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In Re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Date filed: 1998-10-05
Citations: 156 F.3d 1279, 332 U.S. App. D.C. 251
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32 Citing Cases
Combined Opinion
                        United States Court of Appeals


                     FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT


                            Filed October 6, 1998


                                 No. 97-5228


           In Re:  Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Office of the
                         Comptroller of the Currency


                              Consolidated with
                                 No. 97-5229

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                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the District of Columbia
                                 (94ms00329)
                                (95ms00006)


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                          On Petition for Rehearing


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     Before:  Edwards, Chief Judge, Silberman and Sentelle, 
Circuit Judges.

           Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.


     Silberman, Circuit Judge:  The government's petition for 
rehearing raises one point that calls for a response.  We held 
that the government's deliberative process privilege does not 


apply when a cause of action is directed at the government's 
intent.  We explained that the privilege had developed in and 
applies to circumstances where the government decisionmak-
ing process is "collateral" to a plaintiff's claim.  The govern-
ment suggests that the term "collateral" is imprecise and that 
the deliberative process privilege has been employed in cir-
cumstances where the government's decisionmaking process 
could not be thought collateral to the cause of action.  Ac-
cording to the government, our reasoning could be interpret-
ed as suggesting that the deliberate process privilege would 
not apply in a case where the government action is challenged 
as arbitrary and capricious under the APA because, if an 
illegal motive were shown, then the government's action 
would necessarily be arbitrary and capricious.

     When a party challenges agency action as arbitrary and 
capricious the reasonableness of the agency's action is judged 
in accordance with its stated reasons.  Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).  Agency 
deliberations not part of the record are deemed immaterial.  
See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973);  United States v. 
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).  That is because the actual 
subjective motivation of agency decisionmakers is immaterial 
as a matter of law--unless there is a showing of bad faith or 
improper behavior.  See Saratoga Dev. Corp. v. United 
States, 21 F.3d 445, 457-58 (D.C. Cir. 1994);  Overton Park, 
401 U.S. at 420.  (Where there is no administrative record to 
review, the party challenging the agency action may inquire 
into the decisionmaking process in order to create such a 
record, but it does not necessarily follow that the party can 
also probe subjective motivations.)

     Whether or not under those circumstances it is accurate to 
refer to the agency's decisionmaking process as collateral, it 
is clear that the ordinary APA cause of action does not 
directly call into question the agency's subjective intent.  And 
our holding that the deliberative process privilege is unavail-
able is limited to those circumstances in which the cause of 
action is directed at the agency's subjective motivation.