Lawson v. Callahan

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 96-41002

Summary Calendar.

Darlene B. LAWSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

John J. CALLAHAN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.

May 5, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas.

Before WISDOM, JOLLY and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Senior Circuit Judge:

Darlene Lawson appeals the district court's affirmance of the

denial of her claim for social security benefits. She contends

that the administrative law judge erred by not inquiring further

into her apparent waiver of counsel, by not posing a proper

hypothetical question to the vocational expert, and by not

considering her in a higher age category.

Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we

AFFIRM the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for benefits for the

reasons stated by the magistrate judge and adopted by the district

court.

Lawson also alleges that the district court did not report her

case as a motion that has been pending for more than six months as

required by the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 476.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Lawson asked the district court for

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declaratory judgment that the district court was in violation of

the Civil Justice Reform Act.

The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) was enacted by

Congress in response to growing national concern regarding the

expense and delay encountered by most parties engaged in

litigation.1 The Act provided for the creation of local Civil

Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans to effectuate the goals

of the Act and also for oversight by judicial advisory groups

designed to streamline what was to be a national effort. What the

Act did not do was create a cause of action allowing parties before

the court to assert the court's non-compliance with its own plan or

with the Act itself.

In the instant case, the plaintiff does not have standing to

challenge the district court's reporting practices under the CJRA.

The requirements for standing were articulated by the Supreme Court

aptly in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for

Separation of Church and State.2 In that case, the Court stated

that Article III of the United States Constitution gives federal

courts jurisdiction over certain cases or controversies.3 Proof of

a "case or controversy" requires a litigant to show that: (1) "he

personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a

result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant" [injury

1
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089 (1990).
2
454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).
3
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

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in fact]; (2) "that the injury fairly can be traced to the

challenged action" [causation]; and (3) that the injury "is likely

to be redressed by a favorable decision" [redressability].4 The

plaintiff here has fallen short on all counts. Her complaint is

that the district court failed to report her case as a motion

pending for over six months. She has not alleged, however, any

particular injury suffered by her as a result of the failure to

report.5 Necessarily, having shown no injury, neither can the

plaintiff show causation. Finally, she cannot show that a

favorable decision by the court would redress any alleged injury.

As the plaintiff had no standing to assert a claim under the CJRA,

the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain the merits

of the motion.

To the extent that the plaintiff relies on the Declaratory

Judgment Act, her motion must similarly fail.6 Section 2201 states

that "in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ...

any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate

pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any

interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further

relief is or could be sought".7 The meaning of "actual

4
Id. at 472, 102 S.Ct. at 758-59.
5
This assumes that the district court is in fact obligated to
report these cases under the CJRA. We express no opinion, however,
as to the merit in that assertion.
6
28 U.S.C. § 2201 et. seq.
7
We question whether the motion at issue is a "appropriate
pleading" within the meaning of the Act. Here, the Social Security
Commissioner is not an adverse, or even interested, party with

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controversy" for the purposes of this section is identical to the

meaning of "case or controversy" for the purposes of Article III,

as elaborated above.8 As such, for the reasons given, the

plaintiff has not satisfied the "actual controversy" requirement of

§ 2201. Moreover, it is well settled that this section does not

confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court where none

otherwise exists.9 Consequently, the plaintiff's appeal of the

denial of her motion for declaratory judgment is DISMISSED for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. Further, as stated above, the

district court's denial of benefits is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

respect to the resolution of this motion. Rather, the plaintiff
asked the court for declaratory judgment against itself. We can
locate no federal case in which this has been done under the CJRA.
We are frankly unable to determine why the court entertained the
merits of the motion in the first instance.
8
Texas v. West Publishing Co., 882 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.1989).
9
Port Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148, 149 (5th Cir.1988);
See also Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. Bergland, 664 F.2d 818 (10th
Cir.1981); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 596 F.2d
914 (9th Cir.1979).

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