Opinion issued August 25, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-13-00917-CR
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KEITH LADALE WILSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 411th District Court
Polk County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 22281
CONCURRING OPINION
I concur in the Court’s judgment and join its opinion except with respect to
its analysis of Appellant Keith Wilson’s second issue. I disagree with the
majority’s conclusion that Wilson waived his challenge to the trial court’s
admission of extraneous-offense evidence due to inadequate briefing. I would
address the merits of Wilson’s extraneous-offense-evidence issue and hold that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-of evidence.
Wilson didn’t waive
In his second issue, Wilson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the testimony of a then-18-year-old woman who alleged that Wilson
sexually assaulted her after the incident for which Wilson was on trial. In
particular, Wilson argues that the extraneous-offense evidence should have been
excluded because the facts and circumstances of the extraneous offense “were too
dissimilar from those of the offense for which Wilson was on trial.”
Wilson’s 10,911-word brief devotes multiple pages to the extraneous offense
issue. While his discussion of how the admission of this evidence harmed him is
admittedly brief—and that is partly because it refers to and incorporates the brief’s
earlier summary of the guilt/innocence-phase evidence—it does include a zinger
on harm: Wilson’s previous trial, at which the extraneous offense evidence was
not admitted, ended in a hung jury.
The State did not even argue in its brief that Wilson had waived the issue by
inadequate briefing. Nevertheless, the majority faults Wilson for his failure to
“argue that he was harmed” by the admission of extraneous-offense testimony.
While Wilson certainly could have made more hay about harm, the Court of
Criminal Appeals has made clear that “no burden to show harm should be placed
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on the defendant who appeals.” Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001) (citing Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
Complete yet cogent briefing is ideal, but appellate courts should not find briefing
waiver just because that high standard is not met. See State v. Copeland, No. PD-
1802-13, 2014 WL 5508985, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 22, 2014) (“Briefing
rules are to be construed liberally, and substantial compliance with the Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure is sufficient to avoid waiving the right to appeal an issue.”).
Rather, it is the duty of the reviewing court to assess harm from the context of the
error. Johnson, 43 S.W.3d at 4; Ovalle, 13 S.W.3d at 787–88. The majority thus
erred in concluding that Wilson waived his issue by failing to “argue that he was
harmed.” It should have reached the merits of Wilson’s complaint.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the extraneous
offense evidence
Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) prohibits the admission of extraneous
offense evidence to prove a person’s character to show that the person acted in
conformity with that character. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). However, extraneous
offenses may be admissible to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See id. 404(b)(2);
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). And
evidence of extraneous acts may also be admissible to rebut defensive theories.
Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
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In the prosecution for sexual assault of an adult, the State must prove that the
defendant engaged in the conduct intentionally and knowingly without the
complainant’s consent. By raising the defensive theory of consent, the defendant
necessarily disputes his intent to engage in the alleged conduct without the
complainant’s consent and thereby places his intent at issue. Rubio v. State, 607
S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 512
(Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).
Here, the State offered evidence of the extraneous sexual assault to prove
intent and rebut Wilson’s defensive theory that the complainant consented to
sexual intercourse. Wilson argues that the evidence of the extraneous offense is
inadmissible under Rule 404(b) because the offense is not similar enough to the
sexual assault of the complainant to be used to “rebut[] [appellant’s] defensive
theory of consent, or [to] show[] his intent of having sex with an unconscious, non-
consenting woman.” I disagree.
The extraneous offense witness testified that Wilson penetrated her from
behind, without her consent, while she was facing forward and believed that she
was engaging in sexual intercourse with a different man. She also testified that she
had not been aware of Wilson’s presence nearby until after she realized that
Wilson was penetrating her. Wilson had hidden. The circumstances in the charged
offense were not identical. The complainant was unaware of Wilson’s presence in
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the room in which she was sleeping due to her intoxication, not Wilson’s hiding.
But the gist of both incidents was the same: Wilson sexually assaulted a woman
who was not aware of his presence until after the sexual assault. See Cantrell v.
State, 731 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (degree of similarity required
between charged and extraneous offense is not as great when intent, as opposed to
identity, is material issue); Brown, 96 S.W.3d at 512–13 (when defensive theory of
consent raised in prosecution for sexual assault, intent is material issue, and degree
of similarity required between charged and extraneous offense need not be as great
as when identity is material issue); see, e.g., Brown v. State, No. 01-11-00462-CR,
2012 WL 1893700, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 24, 2012, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding extraneous offenses sufficiently
similar where each sexual assault victim testified she did not consent and
defendant threatened her, despite assaults occurring in different locations and
involving different acts); MacKenzie v. State, No. 03-05-00731-CR, 2006 WL
3923608, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 22, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (finding extraneous offense sufficiently similar where
“[i]n both incidents, the women deny consenting or even being aware of
[defendant’s] presence before awakening to discover the sexual activity in
progress”). Accordingly, I would hold that there is sufficient similarity between
the extraneous offense and the charged offense to render the extraneous offense
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evidence probative of Wilson’s intent and therefore not inadmissible under Rule
404(b).
I would further hold that, considering the relevant factors, the probative
value of the extraneous-offense evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of its unfair prejudice. See State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005) (identifying factors). A proper Rule 403 analysis includes, but is
not limited to, four factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential
to impress the jury in some irrational yet indelible way; (3) the time needed to
develop the evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence. See id.
First, Wilson testified that the complainant consented, and the complainant
swore the opposite was true. Consent was thus the central issue at trial and
evidence tending to prove the absence of consent would be quite probative. See,
e.g., Dilg v. State, No. 07-13-00160-CR, 2014 WL 458019, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Jan. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting
probative value of extraneous offense evidence when “he said, she said” situation
exists and consent is pivotal issue at trial).
Second, while the extraneous offense evidence was charged by its very
nature, the trial court correctly instructed the jury that it “may only consider such
evidence as evidence of intent or to refute the defensive theory of consent” and
may not consider such evidence “for any other purpose.” The charge included a
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similar limiting instruction, minimizing the likelihood that the jury would use the
extraneous offense evidence improperly. See Blackwell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1, 15
(Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“The trial court’s instructions to
the jury are a factor to consider in determining whether the jury considered the
extraneous-offense evidence improperly . . . .”).
The last two factors also weigh in favor of admissibility. The State did not
spend an inordinate amount of time presenting the extraneous-offense evidence.
Roughly 55 pages of approximately 515 pages (or about 11 percent) of the
testimony during the trial’s guilt/innocence phase related to the extraneous offense.
See Rickerson v. State, 138 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, pet. ref’d) (noting “[o]ut of a 289-page reporter’s record, th[e] testimony
took up twenty-three pages”). And Wilson defended on the theory that the
complainant consented to engaging in sexual intercourse, making the State’s need
for the extraneous offense evidence considerable. Considering all of these factors,
the trial court correctly overruled Wilson’s Rule 403 objection. The trial court’s
admission of the extraneous-offense evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
The majority incorrectly finds briefing waiver and fails to address the merits
of Wilson’s issue regarding the admissibility of the extraneous offense evidence.
But, having considered the issue on the merits, I conclude that the trial court did
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not abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-of extraneous-offense
evidence. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.
Huddle, J. concurring.
Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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Keith Ladale Wilson v. State
Combined Opinion