The execution of the present inquiry seems to have been on the complaint and answer, and plaintiff was allowed to recover the difference between the purchase price of the land as fixed in the bond for title and its reasonable market value, at the time of the breach, less *347tbe sum “clue and owing upon tbe contract,” plus “sucb sum as you (jury) find necessary to fully compensate tbe plaintiff for any injury sustained by him, directly flowing from, and proximately caused by, tbe wrongful act of tbe defendant.” See Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N. C., 406, 35 S. E. (2d), 277; 27 R. C. L., 619 and 631.
If it be conceded that tbe measure of damages, as thus stated, was in excess of tbe scope of tbe inquiry as fixed by tbe default judgment, DeHoff v. Black, 206 N. C., 687, 175 S. E., 179, it is not perceived wherein tbe defendant can complain, if tbe judgment is to be considered a final disposition of tbe whole matter. Tbe case was tried on tbe pleadings, and largely upon tbe defendant’s evidence. Having thus invited tbe court to entertain bis answer and evidence in support thereof, tbe defendant is hardly in position to quarrel with tbe result. Buie v. Buie, 24 N. C., 87. Tbe theory and scope of tbe inquiry was advanced by tbe defendant, and tbe jury apparently accepted bis figures in arriving at tbe amount of damages.
It is true tbe plaintiff stated on tbe bearing that be would waive bis cause of action on contract and proceed in tort (52 Am. Jur., 380, sec. 27) — consistent with tbe execution of tbe inquiry under tbe default judgment — but tbe defendant thereafter persisted in trying tbe matter on tbe complaint and answer and offered evidence to sustain bis position under tbe contract. If this were error, it seems to have been invited by tbe defendant. Carruthers v. R. R., 218 N. C., 377, 11 S. E. (2d), 157; Kelly v. Traction Co., 132 N. C., 368, 43 S. E., 923.
On tbe record, as presented, we are disposed to uphold tbe judgment.
No error.