MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Apr 20 2015, 9:37 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Victoria L. Bailey Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Keandre Arnold, April 20, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1407-CR-500
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber,
State of Indiana, Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49G01-1305-FA-35062
Barteau, Senior Judge
Statement of the Case
[1] Keandre Arnold appeals the sentence he received for his convictions of
attempted murder, a Class A felony, Indiana Code sections 35-42-1-1 (2007)
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and 35-41-5-1 (1977), and invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor, Indiana
Code section 35-46-1-15.1 (2010). We affirm.
Issue
[2] Arnold presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether the trial
court abused its discretion in sentencing Arnold.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In May 2013, Arnold shot a gun at Aaron Coats in an attempt to kill Coats.
Based upon this incident, Arnold was charged with attempted murder and
invasion of privacy. The trial court sentenced Arnold to forty years on the
attempted murder conviction and 365 days on the invasion of privacy
conviction, to be served concurrent with the forty years. The final four years of
Arnold’s sentence were to be served in a community corrections program.
Arnold now appeals his sentence.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Arnold contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an
aggregate forty-year sentence. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound
discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g,
875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or
the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.
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When imposing a sentence for a felony, a trial court must enter a sentencing
statement including reasonably detailed reasons for imposing a particular
sentence. Id. at 491. A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to issue a
sentencing statement, gives reasons for imposing a sentence that are not
supported by the record, omits reasons clearly supported by the record and
advanced for consideration, or considers reasons that are improper as a matter
of law. Id. at 490-91. Remand for resentencing may be appropriate if we
cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same
sentence had it properly considered the reasons supported by the record. Id. at
491.
[5] Arnold alleges that error occurred when a factor that is improper as a matter of
law was considered in determining his sentence. Specifically, he claims the trial
court abused its discretion by finding as an aggravating circumstance the fact
that he fired a gun into a home. At sentencing, the trial court remarked that
“shots were fired at that residence. That’s huge. It’s a huge aggravator in your
instance.” Tr. p. 177. Arnold argues this is an improper aggravating
circumstance because it constitutes a material element of the offense of
attempted murder.
[6] The nature and circumstances of an offense is a proper aggravating factor.
McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001). Arnold is correct, though,
that a factor constituting a material element of an offense may not be used as an
aggravating circumstance. See Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind.
2000). However, when the trial court evaluates the nature and circumstances of
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an offense, it may properly consider the particularized circumstances of the
factual elements as an aggravating factor. McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584,
589-90 (Ind. 2007).
[7] In order to convict Arnold of attempted murder, the State had to prove that he
intentionally took a substantial step toward killing Coats by shooting a handgun
at him. See Appellant’s App. p. 22; see also Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1.
The evidence at trial showed that at the time of this incident, Coats was at
home with his girlfriend and her three daughters. The interior wood door was
open but an exterior storm door closed the house to the outside. Through the
storm door, the girls saw someone approaching the house. Coats went to the
door and a man asked for one of the girls. Arnold then appeared, said
“Remember me? I’m gonna kill ya,” and began shooting. Tr. p. 62. Coats saw
the gun and told his family to run. Bullets entered the exterior of the home and
exited into the interior of the home, and one bullet pierced the couch in the
living room where the three girls had been sitting.
[8] In sentencing Arnold, the trial court relied on the danger created by firing a gun
into a room full of people as it considered the unique circumstances of this
offense. This finding is supported by the evidence and is a proper comment
upon the nature and circumstances of Arnold’s offense. See Hape v. State, 903
N.E.2d 977, 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that trial court did not abuse
its discretion in recognizing danger posed to community during car chase as
aggravating circumstance in sentencing for offense of resisting law
enforcement), trans. denied. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding as an
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aggravating circumstance the fact that shots were fired into a room full of
people.
[9] Moreover, additional aggravating factors exist to support Arnold’s enhanced
sentence. At sentencing, the trial court stated that “[t]he aggravators clearly
overwhelm the mitigators.” Tr. p. 177. The court then discussed the
aggravating circumstances, beginning with the fact that Arnold cut off his home
detention ankle monitor just days before he attacked Coats, who was also the
victim in Arnold’s previous case. The court labeled this a “worst case scenario”
and then turned to Arnold’s juvenile record, which it stated was another “huge
aggravator” and that Arnold had “built quite a record” for being only eighteen.
Id. Thus, given the severity of the additional aggravators, we are not persuaded
that the trial court would have imposed a different sentence even in the absence
of the aggravating circumstance of firing a gun into a room full of people.
Conclusion
[10] For the reasons stated, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding
Arnold’s act of firing a gun into a room full of people as an aggravating
circumstance when it determined his sentence upon his convictions of
attempted murder and invasion of privacy.
[11] Affirmed.
[12] Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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Keandre Arnold v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion