In a proceeding pursuant to CFLR article 78 to review determinations of the County of Suffolk and the County of Suffolk Office of the County Comptroller dated November 21, 2003, and December 24, 2003, respectively, denying the petitioner’s request for the payment of retirement severance benefits of $98,920.90, and to compel the payment of such funds, the County of Suffolk and the County of Suffolk Office of the County Comptroller appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Mullen, J.), entered October 3, 2006, which granted the petition, annulled the determinations, and directed them to pay the petitioner the sum of $98,920.90 and to report to the New York State Retirement System that the petitioner’s salary upon retirement was $170,000 per year.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
On April 1, 2000, the petitioner was appointed to a three-year term as Fresident of Suffolk County Community College (hereinafter the college) by resolution of the Board of Trustees (hereinafter the Board) and was given an annual salary of $135,000. His contract of employment provided, inter alia, that (1) any extension of the contract would be voted by resolution of the Board, (2) his annual salary would be determined by the Board and agreed to by him, (3) he would be provided 30 days vacation annually, (4) he would be paid additional fringe benefits as set forth in the Status and Benefits Handbook for Managerial-Confidential Employees of the college, and (5) at his retirement,
By letter dated November 21, 2003, the appellants determined that the Board’s vote raising the petitioner’s salary to $170,000 per year was unauthorized, and concluded that the petitioner was entitled to a retirement severance of $69,009.69, representing the balance of a salary of $160,024.02 plus reimbursement for benefits. By letter dated December 24, 2003, the appellants further reduced the petitioner’s retirement severance to $64,215.10 by recalculating the reimbursement for personal days.
The petitioner commenced the instant proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the appellants’ determinations and to compel the payment of $98,920.90 as his retirement severance, calculated pursuant to the petitioner’s contract with the Board and the raises voted by Board resolution. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the appellants to pay to the petitioner the sum of $98,920.90, representing the balance of petitioner’s annual $170,000 salary and reimbursement for benefits, and to report to the New York State Retirement System that the petitioner’s salary at retirement was $170,000 per year.
The appellants contend that the Board’s vote to raise the petitioner’s salary to $170,000 per year and to reimburse him for unused sick time was unauthorized under Laws of Suffolk County, chapter 750, article 1 (Management Salary Plan) § 750-6.2. They also argue that the meeting in which the Board voted for the raise was not properly noticed, that the vote was unlawfully taken in executive session, and that verbatim minutes were not taken at the meeting.
The Supreme Court properly annulled the appellants’ determinations. The Board was authorized by the Education Law and regulations promulgated thereunder to vote to raise the petitioner’s salary to $170,000 per year pursuant to his employment contract (see Education Law § 6306 [2] [the board
The appellants’ alternative contention, that the vote to raise the petitioner’s salary was procedurally improper, also is without merit. There is no support in the record for the claim that the meeting was not properly noticed as to time and place, pursuant to Public Officers Law § 104 (1). Contrary to the appellants’ contention, there is no statutory requirement that notice of the agenda of the meeting be given. In addition, the revised minutes of the meeting on June 12, 2003, indicate that the vote was properly taken in the public session (see Public Officers Law § 103 [a]; § 105 [1]). Moreover, the appellants’ contention that the vote was unauthorized because verbatim minutes of the meeting were not taken is unavailing. Public Officers Law § 106 merely requires that a record or summary of the action at a meeting be taken, and the record discloses that a summary of the action was taken.
The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Schmidt, J.P., Rivera, Florio and Balkin, JJ., concur.