In Re the Marriage of Knudson

No. 80-267
IN THE SUPRENE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
STANLEY M. KNUDSON,
Petitioner and Appellant,
VS .
FRANCES ANNE KNUDSON,
Respondent and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Hill.
Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Berger, Anderson Law Firm, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
John F. Iwen, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted on briefs: December 4, 1980
Decided: E B 9- lgtgf
led :
-pa?+ w

Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.

S t a n l e y Knudson and F r a n c e s Knudson o b t a i n e d a d e c r e e

o f d i s s o l u t i o n i n t h e H i l l County D i s t r i c t C o u r t on October

1 2 , 1978. The husband a p p e a l e d from t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t

p r o v i s i o n s of t h e d e c r e e . The judgment was r e v e r s e d i n p a r t

and a f f i r m e d i n p a r t by t h i s C o u r t . Knudson v . Knudson

(1980) Mont. , 606 P.2d 130, 37 St.Rep. 147.
P o s t - a p p e a l motions were f i l e d by b o t h p a r t i e s , and t h e

husband now a p p e a l s from o r d e r s of the D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e -

q u i r i n g him t o pay i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e of t h e d e c r e e and

t o pay t h e w i f e a r e a s o n a b l e r e n t a l v a l u e f o r t h e r e a l

p r o p e r t y awarded t o h e r under t h e d e c r e e and d i s p o s i n g of

the p a r t i e s 1 personal property.

I n August 1978 t h e p a r t i e s o b t a i n e d a d i v o r c e d e c r e e

p u r p o r t i n g t o d i v i d e t h e e s t a t e 60 p e r c e n t t o t h e husband

and 40 p e r c e n t t o t h e w i f e . Under t h i s d e c r e e t h e w i f e w a s

t o r e c e i v e t h e farmhouse and o u t b u i l d i n g s , v a l u e d a t $87,000,

and $113,000 i n c a s h , p a y a b l e $13,000 i n September 1978 and

$6,000 a n n u a l l y t h e r e a f t e r . The w i f e moved t o amend t h i s

d e c r e e , and i n October 1978 t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d h e r

motion. The c o u r t found t h a t s h e was e n t i t l e d t o a n a d d i -

t i o n a l $20,000, r e p r e s e n t i n g h e r s h a r e of h e r h u s b a n d ' s

r a i l r o a d r e t i r e m e n t p e n s i o n which had n o t been o r i g i n a l l y

c o n s i d e r e d by t h e c o u r t . The husband a p p e a l e d t o t h i s C o u r t

s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s of t h e i n c l u s i o n of t h e p e n s i o n . We

r e v e r s e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i n c l u s i o n of t h e p e n s i o n and a f -

f i r m e d t h e b a l a n c e of t h e d e c r e e . See Knudson v . Knudson,

supra.

Both p a r t i e s t h e n f i l e d p o s t - a p p e a l motions. The

D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t t h e w i f e was e n t i t l e d t o a r e a s o n -
a b l e r e n t from t h e husband f o r t h e t i m e he o c c u p i e d t h e

farmhouse awarded t o h e r . The c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t $6,000

was a f a i r r e n t f o r t h e p e r i o d between October 1978 and

A p r i l 1980. The c o u r t a l s o r e q u i r e d t h e husband t o pay

i n t e r e s t on t h e $13,000 payment which was due i n September

1978 and t h e $6,000 payment due i n September 1979. The

D i s t r i c t Court a l s o reconsidered t h e property d i s t r i b u t i o n

and p u r p o r t e d t o e q u a l l y d i v i d e c e r t a i n p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y

n o t mentioned i n t h e o r i g i n a l d e c r e e .

S t a n l e y Knudson o f f e r s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r t h i s C o u r t ' s

review:

1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n r e c o n s i d e r i n g d i s t r i -

b u t i o n of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y a f t e r t h e c a u s e had been remanded

by t h i s C o u r t ?

2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n i t s a c t u a l d i s t r i -

bution of t h e personal property?

Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n d i r e c t i n g S t a n l e y

Knudson t o pay t o h i s w i f e r e n t and i n t e r e s t d a t i n g from t h e

c o u r t ' s decree?

I n o u r r e s o l u t i o n of t h e f i r s t a p p e a l of t h i s c a s e , w e

ruled:

"The d e c r e e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d
e x c e p t i n s o f a r a s i t awards t h e w i f e a s h a r e
of t h e husband's r a i l r o a d r e t i r e m e n t pension.
T h i s c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
f o r amendment of judgment i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h
t h i s opinion." 606 P.2d a t 135, 37 St.Rep.
a t 153.

The husband c o n t e n d s i n t h i s a p p e a l t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t

Court i s r e l i t i g a t i n g i s s u e s regarding t h e couple's personal

property. H e a r g u e s t h a t t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y d i s p o s e d of

by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had a l r e a d y been d i s t r i b u t e d and t h a t

d i s t r i b u t i o n a f f i r m e d by t h i s C o u r t i n Knudson v . Knudson,

supra. W e do n o t agree.
 On May 1 4 , 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t , " [tihe
i s s u e of t h e d i v i s i o n of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y , mainly household

f u r n i s h i n g s , l o c a t e d a t t h e f a m i l y r e s i d e n c e and r e s p o n -

d e n t ' s a p a r t m e n t , was n o t r a i s e d a t t h e o r i g i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s

o r d i s p o s e d of by t h e c o u r t ' s d e c r e e . " This Court can f i n d

no s p e c i f i c d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y which w a s a l r e a d y

d i s p o s e d o f by t h e f i r s t d e c r e e . To t h e e x t e n t t h e D i s t r i c t

Court determined t h e p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s i n personal p r o p e r t y

p r e v i o u s l y unaccounted f o r , o r e x c l u d e d from, t h e f i r s t

d e c r e e , t h e h u s b a n d ' s argument t h a t t h e judge was r e l i t i -

g a t i n g t h e personal property d i s t r i b u t i o n i s unpersuasive.

W e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e judge w a s m e r e l y c o m p l e t i n g h i s i n i t i a l

t a s k of s e t t l i n g t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . I n view of t h e f a c t

t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e household f u r n i s h i n g s was a

c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e c o u r t ' s o r i g i n a l p r o c e e d i n g , w e a r e

o b l i g e d t o r e s p e c t i t s judgment i n t h e a b s e n c e of a r b i t r a r y

a c t i o n o r t h e f a i l u r e t o employ c o n s c i o u s judgment. I n re

M a r r i a g e of Jacobson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 600 P.2d

1183, 36 St.Rep. 1773, 1776.

Nor do we a c c e p t h u s b a n d ' s argument r e g a r d i n g t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s i m p o s i t i o n of r e n t . Husband m a i n t a i n s t h a t

had t h e w i f e e i t h e r made a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a p o s t i n g of a

s u p e r s e d e a s bond, moved t o d i s s o l v e t h e s t a y of e x e c u t i o n ,
o r asked t h e c o u r t t o impose a r e n t a l a s p a r t of t h e s t a y o f

e x e c u t i o n , h e would have had t h e o p t i o n of c o n t i n u e d occu-

pancy o r removal. Because of h i s w i f e ' s i n a c t i o n , t h e
husband c o n t e n d s h e w a s l i m i t e d i n h i s c h o i c e s and s h o u l d

n o t be r e q u i r e d t o pay r e n t .

W e w i l l n o t a l l o w t h e husband t o b e n e f i t from h i s own

recalcitrance. From t h e d a t e of t h e i n i t i a l d e c r e e g r a n t i n g

h i s w i f e t h e p r o p e r t y , h e knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t h e
was u s i n g and occupying r e a l t y which w a s n o t h i s own. We

f i n d t h a t i t was h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , n o t t h e w i f e ' s , to

proceed toward a d e t e r m i n a t i o n and p r o t e c t i o n of h i s r i g h t s .

T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t a l l o w a p e r s o n t o b e n e f i t from h i s own

inaction. A s a m a t t e r of f a i r n e s s , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e

h u s b a n d ' s occupancy of h i s w i f e ' s p r o p e r t y from t h e d a t e of

t h e i n i t i a l d e c r e e makes him l i a b l e t o h e r f o r r e a s o n a b l e

r e n t a l value. I n determining t h a t value, w e a r e obliged t o

r e s p e c t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment, and i n t h e a b s e n c e of

a c l e a r a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n , t h a t judgment w i l l n o t be

d i s t u r b e d on a p p e a l . N such a b u s e took p l a c e h e r e .
o Lumby

v. Doetch ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. , 600 P.2d 200, 202, 36

St.Rep. 1684, 1687.

I n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e w i f e c l a i m e d i n t e r e s t on

$13,000 from t h e d a t e of t h e judgment and on $6,000 from

September 1, 1979. Husband does n o t deny l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e

i n t e r e s t on t h e $6,000, b u t a s s e r t s t h a t b e c a u s e of t h e s t a y

o f e x e c u t i o n , h e owes no i n t e r e s t on t h e $13,000.

S e c t i o n 25-9-205, MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t i n t e r e s t i s pay-

a b l e on judgments a t t h e r a t e of 10 p e r c e n t p e r annum; b u t ,

under S e c t i o n 2 , Chap. 649, Laws of 1979, t h a t r a t e a p p l i e s

o n l y t o t h e b a l a n c e owing on judgments from and a f t e r J u l y

1, 1979. P r i o r t o t h a t d a t e , t h e p r e v i o u s l e g a l r a t e of 6

percent applies.

Rule 31, M.R.App.Civ.P., provides i n r e l e v a n t p a r t

t h a t , " [ i l f a judgment f o r money i n a c i v i l c a s e i s a f f i r m e d ,

whatever i n t e r e s t i s a l l o w e d by law s h a l l b e p a y a b l e from

t h e d a t e t h e judgment was r e n d e r e d o r made i n t h e d i s t r i c t

court ."

The husband m a i n t a i n s t h a t when h e l i m i t e d h i s a p p e a l
t o t h e i s s u e of h i s r e t i r e m e n t p e n s i o n , h i s w i f e c o u l d have
e l e c t e d t o a c c e p t t h e o t h e r b e n e f i t s i n t h e d e c r e e and c o u l d

have a s k e d t h e c o u r t t o d i s s o l v e t h e s t a y of e x e c u t i o n ; t h a t

h e r f a i l u r e t o do s o o r t o a s k t h a t t h e c o u r t r e q u i r e t h e

payment of r e n t f o r t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y a s a c o n d i t i o n t o t h e

s t a y , amounted t o a w a i v e r of any c l a i m on h e r p a r t f o r

i n t e r e s t o r r e n t ; t h a t , i n f a c t , t h e s t a y was n o t e n t e r e d

u n t i l a f t e r s h e f i l e d h e r n o t i c e of a p p e a l ; and t h a t i t c a n

be assumed t h a t w i f e p e r m i t t e d t h e s t a y t o c o n t i n u e b e c a u s e

i t inured t o her benefit. W do n o t a g r e e .
e

W h e l d i n Resner v. N o r t h e r n Pac. R . R .
e Co. (1973), 161

Mont. 177, 505 P.2d 86, t h a t a judgment b e a r s i n t e r e s t from

t h e d a t e of i t s e n t r y i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t even though i t i s

s u b j e c t t o d i r e c t a t t a c k , c i t i n g Stockton Theatres, Inc. v.

Palermo ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 55 Cal.2d 439, 1 C a l . R p t r .
1 580, 582, 360

P.2d 76, 78. Although t h e s e c a s e s d i d n o t i n v o l v e a s t a y of

judgment, t h e y s t a n d f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t once a p e r s o n

i s l i a b l e f o r a money judgment, and payment i s n o t made, t h e

p e r s o n e n t i t l e d t o t h e judgment i s f u r t h e r e n t i t l e d t o a

f a i r r a t e of i n t e r e s t .

The husband moved t h e c o u r t f o r a s t a y o f e x e c u t i o n .

T h e r e a f t e r , he made no a t t e m p t t o d i s s o l v e t h e s t a y h i m s e l f

o r make any a t t e m p t t o d e t e r m i n e what o b l i g a t i o n s were

accruing. T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t a l l o w t h e husband t o a v o i d

p a y i n g i n t e r e s t merely by a r g u i n g t h a t h i s w i f e d i d n o t d o

enough t o s e c u r e it. W w i l l defer t o the D i s t r i c t Court's
e

judgment i n t h i s m a t t e r , f o r w e d e t e r m i n e t h a t i n t e r e s t w a s

p r o p e r l y imposed under Rule 31, M.R.App.Civ.P., and a p p l i -

c a b l e case law.

T h i s c a u s e i s a f f i r m e d on a l l i s s u e s .
W e concur:

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Justices

T h i s c a u s e was s u b m i t t e d p r i o r t o J a n u a r y 5 , 1 9 8 1 .