COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-09-00322-CV
JOHN RELIFORD APPELLANT
V.
BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY APPELLEE
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FROM THE 96TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
Appellant John Reliford appeals the judgment against him and in favor of
Appellee Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF). Reliford
contends in one issue that the trial court committed reversible error by submitting
an improper jury instruction, by omitting a separate jury instruction, and by
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
submitting the first two jury questions in reverse order. Because Reliford has not
challenged each independent ground supporting the trial court’s judgment, we
will affirm.
II. Background
On November 26, 2003, Reliford filed suit pursuant to the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA)2 against BNSF, seeking damages and
contending that his exposure to toxins at a BNSF plant caused his prostate
cancer. The case proceeded to trial in early August 2009, and the jury rendered
a verdict for BNSF. In rendering its verdict, the jury found that Reliford formed a
belief that his prostate cancer was caused by exposure to substances at the
BNSF plant by March 4, 1999, and that Reliford’s prostate cancer was not
proximately caused by exposure to arsenic at the BNSF plant. The trial court
signed the final judgment on August 24, 2009, and this appeal followed.
III. Discussion
―It is axiomatic that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s judgment
absent properly assigned error.‖ Pat Baker Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447,
450 (Tex. 1998). When the trial court’s judgment rests upon more than one
independent ground or defense, the aggrieved party must assign error to each
ground or the judgment will be affirmed on the ground to which no complaint is
2
See 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (2007).
2
made. Scott v. Galusha, 890 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ
denied).
Section 56 of FELA states, ―No action shall be maintained under this
chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action
accrued.‖ 45 U.S.C.A. § 56 (2007). A cause of action under FELA accrues for
limitations purposes when a claimant discovers both his injury and its underlying
cause. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 121–23, 100 S. Ct. 352, 359–60
(1979); Billman v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 825 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1992, writ denied). ―[I]t is not necessary the claimant know the defendant
is blameworthy.‖ Billman, 825 S.W.2d at 527 (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 121–23,
100 S. Ct. at 359–60).
Here, the jury found that Reliford formed a belief that his prostate cancer
was caused by exposure to substances at the BNSF plant by March 4, 1999, but
Reliford did not file this lawsuit until November 26, 2003, more than three years
after his cause of action accrued. Therefore, because this independent ground—
statute of limitations—supports the trial court’s judgment and has not been
challenged on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Hong Kong Dev.
Co. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
pet.) (overruling issue challenging lack of evidence of waiver or estoppel because
the appellant did not challenge the evidence supporting duress, even though the
jury found that failure to obtain consent to assign a contract was excused by
waiver, estoppel, and duress).
3
IV. Conclusion
Having held that Reliford has not challenged each independent ground
supporting the trial court’s judgment, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DELIVERED: January 27, 2011
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