Lee v. Wetzel

Revised March 8, 2001

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 00-30266
_____________________

HENRY LEE, SR

Petitioner - Appellant

v.

MONICA WETZEL, Warden, Federal Prison Camp,
Pensacola, Florida

Respondent - Appellee

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
_________________________________________________________________

March 7, 2001

Before KING, Chief Judge, and ALDISERT* and BENAVIDES, Circuit
Judges.

KING, Chief Judge:

Petitioner appeals the district court’s denial of his

petition for writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241. Contrary to the approach taken by the district court, we

do not consider the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.

*
Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by
designation.
Instead, we address the question whether the District Court for

the Eastern District of Louisiana had jurisdiction to decide the

merits of the petition. Specifically, we decide whether the

District Court for the Northern District of Florida, the district

in which Petitioner was incarcerated at the time he filed his

§ 2241 petition, properly transferred the petition to the Eastern

District of Louisiana, the district in which Petitioner was

originally sentenced. For the following reasons, we conclude

that the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana was

without jurisdiction to rule on Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is VACATED, and

the case is REMANDED with instructions to DISMISS without

prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 17, 1989, a jury convicted Petitioner Henry Lee,

Sr. in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(the “Eastern District”) for using and carrying a firearm in

relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924.1 In 1992, Lee filed his first motion for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. The Eastern District denied the motion, and this

court affirmed.

1
Lee was also convicted of conspiring to distribute
cocaine hydrocloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and for
possessing cocaine hydrocloride with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

2
 In 1995, however, the Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United

States, which construed the term “use” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)

to mean that the defendant “actively employed the firearm during

and in relation to the predicate crime.” 516 U.S. 137, 150

(1995). Approximately five months later, Lee filed his second

§ 2255 motion in the Eastern District, asserting that under

Bailey, he was innocent of the firearm charge. Because this

motion was successive and Lee had failed to obtain the requisite

certification from this court, the Eastern District denied the

motion without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) (requiring

certification by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals that

the successive motion is based on newly discovered evidence or a

new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme

Court).

In 1997, Lee filed his first petition for habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Eastern District. This § 2241

petition was dismissed because, at the time of filing, Lee was

incarcerated in another district. Then, on May 18, 1998, this

court denied Lee’s request for certification to file a successive

§ 2255 motion to challenge the firearm conviction under Bailey.

This court determined that the successive motion did not meet the

requirements of § 2255 in that Lee failed to make a prima facie

showing that this § 2255 motion either contained newly discovered

evidence or was based upon a new rule of constitutional law made

retroactive by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

3
 Finally, on October 28, 1998, Lee filed the present § 2241

petition for habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the

Northern District of Florida (the “Northern District”) where he

was incarcerated. Lee claims that he was erroneously found

guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), again basing this

claim on Bailey. The Government moved to dismiss the § 2241

petition, arguing that Lee was misusing the § 2241 petition and

that the appropriate avenue of relief was through § 2255.

The Northern District denied the Government’s motion to

dismiss, noting that while no court in the Eleventh Circuit has

decided the issue, other courts of appeals have concluded that a

§ 2241 petition is the appropriate vehicle for raising a

Bailey claim.2 After denying the Government’s motion, the

Northern District decided that to “advance the interest of

judicial economy,” the case should be transferred to the Eastern

District, the district of sentencing.

When the petition reached the Eastern District, the district

court considered the merits of the case and determined that Lee

had not shown that he was actually innocent of the firearm

conviction and, thus, was barred from seeking relief. Lee timely

appealed.

2
In fact, this court has also found that a Bailey claim
may be brought through a § 2241 petition. See Reyes-Requena v.
United States, No. CIV.A. 99-41254, 2001 WL 197931, at *11 (5th
Cir. Feb. 28, 2001) (“Thus, Reyes meets our stringent savings
clause test and is permitted to file his Bailey claim under
§ 2241 in the district court of his incarceration[.]”).

4
 II. PROPRIETY OF THE TRANSFER

The Government does not challenge this appeal on

jurisdictional grounds; however, “we must always be sure of our

appellate jurisdiction and, if there is doubt, we must address

it, sua sponte if necessary.” United States v. Key, 205 F.3d

773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting

Castaneda v. Falcon, 166 F.3d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Moreover, not only must we be confident of our own jurisdiction,

but we are required to ensure that the district court also had

jurisdiction to consider the merits. See Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1998); see also Solsona

v. Warden, 821 F.2d 1129, 1132 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[W]e raise

sua sponte the question of the district court’s jurisdiction.”).

As such, “[i]f the district court lacked jurisdiction, ‘[o]ur

jurisdiction extends not to the merits but merely for the purpose

of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the

suit.’” Key, 205 F.3d at 774 (second alteration in original)

(quoting N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 882 (5th

Cir. 1998)).

In accepting the transfer, the Eastern District noted that

the Northern District “exercised its discretion to transfer to

this court for determination of whether Lee is actually innocent

of the firearm conviction,” Lee v. Weztel, 49 F. Supp. 2d 875,

877 (E.D. La. 1999), and concluded that “the actual innocence

5
issue is best resolved in this court where Lee was tried and

sentenced, and the offices of the United States Attorney and the

Federal Public Defender who participated in the trial are

located.” Id.

We conclude that the Northern District did not have the

“discretion” to transfer Lee’s § 2241 petition from its district,

where Lee was incarcerated at the time of filing, to the Eastern

District. First, § 2241 confers upon federal courts the

authority to grant writs of habeas corpus “within their

respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994). While this

court has not addressed the issue in these precise circumstances,

we have firmly stated that the district of incarceration is the

only district that has jurisdiction to entertain a defendant’s

§ 2241 petition.3 See Hooker v. Sivley, 187 F.3d 680, 682 (5th

Cir. 1999) (“The district court likewise lacked jurisdiction to

entertain Hooker’s pleading as a § 2241 petition: Such a petition

3
While this court has held that “a section 2241 petition
that seeks to challenge the validity of a federal sentence must
be either dismissed or construed as a section 2255 motion,” Pack
v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000), we have also
observed that § 2255 “contains a ‘savings clause,’ which acts as
a limited exception to this general rule.” Id.; see also Kinder
v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 894 (2001). A petition for habeas corpus filed under § 2241
“attacks the manner in which a sentence is carried out,” Pack,
218 F.3d at 451, and must be filed in the district with
jurisdiction over the prisoner or his custodian. See id.; see
also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 495
(1973). In contrast, a § 2255 petition, which contests the
validity of the sentence, must be filed in the sentencing court.
See Pack, 218 F.3d at 451.

6
must be filed in the district where the prisoner is incarcerated.

As Hooker is incarcerated in Talladega, Alabama, only the

district court for the Northern District of Alabama would have

jurisdiction to entertain his § 2241 petition.” (internal

citations omitted)); Story v. Collins, 920 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th

Cir. 1991) (“If the petitioner is a federal prisoner, . . . the

district court still must have jurisdiction over the prisoner or

his custodian [to invoke the jurisdictional basis of § 2241].”).

Second, our conclusion today — that the district of

sentencing does not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of a

§ 2241 petition, unless the petitioner or his custodian is also

located there — is consistent with the history of § 2241 and

§ 2255. One of the purposes behind the 1948 enactment of § 2255

was “to minimize the difficulties encountered in habeas corpus

hearings by affording the same rights in another and more

convenient forum.” United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219

(1952). Before the enactment of § 2255, there was “a great

increase in the number of applications for habeas corpus filed in

the federal courts by state and federal prisoners.” Id. at 212.

Because a petition for habeas corpus must be filed in the

district of confinement, the practical problems arising from the

increase of petitions were exacerbated by the fact that “the few

District Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction major federal

penal institutions are located were required to handle an

inordinate number of habeas corpus actions[.]” Id. at 213-14.

7
Moreover, in many of these habeas corpus actions, the district of

incarceration was far from the scene of the crime, the homes of

the witnesses, and the sentencing court’s records. See id. at

214. To alleviate these burdens, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 “to meet practical difficulties that had arisen in

administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal

courts.” Id. at 219.

We note that if a district court had the “discretion” to

transfer a habeas corpus action to a more “convenient” forum,

before the enactment of § 2255, the above purpose for enacting

§ 2255 would have been rendered a nullity. Indeed, these

overburdened districts of confinement could have easily advanced

the “interest of judicial economy,” as the Northern District did

in the instant case, and transferred those burdensome habeas

corpus actions to the sentencing court. However, the history of

§ 2241 and § 2255 tells us that this was not an option before the

enactment of § 2255, and is not an option for district courts

today.

Furthermore, a grant of a writ of habeas corpus operates

against the restraining authority. See Braden v. 30th Judicial

Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973). Therefore, the court

issuing the writ of habeas corpus must have jurisdiction over the

petitioner or his custodian. See Malone v. Calderon, 165 F.3d

1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999). “Without such jurisdiction, the

8
court has no authority to direct the actions of the restraining

authority.” Id.

Finally, had Congress intended for district courts to have

the discretion to transfer a habeas corpus petition brought under

§ 2241 to the sentencing district, it could have provided for

such discretion as it did for states that hold more than one

judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (2000) (“Where an

application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in

custody under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a

State which contains two or more Federal judicial districts, the

. . . district court for the district wherein such an application

is filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of

justice may transfer the application to the other district court

for hearing and determination.”).

Accordingly, we conclude that the Eastern District did not

have jurisdiction to entertain the merits of Lee’s § 2241

petition for habeas corpus. See Hooker, 187 F.3d at 682; see

also Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“In particular, a habeas petition filed pursuant to § 2241 must

be heard in the custodial court . . . , even if the § 2241

petition contests the legality of a sentence by falling under the

savings clause.”); Bell v. United States, 48 F.3d 1042, 1043 (8th

Cir. 1995) (“Bell could properly attack the execution of his

sentence in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) petition. As the district

court recognized however, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction

9
to hear his petition because Bell was not incarcerated in the

Eastern District of Missouri.”); Norton v. United States, 119 F.

Supp. 2d 43, 45 (D. Mass. 2000) (“[E]ven when the petition

challenges the validity rather than the execution of his sentence

in a petition under section 2241, jurisdiction lies, not in the

sentencing court as per section 2255, but in the district court

that has jurisdiction over the custodian.”). As a result, Lee’s

§ 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief must be dismissed

without prejudice.4 Lee may file the petition in the appropriate

court if he desires.5

III. CONCLUSION

4
Our conclusion applies to both § 2241 petitions brought
to contest the manner in which a prisoner’s sentence is carried
out and § 2241 petitions brought to attack the validity of a
prisoner’s sentence. See supra note 3; see also Hernandez, 204
F.3d at 865; Norton, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
5
We realize that since his notice of appeal to this court,
Lee has been transferred to a halfway house located in the
Eastern District. However, our holding today does not amount to
an empty formality because jurisdiction over Lee’s habeas corpus
petition attached at the time of filing when he was incarcerated
in another judicial district located outside the state of
Louisiana. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d
1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[J]urisdictional facts must be
judged as of the time the complaint is filed[.]”); see also
Santillanes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir.
1985) (“It is well established that jurisdiction attaches on the
initial filing for habeas corpus relief[.]”). Moreover, Lee was
still situated in Florida when he filed his notice of appeal.
Therefore, the fact remains that the Eastern District had neither
jurisdiction over Lee nor jurisdiction over his custodian at the
time the district court considered the merits of Lee’s § 2241
petition.

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 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED with instructions to

DISMISS without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

11