United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1342
CHARLES JAYNES,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
LISA MITCHELL,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Souter, Associate Justice,*
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Christine DeMaso, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with
whom Federal Public Defender Office was on brief, for appellant.
Susanne Reardon, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Maura
Healey, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on brief, for
appellee.
June 2, 2016
* Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
SOUTER, Associate Justice. Charles Jaynes appeals the
district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition, filed
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. None of Jaynes's five claims entitles him
to habeas relief, and we affirm.
I
In the summer of 1997, Jaynes, an adult man, befriended
Jeffrey Curley, a ten-year-old boy, whom Jaynes often saw in his
Massachusetts neighborhood. Jaynes drove a Cadillac and several
times took Curley for rides without his parents' knowledge. At
one point, Jaynes bought a bicycle and promised to give it to
Curley. Jaynes's object in gaining Curley's confidence was to
engage him in sexual acts. If Curley refused, Jaynes told a
friend, he would be taken care of.
On October 1, Jaynes, along with Salvatore Sicari,
another adult, picked Curley up in the Cadillac as the boy was
walking his dog. Later that day and evening, the men bought
gasoline, duct tape, a large plastic container, lime, and concrete,
and traveled to an apartment that Jaynes rented in Manchester, New
Hampshire, where they spent the night. Early in the morning of
October 2, the Cadillac was seen parked at the Great Works River
Bridge in South Berwick, Maine, near the New Hampshire border.
That evening, Jaynes was arrested at a Massachusetts car
dealership where he worked. While he was at the police station,
the police impounded the Cadillac, which had been left parked on
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a public street near the dealership, and made an inventory search
that yielded a driver's license with a picture of Jaynes (but a
different name) and a Manchester address; two rolls of duct tape;
and receipts for a bike, a plastic container, lime, and concrete.
Under police questioning, Jaynes admitted that he
befriended Curley and drove him around without his parents'
permission. He also said that on the evening of October 1 he and
Sicari drove to New Hampshire. On October 3, following a
confession by Sicari that implicated Jaynes, police conducted a
warranted search of Jaynes's New Hampshire apartment and found
lime, a label from the plastic container, and Curley's jersey
smelling of gasoline. Jaynes's fingerprint appeared on a broken
spoon that had been used to mix concrete.
A few days later, Curley's body, along with bits of
concrete and lime, was discovered in the Great Works River, inside
a plastic container sealed with duct tape. An autopsy revealed
that the cause of death was poisoning from inhaled gasoline,
redness and swelling on the boy's face and upper body indicating
that a gasoline-soaked rag had been held over his nose and mouth.
Jaynes was convicted by a Massachusetts jury of
kidnapping and second-degree murder, and he brought a consolidated
appeal from the convictions and the denial of a new-trial motion.
He claimed among other things that the trial court erred in failing
to instruct the jury that the murder charge required the
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Commonwealth to prove that harm preceding death (not just the
separately charged abduction) occurred in Massachusetts, and in
briefly closing the courtroom to the public, although not to Jaynes
or his counsel, during parts of jury voir dire. The Massachusetts
Appeals Court (MAC) affirmed, Commonwealth v. Jaynes (Jaynes I),
770 N.E.2d 483 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002), and the Supreme Judicial
Court (SJC) denied Jaynes's application for leave to obtain further
appellate review (ALOFAR).
Jaynes later filed a second motion for a new trial, which
the trial court also denied. On appeal, Jaynes argued that
inflammatory evidence of his sexual preferences was improperly
admitted, evidence from the searches of his car and apartment
should have been excluded, his trial counsel was ineffective, and
his appellate counsel was, too. Again, the MAC affirmed,
Commonwealth v. Jaynes (Jaynes II), 929 N.E.2d 1001 (table), 2010
WL 2813572 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010), and again the SJC denied Jaynes's
ALOFAR.
Jaynes then came to federal court with this petition for
relief on habeas corpus raising the claims just mentioned. The
district court dismissed the petition and granted a certificate of
appealability.
II
"We review the district court's decision to deny habeas
relief de novo." Scott v. Gelb, 810 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2016).
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Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), habeas relief
shall not be granted with respect to any claim
that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of
the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
"If the relevant claim has not been adjudicated on the merits in
state court, we review that claim de novo." Kirwan v. Spencer,
631 F.3d 582, 586 (1st Cir. 2011).
A
Jaynes first claims a violation of his federal due
process right recognized in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970), to require a jury finding subject to the reasonable doubt
standard on every element of the crime. He cites the trial court's
failure to deliver what he calls a "jurisdiction instruction,"
that the Commonwealth had to prove that Curley's death resulted
from injury or violence that occurred in Massachusetts. This
issue, however, is not properly before us, for Jaynes failed to
exhaust his claim in the state courts.
Under AEDPA, with exceptions not at issue here, a habeas
petitioner must "exhaust[] the remedies available in the courts of
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the State" before seeking relief on a given claim in federal court.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d
279, 294 (1st Cir. 2014). This means that "a petitioner must have
tendered his federal claim in such a way as to make it probable
that a reasonable jurist would have been alerted to the existence
of the federal question." Sanchez, 753 F.3d at 294 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We have identified several ways in which a
petitioner may satisfy this requirement,
including reliance on a specific provision of
the Constitution, substantive and conspicuous
presentation of a federal constitutional
claim, on-point citation to federal
constitutional precedents, identification of
a particular right specifically guaranteed by
the Constitution, and assertion of a state-
law claim that is functionally identical to a
federal constitutional claim. In addition,
citations to state court decisions which rely
on federal law or articulation of a state
claim that is, as a practical matter,
indistinguishable from one arising under
federal law may suffice to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement. The exhaustion
requirement is not satisfied, though, if a
petitioner has simply recited the facts
underlying a state claim, where those facts
might support either a federal or state claim.
Id. (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Although Jaynes's first ALOFAR to the SJC claimed error
in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on causation by
violence or injury in Massachusetts, it failed to raise a federal
due process issue. The ALOFAR did not rely on a federal
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constitutional provision, conspicuously present a constitutional
claim, cite constitutional precedents, or identify a
constitutional right. Jaynes argues the contrary by noting that,
at one point, the ALOFAR stated that an allegedly erroneous
manslaughter instruction violated Jaynes's due process right, and
at a subsequent point said that clarification of the jurisdictional
issue was "[s]imilarly" necessary. The word "[s]imilarly," Jaynes
says, sufficiently indicated that he was raising a jurisdictional
issue under the national Constitution. A look at his pleading,
however, shows that the most patent problem with this argument is
that the word "similarly" does not directly follow the ALOFAR's
invocation of constitutional rights. Instead, it appears after a
discussion of a different point on which Jaynes sought
clarification of state law.
Nor did the ALOFAR assert even a state-law claim
functionally identical to one under the federal Constitution, or
cite state court decisions resting on federal law. Rather, the
ALOFAR framed the issue as whether kidnapping by inveigling
constituted the "inflict[ion]" of "violence or injury" for
purposes of a Massachusetts venue statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
277, § 62. This is a straightforward question of state statutory
construction, not a functional allusion to Fourteenth Amendment
due process.
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The answer is the same to Jaynes's fallback argument
that the ALOFAR is at least ambiguous with respect to a
constitutional assertion, so that we may consult "backdrop"
materials filed in the lower courts that reveal a federal claim.
As we have said before, however, the "backdrop" approach has itself
become problematical after Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004),
see e.g., Janosky v. St. Amand, 594 F.3d 39, 51 n.4 (1st Cir.
2010), but here it is enough to point out that Jaynes's very
premise in raising it is faulty. As we said, the ALOFAR is not,
in fact, ambiguous about raising a constitutional claim. It
unambiguously does not.1
We add that the failure to exhaust does not appear to
have cost Jaynes any relief on habeas even on his own theory that
a jurisdictional issue should have gone to the jury in this case.
The MAC took the following facts to have been "establish[ed]
indisputably":
[T]he kidnapping of the ten year old victim
began shortly after 3:00 p.m. near his home in
Cambridge. The evidence included testimony
from various witnesses who saw the defendant
and Sicari after 3:15 p.m. in Massachusetts
but did not see the victim. A receipt showed
a purchase of gasoline at 3:37 p.m. in Newton
on the defendant's father's credit card, later
found in possession of the defendant. There
Jaynes requests that, if we find his due process claim
1
unexhausted (as we do), we remand to the district court to allow
him to dismiss the claim, so that the exhausted claims may proceed.
Such a remand is unnecessary given that we affirm the district
court's denial of the claims that Jaynes has exhausted.
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was testimony that the defendant was observed
at approximately 4:46 p.m. in Newton, agitated
and smelling of gasoline; the victim died from
gasoline inhalation. The defendant showed up
with Sicari for work in Newton sometime
between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., again without the
victim in sight. Other receipts showed a
purchase at 9:04 p.m. in Watertown of a large
plastic container subsequently used to dispose
of the victim's body, and the purchase at
approximately 10:20 p.m. in Somerville of a
fifty pound bag of concrete. Concrete was
found on the victim and in the container sunk
in the river in Maine. The defendant and
Sicari also bought "No-Doz" and cigars at
10:38 p.m. in Somerville. The medical
examiner testified that the contents of the
victim's stomach indicated a time of death
before 10:30 p.m.
Jaynes I, 770 N.E.2d at 490. Nothing in Jaynes's briefs suggests
that these findings would be subject to disturbance under the
deferential AEDPA review, and they would clearly have met any need
to satisfy the jury that fatal "violence or injury" occurred in
Massachusetts, even on a narrow reading of the state statute.
B
Jaynes's second claim is that his constitutional right
to a public trial was violated by brief courtroom closures during
voir dire. Before trial, he requested that potential jurors be
questioned about prior sexual abuse, attitudes toward
homosexuality, and any racial biases. The trial judge informed
the venire that she would be asking such questions and that, if
any such question raised a legitimate privacy concern, the
courtroom could be closed for that enquiry and response. Jaynes
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did not object when the judge announced this plan to the venire or
when she discussed it with the parties in advance of jury
selection. Accordingly, the judge closed the courtroom only when
a potential juror requested it, and only during the discussion of
the private matter as raised in the question to that individual.
The MAC rejected Jaynes's subsequent courtroom closure
claim:
[The trial judge's] solution to the problem
[was] narrowly tailored: she allowed the
courtroom to be closed in response only to
specific requests made by potential jurors to
protect their privacy, and only during the
discussion of private matters; she immediately
reopened the courtroom for any additional
questioning of each of the potential jurors
once questioning on the private matters was
completed. She also adequately articulated
the basis for the brief closures in order to
permit meaningful appellate review.
Id. at 492. Despite Jaynes's protest to the contrary, the MAC's
decision is not an unreasonable application of Waller v. Georgia,
467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), according to which, "the party seeking to
close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is
likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than
necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must
make findings adequate to support the closure."
Jaynes's argument comprises three particular objections,
the first being that the trial court closed the courtroom sua
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sponte rather than at the request of a party. But this is not an
accurate description. On the verge of engaging in direct,
individual questioning of the potential jurors, the judge
recognized that honest answers on the subjects in issue might well
embarrass or shame the person being examined. She therefore
offered to close the courtroom temporarily to minimize the audience
for a disclosure the individual found threatening. But she did
not close the room sua sponte; she did so only when a person to be
questioned requested it in anticipation of a response that could
well be personally awkward. To be sure, a prospective juror is
not a "party" in the strict sense of the prosecution or defendant.
But it is a reasonable reading of Waller to include a potential
juror as eligible to make the request. Although in most instances
anticipation of a justification to close will be known by a named
party's counsel, who will raise the matter, in questioning for
juror qualification only the individual being examined will
normally know of a reason to seek discreet consideration and no
one else is able to ask for it. So, it is fair to read Waller
broadly enough to allow for a potential juror's request for
closure, and no clearly established federal law holds otherwise.
Jaynes also says that the trial court failed to consider
reasonable alternatives, but the MAC reasonably determined that
the judge's solution was narrowly tailored and noted that Jaynes
had not objected or suggested any alternative measures. If he had
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done so, the most obvious alternative would have been side-bar
questioning outside the hearing of courtroom spectators, and in
functional terms the limited closure ordered by the trial judge
was nothing more. See Wilder v. United States, 806 F.3d 653, 660
(1st Cir. 2015). Indeed, the practice employed here falls just
barely within the outer reaches of the procedure Waller was meant
to regulate.
Finally, Jaynes faults the trial court for failing to
articulate findings that specifically justified each closure. But
nothing in clearly established Supreme Court precedent requires
that, in circumstances like those before us, repeated findings be
made at a particular level of specificity, so long as an
individual's request plausibly falls within an announced category
of the embarrassing subjects deserving privacy. Here, the trial
judge noted in advance the subjects of questions that could fairly
prompt privacy concerns and raise the risk of dishonest answers,
and she closed the courtroom on request only when a question on
one of those limited topics was about to be addressed and the
individual questioned sought privacy. In practical terms,
requiring more could potentially have forced a public disclosure
to the effect that the objecting person had been sexually abused,
or was secretly a bigot, which would have defeated the whole
purpose of a limited, justifiable closure. Jaynes has cited no
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federal law at odds with the state courts' common sense in dealing
with the subject.
C
Jaynes's next point is that the introduction of evidence
of his pedophilia violated his due process right to a fair trial,
and he lists what he says were the trial court's erroneous
admissions of irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence: some
of his own personal writings with pedophilic expressions;
testimony about his comments on boys, including Curley, and his
illicit intentions toward them; testimony about his interest in
the North American Man Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) and in a
certain film showing a naked boy; and a statement by one witness
that Jaynes was a "pedophile."
The parties dispute whether the MAC decided this claim
on the merits, so as to call for deferential AEDPA review, but we
need not resolve this dispute, since Jaynes's claim fails even
when reviewed de novo.
We have said before that
[a]n erroneous evidentiary ruling that results
in a fundamentally unfair trial may constitute
a due process violation and thus provide a
basis for habeas relief. However, to give
rise to habeas relief, the state court's
application of state law must be so arbitrary
or capricious as to constitute an independent
due process violation. To be a constitutional
violation, a state evidentiary error must so
infuse the trial with inflammatory prejudice
that it renders a fair trial impossible.
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Lyons v. Brady, 666 F.3d 51, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations,
alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the high due process bar has not been cleared.
The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction that evidence
of prior bad acts or statements could be considered only for its
bearing on Jaynes's knowledge, motive, intent, or method if the
jurors found he had committed the act charged, and the judge
instantly instructed the jury to disregard the "pedophile"
comment. As so limited, the writings in evidence were relevant to
Jaynes's motive and intent, and defense counsel on cross-
examination and during summation was able to question their
probative value. The testimony indicating Jaynes's intentions
went to rebut his story that he would never act on his fantasies,
and the statements about Jaynes's interests in NAMBLA and the film
were limited to brief exchanges subject to the restrictive
instruction.
D
Jaynes turns from judicial rulings to the conduct of his
defense, in claiming ineffectiveness of his trial counsel for
failing to move to suppress certain evidence, to request a
jurisdiction instruction, and to object to the courtroom closure.
Ineffective-assistance claims are governed by
the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), under which
the defendant must prove two elements. First,
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the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient, which requires
showing that counsel's performance was not
only substandard, but also deficient in some
way sufficiently substantial to deny him
effective representation. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense, which
requires proof that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
Logan v. Gelb, 790 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
"[W]hen a federal court reviews an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim under § 2254, it must use a doubly
deferential standard of review that gives both the state court and
the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt. This is an
extremely difficult standard to meet . . . ." Pena v. Dickhaut,
736 F.3d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). "[T]he pivotal question in a federal collateral
attack under Strickland is not whether defense counsel's
performance fell below Strickland's standard, but whether the
state court's application of the Strickland standard was
unreasonable, that is, whether fairminded jurists would all agree
that the decision was unreasonable." Jewett v. Brady, 634 F.3d
67, 75 (1st Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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1
"[W]here the alleged ineffectiveness was the failure to
file a motion to suppress, in order to show prejudice the defendant
must prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that
there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been
different had the challenged evidence been excluded." United
States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, 787 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Jaynes contends that the impoundment of the car, with
its ensuing inventory search, was unconstitutional and that any
evidence so discovered was suppressible. Because evidence
discovered during that search was used to obtain warrants to search
the car a second time and to search the New Hampshire apartment,
he further argues that any evidence found during those searches
was also excludable. According to Jaynes, his trial counsel was
deficient for filing no motions to suppress this evidence.
The MAC decided that Jaynes suffered no prejudice from
want of a motion to suppress the evidence found inside the vehicle
because such a motion would not have succeeded:
[B]y the time the Cadillac had been towed, it
had been parked for at least three hours on a
street where only two hour parking was
permitted. The defendant, who was under
arrest, was unable to move the vehicle that
was now in violation of that parking
restriction and the record does not reveal
that anyone else had come forward to take
possession of the vehicle. In these
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circumstances, the police were permitted to
impound the vehicle.
Jaynes II, 2010 WL 2813572, at *4.
Jaynes invokes both paragraphs of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) in
contending that the MAC's adjudication (1) constitutes an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
regarding impoundments, and (2) is based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. To start with the latter, the thrust
of Jaynes's argument is that the car was not parked illegally
because, as a legal fact, the two-hour limit did not apply after
7pm: thus it could not have been impounded on the ground claimed.
But we have no need to enquire into this dispute because, even if
the car could not have been impounded for a parking violation, a
motion to suppress would almost certainly have been unsuccessful.
As the MAC recognized, the impoundment was supportable
on a basis unrelated to limits on parking duration: "Courts have
upheld the impoundment of a car from the lot associated with the
arrest location when accompanied by such circumstances as threats
of vandalism, parking restrictions, police liability concerns, or
the inability of the defendant or another later to move the car."
Id. at *3. Under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, police may "impound a vehicle for
noninvestigatory purposes when it is reasonable to do so (say, to
remove an impediment to traffic or to protect a vehicle from theft
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or vandalism)." United States v. Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1, 4 n.2 (1st
Cir. 2010). "Case law supports the view that where a driver is
arrested and there is no one immediately on hand to take
possession, the officials have a legitimate non-investigatory
reason for impounding the car." Vega-Encarnación v. Babilonia,
344 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2003). With Jaynes detained for an
indeterminate period at the police station, and with no one
immediately forthcoming to take possession, the police could
reasonably enough have concluded that the car, which,
incidentally, would have incurred a parking violation eventually,
needed to be moved.
Once a car is impounded, an inventory search follows as
a matter of course in prudent law enforcement practice, if for no
other reason than to make a record to protect the police against
a later claim that custodial negligence allowed the loss of
valuable personal property by theft or otherwise. See Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 n.1 (1996) ("An inventory search
is the search of property lawfully seized and detained, in order
to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such as
might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims
of loss or damage."). Such was the practice undisputedly followed
here. Hence, the doubly deferential standard of review is not
even required to sustain the MAC's conclusion that Jaynes could
show no deficiency of competence in trial counsel's failure to
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object to admitting the fruits of the inventory search, and the
Massachusetts courts did not unreasonably apply federal law.2
Jaynes also contends that even if the inventory search
had been legal there should have been a request to suppress the
evidence discovered in the apartment for an independent reason:
the "nexus element" was not satisfied in support of the warrant to
search there. "Prior to executing a search, police officers, with
some exceptions, must obtain a search warrant supported by probable
cause to believe that (1) a crime has been committed, and (2) that
enumerated evidence of the crime will be found at the place to be
searched--the so-called nexus element." United States v. Joubert,
778 F.3d 247, 251 (1st Cir. 2015) (alterations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
When evaluating the nexus between the object
and the location of the search, a magistrate
judge has to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit before him, there
is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. The application must give
someone of reasonable caution reason to
believe that evidence of a crime will be found
at the place to be searched. The government
does not need to show that the belief is
2 Our conclusion, that the MAC's adjudication of the
ineffective-assistance claim did not result in an unreasonable
application of federal law, forestalls Jaynes's assertion that the
federal district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 183 (2011)
("[W]hen the state-court record precludes habeas relief under the
limitations of § 2254(d), a district court is not required to hold
an evidentiary hearing." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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necessarily correct or more likely true than
false. . . . The reviewing court's duty is
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed.
Id. at 251-52 (citations, alterations, omissions, and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, there is no serious question about the state
court's finding of a substantial basis to infer nexus. The warrant
application included a police officer's attestation that Jaynes
said he had driven to New Hampshire with Sicari on the night of
October 1. The affidavit catalogued the items found in the car,
including the license with Jaynes's picture, apparently assumed
name, and the address of the New Hampshire apartment. Finally,
the officer represented that Sicari confessed to taking Curley's
body to Jaynes's New Hampshire apartment.
2
Jaynes contends that trial counsel was also ineffective
for failing to request a jurisdiction instruction and to object to
the courtroom closures. When faced with these ineffective-
assistance issues in Jaynes II, the MAC responded that the
underlying "claims have already been rejected by this court and
fare no better newly attired in the garb of ineffective assistance
of counsel." 2010 WL 2813572, at *4 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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That this determination was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of federal law is especially evident
under the doubly deferential standard of review. With respect to
the jurisdiction-instruction claim, the MAC disposed of it in
Jaynes I under state law, concluding, based on state statutes and
cases, that the trial judge did not err in keeping from the jury
the question of jurisdiction. 770 N.E.2d at 489-90. The MAC in
Jaynes II thus did not abrogate any principle of clearly
established federal law in failing to relitigate an issue on which
Jaynes had already had his opportunity, or (as our own discussion
of the relevant evidence indicates) in determining that Jaynes was
not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to request the jurisdiction
instruction. And as to the courtroom-closure claim, our prior
examination of it reveals that Jaynes could not show the requisite
prejudice, even assuming arguendo that his trial counsel was
deficient for failing to raise it.
E
Finally, Jaynes asserts that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise claims about ineffective
assistance of trial counsel and the admission of inflammatory
evidence. The MAC responded that Jaynes "has not shown how better
work [by appellate counsel] could have accomplished something
material for the defense." Jaynes II, 2010 WL 2813572, at *4. As
our own dispositions and discussions of the underlying claims
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indicate, this determination was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and
rested on no vulnerable finding of fact.
III
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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Jaynes v. Mitchell
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2016-06-02
Citations: 824 F.3d 187
Copy Citations