delivered the opinion of the court. The objection to reading the deed in evidence was, that the master in chancery had not stated in his certificate of proof, that he knew the witness making the proof to be the subscribing witness to the deed. The act requires, (1 N. R. L. 369.) that the officer, taking the proof of a deed, must know the person making the proof, or have satisfactory evidence that he is a subscribing witness to the deed. In this case the master did not know the witness, but we are to intend that the certificate states that he had satisfactory evidence that he was the subscribing witness. The objection at the trial, that no deed could be proved, unless the officer taking the proof personally knew the subscribing witness, is clearly unfounded.
The rule of court, authenticated by the clerk, was unobjectionable evidence to prove the fact that Harrow had been admitted a co-defendant. I perceive no objection to the admission of the affidavits. The originals were on file, and the copies offered in evidence, as between Harrow and the plaintiff were authenticated by Harrow himself. He served them as true copies on the plaintiff’s attorney, and cannot be listened to, in saying they are not true copies of the affidavits on which the motion was made, and the rule granted; the y were equivalent to office copies.
Motion denied.