Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed March 20, 1995, which ruled that J.A. Yansick Lumber Company, Inc. was liable for additional unemployment insurance contributions.
As part of its commercial activities, J.A. Yansick Lumber Company, Inc. (hereinafter the employer) purchases standing timber, which is felled, cut into log lengths and skidded to
We are not persuaded that the Board was bound by an allegedly inconsistent determination of an ALJ in another similar case involving the employer. Because claimants were not involved in the prior proceeding and, thus, had no "full and fair opportunity” to contest the decision now said to be controlling, the earlier determination has no preclusive effect on them (cf., Allied Chem. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 72 NY2d 271, 276, cert denied 488 US 1005; Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 501). We are also unconvinced that, under the holding of the Court of Appeals in Matter of Field Delivery Serv. (Roberts) (66 NY2d 516), the Board was required to conform to the precedent established in the prior unappealed decision or offer a rational explanation for not doing so.
The ratio decidendi of Matter of Field (supra) is that the doctrine of stare decisis, which "provides that once a court has decided a legal issue, subsequent appeals presenting similar facts should be decided in conformity with the earlier decision” (People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331, 337-338), also applies to administrative agencies acting in a quasi-judicial capacity (see, Matter of Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], supra; see also, Matter of Insurance Premium Fin. Assn. v New York State Dept. of Ins., 88 NY2d 337, 345). It is important to stress the distinction between the doctrine of stare decisis and the analogous doctrine of res judicata (see, 9 Carmody-Wait 2d, NY Prac § 63:431, at 144). Patently, a judgment of a trial court, although binding
Precisely the same analysis applies to the decisions of administrative agencies acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. As with a trial court, an ALJ has the responsibility for conducting a hearing and making initial findings and conclusions. If the ALJ’s decision is not appealed, it is binding upon the parties to the proceeding and entitled to preclusive effect as fully as if it were the decision of the ultimate administrative arbiter, here the Board. That is the clear import of Labor Law § 620 (3) and § 623 (1). It is quite another thing, however, to conclude that the Board will be bound by the ALJ’s determination in other similar cases involving different parties. Consistent with its role as the highest administrative authority in unemployment insurance cases, the Board is not bound by the legal conclusions of any ALJ but, rather, has the authority to "reverse, wholly or in part, or * * * modify” their decisions (Labor Law § 621 [3]).
Cardona, P. J., Casey and Carpinello, JJ., concur.