OPINION.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
1 (after stating the facts). The first question that will be considered, is that presented by the exceptions, in which the appellant contends that the right do recover damages was dependent upon the fact that the plaintiff would have accepted the offer mentioned in the telegram, and that such fact was conjectural and uncertain, and, therefore, could not be considered in determining the defendant’s liability for damages.
A reasonable interpretation of the telegram' is that it related to a contemplated contract of sale, in which the article of merchandise was to be shipped during the month of June at the time stated in a previous communication to the Lynch-burg Milling Company, to which the message was a reply,
Among the cases upon which the appellant relies to sustain the proposition that evidence as to' whether the plaintiff would have accepted the offer contained in the telegram; cannot be considered on the ground that it is. conj ectural and uncertain, is that of Beatty L. Co. v. Tel. Co., 44 S. E. R. (W. Va.), 309, in which the authorities are reviewed. The case was well considered and strongly supports the appellant’s contention. It is predicated upon the theory, that when there is- a failure to deliver a telegram containing an offer to sell, and the market advances, in price, the addressee cannot recover damages, unless it is made to' appear that he would have accepted the offer, and that the testimony of the addressee that he would have accepted the offer cannot be
2 The next question that will be considered is whether the presiding Judge erred in overruling the motion for nonsuit, on the ground that there was no testimony tending to show wantonness, wilfulness or recklessness, entitling the plaintiff to punitive damages. The entire name of the addressee was changed and the message was delivered to his competitor in business. This afforded at least some evidence of a reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.
3 These views practically dispose of all the exceptions, except -those assigning error on the part of the presiding Judge, in permitting the plaintiff to introduce certain testimony, which the appellant contends was irrelevant. Such testimony must necessarily be left in great measure to1 the discretion of the presiding Judge, and his ruling will not be reversed, unless, tjhere was abuse of discretion, which the appellant has failed ho show in this case.
It is the judgment of this Court, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.