NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 6, 2018*
Decided November 8, 2018
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge
No. 18‐2752
Appeal from the United States District
JUSTIN H. KNOPP, Court for the Northern District
Plaintiff‐Appellant, of Illinois, Eastern Division.
v. No. 16‐CV‐2330
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Sara L. Ellis,
Defendants‐Appellees. Judge.
O R D E R
On June 1, 2018, we affirmed the district court’s final judgment in favor of defendants.
A week after the district court received our mandate, plaintiff Knopp filed a motion
seeking relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The massive motion (about
480 pages, with exhibits) claimed that the newly‐affirmed judgment had been obtained
by fraud on the court and was erroneous in light of his new evidence. The key exhibit
was an affidavit from a private investigator claiming that he had conducted a “forensic
* The panel that decided Appeal No. 17‐3062 is treating this appeal as successive
under this court’s Internal Operating Procedure 6(b). After an examination of the briefs
and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal
is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
No. 18‐2752 Page 2
audit” of the documents for Knopp’s loan and mortgage and had found flaws that render
the loan unenforceable, at least by Wells Fargo. The district court denied plaintiff’s
motion. Knopp then filed this successive appeal, which has been briefed and is ripe for
decision.
To obtain relief under Rule 60(b) on the grounds argued by plaintiff, the moving party
must show that the supposedly new evidence is actually new or newly discovered and
that he could not have discovered and presented it by acting with reasonable diligence.
E.g., Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Industries, Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir.
1996); see also Kennedy v. Schneider Electric, 893 F.3d 414, 419 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming
denial of Rule 60 relief and award of Rule 11 sanctions against moving party’s attorney).
Defendants point out that the Federal Trade Commission has warned borrowers against
the danger of fraudulent “forensic loan audits.” See Federal Trade Comm’n, Forensic
Loan Audits (March 2010), available at https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0130‐
forensic‐loan‐audits. Without exploring that problem or several other issues raised in the
briefs, we agree with defendants’ argument that plaintiff Knopp has failed to show that
the supposedly new evidence was not available with reasonable diligence in time to
present it to the district court before its original judgment. See, e.g., Anderson v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 759 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) relief
where movant failed to show reasonable diligence regarding supposedly new evidence);
Musch v. Domtar Industries, Inc., 587 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 2009) (same, with respect to
newly‐offered expert opinion). That is a sufficient reason for us to conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion.
The district court’s denial of plaintiff’s Rule 60 motion is AFFIRMED. Given the
litigation history here, plaintiff should understand as he considers further steps that
financial and other sanctions may be imposed in cases of frivolous litigation, and pro se
litigants are not immune from those sanctions.
Justin Knopp v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Combined Opinion