F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 24 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
In re: MARK INNES and
GENEVIEVE INNES,
Debtors.
MARK INNES and GENEVIEVE
INNES,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v. No. 97-3363
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY,
State of Kansas Higher Education
Assistance Foundation,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 97-4075-DES)
Christopher F. Burger, Assistant Attorney General (Carla J. Stovall, Attorney
General for the State of Kansas, with him on the briefs), Topeka, Kansas, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Brenda J. Bell of Seaton, Miller and Bell, L.L.P., Manhattan, Kansas, for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
_________________________
Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
__________________________
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
_________________________
I.
This case arises from an adversary proceeding instituted in the United
States Bankruptcy Court against Kansas State University [KSU] in which the
debtors, Mark and Genevieve Innes, sought to have their student loans discharged
on the basis of undue hardship pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(8) and 1328.
KSU answered the debtors’ complaint, admitting that Mark Innes was indebted to
KSU for $5,000 plus an amortized amount for each month since the debt became
due in 1995. KSU further stated that the monthly amount due would “not impose
an undue hardship on the debtors,” and requested the court to deny the debtors’
complaint and grant KSU’s “costs and attorney’s fees in defending this action.”
Appellant’s App. at 15.
Subsequently, KSU filed a motion to dismiss the bankruptcy proceeding,
claiming that it was immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh
Amendment. The bankruptcy court denied the motion. It held that KSU’s
agreement with the United States Department of Education to participate in the
federal Perkins Loan Program requiring KSU to defend dischargeability claims in
the bankruptcy court, coupled with Kansas legislation, acted as a waiver of the
-2-
State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Innes v. Kansas State Univ. (In re
Innes), 207 B.R. 953, 957 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1997). KSU appealed that decision to
the district court, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1)(A), which affirmed the bankruptcy
court. See Appellant’s App. at 96. KSU now appeals to this court. We have
jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the
collateral order doctrine. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993) (applying Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
On appeal, KSU reasserts the arguments it made to the bankruptcy and
district courts, contending that neither Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-723 nor KSU’s
contract with the DOE evidences any intent to waive Eleventh Amendment
immunity. KSU further argues that a state may waive its immunity only by
express statements or overwhelming implication in a state statute or constitution,
and that, therefore, it is impermissible to read the Kansas legislation, the contract,
and the federal regulation in concert in order to find a waiver. The debtors
respond that the terms of the Kansas legislation, the contract, and the federal
regulation leave no room for any reasonable construction other than that KSU
waived its immunity. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a state’s
claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See Powder
River Basin Resource Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1483 (10th Cir. 1995).
-3-
II.
The critical issue we must decide is whether KSU waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity in this adversary bankruptcy proceeding by entering into a
contract with the DOE which requires KSU to perform certain actions in the event
of the bankruptcy of the borrower. To answer this question, we must consider
(1) the methods by which a state may waive Eleventh Amendment immunity,
(2) whether KSU did in fact waive immunity, and (3) whether the waiver was
valid.
A.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution restricts federal
jurisdiction over “any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.” U.S. C ONST . amend. XI. The Supreme Court has long interpreted
the Eleventh Amendment to apply to federal suits brought by all persons against
unconsenting states. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54
(1996) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1890)). Because KSU is an
“arm of the state,” it is entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. See
Watson v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1996);
Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 1971). Eleventh
-4-
Amendment immunity is not a defense where a state has waived it and consents to
suit in federal court or where Congress has abrogated it by unequivocally
expressing an intent to do so and acting pursuant to a valid exercise of power.
See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1985); see also
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (clarifying two-part test required to lawfully
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity). Because the debtors concede that
abrogation is not at issue in this case, we only address whether KSU waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 1
In Atascadero, the Court explained that “[a] State may effectuate a waiver
of its constitutional immunity by a state statute or constitutional provision, or by
otherwise waiving its immunity to suit in the context of a particular federal
program.” Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1. The Court further stated that both
1
Because neither the bankruptcy court nor the district court relied on
§ 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, we do not address in this case whether it is
constitutional. See, e.g., Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Pennsylvania (In re
Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 133 F.3d 237, 243-45 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding
11 U.S.C. § 106(a) unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity); Department of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset
Management Co. (In re Estate of Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241, 244-46 (5th Cir.)
(holding attempted statutory waiver of sovereign immunity under § 106(a)
unconstitutional and listing similar cases), amended by 130 F.3d 1138 (5th Cir.
1997); cf. Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C.,
Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 106(a) & (b) offend the
Eleventh Amendment), cert. denied, U.S. ,118 S. Ct. 1517 (1998). But cf.
Wyoming Dep’t of Transp. v. Straight (In re Straight), 143 F.3d 1387, 1392 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) is unaffected by Seminole Tribe),
cert. denied, U.S. , 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998).
-5-
means of waiving immunity “require an unequivocal indication that the State
intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment,” id.; see id. at 241, and described “[t]he test for
determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court
jurisdiction [as] a stringent one.” Id. at 241. A waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity will be found “only where stated ‘by the most expressive language or by
such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other
reasonable construction.’” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (citation
omitted); cf. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., U.S. , 119 S. Ct. 2219, 1999 WL 412639, at *8-*9 & n.2 (1999)
(overturning the constructive or implied waiver principle set out in Parden v.
Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
1.
We begin by ascertaining whether a Kansas statute or constitutional
provision governing this case has expressly waived Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1. Though Kansas has generally
authorized suits brought in state court against state educational institutions, see
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-713, its statutes have not expressly waived Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Brennan, 451 F.2d at 1290; see also Atascadero, 473
-6-
U.S. at 241 (“Although a State’s general waiver of sovereign immunity may
subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the immunity guaranteed
by the Eleventh Amendment . . . [absent] intent[] to subject itself to suit in
federal court.” (citations omitted)); Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that Utah did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity with
respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for
exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts). Nor is there any waiver
provision in the Kansas Constitution. Accordingly, KSU has not waived its
immunity by this method.
2.
Our analysis, however, does not end here. In addition to examining the
state’s statutes and constitution, Atascadero instructs us to determine whether the
state “otherwise waiv[ed] its immunity to suit in the context of a particular federal
program.” Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1. Like the first type of waiver, this
method requires an unequivocal indication that the state intends to consent to be
sued in federal court. See id. at 238 n.1 & 241; College Sav. Bank, 1999 WL
412639, at *9-*10 (rejecting Parden’s doctrine of constructive consent because it
conflicts with the longstanding requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right
must be unequivocally expressed and “altogether voluntary” (quotation marks and
-7-
citation omitted)). Although this second method of waiver seems to allow
looking beyond the text of a state statute or constitution to a state’s conduct in
relation to a federal program in order to find a waiver, KSU contends that
Edelman and this court’s decision in Johns restrict our analysis to examining only
statutory and constitutional text to find a waiver. See Johns, 57 F.3d 1553
(reading Edelman as requiring that a state may waive only expressly in a state
statute or constitution or by overwhelming implication from the text of that state
statute or constitution). Thus, KSU argues that in this case a waiver may only be
found if the text of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-723 overwhelmingly implies no other
reasonable construction. On the other hand, the debtors urge us to follow the
approach taken by the bankruptcy and district courts–reading the legislation in
concert with the contract and the federal regulation to determine whether they
expressly state or overwhelmingly imply that KSU waived Eleventh Amendment
immunity. To resolve this dispute, we must evaluate whether a state may waive
immunity by its affirmative conduct in the context of a federal program or
whether Edelman mandates that a state can waive only by express statements or
overwhelming implication in its statutory or constitutional text. See Atascadero,
473 U.S. at 238 n.1 & 239-40; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673.
Several Supreme Court decisions provide that neither receipt of federal
funds, participation in a federal program, nor an agreement to recognize and abide
-8-
by federal laws, regulations, and guidelines is alone sufficient to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47 (holding that
participation in federal programs and receipt of federal funds under such
programs “fall[] far short of manifesting a clear intent . . . to waive immunity”);
Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450
U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (stating that state agency’s explicit agreement “to obey
federal law in administering federal program can hardly be deemed an express
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity”); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673-74
(holding that neither mere participation in a federal program nor provision
requiring compliance with federal law is sufficient to establish that the state
consented to be sued in federal court); accord Duke v. Department of Agric., 131
F.3d 1407, 1408 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that New Mexico did not waive
Eleventh Amendment immunity “by engaging in activities and entering contracts
subject to federal regulation”). In spite of these holdings, however, this court and
several others, including the Supreme Court, have concluded that, “in the absence
of explicit consent by state statute or constitutional provision, a state may consent
to a federal court’s jurisdiction through its affirmative conduct.” Georgia Dep’t
of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding
that state waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by filing proofs of claim in
bankruptcy proceedings), cert. denied, U.S. , S. Ct. , 1999 WL
-9-
422421 (1999); see Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947) (“When the
State becomes the actor and files a claim against the [bankruptcy] fund, it waives
any immunity which it otherwise might have had respecting the adjudication of
the claim.”); Straight, 143 F.3d at 1389-90 (holding that state waived its immunity
by filing proofs of claim); Dekalb County Div. of Family & Children Servs. v.
Platter (In re Platter), 140 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that state’s
claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity did not bar action in bankruptcy court to
determine discharge of debt because state had initiated adversarial action against
debtor); Rose v. United States Dep’t of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 762
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (deciding that state waived immunity by filing proofs of
claim); cf. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that Utah waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by causing
removal to federal court and litigating merits of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action).
None of these cases rely on the text of a state statute or constitution to
determine that the state waived immunity. In fact, we observed in Straight that
Gardner and Platter do not “rel[y] upon any specific basis for decision other than
the state’s having acceded to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court by seeking
its relief against the debtor.” Straight, 143 F.3d at 1390. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945) (noting that appearance
in suit by state attorney general would waive state’s immunity if attorney general
-10-
had authority under state law to waive immunity but holding that Indiana state law
did not confer such authority); Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative
Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1148-49 (4th Cir. 1997)
(confirming that state generally waives Eleventh Amendment immunity to the
extent that its “assertions in a state-instituted federal action, including those made
with regard to a . . . proof of claim, amount to a compulsory counterclaim” but
holding that Maryland law did not authorize waiver). In light of these cases,
which firmly establish that a state agent acting with proper authorization can
effectuate a waiver by filing a proof of claim or initiating an adversarial action in
federal court, it necessarily follows that a waiver may be found not only in the
text of a state statute or constitution but also by examining the underlying facts
and circumstances of the case. As a result, we do not think it is so novel to
suggest that the entire record and all the facts in this case should be examined to
determine whether a waiver exists.
Further, we do not think that either Edelman or the language in Johns relied
on by KSU was intended to prevent courts from considering the underlying facts
in the record to determine whether they overwhelmingly imply a waiver. Nor
does anything in College Savings Bank foreclose us from examining the
underlying facts. Although the Supreme Court overturned Parden’s constructive
consent principle, see College Sav. Bank, 1999 WL 412639, at *8-*9 & n.2, this
-11-
case does not rely on constructive consent because it involves “a State’s
expressing unequivocally that it waives its immunity.” See id. at *9. Indeed,
College Savings Bank reaffirms the proposition that a waiver may be found in a
state’s acceptance of federal funds with conditions attached. See id. at *8 n.2
(confirming that Atascadero remains good law and explaining that “conditions
attached to a State’s receipt of federal funds are simply not analogous to Parden-
style conditions attached to a State’s decision to engage in otherwise lawful
commercial activity”). The uncontroverted, historical facts of this case, in which
a state agency with delegated authority explicitly consents to participate in a
federal program and to follow the conditions thereof, including participation in
certain federal bankruptcy court functions, is closely analogous to the waiver
found in a state’s acceptance of conditioned federal funds and differs greatly from
mere participation in “otherwise commercial lawful activity.” Id.; see also id. at
*12 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), and noting that “Congress
may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the
States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to
take, and that acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions”
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, we hold that it is permissible to assess the
conduct of the party claiming immunity within the context of the federal program,
including the specific contract and the governing federal regulation, to determine
-12-
whether the state entity expressed an unequivocal intent to waive.
B.
We now examine the Kansas legislation, the contract which KSU entered
with the DOE, and the corresponding federal regulation to determine whether they
reflect an unequivocal intent to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. Section
76-723 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated allows state educational institutions to
contract with the United States Department of Education to apply for and receive
federal funds and to make the funds available under existing law, rules, or
regulations for student financial assistance programs. 2 Known as a “participation
agreement,” the contract with the DOE controls KSU’s participation in several
2
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-723 provides in full:
The board of regents, or any state educational institution with
the approval of the board of regents, may make and file applications
for federal funds appropriated and made available by federal law for
purposes related to the operation or function of such board or
institution. The board of regents, or any state educational institution
with the approval of the board of regents, may receive from the
federal government, or any of its agencies, any funds made available
under existing law, rules or regulations, or that may hereafter be
made available. The board of regents, or any state educational
institution with the approval of the board of regents, may expend the
same in accordance with the law, and the rules, regulations, and
requirements under which such funds are made available. Such
moneys shall be expended only in accordance with and for the
purposes specified in federal law. Federal funds shall be deposited
in the state treasury.
-13-
student loan programs, including the Perkins Loan Program, which governs the
loans subject to discharge in the underlying case. While the agreement indicates
that KSU must comply generally with the terms and conditions of the agreement
and with applicable federal law and regulations, 3 it also explicitly provides that
KSU “agrees to perform the functions and activities set forth in 34 CFR [§] 674.”
In re Innes, 207 B.R. at 954. At the same time, § 674 requires the educational
institution to exercise due diligence by complying with its specific provisions,
including those described in § 674.49 concerning the bankruptcy of the borrower.
See 34 C.F.R. Ch. VI, Subpart C; id. § 674.41.
Section 674.49 sets out the various responsibilities and duties that an
educational institution must undertake and perform in the event of the bankruptcy
of the borrower. First, the regulation states that, upon receiving notice of a
3
The general provisions of the contract state:
The institution understands and agrees that it is subject
to the program statutes and implementing regulations for
each [program established under Title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (HEA)] in which it participates,
as well as the general provisions set forth in Part F and
Part G of Title IV of the HEA and the Student
Assistance General Provisions regulations set forth in 34
C.F.R. [§] 668. The institution also agrees to comply
with all the relevant program statutes and regulations
governing the operation of each Title IV, HEA program
in which it participates.
In re Innes, 207 B.R. at 954.
-14-
petition filed in bankruptcy by the borrower, the institution “shall immediately
suspend any collection efforts outside the bankruptcy proceeding against the
borrower.” Id. § 674.49(a). In this provision, the institution subjects itself to the
mandatory stay provisions of federal bankruptcy law. Second, unless the
borrower has no assets, the institution “shall file a proof of claim in the
bankruptcy proceeding.” Id. § 674.49(b). Third, the institution is required to
follow the procedures set forth in subsection (c) if “it is properly served with a
complaint in a proceeding under chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code,
or under 11 U.S.C. [§] 1328(b), for a determination of dischargeability under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) on the ground that repayment of the loan would impose an
undue hardship on the borrower.” Id. § 674.49(c)(1). Subsection (c) then sets
forth several different obligations that the institution must undertake depending
on the age of the loan and the costs of opposing the request for discharge. For
example, “[i]f more than seven years of the repayment period on the loan . . . has
passed before the borrower filed the petition for relief in bankruptcy, the
institution may not oppose a determination of dischargeability requested . . . on
the ground of undue hardship.” Id. § 674.49(c)(2). Other obligations include
determining whether repayment would impose an undue hardship, calculating the
costs expected to be incurred if the institution determines that repayment will not
impose an undue hardship, opposing the request for dischargeability if expected
-15-
costs do not exceed one-third of the total amount owed on the loan, and
determining whether grounds exist for seeking a conversion or dismissal of a
chapter 13 case. See id. § 674.49(c)-(e).
Because the contract explicitly states that KSU agrees to perform the
obligations imposed by 34 C.F.R. § 674, we agree with the district court that by
including this particular regulation in the contract KSU necessarily consented to
perform certain functions in the federal bankruptcy court pursuant to § 674.49.
The inclusion of this federal regulation in the contract so clearly binds KSU to
suit in federal bankruptcy court that if the contract were enacted into legislation it
would undoubtedly satisfy Edelman’s waiver test. To conclude that KSU
intended anything other than a waiver would defy logic, contract law, and the
equitable principles of bankruptcy. Indeed, we do not think it is either reasonable
or possible to read the agreement and corresponding regulation, along with the
authorizing Kansas legislation, to conclude that KSU intended anything other than
a waiver. Thus, we hold that the overwhelming implication of this record,
including the statute, the contract, and the federal regulation, “otherwise
reflect[s][] an unequivocal intent to waive . . . immunity.” Ellis v. University of
Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 1999).
We are aware of the type of language that has been held sufficient to
abrogate or waive a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity in this context,
-16-
specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a), under Atascadero standards. See Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., U.S. , 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1996 (1998); Lane v.
Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 198 (1996); Litman v. George Mason Univ., No. 98-1742,
1999 WL 547910, at * , F.3d , (4th Cir. July 28, 1999); Clark v.
California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Wilson v.
Armstrong, U.S. , 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998). While this case does not present
the exact language, it does contain what the language must impart–the State
plainly must be on notice that by electing to participate in this federally funded
program it accepts affirmative obligations to pursue or defend claims in federal
court on the merits, despite its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Given KSU’s
consent to these conditions, the applicable regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 674.49, with its
many responsibilities and duties that must be performed in bankruptcy court,
surely cannot be read to somehow preserve Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Additionally, we think that our decision in Duke, which holds that a state
does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity by merely “engaging in activities
and entering contracts subject to federal regulation,” is distinguishable for two
reasons. Duke, 131 F.3d at 1408. First, the Duke court discussed the state’s
Eleventh Amendment claim in a very summary fashion. Although we have little
knowledge about the federal regulation which the state apparently agreed to obey,
-17-
we can infer from the facts of the case, which involved a child who was injured
while camping in a national forest, that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the
federal regulation governing the Perkins Loan Program were implicated. Second,
and more importantly, Duke did not expand the law concerning the Eleventh
Amendment that was established in Edelman, Florida Nursing Home, and
Atascadero. Because none of these Supreme Court cases considered whether a
state entity waived immunity by agreeing to participate in federal bankruptcy
court proceedings in its contract for a federal loan program, we do not think that
Duke forecloses our finding such a waiver. To the contrary, we think that KSU’s
affirmative entry into an agreement which explicitly subjects it to federal
bankruptcy court proceedings is wholly different from the rule that the state does
not waive immunity by merely agreeing to obey general federal laws in
participating in a federal program. This rule, which is based on the reality that
agreeing to obey federal laws does not mean agreeing to be sued in federal court,
is neither violated nor diminished by our conclusion today. In this case, KSU’s
entry into a contract which specifically requires it to abide by 34 C.F.R. § 674
means that KSU has unequivocally subjected itself to federal bankruptcy court
jurisdiction pursuant to § 674.49 for purposes of the Perkins Loan Program.
KSU raises two additional arguments regarding whether it waived
immunity. First, relying on the fact that a request for discharge can be made
-18-
before a federal bankruptcy court under chapters 7, 11, 12, or 13, or before a state
court under chapter 11, see Innes, 207 B.R. at 957; 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(c)(1); see
also 4 C OLLIER ON B ANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.03, at 523-17 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th
ed. 1999) (noting that state courts may exercise jurisdiction to determine
dischargeability of certain debts), KSU argues that the text of 34 C.F.R. § 674.49
does not establish unambiguously that a waiver would extend to federal
bankruptcy court. See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34
(1992). We disagree. In KSU’s contract with the DOE, KSU expressly consented
to follow the requirements of 34 C.F.R. § 674, which includes § 674.49. As we
discussed above, § 674.49 sets forth several actions to be performed by an
educational institution in federal bankruptcy court. We therefore think KSU
agreed to perform obligations under both state and federal court. Our conclusion
is supported by the fact that, under the comprehensive grants of authority to
federal district courts and bankruptcy courts prescribed in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b)
and 157(a), respectively, discharge petitions are ordinarily filed in the federal
bankruptcy court. 4 See also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) & (b)(2)(I) (indicating that
bankruptcy court may have jurisdiction over core proceedings such as
4
While civil proceedings under Title 11 may proceed in another jurisdiction
if the bankruptcy court abstains, see 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) & (2), nothing in this
provision changes our determination that KSU agreed to perform certain
obligations in federal court.
-19-
determination of dischargeability of debt); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 135-36
(1979) (stating that Congress granted bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether a debt is dischargeable based on the bankruptcy courts’
expertise); Schwager v. Fallas (In re Schwager), 121 F.3d 177, 181 (5th Cir.
1997) (noting same).
Second, KSU argues that it did not waive immunity by merely agreeing to
perform certain functions before the bankruptcy court because those obligations
only require it to appear and move for a dismissal under the Eleventh
Amendment. This is not a reasonable interpretation of the obligations to which
KSU assented by entering into the agreement with the DOE because, as explained
above, 34 C.F.R. § 674.49 contemplates a number of specific obligations by
which KSU is bound and which clearly require more than moving for dismissal
under the Eleventh Amendment. See 34 C.F.R. § 674.49(b)-(e).
Therefore, we hold that KSU knowingly and voluntarily waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity by agreeing, as a prerequisite to its participation
in the Perkins Loan program, to undertake certain enumerated actions in federal
bankruptcy court in the event of a claim for discharge filed by the student-
borrower.
C.
-20-
Finally, even though we have concluded that KSU waived immunity by
entering into an agreement with the DOE which subjects it to the jurisdiction of
the federal bankruptcy court, we must examine whether the waiver is valid. This
determination is based on whether KSU had the authority to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 467. We easily resolve
this question by examining the enabling legislation, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-723.
Nothing in the statute itself makes entering into a contract waiving immunity an
ultra vires act. Indeed the contrary is true–this legislation explicitly gives KSU,
as a state educational institution, expansive, unlimited authority to contract with
the DOE so that KSU may participate in student financial assistance programs.
Further, unlike in other Kansas statutes, there is no provision in § 76-723
disclaiming a waiver or prohibiting consent to waive. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 75-6116(g) (stating that “[n]othing in . . . the Kansas tort claims act shall be
construed as a waiver by the state of Kansas of immunity from suit under the
[Eleventh] Amendment); id. § 39-7,137 (stating same with respect to certain
administrative proceedings for Kansas social welfare program). Accordingly, we
hold that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-723 conferred upon KSU the power to waive
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 5
5
Because we have determined that KSU was authorized to waive immunity,
it is not necessary to identify a specific individual at KSU who was authorized to
(continued...)
-21-
III.
In conclusion, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court for the
foregoing reasons.
5
(...continued)
sign the contract with the DOE. Further, Appellant has not argued that the
individual who signed the contract was acting ultra vires or in derogation of his
or her authority at the University.
-22-