IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1121
Filed June 7, 2017
IN THE INTEREST OF I.F., J.K., L.K., and T.K.,
Minor Children,
J.F., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Philip J. Tabor,
District Associate Judge.
The mother appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights
to her four children, I.F., J.K., L.K., and T.K. AFFIRMED.
Judd J. Parker of Parker Law Office, Clinton, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Scott J. Nelson, Dubuque, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ. Tabor, J.,
takes no part.
2
POTTERFIELD, Judge.
The mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her
parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (h) (2016). She
argues the State failed to satisfy the statutory grounds for termination,
reasonable efforts were not made to reunite the children with the mother, and
termination is not in the best interests of the children. Because the mother
refuses to acknowledge the abuse that led to the children’s issues, the home is
unsafe for the children’s return, and the children are improving under alternative
care, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
J.K., L.K., and T.K. are siblings from the mother’s previous marriage,
which dissolved in 2008.1 J.K was born in 2006, L.K. in 2005, and T.K. in 2004.
In 2009, the mother married Michael, the children’s current stepfather. Michael is
also I.F.’s legal father.2 I.F. was born in 2013. Michael has four children from
another relationship who have lived in the household at various times.
Social service departments for Iowa, Indiana, and Illinois have been
involved with this family for quite some time. The first instance of involvement
with social services arose in 2003 when Michael was involved with the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for domestic violence
issues between him and his then-wife. DCFS placed Michael’s children in foster
care for approximately six months. In 2004, Michael had another child, and
DCFS issued a risk-of-harm notice for the child based on the family’s history with
1
The father did not participate in the termination proceedings, and his parental rights are
not at issue in this appeal.
2
I.F.’s father’s parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.
3
services. In 2005, the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) and the
Illinois DCFS raised concerns about domestic violence between Michael and his
former wife. Both parties denied the allegations. In 2008, Michael divorced his
wife, and in 2009, he married the mother.
In September 2010, the parties moved to Indiana. The Indiana
Department of Child Services (DCS) issued a founded abuse report against the
mother and Michael for improper supervision. Another founded abuse report was
issued a month later against the mother and Michael for improper supervision.
The reports indicated the children were observed numerous times at night,
unsupervised, playing on a road. DCS removed the children for lack of
supervision, but they were eventually returned. In 2011, Michael filed for divorce
from the mother, but he later dismissed the action. The family moved back to
Illinois.
Shortly after the move, Illinois DCFS issued a report of abuse for
Michael’s child, S.F.,3 in October 2012. In January 2013, I.F. was born and
shortly thereafter, the family moved to Iowa. In September 2013, DHS issued a
founded physical abuse report against the mother and Michael for hitting T.K.
and L.K. with a paddle, which resulted in bruises. Two months later, DHS issued
an unfounded report after allegations that one of Michael’s children punched T.K.
in the face. After an uncontested dispositional hearing, T.K. was placed in the
mother’s care, subject to DHS supervision, and the court adopted the DHS case
plan, which required the mother to remain in Iowa.
3
S.F. is not a subject of this termination action.
4
In February 2014, DHS issued a founded report of sexual abuse based on
two of Michael’s children sexually abusing T.K. and L.K. A week later, DHS
issued a not-confirmed report of physical abuse alleging Michael struck J.K. in
the back with a paddle. Michael’s children who were accused of sexual abuse
were moved to their mother’s house. In May, the department issued a founded
report against the mother and Michael for denial of critical care for failing to
provide proper supervision when Michael’s ten-year-old child was left supervising
the other children. In August, DHS issued a founded abuse report against the
mother for hitting T.K. with a belt and clothing hangers. In September, DHS
issued a founded child abuse report against Michael for sexually abusing T.K.
over several years. Michael was required to leave the family home and not
allowed to contact the children under the case plan.
In September, T.K. was voluntarily placed in foster care by the mother
after T.K.’s psychiatric hospitalization due to T.K.’s physically violent behavior in
the family home. Reports indicate T.K.’s outburst was behavioral rather than
mental, and it was suggested her home environment was contributing to the
problem. T.K. had another outburst at her foster home, which led the juvenile
court to change her foster placement to another family. Her outbursts, again,
were attributed to behavioral issues. In November, L.K. was voluntarily placed in
foster care after a behavioral outburst that required emergency treatment.
The mother was offered a variety of services throughout the underlying
action, including counseling (individual and couple’s); psychological evaluations;
behavioral health intervention services (BHIS); parenting classes; visitation; and
family safety, risk, and permanency (FSRP) services. Regarding the mother’s
5
effort to participate in services, the court stated, “It is clear that throughout the life
of this case the services that have been offered have either been refused or
manipulated or paid lip service to without any internalization by the mother.”
In December, the court placed J.K. in the custody of DHS for placement in
family foster care. In its order, the court stated:
The testimony of the mother can best be described as a story of
denial, blame, ignorance, and refusal to take responsibility for the
issues in this family. Even with the involvement of Juvenile Court
and services being provided in the family home, these children still
are not having their medical needs met, their therapeutic needs
met, their eye care needs met, and their safety needs met and
cannot be safely maintained in the family home.
The court also cited the mother’s refusal to participate in case-plan requirements
along with her inability to understand the dysfunction in her home as reasons for
removal. In June 2015, after a contested removal hearing, the court placed I.F.
in the temporary custody of DHS. Before the hearing, I.F. was in the mother’s
custody under DHS supervision. The State requested removal after DHS
learned the mother allowed contact between I.F. and Michael, contrary to the
safety plan.
Guardian ad litem (GAL) reports illustrate behavioral harm to the children
due to the mother’s dysfunctional household. J.K. has been diagnosed with
reactive attachment disorder and cognitive disorders. T.K. and L.K. both suffered
from behavioral issues, which required hospitalization, removal, and BHIS.
Reports indicate the children’s behavioral issues have “improved dramatically
since suspension of visitation” with the mother and Michael, and “behavioral
issues always re-manifested following visitation.”
6
In May 2016, a two-day termination trial took place in Clinton County.4
The mother testified about the alleged abuse. She denied Michael sexually
abused any of her children. DHS workers testified the child’s reports of sexual
abuse were believable and consistent. In its order, the court discussed the
mother’s testimony and credibility:
[I]n every hearing the mother has testified, everything that she has
said at that hearing is different when she testifies at the next
hearing: a different house; a different job; a different reason for this;
a different reason for that. It is clear . . . that the mother’s testimony
is not credible. The mother does not take any responsibility for the
dysfunction of her family, nor does she take any responsibility for
the fact that the original adjudicatory harm in this matter was sexual
abuse by members of the household vis-à-vis other members of the
household when she was the supervising adult.
(Emphasis added.) The mother also testified about her living arrangement in a
four-bedroom apartment.5 The mother claimed Michael refurbished two rooms in
an extended-stay motel, and the conditions were safe for the children’s return.
She also submitted pictures of the residence.
DHS and Lutheran Services of Iowa reports, however, conflict with the
mother’s testimony and the photographic evidence. Two witnesses testified on
behalf of the State that they toured the residence. Both witnesses claimed the
apartment was a small two-bedroom residence, and neither witness could recall
a green-painted bedroom that was depicted in one of the mother’s photographs.
DHS workers also testified that the grounds were unsafe for children. The motel
4
The juvenile actions that were initiated in Jones County were later transferred to
Clinton County.
5
At one point during her testimony, the mother testified the apartment contained five
bedrooms. It is not clear from mother’s testimony whether she is living in a two, three,
four, or five-bedroom apartment.
7
is known for drug use and theft. The mother was even assaulted during an
altercation with a belligerent guest, which required hospitalization.
In June the juvenile court entered an order terminating the mother’s
parental rights to I.F., J.K., L.K., and T.K. The mother appealed.
Our supreme court initially remanded the case upon the court’s own
motion to clarify “what records were judicially noticed by the juvenile court in
reaching its decision on the petition to terminate,” as the juvenile records were
from different counties. The juvenile court clarified the juvenile case numbers
and stated all exhibits and testimony from the Clinton and Jackson county files
for A.F., T.F., D.F., T.K., L.K., J.K., G.G., S.F., and I.F.6 were considered in the
termination hearing. The court also noted that any Jones County cases
regarding the children were reviewed during the termination proceedings, and the
files are part of the record. Any transcripts of hearings in the Jackson County
Juvenile Court are not part of the record on appeal, although they were reviewed
by the juvenile court.
II. Standard of Review.
We conduct a de novo review of proceedings terminating parental rights.
In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). An order terminating parental
rights will be upheld if there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for
termination under Iowa Code section 232.116. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706
(Iowa 2010). Evidence is “clear and convincing” when there are no serious or
substantial doubts as to the correctness of conclusions drawn from it. Id.
Although we are not bound by the factual determinations of the juvenile court, we
6
A.F., T.F., D.F., G.G., and S.F. are not subjects of this termination action.
8
do give weight to them, particularly regarding the credibility of witnesses. Id.
The primary consideration of our review is the best interests of the child. In re
J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006).
III. Discussion.
On appeal, the mother argues the statutory grounds were not satisfied,
reasonable efforts were not made to reunite the children with the mother, and
termination is not in the best interests of the children.
We utilize a three-step analysis when evaluating whether the termination
of parental rights is appropriate under Iowa Code chapter 232. See In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). First, the court must determine whether the
grounds for termination under section 232.116(1) were established. Id. Second,
if the State established grounds for termination under the statute, the court must
apply the framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if proceeding with
termination is in the best interests of the child. Id. Third, if the statutory best-
interests framework supports termination of parental rights, the court must
consider if any statutory factors set forth in section 232.116(3) should serve to
preclude termination. Id.
Under the first step, the State must establish the statutory grounds for
termination under chapter 232. The district court held termination is appropriate
under section 232.116(1)(f)7 and (h).8 The remaining issue on appeal under the
7
Under subsection (f), termination is appropriate if:
(1) The child is four years of age or older; (2) The child has been
adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96; (3)
The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s
parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last
twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less
than thirty days; and (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at
9
statutory grounds is whether the State presented clear and convincing evidence
the children could not be returned to the mother at the time of the termination
hearing. The mother claims the home was appropriate for the children to return
and any adjudicatory harm threatening the children was resolved at the time of
termination.
The record, however, suggests the mother’s living arrangement is
unsuitable. Michael is living in the apartment, and while the mother continues to
deny he sexually abused any of her children, a founded abuse report suggests
otherwise. DHS workers testified his presence presents a risk of harm to the
children. DHS noted T.K.’s consistent, believable story that Michael sexually
abused her. DHS workers also discovered D.F.—one of Michael’s children who
sexually abused T.K. and L.K.—staying at the apartment, which was undisclosed
to DHS by the mother. It is unclear how often Michael’s children stay at the
apartment. We agree with the district court that the children are unable to be
returned to the custody of the mother at the time of the termination hearing.
The mother next claims the State did not make reasonable efforts for
reunification because the State did not schedule therapy sessions, and the
the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s
parents as provided in section 232.102.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f).
8
Under subsection(h) termination is appropriate if:
(1) The child is three years of age or younger; (2) The child has been
adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96; (3)
The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s
parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six
consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty
days; (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be
returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section
232.102 at the present time.
Id. § 232.116(1)(h).
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department erroneously determined case-plan requirements were incomplete.
The State has the burden to show reasonable efforts were made. In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). The record shows the State provided a variety of
services to help reunite the mother with the children, including counseling
(individual and couples’), psychological evaluations, BHIS, parenting classes,
visitation, and FSRP services. The record indicates the mother has not
consistently participated in services for herself or her children. Reports also
suggest the mother has not always cooperated with the department. To the
extent the mother raises concerns over the State’s services for the first time at
the termination hearing or on appeal, the mother is required to challenge services
when the case plan is entered. See In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1997); In re L.M.W., 518 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). We
agree with the district court that the State met its burden to show reasonable
efforts were provided to the mother.
Next, we determine whether termination is in the best interests of the
children. Even when the statutory grounds for termination are satisfied, the
juvenile court must give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to
the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). The mother claims the children did not receive better care when
removed. She also claims the sibling bond should preclude termination. The
mother’s claims miss the point. The children’s interests are best served by
removing them from a toxic environment of abuse and neglect, and the mother’s
failure to recognize the abuse further endangers the children. See In re C.H.,
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652 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Iowa 2002) (“A parent’s failure to address his or her role in
the abuse may hurt the parents’ chances of regaining custody and care of their
children.”); In re T.T., 541 N.W.2d 552, 557 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (“[W]hen a
parent is incapable of changing to allow the child to return home, termination is
necessary.”). The mother has yet to demonstrate an ability to understand the
trauma she and her husband inflict on the children, nor does she acknowledge
the steps required to heal the trauma. She denies Michael sexually abused L.K.
despite evidence to the contrary. She also denies or minimizes the abuse
present in the household. Children are not required to endure emotional and
physical trauma while they wait years for their parents to acknowledge it. See In
re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (“It is simply not in the best interests of
children to continue to keep them in temporary foster homes while the natural
parents get their lives together.”); In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987)
(“The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment
with ways to face up to their own problems.”). Terminating the mother’s parental
rights is in the children’s best interests.
We also note testimony shows the children are improving in their
respective care arrangements. Sheryl Murphy, DHS social worker, testified
about the children’s progress since removal. She stated while T.K. had some
issues at school, her behavioral issues have been eliminated, as evidenced by
her BHIS assessment. The GAL report states, “[T]he children seem to thrive in a
care situation involving rules, routine, and expectations. They are not getting
structure with [Michael] and [the mother].” The GAL opined the lack of structure
12
under Michael and the mother “has led to all of the behavioral problems exhibited
by the children.”
Because the mother refuses to acknowledge the abuse that led to the
children’s issues, the home is unsafe for the children’s return, and the children
are improving under alternative care, it is in the children’s best interests to
terminate the mother’s parental rights. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.