Jones v. State

APPELLANT, PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

DAVID M. JONES STEVE CARTER
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

DAVID MICHAEL JONES, )
)
Appellant (Defendant Below), ) 48S04-0212-PC-629
) in the Supreme Court
v. )
) 48A04-0109-PC-406
STATE OF INDIANA, ) in the Court of Appeals
)
Appellee (Plaintiff Below). )

APPEAL FROM THE ANDERSON CITY COURT
The Honorable Donald Phillippe, Judge
Cause No. 48H02-9704-CM-2404

June 3, 2003

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

In 1997, David Michael Jones was found guilty of three misdemeanors
after a bench trial in the Anderson City Court. He later filed a petition
for post-conviction relief. In light of the difficulty of litigating a
post-conviction claim in courts that are not courts of record and the fact
that people found guilty in city court are entitled to a trial de novo
simply for the asking, we conclude that post-conviction relief is not
available.

Facts & Procedural History

The Anderson Police arrived at the apparent site of a two-vehicle
collision on April 17, 1997. Jones said to the responding officer that one
Stoney Dobbs had chased him down an alley to the intersection of 20th and
Morton Streets and rammed his pickup truck into Jones’ car. Dobbs’ version
was that there had been two collisions. He said Jones rammed him in the
parking lot of a diner at 1515 Pendleton Avenue, Dobbs chased after him for
a few blocks, and Jones rammed him again at 20th and Morton.

The investigating officer recorded the encounter as having occurred
at Pendleton. Jones complained strongly during a later visit to the police
station, demanding that the report be changed to show that the accident had
occurred at 20th and Morton.

The State eventually charged Jones with false informing, a class A
misdemeanor under Ind. Code § 35-44-2-2(c), alleging that he gave false
information to an officer concerning his involvement in a property damage
accident.

While Jones was out on bail concerning this charge, he and Dobbs’
former wife Brandy chased after Dobbs’ car one day. Brandy threw something
at Dobbs’ car and said she would “see the kids dead before you get ‘em.”
(Tr. at 44.) Jones pulled out his gun, pointing it in the air, and said,
“I’m just gonna kill ya,” and then drove off. Id.

This event led to additional class A misdemeanor charges of
intimidation, Ind. Code Ann. §35-45-2-1 (West 1998), and possession of
marijuana, Ind. Code Ann. §35-48-4-11 (West 1998). The latter resulted
from marijuana found on Jones when he was arrested on the intimidation
charge. This time, Jones remained in jail pending trial.

After a bench trial, the court found Jones guilty on all three counts
and imposed consecutive sentences of one year on each.

Jones did not file the request for trial de novo that was available to
him. In 1998, he sought permission for a belated appeal; it was denied and
the denial was not appealed. His 1999 petition for post-conviction relief
was denied, and he did not appeal that denial either. As a result of
Jones’ request to the Court of Appeals for permission to file a successive
petition, the trial court entered a second denial, which is the subject of
this appeal. The Court of Appeals adjudicated Jones’ various claims
without addressing the applicability of post-conviction procedures to city
and town courts. Jones v. State, 777 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). We
granted transfer.

The State argues that post-conviction remedies do not lie in city
court because of the special opportunity possessed by criminal defendants
for trial de novo. Persons found guilty in city courts enjoy the most
congenial form of appeal known to our system. Upon the filing of a request
with the county clerk within fifteen days of being sentenced in city court,
they are entitled to a trial de novo in the circuit or superior court.
Ind. Trial de Novo Rule 3(B)(1). The same is true of certain judgments
issued by town courts.

The State is certainly correct that Indiana practice affords those
convicted in city court a remarkably easy appeal: file a request and the
conviction evaporates until the prosecution proves its case yet again in a
different court. The Attorney General asserts generally that the
liberality of this practice makes post-conviction relief unnecessary.

Still, Indiana has maintained a long tradition of post-conviction
relief, including a right to counsel still not afforded by many other
states. See White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 895-96 (Ind. 1986) (describing
history of collateral review from 1882 onward); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 33-1-7-1
to 33-1-7-2(a) (West 1996) (providing post-conviction counsel at public
expense commencing in 1945 under Acts 1945, Ch. 38, § 1).

A post-conviction request is by its nature directed to the court in
which the conviction was entered. Other than that, examination of the
central rule on post-conviction relief reveals no apparent limitation on
forum: “A proceeding under this Rule is commenced by filing three (3)
copies of a verified petition with the clerk of the court in which the
conviction took place.” P-C.R. 1, §2.

While the rule itself seems generally applicable, we conclude that it
was written with the courts of record in mind. In those courts, the
transcript of the trial makes it feasible to assess the sort of claims that
are commonly the topic of post-conviction proceedings. For a claim of
newly-discovered evidence, to take an example, the trial record enables the
post-conviction court to determine whether the evidence is actually new and
whether its existence casts doubt on the reliability of the former
proceeding. Similarly, when a post-conviction petitioner claims
ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial record is available to test
the adequacy of counsel’s performance.

Such assessments would often be impossible when the judgment in
question is not from a court of record. In the absence of a transcript, a
post-conviction judge would have available, at best, the memories of the
participants in a misdemeanor trial that occurred years in the past. Such
evidence would rarely be useful; the chances that a post-conviction
judgment on such matters would be any more reliable than the original trial
are slim. While the ably-run Anderson City Court has produced a transcript
of Jones’ trial, the resolution of the legal issue posed here cannot turn
on whether transcripts exist in some places and not in others.

We conclude that the liberality of Indiana’s approach to trial de novo
is more likely to produce just outcomes than application of Post-Conviction
Rule 1 would provide in this setting, and thus hold that post-conviction
petitions may not be filed in city and town courts. Of course, a person
who invokes the right to trial de novo and is nonetheless convicted is
entitled to pursue post-conviction relief in respect of that conviction.

Conclusion

We remand to the City Court with direction to dismiss.

DICKSON, SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.