J-S90031-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.N.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.A.G., MOTHER :
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: No. 2446 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered June 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): 51-FN-469930-2009,
CP-51-AP-0000419-2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.J.G., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.A.G., MOTHER :
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: No. 2448 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered June 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-0000600-2015
FN-469930-2009
BEFORE: OTT, SOLANO, JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2016
S.A.G. (“Mother” or “S.G.”) appeals from the orders entered June 28,
2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Family Court
Division, that involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her sons, J.N.D.
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(“J.D.”), born in September of 2008, and K.J.G. (“K.G.”), born in September
of 2013 (collectively, “Children”).1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history
of these cases, as follows:
On October 31, 2011, DHS [Philadelphia Department of Human
Services, Children and Youth Division] received a substantiated
General Protective Service (GPS) report alleging that the family
home lacked heat, had an illegal electricity connection and had
defective plumbing. Furthermore, there was minimal food in the
home. Moreover, the mother left her children home alone while
she was out trying to obtain illegal drugs. DHS determined that
the family lacked adequate housing and the children lacked
adequate parental supervision.
On November 29, 2011, DHS obtained an Order of Protective
Custody (OPC) for J.D. The child, J.D., was placed in foster care.
A Shelter Care Hearing was held on December 1, 2011 before
Master Tammy Langenberg. Master Langenberg lifted the OPC
and ordered the temporary commitment of J.D. to the care and
custody DHS.
On January 17, 2012, an adjudicatory hearing was held before
the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine adjudicated J.D.
dependent and committed him to the care and custody of DHS.
The matter was listed on a regular basis before Judges of the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas - Family Court Division -
Juvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 6351, and evaluated for the purpose of determining
or reviewing the permanency plan of the child.
On May 5, 2014, DHS received a substantiated GPS report
alleging that the mother, S.G. was under the influence of PCP
____________________________________________
1
By order of August 24, 2016, this Court consolidated the above-captioned
appeals sua sponte.
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while K.G. was in her custody. The mother, S.G., was incoherent
and was taken to Temple University Hospital by ambulance. The
report further alleged that the mother, S.G., was unable to
provide the name of any relative who was available to care for
K.G.
On May 6, 2014, DHS obtained an OPC for K.G. K.G. was placed
in foster care. A Shelter Care Hearing was held on May 8, 2014,
before the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine lifted the
OPC and ordered the temporary commitment of K.G. to the care
and custody of DHS.
On May 22, 2014, an adjudicatory hearing was held before the
Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine adjudicated K.G.
dependent and committed him to the care and custody of DHS.
In subsequent hearings, the DRO’s reflect the Court’s review and
disposition as a result of evidence presented, addressing, and
primarily with, the goal of finalizing the permanency plan.
[On September 8, 2015, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily
terminate the parental rights of S.G. and the unknown putative
father of K.G., and an amended petition to involuntarily
terminate the parental rights of S.G., E.D., the father of J.D.,
and the unknown putative father of J.D.]
On February 9, 2016 and June 28, 2016, a Termination of
Parental Rights hearing was held[.][2]
Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/2016, at 1–2 (unnumbered).
On June 28, 2016, the Court found by clear and convincing evidence
that Mother’s parental rights of J.D. and K.G. should be terminated pursuant
____________________________________________
2
S.G. attended the February 9, 2016 hearing, but despite a court subpoena,
did not appear for the June 28, 2016 hearing. S.G. did not present any
witnesses or evidence on her own behalf.
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to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8), and (b). 3
Furthermore, the trial court found it was in the best interest of the children
that the goal be changed to adoption. This appeal by Mother followed.
Mother now presents five issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of Mother, S.G. pursuant to
[Section] 2511(a)(1) where Mother completed some of her
FSP goals[?]
2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of Mother, S.G. pursuant to
[Section] 2511(a)(2) where Mother presented evidence that
she has remedied her situation by meeting her goal of
parenting, housing and visitation and has the present
capacity to care for her children[?]
3. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of mother, S.G. pursuant to
[Section] 2511(a)(5) where evidence was provided to
establish that the children were removed from the care of
their mother, and that mother is now capable of caring for
her children[?]
4. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of mother, S.G. pursuant to
[Section] 2511(a)(8) where evidence was presented to show
that mother is now capable of caring for her children[?]
5. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of Mother, S.G. pursuant to
[Section] 2511(b) where evidence was presented that
established the children have a bond with their Mother and
____________________________________________
3
The trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the
unknown putative father of K.G.; E.D., the father of J.D.; and the unknown
putative father of J.D.
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they had lived with their Mother for the first part of their
lives[?]
Mother’s Brief at 7.
Our standard of review is well established:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. The burden rests upon the petitioner
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for
seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d
273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
2511(a), along with a consideration of section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, the trial
court terminated Mother’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2),
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(a)(5), (a)(8), and 2511(b). We will focus on Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b),
which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds: …
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed
from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
…
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).4
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4
It is important to note:
Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an evaluation of the
“needs and welfare of the child” prior to proceeding to Section
2511(b), which focuses on the “developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child.” Thus, the analysis
under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in
addition to the behavior of the parent. … Accordingly, while both
Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We first address whether the trial court erred by terminating Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) The
child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or
more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003).
“Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8)[] does not require an
evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that
led to placement of her children.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, the trial court analyzed the evidence presented at the
termination hearing, as follows:
In the instant case, the mother did not complete her Family
Service Plan (FSP) objectives. The original case manager, Sierra
Gregg, testified that the mother’s FSP objectives were: 1)
complete drug and alcohol treatment, 2) comply with mental
health treatment, 3) obtain appropriate housing, 4) maintain
visits with the children[] and 5) complete parenting class. … The
petitions indicate that the mother did not complete drug and
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve
the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing
the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by Section
2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address
Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).
In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-1009 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citations omitted).
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alcohol treatment. She did not successfully complete an
outpatient drug treatment program and did not demonstrate any
prolonged period of sobriety. Furthermore, the mother did not
have appropriate housing. Moreover, the mother did not
consistently visit with the children.
****
In the instant matter, J.D. has been in placement care for
approximately fifty-five months. K.G. has been in placement
care for approximately twenty-five months. The testimony
established that the children are in a pre-adoptive homes [sic]
with their needs being met. Furthermore, it would be in the best
interest of the children if the mother’s rights were terminated.
****
[T]he original case manager testified that the mother did not
complete mental health treatment. The original case manager
and the current case manager, David Coleman, testified that the
mother failed to comply with the court ordered random drug and
alcohol screens. Furthermore, the case managers testified that
the mother did not complete a drug and alcohol program.
Moreover, the original case manager testified that the mother’s
interactions with J.D. were inappropriate. J.D. is autistic and the
original case manager testified that the mother “...did not
understand how to be appropriate in regards to his
developmental delays due to the autism”. The current case
manager testified that the mother has trouble controlling J.D.
during visits and is unable to meet his needs regarding his
autism. The current case manager further testified that he has
not seen any improvement in the mother’s ability to interact with
J.D. during visits. Additionally, the current case manager had to
end a visit early because the mother appeared to be under the
influence of “something” - meaning an illegal substance/drug.
Lastly, the mother did not consistently visit with the children[.]
She missed fifty percent of the scheduled visits with her children.
****
[B]oth J.D. and K.G. reside in a pre-adoptive foster home. They
share a bond with their foster parents. They refer to them as
mom and dad. The foster parents meet the daily needs of the
children including their medical[] and educational needs. K.G. is
not upset when he leaves the visits with the mother, S.G. The
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child, J.D., runs up to his foster parents and gives them hugs
after visits with the mother. Furthermore, the testimony
established that J.D. would not suffer any long term detrimental
impact if his mother’s parental rights were terminated. Lastly, it
would be in the best interest of the children if the mother’s
parental rights were terminated and the goal is changed to
adoption.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/2016, at 3–6 (unnumbered) (record citations
omitted).
With regard to the requirements of Section 2511(a)(8), the record
supports the finding of the trial court that Children have been “removed
from [Mother’s] care for 12 months or more from the date of removal.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). Further, “the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child continue to exist” because Mother has failed to make
progress toward completing her reunification objectives. Id. Specifically, at
the time of the June 28, 2016 hearing, Mother had not maintained regular
visitation with Children, stopped treatment at her dual diagnosis program
due to noncompliance, was not currently in any dual treatment program,
failed to provide five random drug screens, and was residing in a shelter.5
Finally, the record confirms that “termination of parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the child.” Id. This Court has stated
that “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to
attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The
____________________________________________
5
See N.T., 6/28/2016, at 7–9.
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court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for
permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., supra, 901 A.2d at 513. Here, the
record shows that J.D. – age seven years – is a special needs child with
autism, that K.G. – age two years – was removed from Mother when he was
seven and one-half months old, and that both children are bonded with their
foster parents who meet their daily needs, including medical and educational
needs. At this point in their young lives, Mother’s continued lack of progress
toward her reunification objectives has left Children in a prolonged state of
limbo, which clearly does not serve Children’s “needs and welfare.” Id.
The sole argument presented by Mother with respect to Section
2511(a)(8) is that she “would have benefitted from housing referral and
additional parenting classes for parents who have autistic children.”
Mother’s Brief at 15. This argument, however, is unavailing because a trial
court is not required to consider reasonable efforts in relation to a decision
to terminate parental rights. In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 2014).
See also In re Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1055 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(“While the Supreme Court in D.C.D. focused its analysis on Section
2511(a)(2), we find the Supreme Court’s reasoning equally applicable to
Section 2511(a)(8). Like Section 2511(a)(2), nothing in the language of
Section 2511(a)(8) suggests that reasonable reunification services are
necessary to support the termination of parental rights.”).
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Based upon our careful review of the record, the trial court’s opinion,
the briefs on appeal, and the relevant law, we conclude that the trial court’s
findings are supported by clear and convincing, competent, and sufficient
evidence, and that it properly concluded the elements of Section 2511(a)(8)
were met.
We next consider whether the trial court erred by terminating Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). We have discussed our
analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) as follows:
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act.
Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,
if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or
her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-
interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
considered by the court when determining what is in the best
interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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Our Supreme Court has stated, “Common sense dictates that courts
considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a
pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”
In re T.S.M, supra, 71 A.2d at 268 (citation omitted). The Court directed
that, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b),
“courts must keep the ticking clock of Childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269.
The T.S.M. Court observed that “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of
years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development
quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically
maladjusted children.” Id.
As discussed above, the trial court determined the best interest of
Children would be served by termination of Mother’s parental rights.
Mother, however, argues Children had a strong bond with her prior to their
placement, and she continued her bond with them through her visitation.
We find this argument presents no basis upon which to disturb the trial
court’s decision.
The record shows Mother missed half of the visits between the
termination hearing dates of February 9, 2016, and June 28, 2016,6 Mother’s
interactions during the visits were not appropriate with J.D., who is autistic, 7
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6
N.T., 6/28/2016, at 17.
7
N.T., 2/9/2016, at 24–25; N.T., 6/28/2016, at 10.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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there was no improvement in Mother’s ability to interact or engage with J.D.
during the visits,8 and the current caseworker testified J.D. would not suffer
any long term detrimental impact from the termination of Mother’s parental
rights.9 At the time of the June 28, 2016, hearing, J.D. was seven years old,
he refers to his foster parents as “mom and da,” and has been there for over
three years.10
With regard to K.G., the evidence shows that Mother had missed half
of the visits for him between February 9, 2016, and June 28, 2016, and the
caseworker opined that it would be in K.G.’s best interests that Mother’s
parental rights be terminated to make him free for adoption. 11 The
caseworker testified K.G. was two years of age and had been in care for a
little over two years. He further testified K.G. refers to his foster parents as
his mother and father, and when he returns home after a visit, he runs up
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
8
N.T., 2/9/2016, at 33–34, 48; N.T., 6/28/2016, at 18.
9
N.T., 6/28/2016, at 10–11.
10
Id. at 11.
11
N.T., 6/28/2016, at 15, 17.
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and gives them hugs.12 When asked if K.G. appears very upset when he has
to leave Mother during the visits, the caseworker replied, “No.”13
The trial court found termination of Mother’s parental rights would not
have a detrimental effect on Children and the record supports the trial
court’s determination. In sum, our review confirms there is competent,
sufficient evidence that shows termination of Mother’s parental rights best
serves Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.
See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), supra.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that DHS proved
grounds for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to J.D.
and K.G. pursuant to §§ 2511(a)(8) and (b).
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/15/2016
____________________________________________
12
Id. at 14–16.
13
Id. at 16.
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