United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Corrected on 4/26/07)
05-1546, -1579
INTAMIN, LTD.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MAGNETAR TECHNOLOGIES, CORP.,
Defendant-Cross Appellant.
Ted S. Ward, Berke, Kent & Ward, LLP, of Los Angeles, California, argued for
plaintiff-appellant.
John B. Sganga, Jr., Attorney, Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, LLP, of Irvine,
California, argued for defendant-cross appellant. With him on the brief were Joseph S.
Cianfrani and Christopher L. Ross.
Appealed from: United States District Court for the Central District of California
Judge Gary A. Feess
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
05-1546, -1579
INTAMIN LTD.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MAGNETAR TECHNOLOGIES, CORP.,
Defendant-Cross Appellant.
___________________________
DECIDED: April 18, 2007
___________________________
Before RADER, Circuit Judge, PLAGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and PROST, Circuit
Judge.
RADER, Circuit Judge.
On summary judgment, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California ruled that Magnetar Technologies, Corp. (Magnetar) does not infringe
Intamin, Ltd.'s (Intamin's) U.S. Patent No. 6,062,350 (the '350 patent). Intamin appeals
that ruling. Magnetar appeals the district court's order vacating a previous award of
Rule 11 sanctions. Upon consideration of the claim terms on appeal, this court vacates
part of the district court's claim construction and remands. This court also affirms the
district court's decision to vacate the Rule 11 sanctions.
I
The '350 patent, entitled "Braking System for an Amusement Device," discloses a
magnetic braking system for amusement park rides such as drop towers and roller
coasters. Magnetic brakes create "eddy currents" when a conductor passes through a
gap between two sets of magnets. These eddy currents, in turn, create a magnetic
friction that slows and stops the car attached to the conductor. The '350 patent
describes specific arrangements for the conductor and the magnets. Figure 6 of the
'350 patent illustrates a configuration with the adjacent magnets of opposite polarity in
direct contact. The '350 specification states that ''[a]ccording to Fig. 6, the polarity of the
magnet elements (8) are reversed along the direction of the carrying rail." '350 patent
col.4 ll.22-23.
Figures 7 and 8 of the '350 patent show gaps between magnet elements that are
filled with spacers or "intermediaries."
In one embodiment in the specification, the intermediary is non-magnetic. '350
patent col.4 ll.15-18.
05-1546, -1579 2
Magnetar sells a magnetic braking system under the name "Soft Stop” brakes.
Magnetar's brakes contain magnets arranged as a "Halbach array." A "Halbach array"
rotates the polarities of adjacent magnets by 90 degrees, rather than by 180 degrees as
in Figure 6 of the '350 patent. By configuring the magnets in a Halbach array
arrangement, Magnetar's brake creates a one-sided flux, meaning the configuration
concentrates the magnetic force on one side of a magnet while nearly canceling out the
magnetic force of the other side of a magnet. For example, the one-sided flux of a
Halbach array is the technology behind a refrigerator magnet that sticks on only one
side.
Magnetar joins the magnets into rows with epoxy, with one magnet abutting
another, and places these rows of magnets into metal tubes. Then Magnetar attaches
these magnetized tubes to the track. A conductive rail, or fin, is attached to the
movable passenger car. Magnetar's president allegedly offered to sell Magnetar's
brakes in a configuration with the fin on the track and the magnets on the passenger
cars.
Intamin sued Magnetar alleging that the Soft Stop brakes infringe claim 1 of the
'350 patent. Claim 1 of the '350 patent reads:
A braking device for use with an amusement apparatus having a fixed device
part, at least one running rail secured to the fixed device part, and a movable
device part including at least one traveling gear configured for movement along
the at least one running rail, the braking device comprising:
an eddy current brake assembly including:
a conducting part having at least one conductive rail configured for
attachment to the fixed device part, said at least one conductive rail
being adapted to extend the length of the fixed device part;
an energizing portion having at least one yoke aligned in correspondence
with each said at least one conductive rails, each said yokes
including a pair of yoke arms for receiving said at least one
conductive rail therebetween;
05-1546, -1579 3
at least one pair of carrying rails extending a predetermined distance
along the direction of said at least one conductive rail, each said
carrying rails being mounted on corresponding yoke arms of said
plurality of yokes;
a plurality of magnet elements mounted on each of said carrying rails with
alternating polarities, said plurality of magnet elements being
further arranged such that the poles of magnet elements mounted
on one carrying rail have opposite polarities from the poles of
magnet elements mounted on a corresponding carrying rail of said
at least one pair of carrying rails; and
an intermediary disposed between adjacent pairs of said plurality of
magnet elements;
wherein:
an interferric gap is defined between each said yoke arms and the at least
one conductive rail, and
movement of the movable device part, relative in the fixed device part,
induces eddy currents that create a magnetic brake force between
said conducting part and said energizing part.
'350 patent col.8 ll.29-65.
Seeking summary judgment of non-infringement, Magnetar asserted that its
brakes did not infringe this claim because they did not include an "intermediary,"
because they were not "attached to the fixed device part," and because they did not
include a "conductive rail" "adapted to extend the length of the fixed device part." The
district court agreed that Magnetar's brakes did not contain an intermediary. Intamin,
Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs. Corp., SA CV 04-511-GLT, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25,
2005) (Initial Decision). The district court further found that Magnetar's brakes could not
infringe, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, the limitation requiring
attachment to the fixed device part. Id. at 8-10. Finally, the district court also
determined that Magnetar's Soft Stop brakes did not infringe literally a limitation
requiring the conductive rail to "extend the length of the fixed device part." Id. at 10-12.
The district court opined that Magnetar's Soft Stop brakes may infringe this limitation
under the doctrine of equivalents but did not reach that issue because the absence of
05-1546, -1579 4
other limitations already showed that Magnetar's brakes did not infringe the '350 patent.
Id. at 12-13. Thus the district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement. Id.
Magnetar also alleged that Intamin's complaint violated Rule 11(b). Magnetar
argued that Intamin filed its complaint as retaliation for Magnetar's president's public
criticism of Intamin's brakes. Magnetar also argued that Intamin's complaint was
frivolous. Intamin responded that its law suit was not retaliatory and was adequately
supported by pre-filing investigations. Initially, the district court granted Rule 11
sanctions. Id. at 13-16. Upon reconsideration, the district court affirmed its finding that
Intamin filed the complaint for an improper purpose but vacated its decision that
Intamin's pre-filing investigation was frivolous. Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs. Corp.,
SA CV 04-511-GLT, slip op. at 6-7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2005) (Reconsideration
Decision). Magnetar then moved for attorneys' fees. Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs.
Corp., SA CV 04-511-GLT, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2005) (Fee Decision). In
opposition to Magnetar's motion for attorneys' fees, Intamin argued that, under Ninth
Circuit law, a meritorious (non-frivolous) complaint cannot have an improper purpose.
Id. As such, Intamin argued that the district court could no longer award sanctions. Id.
The district court agreed and vacated its sanctions. Id. at 2-3.
As noted, the district court found on summary judgment that Magnetar's accused
brake system did not infringe Intamin's patent. Initial Decision, slip op. at 7. Intamin
petitioned for reconsideration of the court's finding of non-infringement. The district
court affirmed its finding of non-infringement. Reconsideration Decision, slip op. at 8.
Intamin appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment of non-infringement.
Magnetar cross-appeals the district court's decision to vacate the Rule 11 sanctions.
05-1546, -1579 5
II
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment without deference. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1998). On
appeal, the parties dispute the district court's construction of the claim limitation
requiring "an intermediary disposed between adjacent pairs of said plurality of
magnets." The parties also dispute the district court's claim construction of a second
limitation found in claim 1 of the '350 patent: "said at least one conductive rail being
adapted to extend the length of the fixed device part." Like summary judgment itself,
this court reviews claim construction without deference. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed.Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Regarding the limitation requiring an "intermediary," the dispute rests on whether
the intermediary between adjacent pairs of magnets can itself be a magnet. The use of
the word "said" in a claim refers to an earlier use of the term in the claim. See Bell
Commc’n Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’n Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 621 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Here, the claim proceeds from the following definition: "a plurality of magnet elements
mounted on each of said carrying rails with alternating polarities, said plurality of
magnet elements being further arranged such that the poles of magnet elements
mounted on one carrying rail have opposite polarities from the poles of magnetic
elements mounted on a corresponding carrying rail of said at least one pair of carrying
rails." '350 patent col.8 ll.49-55. Thus, according to claim 1, the magnets surrounding
the intermediary have at least "alternating" polarities.
Intamin argues that adjacent pairs of magnets with alternating polarities must
mean two magnets on the same rail with opposite polarity, as shown in Figure 6 of the
05-1546, -1579 6
'350 patent. Thus, according to Intamin, anything between the magnets of opposite
polarity is an intermediary, whether magnetic or not. Magnetar argues that "adjacent
pairs of magnets" means any two magnets next to each other or abutting each other on
the rail, as shown in Figure 6. Further, according to Magnetar, the term "alternating"
does not require that such magnets have opposite polarity as shown in Figure 6. Thus,
because adjacent magnets are any two magnets abutting each other on a single rail,
Magnetar argues that another magnet cannot be an intermediary. Under its
interpretation, Magnetar's Soft Stop brakes would not infringe claim 1 because they lack
an intermediary.
The district court construed the term "intermediary" without determining the
meaning of "adjacent magnets with alternating polarities." The parties disagree
therefore about the meaning the district court actually gave to the term "intermediary."
Intamin argues that the district court determined that the intermediary could not be
magnetic, thus precluding infringement. Magnetar disagrees that the district court made
such a determination.
In any event, the parties agree that this court cannot interpret "intermediary"
without addressing the polarities of the adjacent magnets. Specifically, an intermediary
cannot be another magnet if this court construes "adjacent pairs of magnets" as two
magnets abutting each other with polarities that alternate at some degree such as found
in a Halbach array. In other words, an intermediary can only be a magnet if the
limitation "alternating polarities" means "opposite polarities." Under that interpretation,
some magnets become "adjacent pairs" and other magnets in between become
"intermediaries." In addition, "adjacent pairs of magnets" with opposite polarities, as in
05-1546, -1579 7
Figure 6, would need some separation. 1 Intamin argues that another magnet can
provide this separation.
The district court adopted Magnetar's proposed claim construction: "In short,
ordinary meaning supports Defendant's construction, and neither the specification nor
the prosecution history changes the ordinary meaning." Initial Decision, slip op. at 4.
On its face, the district court construed the term "intermediary" to mean "a member
between others." Id. at 3-4. In reaching that conclusion, the district court dismissed
Intamin's proposed claim construction that the intermediary can be a magnet between
two other magnets. Id. In fact, the trial court specifically points to language in the
patent that the intermediary is non-magnetic. Id. Thus, the district court apparently
construed the term "intermediary" to mean something non-magnetic between the
adjacent magnets.
The first step in an infringement analysis is the determination of the scope of the
claims. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). This court construes claims according to the principles set
forth by this court in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
As such, the court consults primarily the claims themselves in context, with much of that
context supplied by the specification and the prosecution history. Id. at 1312.
1
At oral argument, Intamin's counsel, in response to a question regarding
the meaning of and the necessity for an "intermediary," stated that "the intermediary
serves the purpose to provide spacing and support for the magnets of the magnet
elements which are the magnets of alternating polarity [because] for physics reasons
there has to be spacing between those two magnets of alternating polarities and also
the magnets are so strong that if there in not something in between they tend to spin
into a new location." Thus, whether another magnet can be an intermediary may
depend on whether it can serve as a spacing and support element. Arguably, none of
Magnetar's magnets are used as spacing and support elements; rather, all are
necessary to create the one-sided flux of the Halbach array.
05-1546, -1579 8
In this case, the claim language itself does not require a non-magnetic
"intermediary." Just as in the Phillips case itself, the claim uses a broad term with an
understandable meaning. As the district court noted, the term "intermediary" standing
alone means a "member between others." Initial Decision, slip op. 4. This term takes
on additional meaning, however, in the context of magnetized members. The context of
the rest of the patent helps show that additional meaning, namely whether the
intermediary may be magnetic.
In Phillips, this court noted that dependent claims can supply additional context
for construing the scope of the independent claims associated with those dependent
claims. 415 F.3d at 1314. An independent claim impliedly embraces more subject
matter than its narrower dependent claim. In this case, dependent claim 2 modifies the
term "intermediary." Claim 2 of the '350 patent discloses "[t]he braking device of claim 1
wherein said intermediary is non-magnetic." This dependent claim shows both that the
claim drafter perceived a distinction between magnetic and non-magnetic intermediaries
and that independent claim 1 impliedly embraced non-magnetic intermediaries. See
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys. Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1123 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
The district court initially did not consider the context supplied by claim
differentiation because Intamin did not raise this argument until reconsideration.
Reconsideration Decision, slip op. at 2. Even without the enlightenment supplied by
claim differentiation, however, the overall context of claim 1 does not limit the broad
language to non-magnetic intermediaries. At one point, the '350 patent describes an
embodiment of the invention with a "non-magnetic" intermediary. '350 patent col.4 ll.16-
05-1546, -1579 9
18. The district court seized on this disclosure to limit the term "intermediary" to non-
magnetic substances only. Initial Decision, slip op. at 4. As this court has repeatedly
noted, see SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Electric Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (plurality opinion), a narrow disclosure in the specification does not
necessarily limit broader claim language. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. The overall
context of the patent, in this case, does not specifically disavow magnetic
intermediaries. See e.g., SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems
Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The single reference does not expressly
limit the entire invention but only describes a single embodiment. Moreover, the term
"intermediary," like the term "baffle" in Phillips, embraces more than the limited
specification disclosure.
Thus, this court finds that the term "intermediary" can embrace magnetic
substances, albeit only if the additional term requirement of "alternating polarity" allows
for it. Accordingly, this court vacates the district court's construction of this term.
However, this court has not reached an additional question on which the trial court has
yet to provide a decision for review. Specifically this court remands to permit the district
court to determine whether the patent limits the term "adjacent magnets of alternating
polarity" to magnets of opposite polarity. With the understanding that an "intermediary"
may be magnetic, the trial court may revisit its finding of non-infringement.
The district court also construed the limitation of a "conductive rail being adapted
to extend the length of the fixed device part" to mean the conductive rail must run the
end length of the track to which it is attached. Initial Decision, slip op. at 10.
Specifically, the district court construed the term "length" to mean "extent from end to
05-1546, -1579 10
end—distinguished from width." Id. In other words, the district court applied the
ordinary meaning to the term "length" and found that the plain meaning of the term
referred to the full length of the fixed device part. Id. at 12. In the patent’s roller coaster
embodiment, this limitation would require the conductive rail to extend the entire length
of the roller coaster.
In the claim, the "fixed device part" refers to the framework of the amusement
device, i.e., the track for the roller coaster or tower drop. The "conductive rail" refers to
a metal rail, part of which will have a conductive coating. The rail and the coating make
up the conductive part. This "conductive part," in turn, passes through the array of
magnets to generate the braking force or vice versa, depending on the configuration.
This court must determine the meaning of "length" as a reference to the full length of the
fixed device part, as the district court construed, or to the direction or orientation of the
conductive rail.
The claim language uses the term "length" in the context of a longer phrase:
"adapted to extend the length of the fixed device part." The verb "extend" already
suggests that the "length" reaches from one end to another. Moreover, the term
"length" imparts information about the "fixed device part," once again suggesting that
the "length" will encompass the entire dimensions of that structure. In sum, the claim
term "length" in context in the claim encompasses the full length of the fixed device part,
as the district court correctly discerned.
The district court further recognized that the specification nowhere uses "length"
to refer to direction or orientation. Initial Decision, slip op. at 11-12. Rather, the district
court found correctly that the term referred to the entire length of the fixed device part.
05-1546, -1579 11
Id. at 12. The patent specification uses "length" consistent with its meaning as a
distance, rather than merely a direction. Thus, the context supplied by the specification
underscores the meaning of claim 1 of the '350 patent that expressly states that the
conductive rail extends the length of the fixed device part.
For example, the '350 patent uses the term "length" to discuss the braking
distance. '350 patent col.2 l.13; col.4 l.66. It also uses the term to refer specifically to
the length of the magnetic elements. '350 patent col.5 ll.32, 34, 41-42. Both uses of
"length" consistently refer to distance or dimension, quantitative applications of the term
"length." In comparison, when the '350 patent references a direction as opposed to a
distance, it uses language such as "along drop directions." '350 patent col.3 ll.36-38
("Both the energizing and conducting parts (5,6) are designed in the form of a rail and
stretch along the drop directions.").
Intamin argues that the intrinsic evidence supports its proposed claim
construction because when the inventors were trying to convey an entire distance, they
used a modifier such as "whole height." '350 patent, col.7 ll.37-40; col.4 ll.31-34. While
Intamin argues that no modifier requires the length to extend the entire length of the
fixed device part, the flip side of this argument also applies: no modifier instructs one
skilled in the art to interpret the phrase as extending to only part of the fixed device.
Thus, the context and word choice of the claim language itself establishes that "extend
the length" means the length of the fixed device part. In other words, the intrinsic
evidence confirms the meaning conveyed by the claim language.
Intamin argues that this interpretation would not permit the claim to read on
embodiments of the invention specifically mentioned in the patent specification. For
05-1546, -1579 12
example, the patent discloses a roller coaster-type embodiment where the passenger
car or movable device houses the conductive part. Under the proper claim construction
with the conducting rail extending the length of the fixed device, the claim may well not
cover this embodiment. Nonetheless, this court has acknowledged that a claim need
not cover all embodiments. See Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247
F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001)("We conclude that only those embodiments involving
communications established by the host processor meet the functional requirement of
the claim."); see also Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 875
(Fed. Cir. 1998). A patentee may draft different claims to cover different embodiments.
In addition, Intamin argues that the proper claim interpretation would render
another claim, dependent claim 10, invalid. Dependent claim 10 addresses the
embodiment where the conductive portion is connected to the movable device. With
claim 1 specifying that the conductive rail extends the length of the fixed device,
dependent claim 10 may well be improper. Thus, Intamin urges this court to construe
claim 1 to retain the validity of claim 10. Under the proper construction of claim 1,
dependent claim 10 erases entirely a limitation of the fixed device part and is thus an
improper dependent claim. Of course, dependent claim 10 has that effect under any
reading of "length" in claim 1. Because claim 1 requires the conductive portion to reach
the length of the fixed device part and claim 10 places the conductive portion on the
passenger car, claim 10 is an improper dependent claim. Thus, construing claim 1 to
mean end to end length does not in itself render claim 10 invalid. In any event, the
05-1546, -1579 13
claim construction of claim 10 is not before this court. Thus, this court considers but
gives no weight to Intamin's argument relative to claim 10.
Given this construction, the district court initially determined that Magnetar's Soft
Stop brakes did not infringe because they placed the conducting rail on the passenger
car. Initial Decision, slip op. 12. The district court determined it could not find on
summary judgment that Magnetar's brakes would not infringe this limitation under the
doctrine of equivalents. Id. However, the district court granted summary judgment to
Magnetar because it determined that Magnetar did not contain an intermediary. Id. at
13. Intamin requested reconsideration and the district court determined that there was
a triable issue as to whether Magnetar's brake system can be configured such that the
conducting rail was attached to the track. Reconsideration Decision, slip op. at 4.
Thus, this court remands to the district court for a determination of whether Magnetar's
brakes would infringe this limitation, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 2
III
Magnetar cross appeals the district court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions against
Intamin. Fee Decision, slip op. at 2-3. This court reviews a district court's decision
regarding Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). Further, this court applies the law of the regional
circuit in its review, Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 274 F.3d 1066, 1072 (Fed.
Cir. 2002), which in this case is the Ninth Circuit.
2
The parties in this appeal discuss additional claim limitations that were not
construed by the district court. This court encourages the district court to consider all of
the limitations of claim 1 of the '350 patent on remand.
05-1546, -1579 14
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty on attorneys to
certify by their signature that the pleading or motion is well-grounded in fact, has a basis
in law, and is not filed for an improper purpose. View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys.,
208 F.3d 981, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Under Ninth Circuit law, "sanctions must be
imposed on the signer of a paper if either a) the paper is filed for an improper purpose,
or b) the paper is 'frivolous.'" Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358,
1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc). With regard to complaints, the Ninth Circuit law finds
that "complaints are not filed for an improper purpose if they are non-frivolous." Id. at
1362. Finally, "[t]he Ninth Circuit defines a 'frivolous' claim or pleading for Rule 11
purposes as one that is 'legally or factually "baseless" from an objective perspective . . .
[and made without] a reasonable and competent inquiry.'" Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew
Jergens Comp., 360 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Christian v. Mattel, Inc.,
286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)).
On appeal, Magnetar argues that Intamin did not conduct a good faith
investigation of Magnetar's Soft Stop brakes before filing its complaint. This court must
therefore determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it found upon
reconsideration that Intamin had conducted a reasonable and competent inquiry at the
time it filed its infringement complaint.
Magnetar argues on appeal that Intamin's pre-filing investigation was insufficient
because it did not obtain and physically cut open the metal casing on the magnets in
Magnetar's brake system. The record shows that Magnetar's system encased the
magnets in metal tubes. Accordingly, a visual inspection would not disclose the
orientation of the magnets within the tubes. In Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780,
05-1546, -1579 15
784 (Fed. Cir. 1997), this court held that the district court abused its discretion in not
granting Rule 11 sanctions against a patentee who failed to obtain a sample of the
product as part of its pre-filing investigation. However, Judin did not create a blanket
rule that a patentee must obtain and thoroughly deconstruct a sample of a defendant's
product to avoid violating Rule 11. Rather, in Judin, the patentee could have easily
obtained a sample of the accused device (a bar code scanner) for a nominal price from
the post office. In this case, the technology presented the patentee with unreasonable
obstacles to any effort to obtain a sample of Magnetar's amusement ride brake system,
let alone the difficulty of opening the casing.
In lieu of cutting open the casing, Intamin might have tested a Magnetar device
for magnetic polarities. In Q-Pharma, however, this court did not impose on a patentee
a Rule 11 obligation to perform a simple chemical test on a sample to determine its
composition. 360 F.3d at 1302. Instead, this court found that the patentee satisfied its
Rule 11 obligations with other reasonable pre-filing inquiries. Id. Here, the district court
determined: "In light of the other information [Intamin] had at the time of filing . . . [its]
pre-filing inquiry was reasonable." Reconsideration Decision, slip op. at 7. In particular,
the district court noted that Intamin "evaluated the patent portfolio, analyzed the patent's
validity, determined the scope of the patent's claims, and performed an infringement
analysis." Id. The district court further determined that Intamin "reviewed publicly
available documents on [Magnetar's] brakes, inspected [Magnetar's] brakes as installed
on a roller coaster, took photos of the brakes, and reviewed the brakes with experts."
Id. Thus the district court determined that Intamin's pre-filing inquiry was reasonable
05-1546, -1579 16
under the circumstances. Id. This court discerns no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s determination.
IV
In conclusion, this court vacates part of the district court's claim construction as
discussed above and remands the decision of non-infringement for further
consideration. Finding no abuse of discretion, this court affirms the district court's
decision to vacate its previous finding of Rule 11 sanctions.
COSTS
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, and REMANDED
05-1546, -1579 17
Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Technologies, Corp. [Corrected Cover Sheet on 04/26/07]
Court: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date filed: 2007-04-18
Citations: 483 F.3d 1328
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion