The appellant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating, through the submission of the plaintiffs deposition testimony, that she was unable to identify the cause of her fall (see Denicola v Costello, 44 AD3d 990 [2007]; Rodriguez v Cafaro, 17 AD3d 658 [2005]). Notably, at her deposition, the plaintiff testified that, immediately prior to the accident, she was looking straight ahead. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The affidavit submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion merely raised a feigned issue designed to avoid the consequences of her earlier deposition testimony (see Denicola v Costello, 44 AD3d at 990). The plaintiff also submitted an affidavit of an expert who alleged that the step in question was in violation of various provisions of the New York State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code. However, since the plaintiff did not know what caused her to fall and did not claim, inter alia, that she would not have fallen, but for the elevation differential she encountered after exiting the appellant’s store, it would be speculative to assume that these alleged violations proximately caused her fall (id.). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have granted the appellant’s motion.
Wat separately moved, on the same ground as the appellant, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her. Although Wat’s separate motion was denied, she, unlike the appellant, did not appeal from so much of the