F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 24 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS E. KINGSFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 99-4204
SALT LAKE CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant,
CHARLES J. SHACKETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 97-CV-358)
Brent A. Burnett, Assistant Attorney General, (Jan Graham, Utah Attorney
General, with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellant.
Stanley J. Preston, (Max D. Wheeler and Judith D. Wolferts with him on the
brief), Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellee.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Thomas Kingsford brought suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah. One of his claims asserted that he was deprived of
property without due process of law in his termination as head football coach at
Highland High School (“Highland”). Named as defendants were the Salt Lake
City School District (“SLCSD”) and Charles Shackett, who was principal of
Highland at the time Kingsford was terminated as head football coach.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on Kingsford’s property interest due
process claim, asserting that Kingsford did not have a constitutionally-protected
property interest in his position as football coach. Defendant Shackett also
claimed he was entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
Kingsford then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on his property
interest due process claim.
The district court granted Kingsford’s motion for summary judgment on his
property interest due process claim and denied Shackett’s motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. Defendant Shackett has appealed the
denial of his motion for summary judgment, claiming either that Kingsford does
not have a constitutionally-protected property interest in his position as football
coach or that he is entitled to qualified immunity because the law on which
Kingsford relies was not clearly established at the time of the events underlying
-2-
this suit. Jurisdiction to consider Shackett’s appeal arises under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. See Johnson v. Fankell , 520 U.S. 911, 915 (1997) (“[A] Federal District
Court order rejecting a qualified immunity defense on the ground that the
defendant’s actions—if proved—would have violated clearly established law may
be appealed immediately as a ‘final decision’ within the meaning of the general
federal appellate jurisdiction statute.”). Because there is a factual question as to
whether Kingsford had a property interest in his position as football coach, this
court remands this question to the district court. Because the law on which
Kingsford relies for his property interest due process claim was clearly
established at the time of the events underlying this suit, this court affirms the
district court’s denial of Shackett’s motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 21, 1981, Kingsford submitted an application to the SLCSD.
Under the portion of the application labeled “Position Desired,” Kingsford
checked “Classroom Teacher” and listed “Coaching responsibilities” in the space
marked “Other.” On July 22, 1981, the SLCSD accepted Kingsford’s application
and extended him a written contract offer for the position of “Teacher” at
Highland. The contract did not mention any coaching responsibilities. Kingsford
-3-
signed this contract on July 31, 1981. This contract is the only written contract
signed by Kingsford with Highland or the SLCSD.
In addition to teaching math and physical education classes at Highland,
Kingsford has throughout his employment been involved in coaching many sports,
including football, basketball, track, and baseball. Between 1981 and 1985,
Kingsford served as an assistant football coach. In 1985, Kingsford became head
football coach.
As the head football coach, Kingsford was the instructor for the “Athletics
Football” course. Students on the football team were given one-fourth of a credit
hour for each year of participation on the football team, which counted toward
fulfilling “Lifetime Activities PE” graduation requirements. Students were
awarded grades for their participation in the “Athletics Football” course, and
Kingsford, as instructor, was apparently responsible for making those grade
determinations.
Kingsford remained head football coach until March 22, 1996, when he
received a letter from the Assistant Superintendent of Personnel of the SLCSD.
The letter informed Kingsford that he was suspended from his coaching position
assignment until June 6, 1996, at which time he would be terminated from his
coaching position. Despite being terminated as a coach, Kingsford has been
allowed to continue teaching at Highland.
-4-
Kingsford filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah against the SLCSD and Highland principal Charles Shackett, claiming, in
part, that he was deprived of his property interest as head football coach without
due process of law. Defendants moved for summary judgment on Kingsford’s
property interest due process claim, arguing that Kingsford did not possess a
property interest in his position as head football coach. Defendant Shackett also
claimed that even if such a right existed it was not clearly established at the time
of the events underlying this suit, thus entitling him to qualified immunity.
Kingsford responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment on his
property interest due process claim.
After oral argument, the district court awarded Kingsford summary
judgment on his property interest due process claim and denied Shackett’s motion
for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court
determined that Kingsford had obtained a property interest in his position as head
football coach and, because Defendants had not disputed that the dismissal
procedures were lacking if a property interest was found, granted Kingsford’s
motion for summary judgment on the claim. The district court also determined
that Shackett was not entitled to qualified immunity on Kingsford’s property
interest due process claim because the rights violated by Shackett were clearly
established at the time of the events underlying this litigation. Although the
-5-
parties raised and the district court addressed many additional issues in the
proceedings below, the only issue appealed and argued to this court is Defendant
Shackett’s assertion that he is entitled to qualified immunity either because
Kingsford does not have a valid property interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment or because such a right was not clearly established at the time of the
events underlying this litigation. 1
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard employed by the district court pursuant to Rule
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Cent. Kan. Credit Union v.
Mut. Guar. Corp., 102 F.3d 1097, 1102 (10th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is
appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
1
This court recognizes that the grant of Kingsford’s motion for partial
summary judgment against the SLCSD is not before this court. The issue of
whether Kingsford had a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment,
which this court addresses in reference to the denial of Shackett’s motion for
qualified immunity, appears to be identical whether the defendant is Shackett or
the SLCSD. The district court can determine on remand how this opinion affects
the previous grant of summary judgment against the SLCSD on Kingsford’s
property interest due process claim.
-6-
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This court construes the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Cent. Kan.
Credit Union, 102 F.3d at 1102.
B. Property Interest
A property interest in continued public employment is not created by the
Constitution. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972). Rather, a property interest in continued public employment must “stem
from an independent source such as state law.” Id.; see also Lancaster v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 1998). State law sources for
property interests can include statutes, municipal charters or ordinances, and
express or implied contracts. See Carnes v. Parker, 922 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th
Cir. 1991). A public employee such as Kingsford must have a “legitimate claim
of entitlement” to continued public employment for a property interest to arise; a
“unilateral expectation” of continued public employment is not sufficient to create
a property interest. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. While a property right can only be
created by state law, once a property right is established, the determination of
what process is due before that right can be deprived is a question answered by
the federal Constitution. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
541-45 (1985). Kingsford claims a property interest in his continued employment
-7-
as head football coach was created by the Utah Orderly School Termination
Procedures Act (“Orderly Termination Act”), the contract between the SLCSD
and the Salt Lake Teachers Association which governs SLCSD teachers (“Written
Agreement”), and an implied agreement with the SLCSD that he would only be
removed for cause. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-8-101 to -107 (1997) (amended
1999).
The analysis begins with the Orderly Termination Act. 2 Shackett argues
that the Orderly Termination Act did not create a reasonable expectation by
Kingsford that he would continue to be employed as head football coach. In
support of his argument, Shackett relies on the unpublished Utah state case of
Parker v. Board of Education., Civil No. 96-03-06050CV (Summit County, Utah
D.C. Aug. 12, 1996). In Parker, a Utah district court ruled that a teacher who had
After the events prompting this lawsuit, the Orderly Termination Act was
2
amended in 1999 to specifically state that “[a]n employee who is given extra duty
assignments in addition to a primary assignment, such as a teacher who also
serves as a coach or activity advisor, is a temporary employee in those extra duty
assignments and may not acquire career status beyond the primary assignment.”
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-8-106(4). Under Utah law, “a legislative enactment which
alters the substantive law or affects vested rights will not be read to operate
retrospectively unless the legislature has clearly expressed that intention.” Roark
v. Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995) (quotation omitted); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 68-3-3. There is no indication that the Utah legislature intended
these substantive amendments to apply retroactively. To the contrary, the
legislature established an effective date for the amendments but said nothing
about possible retroactive application. See 1999 Utah Laws Ch. 324. Thus, the
1999 amendments will not be considered.
-8-
been dismissed from his coaching duties had no expectation of continued
employment in his duties as coach. In reaching this decision, the court made a
conclusion of law stating that “the Orderly Termination Act provides an
expectation of continued employment only to those granted such rights under a
collectively bargained agreement, or under the policies or practices of the School
District or in an individual contract with an employee.” Thus, according to the
Utah district court, an employee cannot rely on the Orderly Termination Act to
establish a property interest in public employment, but instead must produce
specific contracts or “policies or practices” of the public employer.
Although the unpublished district court order has no precedential value
under Utah law, it appears to be a correct interpretation of Utah law. See Utah
Rules Judicial Admin. R. 4-508. In Broadbent v. Board of Education, the Utah
Court of Appeals intimated that employees must look to sources other than the
Orderly Termination Act for an expectation of continued employment. See 910
P.2d 1274, 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the Orderly Termination Act
“has never granted provisional educators any significant protections beyond those
found in their employment contracts”). Although the Orderly Termination Act
distinguishes between “career employees,” “provisional employees,” and
“temporary employees,” a “career employee” is defined as an employee “who has
obtained a reasonable expectation of continued employment based upon an
-9-
agreement with the employee or the employee’s association, district practice, or
policy.” See Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-8-102 (1997) (amended 1999).
The Orderly Termination Act does provide some limited procedural
protections to school employees. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 53A-8-103 to -104
(1997) (amended 1999). It is well established in this circuit, however, that
procedural protections alone do not create a claim of entitlement to continued
public employment. Rather, a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued public
employment arises only when there are substantive restrictions on the ability of
the employer to terminate the employee. See Asbill v. Hous. Auth., 726 F.2d
1499, 1502 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[P]rocedural protections do not support a
‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ to future employment. . . . [P]rocedural
protections alone do not create a protected property right in future employment;
such a right attaches only when there are substantive restrictions on the
employer’s discretion. For example, if a statute . . . specifies the grounds on
which an employee may be discharged, or restricts the reasons for discharge to
‘just cause shown,’ then the employee has a right to continued employment until
such grounds or causes are shown.” (footnote omitted)). Thus, because the
Orderly Termination Act provides only procedural protections to employees and
defers any substantive protections to “agreement[s] with the employee or the
employee’s association, district practice, or policy,” this court must look, as the
-10-
district court did, to the Written Agreement between the Salt Lake Teachers
Association and the SLCSD to determine if Kingsford had a reasonable
expectation of continued employment as head football coach.
The Written Agreement between the SLCSD and the Salt Lake Teachers
Association states that “teachers” may be dismissed only for “just cause.” A
contract that promises continued employment except for “just cause,” if such
promise is applicable to Kingsford in his position as head football coach, creates
a property interest in continued employment. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
538-39 (stating that Ohio law which allowed for termination of classified civil
servants only for “misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance” creates property
right in continued employment (quotation omitted)); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78
(stating that “rules or understandings” that employee could be dismissed only for
“sufficient cause” could create a property right in continued employment). Thus,
the relevant question becomes whether, under the Written Agreement, Kingsford
was a “teacher” in his capacity as head football coach; the district court
determined that he was.
In interpreting the contract, this court must apply the Utah law of contract
construction. Under Utah law, the intentions of the parties are controlling. See
John Call Eng’g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). If
the contract is in writing and the language is unambiguous, the intention of the
-11-
parties must be determined from the words of the contract. See Atlas Corp. v.
Clovis Nat’l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). Extrinsic evidence may be
considered only if the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain. See id.
The Written Agreement defines “teacher” as “all certificated contract
personnel employed by the district and paid on the teacher’s salary schedule.”
Defendant Shackett maintains that Kingsford was not a “teacher” with respect to
his coaching position because he was not “paid on the teacher’s salary schedule”
for his coaching duties. The Teacher’s Salary Schedule is a grid found in the
Written Agreement that determines the level of pay for teachers in the SLCSD.
The grid consists of vertical “steps” and horizontal “lanes.” Vertical “steps”
represent increases in salary that are awarded based on longevity within the
SLCSD. A teacher also gains higher pay by shifting horizontal “lanes,” which is
done by achieving higher levels of education.
When Kingsford was terminated as head football coach, he had obtained the
highest possible pay allowed at that time under the Teacher’s Salary Schedule
grid: $43,982. Because of Kingsford’s coaching obligations, however, he
received an additional $5,730 beyond the maximum allowed under the Teacher’s
Salary Schedule grid. Thus, Kingsford’s total salary at the time he was
terminated was $49,712.
-12-
According to Article 18 of the Written Agreement, which is entitled
“EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES,” individual schools within the SLCSD
such as Highland are given funds “to be used for payment of teaching personnel
directing the extracurricular activities.” An individual school can allocate these
funds through a system developed on its own or by adopting the recommended
pay scale outlined in Article 18 of the Written Agreement. The record indicates
that Kingsford was paid for his head football coaching duties in accordance with
the recommended extracurricular activities pay scale found in Article 18 of the
Written Agreement (as opposed to the Teacher’s Salary Schedule), with additional
pay received for his involvement in four weeks of summer camps and his position
as assistant basketball coach.
Kingsford argues that he was a “teacher” under the Written Agreement in
his position as head football coach because he was treated as such by Highland
and the SLCSD. Kingsford notes that football is a curricular course at Highland
for which students receive grades, that Utah law requires high school head
football coaches to be certified secondary teachers, that various SLCSD
documents refer to his position as “coach/teacher,” and that his coaching pay
stubs indicate that he was on “contract.” Under the Written Agreement, however,
Kingsford was a “teacher” only if he was “paid on the teacher’s salary schedule”
with respect to his coaching position. As previously indicated, Kingsford
-13-
received extra compensation for his coaching activities in addition to his salary
under the Teacher’s Salary Schedule.
Kingsford argues that he was “paid on the teacher’s salary schedule”
because his head coaching pay consisted of thirteen days of pay at his teacher’s
salary. Because his teaching salary was calculated with reference to the Teacher’s
Salary Schedule and his coaching pay was tied to his teaching salary, Kingsford
argues, his coaching pay was also on the Teacher’s Salary Schedule. That
Kingsford’s coaching pay was based on his teachers’s salary, however, does not
mean that he was “paid on” the Teacher’s Salary Schedule. Neither the additional
pay Kingsford received from his coaching duties nor his total compensation for
the year he was terminated as coach are figures that can be found on the
Teacher’s Salary Schedule.
Kingsford also notes that many of his salary “lane” changes on the
Teacher’s Salary Schedule were for football-related courses that he attended after
beginning his employment at Highland. That Kingsford was allowed lane changes
for football-related courses is fully consistent with Kingsford’s role as instructor
of the football class. When Kingsford was removed as “football coach” at
Highland, he was terminated as both instructor of the football class and as head
football coach. Despite the fact that Kingsford is no longer instructor of the
football class, he remains employed as a teacher and continues to receive the
-14-
highest possible salary on the teacher’s salary schedule. Kingsford’s due process
claim, however, is not based on his removal as the instructor of the football class;
he has not argued that the Written Agreement provided him with a legitimate
claim to continued employment teaching the exact same classes as he had
previously taught. Rather, he has argued that the Written Agreement provided
him with an expectation of continued employment as coach of the football team.
Under the Written Agreement, Kingsford had a legitimate claim of continued
employment as coach only if he was a “teacher” in his coaching responsibilities.
Kingsford was not a “teacher” in his role as football coach, however, because he
was not “paid on the teacher’s salary schedule” for his football coaching duties.
That Kingsford, in his role as instructor of the football class, received lane
changes for the football-related classes he attended is inconsequential to how
Kingsford was paid in his position as football coach. Thus, the Written
Agreement does not create a property interest by Kingsford in his position as head
football coach.
Kingsford also claims that a property interest in continued employment as
head football coach was created by an implied agreement with the SLCSD that he
would be terminated only for cause. Under Utah law, unless there is an
employment contract with a definite term of duration, the employment is
presumed to be at-will. See Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 53 (Utah
-15-
1991). Because Kingsford did not sign a coaching contract with a definite term of
duration, his employment as football coach is presumed to be at-will under Utah
law. This presumption, however, “can be overcome by an affirmative showing by
the plaintiff that the parties . . . impliedly . . . agreed to terminate the relationship
for cause alone.” Berube v. Fashion Ctr, Ltd, 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989).
Thus, under Utah law, it is possible that Kingsford developed a legitimate
claim of entitlement to continued employment as football coach based on an
implied-in-fact promise that he would not be terminated as football coach except
for cause. See id.; cf. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972) (stating
that whether a property interest was created by understanding between teacher and
administration is a factual question). An implied-in-fact promise to terminate
only for cause can be demonstrated by “the conduct of the parties, announced
personnel policies, practices of that particular trade or industry, or other
circumstances which show the existence of such a promise.” Berube, 771 P.2d at
1044. The determination of whether an implied-in-fact promise to terminate only
for cause exists is a question of fact for the jury, with the employee bearing the
burden of proof. See id.
In support of his implied-in-fact property interest theory, Kingsford points
to the deposition testimony of Defendant Shackett and the SLCSD Assistant
Superintendent over Personnel at the time Kingsford was terminated indicating
-16-
that coaches should only be fired if there is some “logical rationale” or
“reasonable justification,” and not for an “arbitrary or capricious” reason. In
addition, Kingsford also stated in a deposition that he believed he would retain
the coaching position for as long as he wanted it, and that he thought he could
only be terminated as coach for “[t]he way that you treated kids [and] wins and
losses.” This evidence, taken in the aggregate, suggests that there may have been
a policy at Highland and the SLCSD that coaches would only be terminated for
cause. Such a policy could constitute an implied-in-fact promise under Utah law
that Kingsford would only be terminated for cause. See id.
There is also substantial evidence in the record, however, that coaches at
Highland serve at the discretion of the principal. Because there is conflicting
evidence on the factual question of whether there was an implied-in-fact promise
to Kingsford that he would be removed as football coach only for cause, the issue
cannot be decided at the summary judgment stage. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Thus, it is necessary to remand this issue to the district court.
C. Qualified Immunity
The district court denied Defendant Shackett’s motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. Government officials are shielded from
liability for civil actions for damages unless their conduct violated clearly-
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
-17-
have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It is the
plaintiff’s burden to prove that the law on which he relies was clearly established
at the time of the events underlying his suit. See Hilliard v. City & County of
Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991). Although a plaintiff need not
demonstrate that the specific action in question has previously been held
unlawful, the right allegedly violated must be sufficiently clear so that a
reasonable official could understand that his conduct violated that right. See id.
There is a factual dispute as to whether there was an implied-in-fact
promise that Kingsford would only be dismissed as football coach for cause.
When a defendant has moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity,
this court construes the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See
Calhoun v. Gaines, 982 F.2d 1470, 1474 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992). Thus, it must be
assumed that there was an implied-in-fact promise that Kingsford would only be
terminated from his football coaching position for cause.
It is well established that an implied-in-fact contract is a source of state law
that can potentially create an expectation of continued public employment. See,
e.g., Perry, 408 U.S. at 601-02; Carnes, 922 F.2d at 1509. The theory under
which Kingsford attempts to prove a property interest was well established under
Utah law. Kingsford has offered evidence indicating that it was the policy of the
SLCSD and Highland that coaches would only be fired for cause. The Utah
-18-
Supreme Court stated in 1989 that an implied-in-fact promise limiting the reasons
for dismissal may arise from “the conduct of the parties, announced personnel
policies, practices of that particular trade or industry, or other circumstances
which show the existence of such a promise.” Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044. Thus, it
was clearly established under Utah law that such a policy on the part of Highland
and the SLCSD could create a legitimate expectation of continued employment as
football coach. The decision of the district court denying Shackett qualified
immunity is affirmed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this court AFFIRMS the district court’s
opinion in part and REMANDS for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
-19-
Kingsford v. Salt Lake City School District
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2001-04-24
Citations: 247 F.3d 1123
Copy Citations