Lee County v. Town of St. Charles

PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and
Lemons, JJ., and Compton, S.J.

LEE COUNTY

v. Record No. 012543 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
September 13, 2002
TOWN OF ST. CHARLES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY
Ford C. Quillen, Judge

In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred

in ruling that a board member of a water and sewer authority

must reside within the authority's service area to be qualified

to hold that office.

In 1967, Lee County (the County) and the Town of St.

Charles (the Town) entered into a joint resolution to create the

St. Charles Water and Sewer Authority (the Authority) to provide

water and sewer services to the residents of a designated

service area. In the joint resolution, the County and the Town

appointed five members to the Authority's Board of Directors

(the Board). However, the joint resolution and the Authority's

articles of incorporation and by-laws were silent concerning

qualification requirements for future Board members.

In 1992, the Town filed a declaratory judgment action

against the County to determine the respective rights of the two

entities to appoint members to the Board. In 1997, the trial

court entered an order declaring that the Town and the County
each have the right to appoint two members to the Board and that

the fifth board member shall be appointed jointly by the Town

and the County. The court did not address the issue whether

members of the Board must reside within the Authority's service

area. 1

The present litigation began after Nell Stewart, who was

serving as the joint appointee on the Board, moved her residence

from St. Charles to Pennington Gap. Although Stewart's new

residence is located within the County, that residence is

outside the Authority's service area.

The Town Council voted to remove Stewart from the Board and

to appoint a new member as her replacement. The Town requested

that the County also act to remove Stewart from the Board and to

designate its choice for a joint appointee to replace her. The

County, by vote of its board of supervisors, refused the Town's

request.

The Town filed the present declaratory judgment action

against the County, asking that the trial court determine, among

other things, the qualification requirements for membership on

the Board. After hearing argument of counsel, the court held

that all Board members must be residents of the Authority's

service area. In explaining its decision, the court stated:

1
These rulings were made by the Honorable James C.
Roberson.

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 This [residency] requirement makes sense in that a
member of [the Authority], in effect, represents all
the people within the service area of the Authority.
Therefore, to properly represent the citizens of the
service area, that member should be a resident of the
defined service area of the Authority. Without this
requirement, a person could live in another area of
the county (or even in another county or state) served
by a different water and sewer authority and yet make
decisions which directly affect the lives of the
citizens served by [the Authority].

The trial court disqualified Stewart from membership on the

Board and directed the Town and the County to appoint jointly a

replacement member who met this residency requirement. The

County appeals from this judgment.

The County argues that the trial court erred in imposing a

service area residency requirement for Board membership and

notes that Code § 15.2-5113(A), which addresses the selection of

board members of a water and sewer authority, does not specify

such a requirement. The County observes that numerous other

statutes impose a residency requirement for appointment to

various offices, boards, and commissions in the Commonwealth.

Therefore, the County argues, had the General Assembly intended

that all board members of a water and sewer authority be

residents of that authority's service area, the General Assembly

would have expressly stated such a requirement. The County also

notes that the joint resolution establishing the Authority, as

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well as its articles of incorporation and by-laws, do not

contain a residency requirement for all Board members.

In response, the Town argues that Code § 15.2-5113(A) does

not prohibit the imposition of a residency requirement, and that

a residency requirement can be inferred from the fact that the

joint resolution establishing the Authority named as Board

members individuals who were all residents of the Authority's

service area. The Town also notes that from the date the

Authority was created until the date Stewart moved to Pennington

Gap, all Board members had been residents of the Authority’s

service area. Finally, the Town argues that the trial court’s

1997 order implicitly established a residency requirement for

the fifth Board member by requiring that this member be

appointed jointly by the County and the Town. We disagree with

the Town’s arguments.

In our review of the trial court’s judgment, we first

observe that the trial court’s legal conclusions are not binding

on this Court, and we are accorded the same opportunity as the

trial court to consider the issue of law presented. See Eure v.

Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 263 Va. 624, 631, 561

S.E.2d 663, 667 (2002); Craig v. Dye, 259 Va. 533, 537, 526

S.E.2d 9, 11 (2000). This issue of law is resolved by our

examination of Code § 15.2-5113(A).

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 Under basic principles of statutory construction, we

consider all relevant provisions of a statute and do not isolate

particular words or phrases. Industrial Dev. Auth. v. Board of

Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002);

Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001).

When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we are

bound by the plain meaning of that statutory language.

Industrial Dev. Auth., 263 Va. at 353, 559 S.E.2d at 623; Shelor

Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 479, 544 S.E.2d 345, 348

(2001). Thus, when the General Assembly has used words that

have a plain meaning, courts cannot give those words a

construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly

meant something other than that which it actually expressed.

Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677, 554 S.E.2d 88, 90

(2001); Halifax Corp. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 262 Va. 91,

100, 546 S.E.2d 696, 702 (2001).

Code § 15.2-5113(A) provides, in relevant part:

The powers of each authority created by the governing
bodies of two or more localities shall be exercised by
the number of authority board members specified in its
articles of incorporation, which shall be not less
than one member from each participating locality and
not less than a total of five members. The board
members of an authority shall be selected in the
manner and for the terms provided by the agreement
. . . or concurrent ordinances or resolutions creating
the authority.

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 We conclude that this statutory language is plain and

unambiguous. That language provides for the selection of board

members of a water and sewer authority and requires that at

least one person from each participating locality be included

among the appointees to such an authority board. However,

compliance with this requirement is not an issue here because

the Town does not argue, and the record does not show, that Nell

Stewart was the sole resident from the Town serving on the

Board.

The above requirement is the sole restriction contained in

Code § 15.2-5113(A) concerning the residence of water and sewer

authority board members. Moreover, contrary to the trial

court's interpretation, the statute does not require that each

person appointed by a locality to a water and sewer authority

board reside within that authority's service area. When the

General Assembly has intended to impose a residency requirement

for service on boards, authorities, and commissions in the

Commonwealth, it has done so explicitly. See, e.g., Code

§ 15.2-4203(B) (establishing residency requirement for certain

members of planning district commissions); Code § 15.2-4904(C)

(mandating residency requirement for directors of industrial

development authorities); Code § 15.2-5204 (providing that

members of hospital or health center commissions be residents of

political subdivisions they represent); Code § 15.2-6403(A)

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(requiring that board members of regional industrial facilities

authorities be residents of appointing member locality).

Finally, we note that the 1997 order entered by Judge

Roberson did not address the issue of a residency requirement

for Board members. Nor did the provision in that order for the

joint appointment of one Board member implicitly impose any

residency requirement for that member, because the record does

not show that the Town's appointment power is restricted to the

selection of residents from the Authority's service area. Thus,

we hold that the trial court erred in imposing a service area

residency requirement for all appointments to the Board and in

concluding that Nell Stewart is disqualified from serving on the

Board because she resides outside the Authority's service area. 2

For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's

judgment and enter final judgment declaring that there is no

requirement that every Board member be a resident of the

Authority's service area and, thus, that Nell Stewart is not

disqualified from serving on the Board based on her place of

residence and she is entitled to remain in office for the

duration of her present term.

2
We need not address the issue whether the County and the
Town had the power to impose a residency requirement for the
appointment of all Board members. The joint resolution
establishing the Authority, the Authority's articles of
incorporation, and its by-laws do not provide such a
requirement.

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 Reversed and final judgment.

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