By the Court.
delivering the opinion.
[1.] We think the Court erred in admitting®the testimony that Dr. Maddox manifested surprise on being informed, that in Charleston he was regarded as a member of this
[2.] We. think the Court erred also, in charging the jury that circumstances could not outweigh direct testimony. Direct or positive testimony might come from a very unrer liable person, or coming from a source of great respectability might yet break down under the weight of its own absurdity. It is impossible, therefore, to fix any uniform value upon direct or positive testimony as such. It is equally impossible to fix a uniform value upon circumstantial evidence as such. In many cases the one justly outweighs the other, while iis many others the preponderance is precisely reversed. But strictly speaking, the evidence on both sides of this case was only circumstantial. The testimony that Dr. Maddox sold out, for instance, is only a circumstance raising an improbability that he was again immediately connected with the firm. No witness could know that he was not a member of the firm, except the members of the firm themselves. All other people are necessarily left only to infer it, if they get to that conclusion at all.
[3.] We think the Court was right in holding, that persons who are mere apparent partners as distinguished from actual partners, are responsible as such, only to those who have acted on the faith that the appearance was according
Ju dgmen t reversed'.