent had not yet returned the packet that was sent to her to begin her
integrated assessment process. On May 17, 2019, Caritas filed a report dated May 15, 2019, which
indicated that it was prepared for use at a May 22, 2019, dispositional hearing. The report did not
specifically reference the respondent’s progress with regard to an integrated assessment, but stated
that Caritas recommended that the respondent “complete parental services and mental health
counseling.” The report stated that the respondent indicated that she was “willing to complete
parenting classes but that she did not see a need for her to be engaged in mental health counseling.”
The report continued that the respondent stated “she would do whatever she needed to do in order
for her children to be returned.” The report noted that the respondent had a supervised visit with
the children on April 24, 2019, and was scheduled to have one on May 22, 2019. A separate section
of the report that listed and summarized the supervised visits of both the respondent and V.L. with
4
the children stated that there were no concerns noted with regard to the respondent’s April 24,
2019, visit.
¶9 At the May 22, 2019, dispositional hearing, the respondent testified, inter alia, that she had
lived in Kansas most of her adult life, and presently lived in Fort Scott, Kansas with, inter alia,
her boyfriend and three of her children. She testified that she presently received services from the
state of Kansas to help “maintain a healthy environment for the children.” She testified that in
Illinois, it had been recommended that she receive parenting services and mental health counseling.
When the respondent was asked what she had done “with regard to those recommendations,” she
testified as follows:
“I have already seen a therapist. There was no—I can’t think of what the word is. But there
is no—we didn’t have to go any further with that. And the parenting classes, Fort Scott
does not have services for parenting classes. So I’m going to get with my Family
Preservation worker and see if maybe there is something in Pittsburgh which is 30 minutes
away from Fort Scott or maybe see about getting some online classes.”
¶ 10 When asked if she had received a mental health assessment, the respondent testified that
she had, and when asked where, she testified that she “went to SEK Mental Health” in Fort Scott.
She testified that no counseling was recommended for her as a result of the assessment. When
asked if she had a plan for what she would do for S.L. and I.L. if they came to live with her in
Kansas, the respondent testified that she would make sure S.L. continued to get counseling, and
that I.L. got whatever services were needed to help him. She testified that services were available
very near her home, within a short walking distance.
¶ 11 When questioned by the State, the respondent conceded that she currently lived in a two-
bedroom apartment with a total of nine inhabitants. When asked if she had done “anything” with
5
regard to getting parenting classes, the respondent testified that she “just found out that [she] had
to do parenting classes today.” When asked if she had been in contact with her caseworker in
Illinois, the respondent testified that they texted “[o]nce or twice a week.” She testified that prior
to the children being removed from V.L.’s care in this case, she “had a lot” of contact with them,
which mostly consisted of video chats facilitated by V.L. When asked if she thought she needed
mental health counseling, the respondent testified that she did not. When asked why, she testified
that she believed she was doing fine raising her children without it. When asked if mental health
counseling was recommended for her, she testified that it was, and added, “I went to the intake
appointment. There was no recommendation[ ] after that.”
¶ 12 When questioned by the guardian ad litem (GAL), the respondent testified that legally,
prior to DCFS initiating this case, she and V.L. had joint custody of S.L. and I.L. She testified that
she sent them to live with V.L. in Illinois shortly before their divorce was finalized, approximately
two years ago. When asked if she believed it showed “good judgment” to let the kids live with
V.L., the respondent testified that she believed it did at that time, because she had a full-time job
then, and a total of five children to try to take care of. She conceded that she knew both S.L. and
I.L. had “special needs,” but thought V.L. could provide for them, because V.L. was on disability
at that time and therefore had time to get services for them. When asked, she reiterated that she
did not believe she needed mental health counseling. She conceded that I.L. had issues that made
him “a very hard kid to handle.”
¶ 13 Following the respondent’s testimony, the GAL argued that, in light of the trauma S.L. and
I.L. had undergone, it was “absolutely in their best interest that custody and guardianship be with
[DCFS] and that they be wards of this Court.” She further argued that both parents needed “to
work on the service plan,” because the kids had serious issues. The State agreed. Counsel for the
6
respondent argued that the children should be allowed to live with the respondent in Kansas,
because the respondent had testified that she would ensure their many needs were met there. V.L.’s
counsel agreed.
¶ 14 Thereafter, the trial judge stated that she had “considered the testimony of [the respondent],
the recommendation of the [GAL,] and the dispositional report,” and concluded that it was in the
best interests of the children for them to be placed in the custody and guardianship of DCFS. She
stated, inter alia, that “these children need a level of care that neither parent, including mom, can
provide at this point given how they have been traumatized.” In a written order entered that day,
the trial judge ruled that the respondent was “unable to care for [the] minors with her current living
conditions.”
¶ 15 On June 18, 2019, Caritas filed a report that indicated that the respondent visited with the
children on May 22, 2019. On August 22, 2019, Caritas filed a report that indicated that it was
prepared for use at a permanency hearing scheduled for August 28, 2019, and that indicated that
the respondent was not working, due to a high-risk pregnancy, but was looking for larger living
quarters. The report indicated that on August 20, 2019, the respondent reported that she was not
participating in mental health counseling because she did not like leaving her children with other
people. The report indicated that a Kansas caseworker had informed Caritas that the respondent
received a mental health assessment, and that thereafter no follow up treatment was recommended,
but that Caritas had not yet received written documentation of this from the Kansas caseworker,
despite “multiple” requests for it. The report indicated that the respondent was attending parenting
classes “every Thursday night” and a “Mother to Mother Ministry.” The report stated that a
representative of the Mother to Mother program indicated that the respondent “arrives on time,
completes her homework, and ‘seems to really be taking in the information.’ ” The report indicated
7
that the respondent had attended the program on August 8, 2019, and August 15, 2019, and was
expected to attend on August 22, 2019.
¶ 16 Following the August 28, 2019, permanency hearing, the trial judge entered a written order
in which she set the permanency goal as “return home 12 months,” but which did not include any
findings as to whether the respondent, or V.L., were making progress.
¶ 17 On November 6, 2019, Caritas filed a report that indicated that it was prepared for use at a
status hearing scheduled for November 13, 2019, and that indicated that Caritas still had received
no written documentation regarding the respondent’s purported mental health assessment, but that
the respondent was still attending parenting classes, and in fact had provided certificates of
completion from Mother to Mother Ministry on September 7, 2019, and on November 5, 2019.
The report also indicated that the respondent had completed a fourth supervised visit with the
children, on August 28, 2019, and that the foster mother to the children allowed them to call the
respondent “occasionally.”
¶ 18 On November 27, 2019, a DCFS family service plan dated November 15, 2019, was filed.
Although the plan contended that V.L. had “not made any progress throughout the life of this
case,” it noted that the respondent had “completed two parenting classes and found a bigger
apartment for the children to be returned to,” and that the respondent had “also been compliant
with the Kansas Family Preservation (Intact) Services.” Elsewhere, the plan noted the fact that the
respondent still had not provided written documentation of receiving her mental health assessment,
and the plan specifically listed the respondent’s progress on this item as “[u]nsatisfactory,” but
stated that once Caritas received such documentation, “this rating will change.”
¶ 19 On February 7, 2020, Caritas filed a report that indicated that it was prepared for use at a
permanency hearing scheduled for February 12, 2020, and that indicated that Caritas still had
8
received no written documentation regarding the respondent’s purported mental health assessment,
but that Caritas had contacted SEK Mental Health, which had indicated that the respondent would
have to sign a release, and had contacted the respondent, who stated that she would sign a release.
The report also stated that due to the respondent’s “compliance with the service plan, [Caritas had]
started the paperwork for the Interstate Compact Process” so that a home study could be completed
in Kansas. Following the February 12, 2020, hearing, the trial judge entered a written permanency
order that stated that the permanency goal remained “return home within 12 months,” and that
specifically noted that the respondent had “made substantial progress toward” the goal, while V.L.
had not.
¶ 20 On May 15, 2020, Caritas filed a status report that was dated May 5, 2020, and indicated
that it was prepared for use at a status hearing scheduled for May 20, 2020. The report indicated
that the respondent was “in need to complete her mental health assessment and follow up with
their recommendations.” The report thereafter stated that Caritas recommended that the
respondent, “per her service plan to complete parenting services, obtain a mental health assessment
and follow recommendations.” The report noted that a new Caritas caseworker had taken over this
case, and that when she asked the respondent about mental health services on May 1, 2020, the
respondent stated, “I wasn’t told I needed a mental evaluation.” The report indicated that the new
caseworker “encouraged her to work towards obtaining this assessment to be in compliance with
her service plan,” and that the caseworker was going to send the respondent “an updated service
plan.”
¶ 21 On July 27, 2020, Caritas filed a report that was dated July 15, 2020, and indicated that it
was prepared for use at a permanency hearing scheduled for July 30, 2020. The report indicated
that Caritas did not believe placement of the children with the respondent was appropriate, due in
9
part to the respondent’s “lack of engagement in mental health counseling,” particularly in light of
recent issues both children were having. The report indicated that on July 20, 2020, the respondent
told her Caritas caseworker that she had completed her mental health assessment, but that when
the caseworker checked with SEK Mental Health, they informed her that on March 27, 2019, the
respondent “met with a therapist for an inquiry but did not complete an assessment.” The report
indicated that SEK Mental Health planned to contact the respondent “to re-engage her,” and that
the Caritas caseworker attempted to contact the respondent on July 22, 2020, but had not yet heard
back from her.
¶ 22 A permanency hearing was held via Zoom on July 29, 2020. At the hearing, the
respondent’s counsel stated that although the respondent previously had “indicated that she
completed a mental health assessment,” in fact, the records that were obtained from Kansas show
that the respondent visited “and made inquiry[,] which didn’t raise to the level of assessment.”
Counsel stated that the respondent had “scheduled another one for August 4, so that should be
taken care of.” Following the hearing, the trial judge entered a written order that indicated that the
permanency goal remained “return home within 12 months.” The order was silent as to whether
the respondent or V.L. had made substantial progress toward the goal.
¶ 23 On October 21, 2020, Caritas filed a report that was dated October 15, 2020, and indicated
that it was prepared for use at a hearing scheduled for November 4, 2020. The report indicated that
the respondent still had not completed her mental health assessment, and the report again raised
concerns about the children returning to the respondent’s care in Kansas. The report indicated that
the respondent stated that she had an appointment to get her mental health assessment, but had to
cancel that appointment due to work, but now had a new appointment scheduled for October 20,
10
2020. The report noted that “Mental Health has been in [the respondent’s] service plan since
11/28/18.”
¶ 24 At the November 4, 2020, hearing, which also was held via Zoom, counsel for the
respondent stated that the respondent had attended her October 20, 2020, mental health assessment,
but that “[a]pparently, she needs another follow-up visit or follow up to complete that evaluation.”
Counsel further stated that “we’re kind of waiting on the mental health assessment to come back
to see if there is any recommendations from that.” The GAL and the State both expressed concerns
about the lack of progress on the part of both parents, as well as the respondent’s ability to take
care of the children and their many special needs if the children were sent to her in Kansas.
¶ 25 On January 19, 2021, Caritas filed a report that indicated that it was prepared for use at a
hearing scheduled for February 3, 2021. The report indicated that Caritas had not been able to
make contact with the respondent since October 28, 2020, either by phone or email. The report
indicated that the respondent attended her mental health assessment appointment on October 20,
2020, but that therapist Kelly Ferguson of SEK Mental Health told Caritas that the respondent
“would not disclose information throughout the intake assessment,” and that accordingly, “there
was not much [Ferguson] could do on assessing whether [the respondent] needed further treatment
because [the respondent] would not disclose information.” The report also indicated that following
a home visit to the respondent’s home on October 23, 2020, there were “many concerns,” including
issues regarding the cleanliness of the home, as well as “a backlog of laundry,” issues regarding
the number of children living in the home, and issues regarding how the children were being
disciplined in the home. A summary at the end of the report stated, inter alia, that “[a]t this time,
the progress has not been made by either parent to support a rating of satisfactory for the service
plan,” and that “[t]he agency is in the process of filing for legal screening.”
11
¶ 26 On January 21, 2021, a DCFS family service plan dated October 29, 2020, was filed. The
plan noted, inter alia, that the respondent needed to complete mental health services. The plan
rated the respondent’s progress as unsatisfactory with regard to participating in a mental health
assessment and following recommendations. The plan indicated that the respondent would “need
to disclose information in order for an accurate mental health assessment [to] be completed.”
¶ 27 Thereafter, the February 3, 2021, permanency hearing, held via Zoom, was continued until
February 10, 2021. At the February 10, 2021, hearing, also held via Zoom, counsel for the
respondent asked if another mental health assessment was being requested, in light of the
information in the Caritas report and the service plan. The Caritas caseworker present at the hearing
answered, “Yes.” Counsel responded, “Okay.” Due to a hospitalization involving S.L., the trial
judge asked the parties if they objected to the hearing being continued again. No one objected. A
new hearing date of March 3, 2021, was set.
¶ 28 On March 2, 2021, Caritas filed an addendum report which included more detailed
information surrounding S.L.’s psychiatric hospitalization. At the March 3, 2021, permanency
hearing, held via Zoom, counsel for the respondent again asked if the respondent would “need to
complete another evaluation to make sure that that’s checked off her list.” The Caritas caseworker
present at the hearing answered, “Yes, that is correct.” Counsel for the respondent then asked the
caseworker if she knew if the respondent had “scheduled one or completed another one,” to which
the caseworker responded, “Not to my knowledge.” Counsel for the State thereafter stated that, in
his view, “[i]t seems like the parents are making minimal effort.” The trial judge stated that
although she would allow the permanency goal to remain as it was, she “obviously has concerns
and questions, obviously, the validity of that goal,” but that because she had “to pick from the
goals that are listed in the statute,” and because there was no legal screening or petition to terminate
12
rights filed, she was “left with the goal of return home.” She emphasized, however, that at the next
hearing, in 90 days, she wanted “to hear more about the legal screening process.”
¶ 29 On May 20, 2021, Caritas filed a report that indicated that it was prepared for use at a
hearing scheduled for June 2, 2021. The report indicated that Caritas had been unable to contact
the respondent between October 28, 2020, and March 10, 2021. The report indicated that the
respondent had gotten married and moved to Illinois on March 5, 2021, but that she was not
allowed to visit with S.L. because S.L.’s mental health and behavioral problems increased after
she had a phone conversation with the respondent in January 2021. The report indicated that the
respondent still had not completed her mental health assessment and that she would be given a list
of mental health service providers near her home in Illinois. The report stated that the respondent
would have “to be willing to reengage in mental health services.”
¶ 30 On June 2, 2021, the State filed petitions for termination of parental rights and for
appointment of a guardian with the power to consent to the adoption of S.L. and I.L. The petitions
alleged that the respondent was unfit in that she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the children, failed to make reasonable efforts to
correct the conditions that were the basis for removal, and failed to make progress toward the
return of the children during any nine-month period following adjudication (specifically from
April 25, 2019, to January 25, 2020, and from January 26, 2020, to October 26, 2020).
¶ 31 On July 2, 2021, Caritas filed a report that indicated that it was prepared for use at a hearing
scheduled for July 14, 2021. The report stated, with regard to the respondent’s mental health
services, that “[s]ince moving to Illinois, when asked about her engagement in services, [the
respondent] has stated she would like to focus on her family first,” and that on June 30, 2021,
Caritas had asked the respondent if she had engaged in mental health services, to which the
13
respondent answered “that she was trying to get more hours through work currently.” The report
indicated that the respondent presently lived with her new husband and her four other children in
a two-bedroom trailer in Salem, Illinois, and that the respondent had refused to allow a home visit
on June 30, 2021.
¶ 32 At the July 14, 2021, permanency hearing, held via Zoom, counsel for the respondent
claimed that the respondent “essentially” had complied with her service plans. She stated that she
believed it was “still a little debatable about whether she really did disclose everything that she
needed to” at the appointment for her October 20, 2020, mental health assessment. Thereafter, the
trial judge ruled that she would “find that substitute care pending the Court’s determination of the
termination petition is in these kids’ best interest,” and that the respondent and V.L. had “not made
reasonable progress towards the goal of return home.” She ruled that the respondent had “engaged
in some services but not completed all of them.” After the hearing, the trial judge entered a written
order in conformity with her oral rulings. Additional filings were made in support of the State’s
petitions.
¶ 33 A fitness hearing on the State’s petitions to terminate the respondent’s parental rights was
held on September 15, 2021. Caitlin Joy testified that she was employed by Caritas and had
previously supervised one of the caseworkers in this case. Joy testified about the creation of family
service plans, which she testified are updated every six months, then verified a family service plan
that was created and approved by Caritas in May 2019, for, inter alia, the respondent in this case.
Joy testified that the plan required the respondent to, inter alia, “get a mental health assessment
and engage in parenting classes.” With regard to the mental health assessment, Joy testified that
she “believe[d]” that the respondent “eventually completed that after the first six month period.”
Joy verified the respondent’s second service plan, which began in November 2019, and testified
14
that it had the same requirements for the respondent as the first service plan had. She testified that
at the time she stopped being a supervisor in this case, in February 2020, the respondent’s rating
was “satisfactory” because “she had complied at that time.” On cross-examination, Joy agreed that
the respondent received an “unsatisfactory” rating because she never provided written
documentation demonstrating that she received a mental health assessment. She further agreed that
she was told by a caseworker in Kansas that the respondent “had completed this mental health
evaluation” and that there were no services recommended beyond the evaluation. She agreed that
she needed to see “proof like the actual physical document” to verify this, and believed that the
delay in getting the documentation was with the provider, not the respondent. She testified that the
first service plan, although dated May 2019, actually covered the six months prior to that, meaning
that it began in November 2018, when this case originated. She testified that the respondent
exercised limited visitation with the children, but agreed that the respondent had transportation
issues that made it difficult to come from Kansas to Illinois to visit them.
¶ 34 Krystal Foley testified that she had been a caseworker for Caritas since May 2019. She
testified that during the time she was involved in this case, which was from July 2019 to March 3,
2020, the respondent did not participate in a mental health assessment. Foley testified that the
respondent stated that “she couldn’t do the mental health assessment because she didn’t like
leaving her children with other people,” and that the respondent “never had an appointment for a
mental health assessment when [Foley] had the case.” She testified that she informed the
respondent, over the phone, of the service plan’s requirements. Ultimately, the respondent was
rated unsatisfactory on the service plan for mental health services. Foley testified that the
respondent engaged in one supervised visit with the children while Foley had the case, and that
the respondent did not ever contact her to ask for more or longer visits. On cross-examination, she
15
agreed that a Kansas caseworker had told Caritas that the respondent completed a mental health
assessment, but testified that no proof of that was ever received.
¶ 35 Alison Wharton1 testified that she was a foster care case manager at Caritas, and that she
was previously the caseworker for the children in this case, from August 2020 to August 2021.
She testified that the respondent “had very sporadic contact throughout the entire” case, and did
not visit the children at all while Wharton was the caseworker, even after the respondent moved to
Illinois. She testified that the respondent contacted her to try to arrange visits once she moved to
Illinois, but that Caritas determined that visits would not be in the best interest of S.L., who became
very agitated after a January 2021 phone conversation with the respondent, and who was
subsequently placed in a psychiatric hospital. She testified that since the respondent moved to
Illinois, there had been approximately six hotline reports involving her other children who lived
with her. She testified that the other children were no longer in the respondent’s care. She testified
that the respondent was rated as unsatisfactory on her service plans during the time Wharton was
the caseworker, in part because although the respondent “did complete a mental health assessment,
*** with the information she gave them they were not able to recommend further treatment or
discharge her [because] [t]hey said she did not disclose information.”
¶ 36 Leigh Dickey testified that she was the associate director of foster care at Caritas, and
supervised caseworkers involved in this case. She verified one of the service plans in this case.
Kendra Schuler testified that she was a caseworker at Caritas, and was the present caseworker for
this case, having taken over the case in August 2021. She testified about interactions with the
respondent and V.L. since taking over the case. Following her testimony, the trial judge admitted
into evidence the first three service plans that were created in this case.
1
Alison Wharton is of no relation to Justice Milton S. Wharton.
16
¶ 37 The respondent then testified. She testified that she received copies of her service plans
from caseworkers, and that it was recommended that she complete a mental health evaluation. She
testified that she “completed two of them.” As to the first one, she testified that it was “around the
end of 2018.” She testified that after she could not receive documentation of the first one, she
completed a second one, with a different therapist, but at the same location. She testified that she
was told that the second one “was inconclusive” because the therapist believed the respondent was
not “being honest.” She testified that she scheduled a third mental health assessment but became
ill with COVID-19 and could not complete it. She testified that it was rescheduled for September
20, 2021, five days after the present hearing. She testified that her transportation issues made it
hard for her to visit the children while she was in Kansas, but that she sometimes had phone
conversations with them.
¶ 38 On cross-examination, the respondent agreed that she had previously told a caseworker
that she did not believe she needed a mental health evaluation. She denied that she told a
caseworker in May 2020 that she had never been told that she needed a mental health evaluation.
When asked if she told a caseworker that she could not attend an evaluation because she did not
like leaving her children with other people, she testified that it was true that she did not like leaving
them with other people, but that she did so. She agreed that she “knew throughout the entire course
of this case that [she was] mandated to get a mental health evaluation.” She testified that she
“believe[d]” she got both evaluations in 2018. She thereafter agreed that in August 2019 she stated
that one of the reasons she could not get a mental health evaluation was because she did not like
leaving her children with other people, but continued to testify that she believed she completed
both evaluations in 2018. She denied that she ever denied caseworkers access to her home. On
17
redirect examination, she testified that she “probably” tried to call her children on the phone “two
to three times a week” after she moved to Illinois.
¶ 39 At the request of the GAL, the trial judge agreed to take judicial notice of the permanency
orders that were entered on August 28, 2019, February 12, 2020, and August 3, 2020, “indicating
that the services in the service plan are reasonably related to correct the conditions that brought
the children into care.” The GAL then recalled Alison Wharton to the stand. Wharton verified a
service plan dated October 29, 2020, in which both the respondent and V.L. were rated
“unsatisfactory” overall. She agreed that the service plan showed that the respondent’s mental
health evaluation appointment was October 20, 2020.
¶ 40 In argument, the State contended, inter alia, that the respondent had not maintained contact
with the children, because her last visit with the children was in August 2020, had “not really
wholeheartedly participated in a mental health assessment” because she was evasive during her
purported second assessment and the results were therefore deemed “inconclusive,” and overall
her contact with the children was “rare” and “sporadic.” The State added that the court “would
have a better idea if she had completed these mental health evaluations as to her mind-set to the
children’s ability to be safe with her,” but that she had “been unsuccessful every step of the way.”
¶ 41 Counsel for the respondent argued that the respondent “completed really all of her services
*** [a]lthough certain caseworkers may disagree.” She argued that the respondent “completed a
mental health evaluation” but that the providers never gave Caritas written documentation of that,
and argued that the respondent completed a second evaluation, notwithstanding the fact that it was
deemed to be inconclusive. She also argued that the respondent visited the children as much as she
could, given her circumstances.
18
¶ 42 With regard to the respondent, the trial judge noted that she “went a year without seeing
[the children] in person, which is a long, long time for kids of any age, but particularly children of
this age and who have been suffering from the effects of trauma and struggling.” She noted that
there had been “inconsistent testimony” with regard to how much contact the respondent
maintained with the children by phone. She stated that although “there was a barrier for
transportation,” nevertheless “going a year without seeing them is inexcusable,” especially because
Caritas “provided gas cards and could have been provided other assistance if she had asked. The
caseworker indicated she didn’t ask about other forms of transportation.” The trial judge continued
as follows:
“With regard to the mental health assessment, she was rated unsatisfactory for that. It
sounds like she attempted on two occasions and did have an assessment. But that
assessment did not reflect what the counselor believed to be her counseling needs, therefore
during the life of these cases she never received any sort of mental health counseling. Even
when her children had been removed from her she didn’t see them for a year. As [the GAL]
indicated, surely that would have necessitated some support that mom needed by way of
mental health counseling.”
¶ 43 The trial judge then noted that the respondent never lived in a location where she could
have taken custody of S.L. and I.L., and added that when “determining whether a parent has made
reasonable progress, a Court examines the progress of a service plan, but also analyzes whether
the parent is ready or near ready to take custody of their children.” She stated that the respondent
“was far from that *** [n]ot only in her physical environment and ability to bring these two kids,
who have lots of issues, into her home *** but also with regard to her connection with them, her
ability to parent them.” She further stated that it would have served the family’s best interests for
19
them to “have had family counseling and reunification counseling and more of a bond before the
Court could have considered whether they should have been returned home to mom.” She ruled
“that the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent] is unfit for failure
to make reasonable progress towards the goal of return home.” She set the matter for a best interests
hearing.
¶ 44 Because no issues are raised on appeal related to the best interests hearing, we need not
discuss it in detail. After the hearing, on March 7, 2022, the trial judge entered orders terminating
the respondent’s parental rights to both S.L. and I.L. On April 1, 2022, the respondent timely
appealed in both cases. On April 6, 2022, this court entered an order consolidating the appeals.
¶ 45 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 46 Termination of parental rights proceedings are governed by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
(Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) and the Adoption Act (750 ILCS
50/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)). In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (2004). A petition to terminate
parental rights is filed under section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act, which delineates a two-step
process to terminate parental rights involuntarily. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020). The State
must first establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is an unfit person under one
or more of the grounds enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West
2020)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2), (4) (West 2020); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337 (2010). If the court
finds that the parent is unfit, the matter proceeds to a second hearing, at which the State must prove
that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2020); D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352. Here, as noted above, the respondent challenges only the trial
judge’s finding of unfitness. She makes no argument challenging the findings at the best interest
hearing. Accordingly, we consider only the trial judge’s finding that the respondent was unfit. On
20
appeal, the respondent contends that finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence and
must be reversed.
¶ 47 Illinois courts have recognized that parental rights and responsibilities are of deep
importance and should not be terminated lightly. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. Thus, parental rights may
be terminated only after a finding of unfitness that is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. A finding of parental unfitness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001). A finding is against the manifest
weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Id. A trial judge’s finding
of unfitness is given great deference because that judge has the best opportunity to view and
evaluate the parties and their testimony. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006).
This court, therefore, does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses.
In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2001). Each case concerning parental fitness is unique and
must be decided on the particular facts and circumstances presented therein. In re Gwynne P., 215
Ill. 2d 340, 354 (2005). In addition, because each of the statutory grounds of unfitness is
independent, a trial judge’s finding may be affirmed where the evidence supports a finding of
unfitness as to any one of the grounds alleged in the petition at issue. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198,
217 (2002).
¶ 48 Here, the trial judge ruled that the respondent was unfit for failure to make reasonable
progress towards the goal of return home during two nine-month periods following adjudication:
from April 25, 2019, to January 25, 2020, and from January 26, 2020, through October 26, 2020.
The respondent argues on appeal that this finding was errant because, inter alia, any lack of
progress on her mental health assessment goal was attributable to the failure on the part of the
service provider in Kansas to send documentation, not to the respondent, and that in any event,
21
with regard to her second mental health assessment, the fact that she “attempted” it,
“notwithstanding the perception that it was not sufficient for the evaluator to provide
recommendations,” means that she “complied with the request” in her service plans. She also
contends that there was evidence that she was scheduled for a third evaluation, and posits that “[a]
parent who was not engaging and not attempting to comply with all that the agency requested of
them would not have engaged in three separate evaluations.” She also contends that she visited the
children as much as she could, and notes that the children were removed from V.L.’s home because
of conduct by V.L. and his paramour, not because of anything the respondent, who was then living
in Kansas, did wrong.
¶ 49 The State counters that (1) the respondent never successfully completed a mental health
assessment, (2) her housing situation was never sufficient to allow her to gain custody of the
children, (3) her sporadic communication with the children, much less her infrequent visits after
they were taken into care, was inadequate, and (4) she fails to acknowledge “that she basically
abandoned the minors in the first place because she was unable to handle” their special needs. In
support of its arguments, the State points to, inter alia, (1) discrepancies in the respondent’s
testimony regarding the mental health assessments, as well as documentation in the record that
with regard to the first purported mental health assessment, the respondent met with a therapist on
March 27, 2019, for an inquiry, but never completed an assessment, as conceded by the
respondent’s counsel at the hearing on July 29, 2020, as well as the undisputed fact that the
therapist who conducted the “second” assessment opined that the respondent’s failure to disclose
information made it impossible for the therapist to assess her and make recommendations; (2) the
fact that the trial judge was best positioned to determine the credibility of the respondent with
regard to the conflicting testimony about how much contact the respondent had with the children
22
by phone, and that the record demonstrates that the trial judge was correct in her assessment that
at no point since this case began has the respondent been in a situation, with regard to her housing,
where she could take custody of the children; and (3) the record substantiates that the respondent
relinquished custody of S.L. and I.L. to V.L. in the first place because she could not attend to their
complex behavioral needs and other special needs.
¶ 50 In her reply brief, the respondent notes that the trial judge did not make any explicit
findings as to credibility, and posits that the “evidence was not actually contradictory.” Without
citation to authority, she also claims that “[t]he judge’s finding that [the respondent] never lived
in a place where she could take custody of two more children is not supported by evidence absent
some presentation of evidence to objectively establish what is acceptable, or legal.” She reiterates
her arguments in her initial brief that she should not be blamed for the misconduct of V.L. and his
paramour, which is what led to the removal of the children in the first place.
¶ 51 As the parties agree, “reasonable progress” is judged using an objective standard and
focuses on the amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was
taken from the parent. See, e.g., In re Jacorey, 2012 IL App (1st) 113427, ¶ 21. “Reasonable
progress requires, at minimum, measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of
reunification.” Id. A parent’s progress is measured by considering “the parent’s compliance with
the service plans and the court’s directives in light of the conditions that led to the child’s removal,
and subsequent conditions that would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the
parent.” Id. Reasonable progress will be found when a trial judge concludes that the judge will be
able to order the child returned to parental custody in the “near future.” Id.
¶ 52 In this case, the record supports, as reasonable, the trial judge’s ruling that the State met its
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent failed to make reasonable
23
progress, during the periods of time in question, towards the goal of return home, and therefore
was unfit. The documentation found in the record in this case is laid out in extensive detail above.
With regard to the mental health assessment, it is undisputed that the respondent has never
produced written documentation that she completed the “first” mental health assessment on March
27, 2019, in Kansas, and in light of the evidence in the record—including from the respondent’s
own counsel at the July 29, 2020, hearing—a reasonable trial judge could have concluded that the
respondent completed only an inquiry, not a full assessment, on that date, even though she was
aware, by her own admission, that a full assessment was mandated by her service plan. It is also
undisputed that the therapist who met with the respondent on October 20, 2020, thereafter stated
that she could not determine whether the respondent needed mental health services because the
respondent would not disclose information to her. Thus, a reasonable trial judge could have
concluded that the respondent, due to her failure to cooperate with the therapist, did not complete
this assessment either, even though the respondent was aware, by her own admission, that a
complete assessment was mandated by her service plan. On the basis of the foregoing, a reasonable
trial judge in turn could have concluded—particularly in light of the respondent’s statements that
she did not believe she needed a mental health assessment, and the other excuses she gave for why
she could not complete an assessment—that the respondent never made a genuine attempt to
comply with this aspect of her service plans, despite repeated opportunities to do so, and therefore
failed to make reasonable progress on complying with the plans and towards the goal of return
home.
¶ 53 We note as well that with regard to the trial judge’s finding that the respondent never lived
in a location where she could have taken custody of S.L. and I.L., this too was a reasonable finding
that is supported by the evidence. The trial judge specifically noted that for there to be reasonable
24
progress, the parent must be “ready or near ready to take custody of their children,” but that in this
case the respondent “was far from that *** [n]ot only in her physical environment and ability to
bring these two kids, who have lots of issues, into her home *** but also with regard to her
connection with them, her ability to parent them.” A review of the record shows that it is
undisputed that although there were times that the respondent’s housing situation was sufficient
for her and the children who already lived with her, at no time was it sufficient to accommodate
S.L. and I.L. as well, in terms of having adequate space for them, ensuring they were not
cohabitating with inappropriate adults other than the respondent, and also in terms of the many
special needs the children had. With regard to the respondent’s “connection” to the children, a
reasonable trial judge—who, as the State points out, would be best positioned to determine the
credibility of the respondent with regard to the conflicting testimony about how much contact the
respondent had with the children by phone—could have concluded that there simply was not a
sufficiently stable connection between the respondent and the children for the judge to be able to
order S.L. and I.L. to be returned to the respondent’s custody in the “near future.” See, e.g.,
Jacorey, 2012 IL App (1st) 113427, ¶ 21. This is also true in light of the undisputed fact that the
respondent at one point went a year without visiting the children in person.
¶ 54 We reiterate that a finding of parental unfitness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that a finding is against the manifest weight of
the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208. In this
case, for the reasons discussed above, there is no reasonable way to conclude that the opposite
conclusion to the trial judge’s finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent was unfit is “clearly apparent.” Accordingly, the trial judge’s finding is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence, and we therefore affirm it. See id.
25
¶ 55 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 56 For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the circuit court of Marion County that terminated
the respondent’s parental rights as to S.L. and I.L. are affirmed.
¶ 57 Affirmed.
26
In re S.L.
Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
Date filed: 2022-08-17
Citations: 2022 IL App (5th) 220209-U
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion