Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Tait, J.), entered October 27, 2008 in Broome County, which, among other things, denied a motion by defendants Vestal Fark, LLC and Northeast United Corporation for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them.
Plaintiff sued to recover for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice on the sidewalk of a shopping plaza owned by defendants Vestal Fark, LLC and Northeast United Corporation (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants). In their answers, defendants interposed cross claims for contribution and indemnification against defendants Greenskeeper Lawn Maintenance Service and Anthony Joseph Fittarelli II, individually and doing business as Greenskeeper Lawn Maintenance Service (hereinafter collectively referred to as Greenskeeper), the contractor hired to perform snow and ice removal of the sidewalks at the plaza. Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendants and Greenskeeper separately moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, with Greens-
To demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint, it was incumbent upon defendants “to establish as a matter of law that they maintained the property in question in a reasonably safe condition and that they neither created the allegedly dangerous condition existing thereon nor had actual or constructive notice thereof’ (Brown v Haylor, Freyer & Coon, Inc., 60 AD3d 1188, 1189 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Managault v Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 62 AD3d 1196, 1197 [2009]; Moriarity v Wallace Dev. Co., LLC, 61 AD3d 1088, 1088 [2009]). Here, defendants met their initial burden by proffering, among other things, evidence of the contractual arrangements with Greenskeeper to maintain the plaza’s sidewalks free of snow and ice, plaintiffs testimony that she had not observed any snow or ice on the sidewalk before she fell, and the testimony of defendants’ representatives and staff establishing that they did not receive any complaints from store tenants concerning an icy condition, nor did the weather indicate the need to ensure that maintenance contractors were on site to salt (see Elsey v Clark Trading Corp., 57 AD3d 1330, 1331 [2008]; Torosian v Bigsbee Vil. Homeowners Assn., 46 AD3d 1314, 1315 [2007]; Dickerson v Troy Hous. Auth., 34 AD3d 1003, 1004 [2006]). As such, the burden shifted to plaintiff to come forward with evidence demonstrating a triable issue of fact (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).
In opposition, plaintiff asserted that the slippery condition was created by the melting of snow on the roof, which resulted in water falling from the overhang onto the sidewalk and then freezing to form ice, and submitted proof primarily aimed at raising a factual issue concerning constructive notice. “A claim of constructive notice requires that the condition be visible and apparent and in existence for a sufficient period of time so as to allow the defendant an opportunity to take corrective action” (Saunders v Bryant’s Towing, 27 AD3d 992, 994 [2006] [citation omitted]; see Brown v Haylor, Freyer & Coon, Inc., 60 AD3d at 1189-1190; Cantwell v Rondout Sav. Bank, 55 AD3d 1031, 1032 [2008]).
Plaintiffs deposition testimony established that, immediately
Nor are we persuaded that Supreme Court erred in dismissing defendants’ cross claims for contribution and indemnification. To sustain a claim for contribution, defendants were required to show that Greenskeeper owed them a duty of reasonable care independent of its contractual obligations or that Greenskeeper owed a duty directly to plaintiff and that a breach of that duty contributed to her injuries (see Phillips v Young Men’s Christian Assn., 215 AD2d 825, 827 [1995]). Here,
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to defendants’ cross claims for indemnification. Here, Greenskeeper made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the contractual indemnification claims by demonstrating that it fulfilled its duties under the contract (see Peycke v Newport Media Acquisition II, Inc., 17 AD3d 338, 339 [2005]; Baratta v Home Depot USA, 303 AD2d 434, 435 [2003]). The contract obligated Greenskeeper to plow the sidewalks if two inches of snow or more fell, and required salting if less than two inches of snow had accumulated or upon receiving “freezing rain and/or sleet or standing water freezing.” It further required Greenskeeper to perform snow removal and salting when requested by Vestal Park. To that end, it is uncontroverted that, on the day prior to plaintiffs fall, Greenskeeper performed snow removal and salting at 8:00 a.m., and resalting at 10:00 a.m. Greenskeeper also submitted meteorological evidence demonstrating that no precipitation had fallen between the time it last salted the sidewalks and plaintiffs fall, and that it was sunny with temperatures rising above freezing throughout the morning of the accident.
In response, defendants failed to raise an issue of fact. Plaintiffs theory of the case is that she slipped on ice that formed from water that dripped from defendants’ roof and then froze, and no evidence has been submitted as to any other source of the ice upon which plaintiff allegedly slipped. Although defendants argue that Greenskeeper would be responsible for salt
Spain, Lahtinen, Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
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Plaintiff subsequently discontinued her claims against Greenskeeper.