Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks

Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell,
and Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice

LAWRENCE CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH CORPORATION
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR.
v. Record No. 950568 January 12, 1996

OKEY H. BROOKS, JR.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
George F. Tidey, Judge

In this appeal, we consider whether a former employee

at-will has a cause of action for wrongful discharge against

his former employer.
Okey H. Brooks, Jr., filed his motion for judgment

against Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corporation. Brooks

alleged that he was fired by Lawrence Chrysler because he

refused to perform certain repairs on a car and that his

termination violated the public policy of this Commonwealth.

Lawrence Chrysler repeatedly argued in the trial court that

Brooks does not have a cause of action for wrongful

discharge because he was an employee at-will, and his

termination did not contravene any enunciated public policy

of Virginia.

The trial court rejected Lawrence Chrysler's

assertions, and a jury returned a verdict of $90,000 in

favor of Brooks. The trial court required the plaintiff to

remit a part of his recovery, reduced the verdict to

$50,000, and entered a judgment thereon. Code § 8.01-383.1.

We awarded Lawrence Chrysler an appeal.

We will review the evidence and all reasonable

inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to

Brooks, who comes to this Court armed with a jury verdict
confirmed by the trial court. Brooks was employed as a body

shop repairman for Lawrence Chrysler. Lawrence Chrysler

relied upon Brooks to repair cars in a safe manner.

In March 1992, Lawrence Chrysler's body shop manager,

Glenn Fowlkes, requested that Brooks repair a car that had

sustained rear end damage. Fowlkes directed Brooks to

repair the car by utilizing a procedure described as

"clipping" or "sectioning." Brooks described his

conversation with Fowlkes as follows:
[Glenn Fowlkes] asked me to cut the car in
half and -- which the short term they call is
clipping. Cut it in half through the floors,
through the rocker panel and through the
windshield posts. Roll away that half and go to
the junkyard and get another half and put to that
front part and try to weld it together.

Brooks believed that this method of repair was unsafe.

Brooks testified:
[W]hat they [were] asking me to do was cut
the car in half and cut all your major panels and
all the floor panels, in which the floor panels
have all your stress conductors. They are crush
points designed in this car to crush if this car
is wrecked. If it's hit again, if I had repaired
it the way I was asked, I would be destroying all
that area.

Lawrence Chrysler's general manager fired Brooks because he
*
refused to repair the car as instructed.
Lawrence Chrysler asserts that Brooks, who admits he is

an employee at-will, does not have a legally cognizable

cause of action against it. Brooks contends that even

*
Lawrence Chrysler vigorously disputed, at trial, that
this method of repair is unsafe. Lawrence Chrysler
presented evidence that the "sectioning" procedure is
considered a safe practice in the automotive repair
industry.
though he is an employee at-will, Lawrence Chrysler

wrongfully discharged him in violation of Virginia's public

policy and that "the public policy of Virginia need not be

found in an express statutory command." We disagree with

Brooks.

Virginia strongly adheres to the common-law employment-

at-will doctrine. We have repeatedly stated:
"Virginia adheres to the common-law rule that
when the intended duration of a contract for the
rendition of services cannot be determined by fair
inference from the terms of the contract, then
either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate
the contract at will, upon giving the other party
reasonable notice.
An employee is ordinarily at liberty to leave
his employment for any reason or for no reason,
upon giving reasonable notice, without incurring
liability to his employer. Notions of fundamental
fairness underlie the concept of mutuality which
extends a corresponding freedom to the employer."

Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems, 247 Va. 98, 102,

439 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994) (quoting Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc.,

234 Va. 462, 465, 362 S.E.2d 915, 916-17 (1987)); accord
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 535, 331

S.E.2d 797, 798 (1985); Stonega Coal and Coke Co. v.

Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Va. 223, 226, 55 S.E.

551, 552 (1906).

This rule is not absolute, and we have recognized

certain very narrow exceptions. In Bowman v. State Bank of

Keysville, supra, we permitted at-will employees of a bank

to prosecute causes of action for wrongful discharge against

their former employer, State Bank of Keysville. The Bank

allegedly fired the employees, who owned shares of the

Bank's common stock, because the employees ultimately failed
to vote in favor of the Bank's proposed merger. We held

that the employees had pled valid causes of action in tort

for improper discharge from employment. The alleged

discharges violated the public policy of the Commonwealth as

enunciated in former Code § 13.1-32, now Code § 13.1-662,

which conferred upon the employees as stockholders the right

to vote. We stated:
Because the right conferred by [Code § 13.1-662]
is in furtherance of established public policy,
the employer may not lawfully use the threat of
discharge of an at-will employee as a device to
control the otherwise unfettered discretion of a
shareholder to vote freely his or her stock in the
corporation.

Bowman, 229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.

In Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., supra, we observed that
Bowman recognized an exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine limited to discharges which
violate public policy, that is, the policy
underlying existing laws designed to protect the
property rights, personal freedoms, health,
safety, or welfare of the people in general. . . .
The exception we recognized was not so broad as
to make actionable those discharges of at-will
employees which violate only private rights or
interests.

234 Va. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 918.

In Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems, supra,
we reiterated that even though we strongly adhere to the

employment-at-will doctrine, there are narrow exceptions to

that doctrine. There, we permitted two former employees,

who alleged that they had been terminated because of their

race or gender, to prosecute causes of action against their

respective former employers. We emphasized in Lockhart that

the former employers' actions, if proven, would have been

violative of Virginia's public policy against race and
gender discrimination as enunciated in Code § 2.1-715. That

statute, which is a part of the Virginia Human Rights Act,

states that it is the policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia

to "safeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth from

unlawful discrimination" because of, inter alia, race and

gender.

Brooks asserts, on brief, that "[t]o repair a car in

such a manner as was requested in this case is an obvious

violation of both statutory and common law duties, including

duties under the Consumer Protection laws, the Automobile

Salvage laws (Virginia Code §§ 46.2-1600 et seq.), and
common law duties of the dealership concerning the exercise

of due care." We simply find no language in Code §§ 46.2-

1600 through -1610 (which govern salvage, nonrepairable, and

rebuilt vehicles) that supports Brooks' position. More

telling, Brooks does not specify what precise statute that

Lawrence Chrysler purportedly contravened.

In Bowman and Lockhart, the plaintiffs, who were
permitted to pursue causes of action against their former

employers, identified specific Virginia statutes in which

the General Assembly had established public policies that

the former employers had contravened. Unlike the plaintiffs

in Bowman and Lockhart, Brooks does not have a cause of

action for wrongful discharge because he is unable to

identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy

that Lawrence Chrysler violated. We also reject Brooks'

attempt to expand the narrow exception we recognized in
Bowman by relying upon so-called "common law duties of the
dealership."

Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial

court and enter final judgment here on behalf of Lawrence

Chrysler.

Reversed and final judgment.