F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 17 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
MARK ERROLL KANIKAYNAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-2200
MICHAEL SISNEROS, Director
Bernalillo County Detention Center;
ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF
NEW MEXICO,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CIV-98-17-BB/LCS)
D. Eric Hannum, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
M. Anne Kelly, Assistant Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, (Tom
Udall, Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, on the brief), Santa Fe,
New Mexico, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before PORFILIO, BRORBY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
Mark Erroll Kanikaynar was arrested for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).
While in custody, the arresting officer read to him the warning required by the
New Mexico Implied Consent Act, informing him that if he refused to consent to
the chemical testing, his driver’s license could be revoked. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §
66-8-111(B). He pleaded guilty to DWI, in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-
102(D), which carries with it an enhanced sentence for, inter alia, refusal to
consent to the chemical testing. See id. § 66-8-102(D)(3). Because Kanikaynar
had refused to consent to the chemical test, his sentence was automatically
increased by a minimum of sixty-days confinement. See id. § 66-8-102(F)(2). In
addition to the sixty-day enhancement for the aggravated DWI, which was stayed
pending appeal, Kanikaynar was sentenced to 30 days in jail, the minimum period
required by law. The New Mexico Court of Appeals resolved Kanikaynar’s
constitutional challenges to the enhancement for aggravated DWI. See State v.
Kanikaynar, 939 P.2d 1091 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Kanikaynar subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
The district court held that the state court decision was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and dismissed the
petition. Because the district court granted a certificate of appealability, this court
exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and affirms.
-2-
This appeal is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Prior to the AEDPA, federal
courts conducting habeas appeals were not required to “pay any special heed to the
underlying state court decision.” O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir.
1998). The AEDPA, however, requires federal courts to defer to state court
decisions. Accordingly, a state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief
only if he can establish that a claim adjudicated by the state court “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The text of § 2254(d) “offers little guidance to the courts charged with
applying it.” Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 1999) (en
banc). Moreover, there is no consensus among the circuits on the degree of
deference to be accorded a state court’s federal constitutional ruling. 1 See Matteo,
171 F.3d at 885. While there are multiple approaches affecting the degree of
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case involving an
1
interpretation of § 2254 and may resolve the issue. See Williams v. Taylor, 163
F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 1355 (Apr. 5, 1999) (No.
98-8384).
-3-
deference to be accorded a state court’s constitutional ruling, 2 this court concludes
that under any interpretation of § 2254(d), Kanikaynar’s appeal fails.
I. DUE PROCESS
Kanikaynar argues that because he was warned only that refusal to submit to
a chemical test could result in revocation of driving privileges, his due process
rights were violated by the subsequent mandatory criminal sanctions for such
refusal. In asserting that the partial warning was “fundamentally unfair,”
Kanikaynar applies the due process balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976). The New Mexico Court of Appeals held, however, that
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), was controlling authority in this
case. See Kanikaynar, 939 P.2d at 1093. The Supreme Court held in Neville there
was no due process violation when an officer warned an arrestee that refusal to
consent to a chemical test could result in the revocation of driving privileges, but
did not also warn that refusal could be used as evidence against the defendant at
trial. Neville, 459 U.S. at 559-64. Kanikaynar argues there is a significant due
process difference between the use of a defendant’s refusal as evidence of guilt,
See Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 357-62 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing
2
various approaches of the circuits).
-4-
the consequence of refusal in Neville, and mandatory incarceration, the
consequence of refusal in New Mexico. 3
Relying upon Neville, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected this
distinction by stating that the “right of an accused to refuse the breath alcohol test
has no constitutional implications.” Kanikaynar, 939 P.2d at 1093. Neville’s
holding makes clear that the nature of the unwarned consequence was not a factor
in its decision. First, the Court stated that a defendant’s right to refuse a blood-
alcohol test “is simply a matter of grace bestowed by [the state].” 459 U.S. at 565.
Accordingly, a defendant cannot argue a right to be free of “the attendant penalties
for making that choice.” 4 Id. at 563. Second, the Court held that the limited
3
Kanikaynar relies upon a First Circuit case to support this argument. See
Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287 (1995). Assuming without deciding that Roberts
is relevant under the AEDPA in light of § 2254(d), Kanikaynar’s reliance upon
Roberts is misplaced. In Roberts, the First Circuit concluded that the defendant’s
due process rights were violated because he was informed in writing that he had
been “advised of the consequences of failure to comply” with a blood-alcohol test
when he was not, and because he was denied the right to speak with his attorney,
despite his request. Id. at 1295. Roberts, however, is consistent with Neville’s
distinction between a warning about consequences which explicitly or implicitly
assures the warned that they have been informed of all the consequences, and a
warning about some consequences without any corresponding assurance. See
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 (1983) (contrasting the Miranda
warning, which implicitly assures the suspect that his silence will not be used
against him, and the partial warning given by the officer in that case which
“contained no such misleading implicit assurances as to the relative consequences
of his choice”).
4
This holding by the Court that a state can either compel a driver to take the
test or penalize refusal addresses Kanikaynar’s argument that he was deprived of
due process by the conflict between the New Mexico statute stating that when a
-5-
warnings of the consequences of refusing to take the blood-alcohol test could not
be characterized as “assur[ing] a suspect that no consequences other than those
mentioned will occur.” Id. at 566. “Importantly, the warning that he could lose
his driver’s license made it clear that refusing the test was not a ‘safe harbor,’ free
of adverse consequences.” Id.
Because of the similarity between Neville and the case here, under any
interpretation of the standard of review in § 2254(d), the state court’s decision to
follow Neville was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established law, as determined by the Supreme Court.
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Kanikaynar argues that the right to counsel attaches when a defendant is
requested to submit to chemical testing and a refusal can result in the imposition
of criminal penalties. The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected Kanikaynar’s
argument on several grounds. See Kanikaynar, 939 P.2d at 1094-95. First, it
relied upon the Supreme Court’s summary dismissal for want of a federal question
in Nyflot v. Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985). See
id. Nyflot had appealed from a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court which
driver declines to submit to a test, “none shall be administered,” and the statute
criminalizing such refusal.
-6-
held that there was no statutory or constitutional right to consult with counsel
before deciding whether to submit to a chemical blood test. See Nyflot, 474 U.S.
at 1028-29 (White, J., dissenting). Citing to Mandel v. Bradley, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals stated that the Court’s summary dismissal “preclude[s] lower
courts from coming to a different conclusion on the issue presented.” Kanikaynar,
939 P.2d at 1094; see Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (“Summary . .
. dismissals for want of a substantial federal question . . . prevent lower courts
from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and
necessarily decided by those actions.”). Second, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals noted that the Supreme Court has stringently limited the situations in
which the right to counsel attaches and concluded that “[f]urther expansion of the
right to counsel prior to the commencement of adversary criminal proceedings
seems contrary to the view of the Supreme Court.” Kanikaynar, 939 P.2d 1095.
The court also noted that expansion of the right to counsel according to
Kanikaynar’s suggestion would “severely compromise the State’s interest in
preserving blood alcohol evidence.” Id.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals’ holding is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent. The Court has reiterated on numerous occasions that the right to
counsel attaches only when the government’s role shifts from investigation to
accusation and judicial proceedings are formally commenced against a suspect.
-7-
See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1991); Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 430-32 (1986); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-88
(1984) (citing cases since 1938 holding same). Indeed, this same argument was
rejected by the First Circuit in Roberts v. Maine, relied upon by Kanikaynar supra.
Roberts, decided prior to the AEDPA and thus applying a standard of review
considerably less deferential than currently compelled under § 2254(d), noted that
Supreme Court jurisprudence allows for few exceptions to the bright-line rule that
the right to counsel does not attach until the government initiates official
proceedings. See Roberts, 48 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (1995); see also Gouveia, 467
U.S. at 188-89 & n.5 (reaffirming bright-line rule); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 316 (1973) (rejecting expansion of bright-line rule to witness photographic
identification). The First Circuit held that when a driver is confronted with the
choice of consenting to a test or refusing but being subject to a mandatory
sentence for doing so, “[t]he government [has] not yet crossed the constitutional
divide between investigator and accuser.” See Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1290-91.
Were he before the Supreme Court, Kanikaynar might be able to persuade
the Court to create an exception to its repeatedly announced bright-line rule.
Copious Supreme Court precedent reiterating its bright-line rule, however,
compels this court to conclude that the New Mexico Court of Appeals decision
-8-
was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law, as
determined by the Supreme Court.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT
Finally, Kanikaynar argues that an enhanced sentence for refusing to submit
to alcohol testing violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection from warrantless
searches. The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that there is no constitutional
right to refuse a chemical test. See Kanikaynar, 939 P.2d at 1096 (citing
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (holding that blood-alcohol
test taken without consent of arrestee did not violate the Fourth Amendment when
time had passed since car accident and further delay in securing warrant would
have compromised value of blood-alcohol test evidence); Skinner v. Railway
Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1989) (no Fourth Amendment violation
to test railroad employees who violated safety regulations or were involved in
accidents)).
It is true that the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of
burdening a state-conferred choice to refuse to take a test with a mandatory
criminal sentence. In addition to Schmerber and Skinner, however, the Court has
on several occasions upheld mandatory chemical testing, particularly of those who
pose a high risk to others. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
-9-
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1992) (holding mandatory chemical testing of customs
agents who carry firearms or are involved in drug interdiction constitutional); see
also Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (same regarding
chemical testing of scholastic athletes). The Court has also held that the
extraordinary danger posed to the public by intoxicated drivers justified relaxing
strict Fourth Amendment requirements. In Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz, the Court held that although the highway sobriety checkpoint program
constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, it was justified by the state’s
interest in addressing the problem of drunk driving. See 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
In discussing the seriousness of drunken driving, the Court stated, “[n]o one can
seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’
interest in eradicating it.” Id. at 451; see also Neville, 459 U.S. at 558 (“The
carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented . . . .”).
Because the Court has found that there is no constitutional problem with
requiring a blood-alcohol test despite refusal when waiting for a warrant would
compromise the evidence, that compulsory testing is constitutional when the public
danger outweighs private rights, and has frequently noted states’ interest in
reducing the carnage wrought by those who drive while intoxicated, this court
cannot say that the New Mexico court’s decision was contrary to or an
-10-
unreasonable application of clearly established law, as determined by the Supreme
Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Kanikaynar has failed to show that the New Mexico Court of Appeals’
decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law.
Accordingly, the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition is affirmed.
-11-
Kanikaynar v. Sisneros
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 1999-08-17
Citations: 190 F.3d 1115
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion