In Re: v. Martinez Catala

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 97-1396

IN RE: MARISOL MARTINEZ-CATALA, ET AL.,

Petitioners.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Before

Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges,

and Keeton,* District Judge.

Carlos Del Valle Cruz for petitioners.

Arlene De La Matta with whom Jose R. Gaztambide was on memorandum

in support of opposition to application for writ of mandamus and
addendum for respondents Honorable Maria D. Guzman Cardona, et al.

November 12, 1997

*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. This case comes to us on

petition for writ of mandamus directing the district judge to

recuse himself in this case. The district judge denied the

motion to recuse without an evidentiary hearing or any

detailed submission by the opposing parties. Thus, the raw

facts set forth below, and assumed to be true for purposes of

this opinion, are largely drawn from the petition for

mandamus and related filings by petitioners.

I. BACKGROUND

After the 1992 municipal elections in Florida, Puerto

Rico, the candidate for mayor of Florida affiliated with the

New Progressive Party unseated the incumbent mayor who was

affiliated with the Popular Democratic Party. According to

the complaint later filed by petitioners, who are plaintiffs

in the district court, all 14 of them were dismissed or

demoted in early January 1993. Some of the plaintiffs had

served as assistants to the mayor and others had been

employees of Florida's elder community center.

The suit was brought as a civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs charged that their firing violated

their constitutional free speech rights under Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347 (1976), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980),

and Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990). These

cases limit, although they do not wholly eliminate, the

ability of a new administration to dismiss or demote

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employees of the old administration on account of party

affiliation. Plaintiffs sought damages and reinstatement.

In November 1995, a motion for summary judgment was

filed on behalf of defendants, who included the new mayor,

the municipality and others. The summary judgment motion

urged that the former mayoral assistants had confidential

positions that excepted them from the limit on political

firings and also asserted that in other cases, the assistants

had been hired illegally. Defendants said that the former

workers at the elder community center had been discharged due

to lack of funds.

On June 13, 1996, in an effort to reach a settlement,

the district judge met in chambers with counsel from both

sides, with the defendant mayor, and with Florida's interim

director of human resources. Then the judge, apparently

without objection, met separately with both sides.

Plaintiffs' counsel was Carlos Del Valle Cruz; defense

counsel included Jose Gaztambide, who at some earlier time

had served as a law clerk to the district judge.

Following their separate meetings with the judge,

counsel for both sides met privately to discuss settlement.

Del Valle later filed an unsworn statement, made under

penalty of perjury, describing his meeting with Gaztambide

and with Luis Plaza, another defense attorney. Crucial

language from the unsworn statement follows:

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In said conference, they [the defense attorneys]
made a settlement offer on the basis on (sic) of
the Court's prospective ruling on their [defense]
motion for summary judgment. Counsel Gaztambide
stated that the Court would be dismissing the case
as to five (5) of the plaintiffs, was yet unsure of
his decision as to three (3) of the plaintiffs, and
would deny the motion for summary judgment as to
the remaining six (6) plaintiffs.

Defense counsel then reviewed an earlier letter

containing settlement offers for each plaintiff. The

statement continues: "Next to the name of each plaintiff,

counsel Gaztambide made a downward slant for all those cases

which the Court would be dismissing . . . an upward slant

next to the names of the cases the Court was yet unsure of .

. . and a circle next to the names of those cases [in which]

the Court would deny the motion for summary judgment . . . ."

Del Valle objected that defense counsel had information

about "a prospective dismissal" of certain of the cases. All

three lawyers returned to the judge who continued to urge

settlement of the case. When defense counsel Plaza said that

Del Valle had an ethical obligation to report the settlement

offers to his clients, Del Valle said that his clients were

in court "because they believed in the Constitution and their

right to be made whole."

According to Del Valle's statement, the district judge

then intervened "to express that the undersigned should

`forget the Constitution,' because several of my clients were

`political sweet potatoes' that cared more about having some

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money in their pockets than about their Constitutional

rights." The judge then proposed a settlement figure of

approximately $200,000 that "counsel agreed to recommend to

their clients." Del Valle did meet with his clients, but the

upshot was a motion by Del Valle, accompanied by the

statement just described, requesting the district judge to

recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 144, 455(a) and (b).

The motion for recusal was filed on June 17, 1996. When

no action had been taken on the motion after eight months,

plaintiffs, on February 26, 1997, filed a motion requesting a

ruling. When again there was no response, plaintiffs on

April 19, 1997, filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this

court. Ten days later, on April 29, 1997, the district court

issued an opinion and order denying the motion for recusal.

In the 28-page opinion and order, the district court

concluded that disqualification was not required under either

section 144 or section 455. The district judge stated that

he had, "as is customary, discussed separately with each

party's counsel the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the

case . . . ." The opinion continued: "The undersigned did

not tell either party definitively what his decision would

be--he merely gave both parties his preliminary impression of

the possibilities for success as to each claim."

This decision mooted plaintiffs' request to us for an

order directing the district judge to rule. But the mandamus

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petition also requested that this court order the district

judge to recuse himself. Accordingly, on May 23, 1997, this

court asked the parties to file memoranda addressing the

merits of the recusal claims and the overhanging question

whether review by mandamus was warranted. Del Valle

complied; defense counsel relied largely on the district

judge's decision.

On June 6, 1997, the district court issued an opinion

and partial judgment disposing of the pending motions for

summary judgment filed by the defendants. The court

dismissed certain claims and, as to others, scheduled an

evidentiary hearing for later in June and a trial date in

August 1997. At the request of plaintiffs, this court then

granted a stay of further proceedings in the district court.

II. DISCUSSION

In this case, there is no final judgment appealable as

of right. Ordinarily, a district judge's refusal to recuse

is reviewable only on appeal of a final judgment; the

collateral order doctrine does not apply. Nevertheless, in

unusual situations, interim review of such a refusal is

available through writ of mandamus. See In re Cargill, Inc.,

66 F.3d 1256, 1260 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.

1545 (1996) (collecting cases).

The usual first requirement for mandamus in a recusal

matter is that the party seeking the writ show a "clear and

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indisputable" entitlement to relief. In re United States,

666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981); see 13A C. Wright, A.

Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 3553, at

661 (2d ed. 1984). Interlocutory review, after all,

interferes with the ordinary processes of trial and appeal;

and absent interlocutory review, many issues wash out along

the way. But over the years, appeals courts have held that

given a clear error by the district judge in refusing to

recuse, a stronger argument exists for immediate review by

mandamus.

Mandamus is a discretionary writ and, even where the

merits clearly favor the petitioner, relief may be withheld

for lack of irreparable injury or based on a balance of

equities. These are malleable concepts and often matters of

degree. Some opinions suggest that a clear entitlement to

recusal may itself warrant immediate relief, absent an

equitable bar, because public confidence is enhanced where

a clearly disqualified judge is removed swiftly. See, e.g.,

In re United States, 666 F.2d at 694.

In all events, in recusal cases, mandamus is almost

always withheld--we do not say always--unless the petitioner

demonstrates that it is "clearly" entitled to relief. See

Cargill, 66 F.3d at 1262. Here, the plaintiffs have invoked

two separate bases for disqualification, sections 144 and

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455, whose procedural incidents differ widely. We consider

them separately and in order.

Section 144. This provision begins with a core one-

sentence paragraph:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a
district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice
either against him or in favor of any adverse
party, such judge shall proceed no further therein,
but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.

A second paragraph sets forth a timeliness requirement (not

here in dispute), provides that the party can only file one

such affidavit in any case, and requires a certificate of

counsel of record that the affidavit is made in good faith.

Section 144 is unusual because it requires that the

district judge accept the affidavit as true even though it

may contain averments that are false and may be known to be

so to the judge. See United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884,

889 (1st Cir. 1983). However, penalties for perjury and the

certificate of counsel tend to discourage outright falsehood.

And the possibility remains, although not developed in the

statute, that the transferee judge might hold a hearing,

conclude that the affidavit was false and transfer the action

back to the original judge.

Nevertheless, courts have responded to the draconian

procedure--automatic transfer based solely on one side's

affidavit--by insisting on a firm showing in the affidavit

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that the judge does have a personal bias or prejudice toward

a party, and also by insisting on strict compliance with the

procedural requirements of the section.1 And, while there

are various bases at law for recusal, the only one governed

by section 144 and subject to its procedural advantages for

the recusing party are "personal bias or prejudice."

We start with procedural issues. Section 144's second

paragraph requires the affidavit of "a party" setting forth

"the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or

prejudice exists" and a separate "certificate of counsel of

record stating that it [the affidavit] is made in good

faith." Here, there was neither an affidavit of a party nor

a certificate of counsel--only a single unsworn statement of

counsel setting forth facts under penalty of perjury. The

papers are thus doubly defective.

Still, an unsworn statement under penalty of perjury has

the same effect as an affidavit. 28 U.S.C. 1746. The

missing certificate of counsel may also be redundant

(although it still should have been supplied) where, as here,

the motion and unsworn statement are both signed by counsel,

making counsel subject to the good faith strictures of Fed.

R. Civ. P. 11. One might be more concerned about the lack of

1See, e.g., Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th

Cir. 1988); Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1077 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985); United States v.

Womack, 454 F.2d 1337, 1341 (5th Cir. 1972).

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any affidavit or statement from "a party," especially in view

of the tradition of construing section 144 strictly in light

of its drastic consequences.

But probably the drafters of the statute expected that

"a party" would possess the necessary knowledge showing (for

example) personal hostility of the judge against that party.

In this case, plaintiffs' counsel was much closer than his

clients to being a firsthand witness to the events. It seems

to us to satisfy the underlying purpose of the recusal

statute to allow Del Valle to make the necessary filing

rather than to insist that the plaintiffs themselves repeat

the same facts on a hearsay basis.

Starting with defense counsel's alleged inside knowledge

of the judge's intentions, the problem is not one of ex parte

contacts as such; absent objection, separate discussions in

the context of settlement agreements are common occurrences.

And, in pressing each side to take a reasonable view of its

situation, judges often give the parties the court's

impression of apparent strengths and weaknesses. There are

dangers in this practice, of course, but clients are often

well served by settlements, and settlements often result from

realistic appraisals of strengths and weaknesses.

Rather, the claim of bias or prejudice here rests

primarily on the inference, drawn by plaintiffs' counsel,

that the judge told defense counsel more or less definitively

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how the judge planned to rule on the summary judgment motions

and on the implication that the judge gave no similar

information to plaintiffs' counsel. If so, this would

obviously give one side a substantial advantage in

negotiations. We will assume arguendo that such an

indiscretion could at least arguably be grounds for a

reasonable inference of bias or prejudice toward someone

(whether toward a party or counsel might require further

information).

Under section 144, recusal must be based upon the facts

alleged in the affidavit, so we have to disregard the

district judge's own later denial that he revealed how the

motions were to be decided. See Kelly, 712 F.2d at 889.

But, by the same token, automatic removal of the judge under

that section requires averment of facts showing that the

judge "has" a personal bias or prejudice, not that the judge

might have such a bias or prejudice or that grounds exist for

further inquiry. As explained below, "mights" and further

inquiries can always be pursued under section 455--where,

however, the affidavit itself can be challenged.

The difficulty with Del Valle's unsworn statement is

that it does not show that the district judge revealed his

intended disposition of any of the summary judgment motions

to defense counsel. The statement does not even say that

defense counsel made such a claim. Instead, the remarks

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attributed to defense counsel--the pertinent ones have been

quoted in full above--show only that defense counsel sought

to convey the impression that he knew how the judge would

rule, while carefully refraining from explaining how he knew.

The unsworn statement itself shows that both plaintiffs'

counsel and defense counsel had come from separate settlement

conferences where (in common experience) judges often discuss

the strengths and weaknesses of the claims. There is nothing

in the unsworn statement to indicate that defense counsel was

doing more than making an intelligent prediction, perhaps

puffing a bit to enhance his bargaining position. This does

not prove that the judge revealed to defense counsel how the

judge intended to rule on the pending motions.

We turn next to the judge's alleged statement that some

of the plaintiffs were "political sweet potatoes." We

understand this term to mean political hack, see Rodriguez-

Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 100 n.10 (1st Cir. 1990), or

as the district judge put it in another instance, "people

appointed to more or less useless jobs as political favors,"

see Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, No. 87-1411, 1988 WL 124046,

*2 (D.P.R. Nov. 9, 1988). Under section 144, the question

again is whether such a reference shows personal bias or

prejudice.

Assuming that the statement does show a predisposition,

there is no evidence that the statement was improper. A

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judge is ordinarily entitled to form a view of the parties

that is favorable or unfavorable, so long as it derives from

information in the case; there may be exceptions but they are

"rare" indeed. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,

554 (1994). Here, the district judge had before him the

summary judgment filing in which the defendants challenged

the bona fides of various plaintiffs. There is no indication

that the judge knew the individual plaintiffs from any

context other than the current judicial proceedings.

Judges constantly form personal opinions during

proceedings. It may be wiser not to express such views, and

almost always prudent to avoid epithets, but disqualification

is almost never required where the judge's opinions are based

on the proceedings. Inaccurate findings based on those

opinions may lead to reversal on appeal but not to recusal.

Whether the words used by the district judge suggest a lack

of impartiality is a different question, properly raised

under the objective standard of section 455 and addressed

below.

There is even less to the claim that the judge showed a

personal bias or prejudice when he said, if he did say, that

the plaintiffs should "forget the Constitution." However

dramatic the phrase may sound in the abstract, in context it

was here used as part of a perfectly permissible suggestion

by the district judge, namely, that counsel ask his clients

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whether they were more interested in a monetary settlement

than in an opportunity to express principle. Judges say

something of the sort in many settlement conferences.

Section 455. In its present version section 455 is the

more modern and complete recusal statute and applies to all

federal judges. There is no threshold requirement of an

affidavit or any other format for raising a recusal issue.

In fact, the judge is expected to recuse sua sponte, where

necessary, even if no party has requested it. Nor is there

anything to prevent the party seeking recusal from trying to

engage in discovery incident to a recusal motion, although

the allowance of such discovery is within the sound

discretion of the court. See, e.g., Cheeves v. Southern

Clays, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1570, 1580 (M.D. Ga. 1992).

On the other hand, under section 455, a judge is not

compelled automatically to accept as true the allegations

made by the party seeking recusal. To the extent that facts

are in dispute, factual determinations are made by the judge

whose recusal is in question, and the same judge also decides

whether the facts trigger disqualification, subject always to

review on appeal, normally for abuse of discretion. See,

e.g., Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of

Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438, 1460 (1st Cir. 1992).

It might seem odd that recusal issues should be decided

by the very judge whose recusal is in question. But there

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are other considerations at work, including a desire for

expedition and a concern to discourage judge shopping. In

addition, one of the grounds for recusal under section 455 is

the far-reaching direction that the judge recuse himself or

herself "in any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality

might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. 455(a). Thus,

taken together, the provisions of section 455 tend to strike

a reasonable balance.

In our case, the plaintiffs have invoked both section

455(a) and section 455(b)(1), which repeats the bias and

prejudice language of section 144. For present purposes, we

focus on the impartiality language of section 455(a) because

it covers the same ground and reaches even further. Section

455(a) is in no way limited to "personal" bias or prejudice

"concerning a party" and--unlike sections 144 and 455(b)(1)--

does not require that bias or prejudice in fact be

established. United States v. Chantel, 902 F.2d 1018, 1023

(1st Cir. 1990).

Rather, section 455(a) requires recusal wherever

the objective circumstances create an appearance of

partiality. This does not mean that required recusal can be

based on an "unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous

speculation." In re United States, 666 F.2d at 694. It does

mean that where the appearance of partiality exists, recusal

is required regardless of the judge's own inner conviction

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that he or she can decide the case fairly despite the

circumstances. See Chantel, 902 F.2d at 1023. See also

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548; Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217,

1220 (1st Cir. 1979).

With this gloss, we revisit plaintiffs' first and

sharpest claim, namely, that the judge told the defense but

not the plaintiffs how he planned to rule on the pending

summary judgment motions. As we have said, section 455,

unlike section 144, is not limited to facts alleged in an

affidavit. But Del Valle's statement was itself insufficient

to show that the judge made the alleged disclosure; and the

only additional pertinent fact beyond the statement is the

judge's denial that he did so, hardly of help to the

plaintiff.

Plaintiffs now attack the judge's statement that he gave

both sides a preliminary appraisal: Del Valle now claims in

his mandamus memorandum that in the settlement conference

with the judge he was told virtually nothing even about

likely outcomes. But new assertions of fact by counsel in

appellate briefs come too late, see Hurney v. Carver, 602

F.2d 993, 996 (1st Cir. 1979); Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d

1040, 1049 n.12 (7th Cir. 1990), and plaintiffs have made no

effort to prove what defense counsel was told. Without

knowing both, any comparison is hopeless.

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We return now, under the standard of section 455(a), to

the district court's alleged remark that some of the

plaintiffs were "political sweet potatoes." As already

noted, a judge is normally free to develop views from the

record as the case proceeds, and there is no showing here

that the judge's assessment came from any other source.

Further, the judge's supposed comment--like his alleged

admonition to "forget the Constitution"--was in context

little more than a warning to plaintiffs' counsel, quite

relevant to the settlement then being urged, that some of his

clients might do better by compromise than at trial.

Two other assertions remain to be addressed. In his

unsworn statement, plaintiffs' counsel referred to the fact

that one of the defense counsel had once clerked for the

judge, an issue unrelated to party bias or prejudice but

perhaps pertinent to appearance of partiality. And on

appeal, plaintiffs' counsel widens his claims slightly by

saying that the district judge had once been actively

connected with political causes opposed by the Popular

Democratic Party. Neither ground is expressly offered as an

independent basis for recusal, and for good reason.

It is common knowledge in the profession that former law

clerks practice regularly before judges for whom they once

clerked. Courts often have prophylactic rules that forbid a

former law clerk from appearing in that court for a year or

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more after the clerkship, see, e.g., 1st Cir. R. 46, but no

such rule is claimed to have been violated in this case. And

any lawyer who studies a judge's past rulings can make an

informed guess as to how the judge is likely to approach an

issue.

So, too, appointees to the bench have sometimes had a

former active connection with a political party. But many

judges also sit, usually after a self-imposed cooling off

period, on cases involving former clients (assuming always no

current financial ties and that the judge did not work on the

same or a related matter while in practice). Former

affiliations with a party may persuade a judge not to sit;

but they are rarely a basis for compelled recusal. See,

e.g., In re United States, 666 F.2d at 696; Matter of Mason,

916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990).

All this being said, the whole is sometimes greater than

the sum of the parts. The cumulative effect of a judge's

individual actions, comments and past associations could

raise some question about impartiality, even though none

(taken alone) would require recusal. And, while the abuse of

discretion standard is a forgiving one, perhaps in an extreme

case the cumulative effect would warrant reversal on direct

appeal if the judge refused to recuse.

But the primary condition of mandamus is that the

petitioner be clearly entitled to relief. Judges may choose

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to step aside in close cases; the "duty to sit" concept has

been modified by amended section 455. See Blizard, 601 F.2d

at 1220-21; see also 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper 3549, at

611. But mandamus requires a case not merely close to the

line but clearly over it; and the line itself is especially

blurred where no incident is sufficient and the claim is one

of cumulative effects. This case is certainly not so clearly

over the line as to justify the shortcut of mandamus.

III. CONCLUSION

When this case returns to the district court, section

144 will be out of the picture; Del Valle's statement was

insufficient on its face to show bias or prejudice, so it

fails regardless of mandamus requirements, and only one such

affidavit may be filed in an action. The situation is

otherwise under section 455(a); our decision, resting as it

does partly upon the mandamus standard, does not

automatically prevent the further development of the record,

nor an appeal after a final judgment.

The possibility left open may carry some suggestion of

reproof. We therefore note that as yet no showing exists

that the district judge gave any improper advantage in his

disclosures to defense counsel, which is the closest that

plaintiffs have come to a specific and serious charge. Our

only present stricture is that a district judge, however

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busy, ought not let a recusal motion alleging personal bias

and prejudice sit dormant for eight months.

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. The stay

of proceedings in the district court is vacated. Each side

shall bear its own costs.

It is so ordered.

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