In Re the Marriage of Lawrence

140. 84-120

I N THE S U P R E b E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA

1984

I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F

CLARENCE E. LAWRENCE,

P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l a n t ,

and
ALP4A K . LAWRENCE,

R e s p o n d e n t and R e s p o n d e n t .

APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of C a r t e r ,
T h e H o n o r a b l e A l f r e d B. C o a t e , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For A p p e l l a n t :

L u c a s & Monaghan; G a r y L. Day, M i l e s C i t y , Montana

For Respondent:

R i c h a r d 0. H a r k i n s , E k a l a k a , J 4 o n t a n a
Ira E a k i n , Baker, Montana

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : July 3, 1984
Decided: S e p t e m b e r 13, 1994

Filed: SkP :3

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Clerk
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
Court.

The Estate of Clarence E. Lawrence appeals from ail
order of the District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial
District, Carter County, dismissing his petition for
dissolution of marriage. We affirm the District Court's
decision.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Clarence
E. Lawrence, the appellant, and Alma K. Lawrence, the
respondent, were married in September of 1935 in Belle
Fourche, South Dakota. Both parties were long-time
residents of Montana. During the course of the marriage the

parties accumulated real and personal property, including a
3,500 acre ranch located in Montana and Wyoming.
On March 22, 1983, the appellant filed a petition for
dissolution of the marriage. A hearing on the petition for
dissolution was held on August 22, 1983. The appellant was
unable to attend because of illness. However, he submitted
an affidavit to the court indicatinq that he wished the
matter to proceed, and outlined the circumstances supporting
his position in favor of dissolution. Following the
presentation of evidence, including oral testimony of the
respondent, wife, the court took the matter under advisement
without entering any judgment, either oral or written.
Within minutes after the hearing concluded, the appellant
died in a South Dakota hospital. The appellant left a will
which included the following provision:
"If my wife, ALMA K. LAWRENCE, survives
me and we are married at the time of my
death, then I give to her so much of my
net estate as Alma K. Lawrence would have
the right to elect to take by virtue of
 t h e laws of t h e S t a t e of Montana, o r a n y
o t h e r S t a t e which l a w s may a p p l y a t my
death. I n t h e e v e n t my wife predeceases
m e , then the portion she would h a v e t a k e n
s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d i n accordance with
A r t i c l e I11 b e l o w . "
On August 2 4 , 1983, t h e respondent f i l e d a motion t o

d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n b e c a u s e o f a p p e l l a n t ' s d e a t h , w h i c h was
g r a n t e d i n a n o r d e r d a t e d J a n u a r y 11, 1 9 8 4 . In t h a t order,

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made i t s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s
of l a w , i n c l u d i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g s :

"5. T h a t t h e r e was s e r i o u s m a r i t a l
d i s c o r d which a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d o n e o r
b o t h of t h e p a r t i e s t o w a r d s t h e m a r r i a g e
and t h e p a r t i e s h a v e l i v e d s e p a r a t e and
a p a r t s i n c e 1980;
" 6 . T h a t t h e r e was no r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t
of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . "

The i s s u e on a p p e a l is w h e t h e r t h e d e a t h o f a p a r t y t o
a dissolution proceeding prior to the e n t r y of a decree
abates the action, in a case where significant property

r i g h t s w i l l be a f f e c t e d by t h e d e c r e e , o r l a c k t h e r e o f .

The a p p e l l a n t ' s c o u n s e l a r g u e s t h a t t h e d e a t h o f the

appellant following the d i s s o l u t i o n hearing should not abate
the action, despite the fact that no judgment had been

entered in the matter at that time, either o r a l l y or in
writing. Appellant maintains that because there was

s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e on t h e r e c o r d t o p r o v e t h a t t h e m a r r i a g e

was irretrievably broken at the conclusion of the
dissolution hearing, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d be r e q u i r e d
t o e n t e r a d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n .
The issue presented for review is one of first
i m p r e s s i o n i n Montana. However, the general rule in other
j u r i s d i c t i o n s is c l e a r :
"A c a u s e o f a c t i o n f o r d i v o r c e is p u r e l y
p e r s o n a l , and . . . t e r m i n a t e s on t h e
 d e a t h of e i t h e r s p o u s e ; and i f an a c t i o n
f o r a d i v o r c e is commenced, and o n e o f
the p a r t i e s d i e s t h e r e a f t e r , but before
e n t r y of t h e f i n a l d e c r e e , t h e a c t i o n
abates. The j u d i c i a l power i s e n d e d when
a p a r t y d i e s b e f o r e t h e e n t r y of a
decree. .. " 24 Arn.Jur.2d D i v o r c e and
S e p a r a t i o n , s e c t i o n 176 ( 1 9 8 3 ) .

See a l s o Annot., 1 5 8 A.L.R. 1205, 1206 ( 1 9 4 5 ) . This rule

applies e v e n when the d i s p o s i t i o n of significant property

r i g h t s w i l l be determined by t h e e n t r y of a d e c r e e , o r l a c k

thereof. Tiedman v. Tiedman ( M i c h . 1 9 7 7 ) , 255 N.W.2d 632,

634-35; D a l y v. Daly (Utah 1975), 533 P.2d 884, 885-86;

L a r s o n v . L a r s o n (S.D. 1 9 7 5 ) , 235 N.W.2d 9 0 6 , 909-10.

The m o s t commonly cited rationale for the majority

r u l e i s t h a t when a p a r t y t o a d i s s o l u t i o n a c t i o n d i e s p r i o r

t o e n t r y of a d e c r e e , t h e m a r r i a g e is t e r m i n a t e d a s a m a t t e r

of l a w , f o r t h e r e r e m a i n s n o t h i n g f o r t h e c o u r t t o d i s s o l v e .

L a r s o n , s u p r a a t 909; T i e d m a n , s u p r a a t 6 3 4 ; I n r e M a r r i a g e

of Shayman ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 1 C a l . R p t r .
1 11, 1 3 . The d i v o r c e c o u r t

is thus divested of jurisdiction to take any action on

matters such a s p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n which a r e i n c i d e n t a l

t o t h e primary o b j e c t o f changing t h e s t a t u s of t h e p a r t i e s .

Wood v. Parkerson (Colo. 1967), 430 P.2d 467, 468-69;

L a r s o n , s u p r a a t 9 0 9 ; T i e d m a n , s u p r a a t 634-35.

I n s u p p o r t of h i s p o s i t i o n , t h e a p p e l l a n t c i t e s Judson

v. Anderson ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 1 1 8 Flont. 1 0 6 , 1 6 5 P.2d 1 9 8 , and D e i c h

v. Deich ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 3 6 Mont. 566, 323 P.2d 35. The f a c t u a l

c i r c u m s t a n c e s of b o t h of these cases are similar: one of

t h e p a r t i e s t o a d i v o r c e d i e d a f t e r a f i n a l d e c r e e had b e e n

entered, and t h e judgment of the t r i a l court w a s appealed.

An i s s u e on appea.1 was whether the action a-bated f o r the

p u r p o s e o f a p p e a l upon t h e i n t e r v e n i n g d e a t h o f one of the

parties. We ruled that where property interests are
involved, an appeal in a divorce case does not abate upon
the death of a party pending its determination. Judson,
supra at 125, 165 P.2d at 207; Deich, supra at 577-78, 323
P.2d at 42. The circumstances of the instant case are
distinctly different from those operating in Judson and

Deich, where the marriage of the parties had already been
dissolved by a judgment. We do not believe the holding in
Judson and Deich should be extended to those cases where no
divorce decree of any kind has been entered by the trial
court. Instead, we adopt the majority rule and hold that an
action to dissolution of marriage abates upon the death of

either party prior to the entry of decree, and at that time
the trial court loses jurisdiction to determine incidental
issues such as the disposition of property rights involved
in the marriage.

The appellant also contends that a decree of
dissolution must be entered in this case under section
40-4-104, MCA. Section 40-4-104 states in pertinent part:
"(1) The district court shall enter a
decree of dissolution of marriage if:

"(b) the court finds that the marriage is
irretrievably broken, which findings
shall be supported by evidence :
" ( i ) that the parties have lived separate
and apart for a period of more than 180
days next preceding the commencement of
this proceeding; or
"(ii) that there is serious marital
discord which adversely affects the
attitude of one or both of the parties
towards the mar r iage ;
"(c) the court finds that the
conciliation provisions of the Montana
Conciliation Law and of 40-4-107 either
do not apply or have been met;"
 Appellant argues that the statutory language mandates
entry of a decree once a judge has made the required
findings. In this case, however, the findings and
conclusions of the District Court were not issued until
January of 1984, over four months after the death of the
appellant. Following the appellant's death, the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to enter a divorce decree and
properly granted the respondent's motion to dismiss.
A £ firmed.

Justice ,.
/
'

We concur:

a d $ &&A
Chief Justice