It was said in argument, on the part of the defendant, that, from the manner in which the complainant got the title in him, he had no equity calling for his protection against the judgment of the defendant.
The question whether the sale by him, as administrator of J. Northrup, deceased, and the subsequent conveyance of the property to him by the purchaser at that sale, were good as between bim and those interested in the estate of Northrup, is not before us in this cause. For the purposes of this cause, the complainant stands in the place of J. Northrup, and holds the same position as if the questions involved in this cause were presented in a proceeding in this court between J. Northrup and J. H. Hall as a judgment creditor of Uzal C. Haggerty.
As between them the case stands thus : Northrup was a bona
Under the circumstances under which Northrup purchased, it cannot be doubted that he would hold against a purchaser under the Haggerty title on the day on which Hall’s judgment against Haggerty was entered. Such a purchaser would clearly have been chargeable with notice.
The 18th section of the “Act respecting conveyances” provides, that every deed for landsjo any purchaser of the same, made since January 1, 1821, shall be void and of no effect against a subsequent judgment creditor or bona fide purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, unless such deed shall be recorded within fifteen days after the time of signing, sealing and delivering the same.
The section was not intended to exclude the idea that such a state of facts might arise, by sale by the purchaser from A., and by his grantee to another, and so on through several conveyances, through a long course of years, the actual possession accompanying the several titles, and all the intermediate deeds duly recorded, as will charge a creditor obtaining a judgment against A. after all this, and for a debt that may have accrued but yesterday, with constructive notice of the deed from A. to B.
Another view of the statute might be taken. It provides that every deed from a grantor against whom a judgment shall be subsequently recovered, shall be void &c. It does not say that a deed from such grantor’s grantee to a bona fide purchaser from such grantee, duly recorded, shall be void against a subsequent judgment creditor of the first grantor. It leaves untouched the-doctrine that, though a deed from A. to B. may be void as against a subsequent judgment creditor of A., yet a deed from B. to C. , a bona fide purchaser from B., may be good against such subsequent judgment creditor of A.
I am of opinion that a judgment creditor stands on no better ground under this statute than a purchaser; and that what would charge a subsequent purchaser with constructive notice will charge a subsequent judgment creditor with the notice contemplated by this statute. And I am of opinion, further, that the facts in this case would be sufficient to charge a subsequent pur
In reference to the answer in this case, I do not think it comes up to a full denial of actual notice.
Decree for complainant.