MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 18 2017, 5:58 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew D. Anglemeyer Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
John Thompson, August 18, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1701-CR-36
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Lisa Borges, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
49G04-1607-F1-25387
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1701-CR-36 | August 18, 2017 Page 1 of 7
Case Summary
[1] John Thompson (“Thompson”) was convicted of two counts of Rape, as Level
1 felonies,1 Criminal Confinement, as a Level 3 felony,2 Aggravated Battery, a
Level 3 felony,3 and Strangulation, as a Level 6 felony.4 He challenges his
convictions for Aggravated Battery and Strangulation, presenting the sole issue
of whether those convictions violate double jeopardy prohibitions because they
are based upon the same act as that charged in the Confinement count. We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions that the trial court
vacate the Aggravated Battery and Strangulation convictions.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] During the evening of June 27, 2016, Thompson and K.S. agreed to meet at
Thompson’s Indianapolis apartment. A disagreement over money arose, and
K.S. prepared to leave the apartment. When she stood, Thompson began to tug
at her shorts. K.S. tried to move out of Thompson’s reach by dropping to the
floor and pushing with her feet; however, Thompson grabbed K.S. under her
arms and forced her back onto the sofa.
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1).
2
I. C. § 35-42-3-3(a).
3
I. C. § 35-42-2-1.5.
4
I. C. § 35-42-2-9(b).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1701-CR-36 | August 18, 2017 Page 2 of 7
[3] K.S. banged on the wall and screamed in an attempt to get help; her efforts
were unavailing. Thompson put his arm around K.S.’s neck and strangled her
into unconsciousness. When K.S. regained consciousness, she was gasping for
air. Thompson threatened to shoot K.S. and she agreed that she would be quiet
and compliant. K.S. asked to be allowed to leave and Thompson responded by
saying that he would kill her.
[4] Thompson then forced K.S. to engage in oral sex and intercourse. He placed a
knit hat over her face and walked her to the apartment building exit. He once
more threatened K.S. that she would be killed if she called police.
[5] K.S. went to her vehicle and summoned police. Having sustained significant
injuries, K.S. was taken to the hospital. She was able to identify the apartment
of her attacker, and Thompson was soon identified as the assailant. He was
charged with two counts of Rape, and one count each of Criminal
Confinement, Aggravated Battery, and Strangulation. At the conclusion of a
bench trial conducted on November 21, 2016, Thompson was found guilty as
charged.
[6] Thompson was given concurrent thirty-five-year sentences for each Rape
conviction, concurrent nine-year sentences for Criminal Confinement and
Aggravated Battery, and a concurrent one-year sentence for Strangulation. The
aggregate sentence imposed was thirty-five years imprisonment, with five years
suspended to probation. He now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1701-CR-36 | August 18, 2017 Page 3 of 7
Discussion and Decision
[7] Thompson argues that his convictions for Criminal Confinement, Aggravated
Battery, and Strangulation were all based upon his one act of strangling K.S., in
violation of Indiana’s prohibitions against double jeopardy. He directs our
attention to the double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution, which
provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for
the same offense.” Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 14. He further directs our attention to
Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-6, providing
Whenever
(1) A defendant is charged with an offense and an included
offense in separate counts; and
(2) The defendant is found guilty of both counts;
judgment and sentence may not be entered against the defendant
for the included offense.
[8] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-168(1), an included offense is an
offense that “is established by proof of the same material elements or less than
all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense
charged[.]”
[9] Whether convictions violate double jeopardy presents a pure question of law,
which we review de novo. Whitham v. State, 49 N.E.3d 162, 168 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015). An offense is a factually lesser-included offense when the charging
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1701-CR-36 | August 18, 2017 Page 4 of 7
instrument alleges “the means used to commit the crime charged include all of
the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.” Smith v. State, 881 N.E.2d
1040, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[10] In Count III, the State charged that Thompson committed Criminal
Confinement:
On or about June 28, 2016, JOHN MICHAEL THOMPSON
did knowingly or intentionally confine [K.S.] without the consent
of [K.S.], said act resulting in serious bodily injury to [K.S.], to
wit, unconsciousness[.]
(App. at 27.)
[11] In Count IV, the State charged Thompson with Aggravated Battery, as follows:
On or about June 28, 2016, JOHN MICHAEL THOMPSON
did knowingly or intentionally inflict injury on [K.S.] that created
a substantial risk of death[.]
(App. at 27.)
[12] In Count V, the State charged Thompson with Strangulation, as follows:
On or about June 28, 2016, JOHN MICHAEL THOMPSON, in
a rude, insolent or angry manner, did knowingly apply pressure
to the throat or neck, or obstruct the nose or mouth of [K.S.],
another person, in a manner that impeded the normal breathing
or the blood circulation of the other person[.]
(App. at 27.)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1701-CR-36 | August 18, 2017 Page 5 of 7
[13] The State alleged and proved that Thompson committed Criminal Confinement
by strangling K.S. into unconsciousness. The Aggravated Battery count, and
the State’s proof adduced thereon, concerned the same act of strangulation with
the same injury, that is, unconsciousness. The Strangulation count and proof
thereon concerned the same act. On the facts of this case, the Aggravated
Battery and Strangulation offenses are factually lesser-included offenses of
Criminal Confinement as they were “established by proof of the same material
elements or less than all the material elements” required to establish Criminal
Confinement, as charged. See I. C. § 35-31.5-2-168(1). It was impossible for the
fact-finder to have found that Thompson criminally confined K.S. by strangling
her into unconsciousness without also having found the facts that Thompson
strangled K.S. and caused unconsciousness.
[14] “A double jeopardy violation occurs when judgments of conviction are entered
for the same criminal act and cannot be remedied by the ‘practical effect’ of
concurrent sentences or by merger after conviction has been entered.” West v.
State, 22 N.E.3d 872, 874-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Thompson’s convictions for
Aggravated Battery and Strangulation must be vacated to cure the double
jeopardy violation.
Conclusion
[15] Thompson’s convictions for Rape and Criminal Confinement are affirmed. His
convictions for Aggravated Battery and Strangulation are reversed. We remand
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1701-CR-36 | August 18, 2017 Page 6 of 7
to the trial court with instructions to vacate the convictions and sentences for
those offenses.
[16] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Baker, J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1701-CR-36 | August 18, 2017 Page 7 of 7
John Thompson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion